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ABSTRACT
The thesis examines three case studies of the Greek feminist and ecological 
movements during the period: 1975-1992. As the most appropriate theoretical 
framework for the analysis of those case studies, ‘new social movement theory’ is 
selected. However, the Greek case studies represent significant variations in regard to 
the ‘ideal type’ of new social movements as depicted in the literature. These 
differences originate to a certain degree from Greek new social movements’ different 
cultural and political environment. The Greek social movements had to face a strong 
statocratic and partocratic society, where there was lack of an autonomous social 
movement sector. This led to the formation of semi-autonomous, party-affiliated 
social movement organisations. Moreover, the Greek political culture has been rooted 
on two different geopolitical visions. The one has pointed to a more traditionally 
oriented, inward looking political orientation hostile to Western values and the 
institutional arrangements of modernity. The other has been a modernising, outward 
looking orientation, adopting Western institutions and values. The stand of the Greek 
new social movements towards this open question of modernisation has been variable. 
Some social movement organisations have underlined the need for empowering 
national autonomy and have, therefore, been positively predisposed towards the state 
and the political parties as a significant means for achieving this goal. Others have 
eschewed the question altogether, focusing only on the local and international level 
with significant, however, political cost. Another factor, which has influenced the 
identity of the Greek new social movements, has been the tradition of the Left, which 
has favoured grand-narratives based on humanism and posing a dichotomy between 
‘general’ and ‘particular’ struggles. Summing up, the social movements presented 
show marked variations in comparison with the ideal-typical type. They were strongly 
influenced by: statocracy and patrocracy, the open question of modernisation, and the 
political culture of the Left.
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Introduction
The subject of this thesis is new social movements in Greece, with special 
attention to the feminist and ecological movements. In the relevant academic literature 
ecological and feminist movements, which articulated post-materialist values during 
the ‘70s and ‘80s, are referred to as new social movements. The purpose of the present 
work is to show how far the attributes of the Greek movements studied agree or 
disagree with the ideal type. While other schools of thoughts in social movement 
literature are also employed (classical model, resource mobilisation theory), no 
attempt is made to merge all of these into a single unified model, but simply to 
employ those theoretical tools that best illuminate the Greek case.
As will be seen, the Greek social movements, which are here examined in 
depth, developed attributes notably absent from the pertinent literature on Western 
Europe and the United States. The partial correspondence of the Greek new social 
movements’ identity to the ideal type gives rise to a series of central questions. Since 
Greek new social movements developed a number of attributes differing from the 
ideal-typical type, is it still legitimate to classify them as new social movements? If 
the answer is yes, then which were their no.vel elements? Were Greek new social 
movements influenced by the developments in the social movement sector abroad? If 
the influence was only limited, then which variables defined their different course? 
Were the emergence and life-course of new social movements in Greek society 
related to a specific historical cycle? Does this historical cycle correspond to a similar 
cycle in Western Europe and the United States? Beyond the Greek case, have other 
researchers on new social movements recorded dissimilarities between the ideal type 
and specific empirical cases?
The thesis will show that Greek new social movements developed attributes 
that were novel to the Greek context. Movement politics during the period 1975-1992 
expanded the boundaries of the political by introducing new political subjects in the 
political process. Moreover, the Greek feminist and ecological movements questioned 
the quality of representative democracy and aimed to further political participation by 
introducing new organisational principles and structures (e.g. direct democracy). 
Greek new social movements politicised issues previously regarded as private and 
introduced into Greek politics a new agenda, concerning identity formation. In this 
respect, Greek new social movements presented novel elements similar to the ones 
outlined in the ideal type. However, Greek new social movements also presented
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qualities notably absent from the ideal type. The thesis will show that the latter 
characteristics were due to complex interactions with two distinct, but interrelated 
phenomena: the internal organisation of the Greek nation-state and the state’s relation 
with the international community. In the first case, the strong statocratic and 
partocratic elements of Greek society have created conditions, which were 
unfavourable to the development of autonomous (from party and state) social 
movements. Thus, the post-junta (post-1974) Greek feminist movement relied heavily 
on political parties and/or the state apparatus. In the second case, disassociation of the 
movements’ political discourse from the dominant national issues meant a reduction 
in political influence. For instance, the political discourse of the ecological movement 
did not include international issues, meaning issues referring to Greece’s relation with 
the international community. As a result its appeal to the large majority of people was 
quite limited. On the contrary, one organisation of the Greek feminist movement (the 
Union of Greek Women) underlined the need for strong national autonomy 
reproducing the political parties’ discourse. The geopolitical question of Greece’s role 
in the international community was a necessaiy element in the discourse of any 
political force aiming at a broader political support.
Another factor, which influenced the identity of the Greek new social 
movements, was the political tradition of the Left. The life-course of the Greek new 
social movements was related to a specific historical cycle of the Left, which favoured 
grand narratives, humanism and a clear distinction between ‘general’ versus 
‘particular’ struggles. The political influence of the Left on Greek new social 
movements differed from the respective historical experience in Western Europe and 
the United States, where a radical rupture with the Left had usually preceded the 
formation of new social movements.
Summing up, the variations shown by the Greek new social movements in 
comparison with the ideal-typical type were due to: 1) statocracy and partocracy, 2) 
the open question of Greece’s position in the international community and 3) the 
political culture of the Left. These marked variations have not been specific to the 
Greek context only. The thesis will show that other researchers as well have addressed 
issues of non-correspondence between the ideal type and the actual attributes of new 
social movements in various geographical zones (e.g. Latin America).
The two case studies of the Greek feminist movement (of the Union of Greek 
Women, and of the autonomous feminist groups) both concern the period 1975-1990;
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that of the Greek ecological movement (Federation of Ecological and Alternative 
Organisations) covers the period 1989-1992. The main parameters of the respective 
political contexts and the statistical data presented refer predominantly to the time- 
period of study of each movement. Despite variations in their political conjuncture, 
the three case studies exemplify the political culture of the post-junta period, which 
eventually faded out in the 1990’s. Accordingly, the subject-organisations of all three 
case studies were affected by: (i) the issue of autonomy, (ii) the presence of an ‘anti- 
systemic’ Left political discourse, iii) the open question of modernisation. The 
common origins of the three studies are illustrated by their shared strategic dilemmas. 
How can political autonomy be obtained and safeguarded in a society with strong 
statocratic and partocratic elements? Does political autonomy inevitably lead to a 
feeble presence in a weak civil society? Do the left political forces constitute a 
political ally? Do political projects aim at the total reconstitution of society? Can a 
movement flourish in civil society without being supported by the state or the political 
parties? Is it possible to safeguard national autonomy and self-determination while 
attacking the state apparatus? The political discourse of all three case studies was built 
around a core of the same strategic dilemmas,, but the answers provided by each case 
study are different. A detailed account is given of how the common cultural 
background led to the articulation of different identities and strategies, illustrating 
thereby that each of the three organisations studied, is not a mere product of its 
contextual setting, but is also a partial producer of its chosen trajectory.
The title of the thesis mentions new social movements, but the actual case 
studies analyse social movement organisations (SMOs). The fluidity of new social 
movements, whose extensive networks vary from formal organisations to individual 
sympathisers, renders any theoretical endeavour to capture the various forms they 
have taken almost impossible. A narrower focus on the organisations of the Greek 
feminist and ecological movements makes the specification of attributes somewhat 
more feasible and reliable. The ‘movement dimension’ is introduced into the analysis 
by brief historical accounts o f the movements and their institutional setting, while the 
subsequent in-depth analyses of the movements’ organisations specify more distinct 
attributes. The thesis keeps away from any fixed and binary opposition between social 
movements and movements’ organisations. The concept of SMO entails three
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interrelated meanings.1 The first meaning of the term, which is dominant in the field, 
refers to formal organisation, meaning ‘a complex organisation that identifies its 
goals with the preferences of a social movement or a countermovement and attempts 
to implement those goals’.2 The second meaning refers to the organisation o f  
collective action, i.e. to the forms by which confrontation with challengers are carried 
out. In different movements, the organisation of collective action ranges from 
initiatives emerging from below to activities initiated from above. The third element 
concerns the mobilising structures that connect the various organisational levels of a 
movement (the leadership with grass-root activities, the centre of a movement with its 
periphery). Mobilising structures often exist prior to the establishment of a formal 
organisation, as was indeed the case for the Greek ecological movement, where 
coordinated mobilisations existed a long time before the Federation of Ecological and 
Alternative Organisations was formed.
Concerning the Greek feminist movement, the decision to report two case 
studies instead of one, as for the ecological movement, is due to the heterogeneous 
nature of the movement. Social movements - consisting of interrelated organisations, 
informal groupings, and single individuals - include core organisations with a usually 
coherent ideology and rigid structure, as well as loosely connected networks and 
circles of sympathisers. In the case of the Greek feminist movement the gap between 
the organised core (the Union o f Greek Women) and the peripheral networks (the 
autonomous feminist groups) was very wide. The core consisted of the party affiliated 
organisations that dominated the feminist spectrum. The autonomous feminist groups 
and their mobilisations, on the other hand, introduced the movement dimension that 
went beyond the borders of party control. To focus on only the core or only the 
periphery of the movement would have given a distorted picture, especially since the 
periphery of the Greek feminist movement came into being in direct opposition to the 
party-aligned core organisations. A proper account of the Greek feminist movement 
therefore requires looking at both sides.
1 Tarrow, Sidney (1994) Power in Movement: Social Movements, Collective Action 
and Politics, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press).
2 Zald, Mayer and McCarthy, John (1987) Social Movements in an Organisational 
Society, (New Brunswick, New Jersey, Transaction Books), p. 20
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The research methodology of the thesis employed a combination of primary 
and secondary sources. Concerning the primary sources, the publications by the three 
case studies were utilised extensively and interviews with leaders and simple 
members were conducted. The strong emphasis on the case studies’ publications was 
necessitated by the organisations’ total lack of (e.g. autonomous feminist groups) or 
very restricted access to (e.g. the Federation) the daily press. Moreover, the 
organisations’ publications provided the necessary information about the 
heterogeneous elements in the organisations’ identity. The press presented a wide 
range of opinions, as well as specific issues generating intra-organisational conflicts, 
(e.g. Bulletin by the Federation). In addition, the coverage of the organisations’ press 
(e.g. Open Window by the Union of Greek Women, 1979 -) over a long period of time 
illuminated the different stages in each organisation’s course. This facilitated the 
demarcation of the various periods in the organisations’ histories.
The primary material also includes interviews conducted with leaders or 
simple members of the organisations. The interviews gave access to the participants’ 
views and strategies. The leaders highlighted the strategic dilemmas they faced, while 
the simple members outlined the subjective perceptions of the organisations’ identity. 
Furthermore, the interviews conducted assisted the research by providing useful 
information about the organisations’ nucleuses in the countryside. This information 
was usually not provided by the organisations’ press, which focused on major events 
in urban cities.
Summing up, the primary sources assisted the comparative nature of the thesis. 
Comparisons were drawn up not only in regard to different case studies or countries 
but also in relation to variations in each organisation’s course or identity.
The secondary sources enhanced the process of unifying fragmented 
information into a coherent framework. The research was obstructed by the absence of 
collective archives and the lack of a detailed historical account of the organisations or 
groups concerned. In some instances (e.g. the autonomous feminist groups) the non­
existence of public or private institutions providing collective archives made access to 
personal records and contacts, the only means for obtaining information. In the 
absence, furthermore, of any history of the organisations or groups under question, the 
present accounts of the three case studies constitute original contributions to the 
subject.
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The secondary sources also included theoretical debates initiated by the 
feminist and ecological movements in a variety of countries (e.g. state feminism, 
ecocentrism). This endeavour aimed at illuminating the Greek context by explaining 
the presence or absence of relevant debates. Hence, the comparative nature of the 
thesis incorporated social reality as well as its social reconstruction.
The Structure of the Thesis
Chapter 1 explores the academic literature on social movements, 
concentrating on the model of new social movements. Developments in the field of 
social movement literature are assessed, and the different models are seen to require 
integration. This chapter is meant to provide a conceptual framework for the analyses 
to follow.
Chapter 2 gives a short account of the historical and social background of the 
Greek feminist movement. It looks at the changes in the socio-economic variables of 
Greek society, the main parameters of the political system, the recurrent patterns in 
the movement’s history, and finally the specific political opportunity structure of the 
post-junta feminist movement.
Chapter 3 presents the first of the empirical case studies, that of the Union of 
Greek Women. This was the only feminist organisation that succeeded in widely 
disseminating its discourse and to have access to the state apparatus. However, the 
organisation’s party dependency, its pro-state ideology, highly centralised 
organisational structure, and nationalistic discourse contradicts most characteristics of 
new social movement organisations as depicted in the literature.
Chapter 4 discusses the case study of the autonomous feminist groups. In this 
context the element of formal organisation was very largely absent, leaving 
considerable autonomy to individual members. The groups functioned for 
consciousness-raising and study. Their identity was structured around a belief in 
pluralism, participatory democracy, and the political dimension of the private sphere. 
The autonomous feminist groups declared their solidarity with various national- 
liberation movements and the oppressed minorities across the world. This anti­
imperialist stance was founded on their opposition to any form of domination, rather 
than on a nationalistic ideology. While the autonomous groups took the lead in most 
rallies of the Greek feminist movement, dissemination of their discourse was left to 
their younger, better-educated members.
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Chapter 5 presents the social and political environment of the ecological 
movement. Elements are pointed out that applied equally to the feminist movement, 
and certain discontinuities with the past are elaborated. The chapter also mentions a 
number of factors (administrative policies, absence of nuclear plants, regional 
imbalances, absence of well developed environmental consciousness, etc.) that had 
their effect on the course of the Greek ecological movement.
Chapter 6 concerns the third case study, that of the Federation of Ecological 
and Alternative Organisations (FEAO). The Federation has, until now, been the only 
extensive and relatively enduring political project of the Green spectrum. However, it 
was quite short-lived (1989-‘92), and its failure marked the retreat of the Greens from 
any political project. The agenda of the Federation was ideologically very close to that 
of the autonomous feminist groups. However, its decentralised organisational 
structure, approximating to the premises of participatory democracy, was 
incompatible with its strategy, when the Federation chose to become a political party 
and sought inclusion in the traditional political system. Its attempt to ideologically 
safeguard the values associated with new social movements, while at the same time 
involved in electioneering and parliamentary politics, resulted in major internal 
difficulties and the FEAO’s final dissolution.
The Conclusion looks at some of the implications of the analyses in this thesis, 
particularly the viability of new social movements in Greek society. It is argued that 
the strong presence of the state and the political parties has inhibited the realisation of 
such projects. Their impact has been mediated by the strong geo-political elements in 
Greek political culture, favouring political discourses including an international 
agenda that delineates Greece’s potential role in the international community.
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CHAPTER 1
MAIN THEORETICAL ACCOUNTS OF SOCIAL MOVEMENTS: 
THE SHIFT IN ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORKS
13
1.1 Introduction
Social movement theory has developed out of the study of anomic, marginal 
phenomena into an analysis of the self-constitution of society (Alain Touraine’s 
‘historicity’). Social movements have been perceived as symptoms of deprivation and 
anxiety, as well as emancipatory forces. Hence, social movement theory has produced 
many different analytical frameworks, which differ not only historically (e.g. collective 
behaviour versus resource mobilisation) but also concerning their geographical context 
(resource mobilisation has originated mainly in the United States, while new social 
movement theory developed in Europe). Despite the variations within the field of analysis, 
the study of social movements has investigated the core elements of social movements that 
are applicable universally. This search for the ontological essence of social movements has 
led to competing frameworks, with new theoretical accounts juxtaposed to the existing 
ones. In consequence social movement theory has undergone a shift in terms of its 
analytical framework, which originally had completely different starting points (e.g. the 
individual, organisation, society), and asked very different questions (e.g. why do social 
movements emerge? how are resources mobilised?).
The still growing literature on social movements has underlined the need to merge 
diverse elements, and to produce theoretical hypotheses that are both historically specific 
and multi-dimensional. Instead of reducing social movements to their essence, current 
analyses present them as complex phenomena, characterised by many conflictual 
tendencies. The principal goal of the theoretical part of this work is to summarise and 
evaluate the various frameworks underlying social movement theory today and to outline 
the current state of social movement analysis. The text on these subjects is relatively 
concise for two reasons: because, firstly, numerous other authors have already provided a 
general overview of the field, and secondly, the primary focus here is on what may be 
called new social movement theory.1 The literature on new social movements concerns
1 See Me Adam, Doug (1982) Political Process and the Development o f Black 
Insurgency, 1930-1970 (Chicago and London, University of Chicago Press); Foweraker, 
Joe (1995) Theorising Social Movements (London and Boulder, Colorado, Pluto Press); 
Lyman, Stanford (ed.) (1995) Social Movements: Critiques, Concepts, Case Studies
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itself with the emergence at the end of the 1960s of various non-institutionalised, value- 
oriented movements (on peace, the ecology, feminism, etc.). The case studies in Part II 
below (of the Greek feminist and ecological movements) are analyses providing 
comparisons of actual groups with the ideal type of new social movements found in the 
relevant literature. As its name implies, this ideal type is independent of any specific 
empirical case study. This means that the Greek case studies are seen against the 
theoretical background of the broader debate within the field. The principal focus on new 
social movement theory is accompanied by references to the classical model as well as to 
resource mobilisation, since these three complement and elucidate each other. In addition 
to the Greek case, various other empirical studies (from France, Germany, Sweden, the 
Netherlands, Spain) are mentioned in order to illuminate theoretical concepts such as the 
political opportunity structure, or propositions in social movement theoiy. In view of this, 
Part I constitutes a broad introduction to social movement theory as a basis for the 
specific Greek case studies.
Definitions of the social movement concept have varied with different theoretical 
frameworks. The recent synthesis in the literature of the separate perspectives has led to a 
more comprehensive definition, stressing the heterogeneity of social movements. This 
work will use Donatella and Diani’s definition:
‘We will consider social movements.. .as (1) informal networks, 
based on (2) shared beliefs and solidarity, which mobilize about (3) 
conflictual issues, through (4) the frequent use of various forms 
of protest’.2
This definition includes the full range of components, variably emphasised by the different 
schools of thought in social movement literature.
(London, Macmillan); Zirakzadeh, Cyrus Ernesto (1997) Social Movements in Politics: A 
Comparative Study (New York, Longman); Della Porta, Donatella and Diani, Mario 
(1999) Social Movements: An Introduction (Oxford, Blackwell); Buechler, Steven (2000) 
Social Movements in Advanced Capitalism: The Political Economy and Cultural 
Construction o f Social Activism (Oxford and New York, Oxford University Press).
2 Della Porta and Diani, ibid., p. 16.
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Social movement theory can be seen as consisting of three general analytical 
frameworks: (i) the classical model, (ii) resource mobilisation, and (iii) new social 
movements. There are significant variations even within each framework, leading to many 
different classifications. However, in general terms these three categories describe the 
divisions within social movement analysis concerning the level of analysis (the individual, 
organisation, society); the polity model (pluralist, elitist, neo-Marxist); the relation 
between agent and structure (e.g. passive versus active social subjects); and the evaluation 
of the role of social movements (e.g. positive, negative).3
1.2 The Classical Model
There is general agreement on the analytical distinction of ‘resource mobilisation’ 
and ‘new social movements’ as different perspectives. There is considerable dispute, on 
the other hand concerning social movements analysis prior to the 1970s. I shall adopt 
Me Adam’s classification and subsume the different strands of pre-1970 theory under a 
single model known as the classical model.4 The different versions of this classical model 
are not interchangeable, but what they have in common is the assumption that collective 
mobilisations are caused by structural strains disrupting the psychological state of 
individuals who then become susceptible to mobilisation.
3 A fundamental premise of the pluralist model is that power is shared by numerous groups 
in society. When resources are widely dispersed throughout the population, there are no 
limits to political opportunity and options. In the elitist and neo-Marxist models, resources 
are scarce and limited to specific socio-economic groups, thereby preventing full and equal 
political participation. The elitist model underlines the significance of political elites in 
parties and public offices, while it provides a fragmented pattern of social and political 
conflict. The neo-Marxist model on the other hand focuses on the distribution of socio­
economic resources, the function of the state, and the emergence of corporatist 
arrangements. It provides a societal model based on class analysis, including various 
definitions o f ‘class’. See Held, David (1987) Models o f Democracy (Stanford, California, 
Stanford University Press).
4 Me Adam, Doug, op. cit, ref. 1.
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There are a number of other shared factors that unite the different versions into a 
single category. For the classical model, the level of analysis is the individual The polity in 
all its different versions is that of pluralist democracy. There is a negative bias towards 
social movements as irrational responses, and social action is presented as the result of 
structural change and not vice versa. These points will be elaborated further after a brief 
review of the main versions o f the classical model. These are: Davies’ J-curve theory of 
revolution, relative deprivation, mass-society theory and collective behaviour.
1.2.1 Main Versions
In the 1960s a considerable literature developed concerning the role of strain in 
producing collective behaviour. The main contributors to this were Davies (J-curve), Gurr 
(relative deprivation), Komhauser (mass society) and Smelser (collective behaviour).
A) J-Curve Theory o f Revolution: The concept of the J-Curve developed by Davies 
explains that
‘revolution is most likely to take place when a prolonged period of rising expectations 
and rising gratifications is followed by a short period of sharp reversal, during which 
the gap between expectations and gratifications quickly widens and becomes 
intolerable. The frustration that develops, when it is intense and widespread in the 
society, seeks outlets in violent action’.5
Davies argues that revolutionary outbreaks are linked with improvements of 
political and economic conditions, followed by sudden breakdowns. If the frustration of 
individuals is widespread, intense, and focuses on government, it can lead to a 
revolutionary upheaval that displaces the ruling government and alters the societal power 
structure. However, if violence remains contained within the political system, then the 
resulting rebellions modify but do not displace the political regime. Davies* analysis 
integrates elements of Karl Marx’s theory that revolutions are more likely to occur when
5 Davies, James Chowning (1979) ‘The J-Curve of Rising and Declining Satisfactions as a 
Cause of Revolution and Rebellion’, in: Hugh Davies Graham and Ted Robert Gurr (eds.), 
Violence in America: Historical and Comparative Perspectives (London, Beverly Hills, 
Sage Publications), p. 415.
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conditions are deteriorating, as well as de Tocqueville’s observation that an improvement 
in social conditions gives rise to increased expectations that may foster revolutions.6 
Davies gives a psychological explanation for the causes of revolution, with the individual 
as a unit of analysis. Therefore central in Davies analysis is the individual’s state of mind in 
the context of society.
B) Relative Deprivation: Gurr’s theoretical contribution to the classical model has been 
the concept of ‘relative deprivation’. He defined the concept as ‘a perceived discrepancy 
between men’s value expectations and their value capabilities’.7 Accordingly, an increase 
in expectations without a simultaneous increase in capabilities to satisfy those 
expectations, or a decrease in capabilities without a simultaneous reduction in 
expectations, leads to the politicisation of discontent and the emergence of collective 
behaviour. For Gurr, political violence results not from some general form of discontent, 
but from relative deprivation in specific.8 Gurr has also introduced a multiplicity of other 
factors (such as regime legitimacy, tradition of political violence, response by the regime) 
that influence the development of collective behaviour.
Since the concept of relative deprivation refers to subjective perceptions and 
expectations, the question arises whether these perceptions do or do not correspond to 
objective circumstances.9 Gurr tried to deal with this problem by bringing in a number of 
political and economic indicators. This, however, has led to several methodological 
problems. Since he does not elaborate the complex interaction between the subjective 
perceptions of individuals and the objective indicators, this leads to a definitional 
vagueness as to how the final intensity of deprivation is to be measured.
6 Marx, Gary, and Wood, James (1975) ‘Strands of Theory and Research on Collective 
Behaviour’, Annual Review o f Sociology, vol. 1.
7 Gurr, Ted R. (1970) Why Men Rebel, (Princeton, Princeton University Press), p. 13.
8 Marx and Wood, op. cit., ref. 6.
9 Gurney, Joan Neff and Tierney, Kathleen (1982) ‘Relative Deprivation and Social 
Movements: A Critical Look at Twenty Years of Theory and Research’, The Sociological 
Quarterly, vol. 23.
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C) Mass Society Theory: Komhauser’s work examines the social conditions that result in 
the abandonment of constitutional modes of political activity in favour of uncontrolled 
mass action. Accordingly, Komhauser employed the term ‘mass society’ to explain 
extremist tendencies in society, such as the rise of totalitarianism. He specified, however, 
that mass society in itself is not totalitarian, though rather more vulnerable to 
totalitarianism than other forms (e.g. pluralist, communal societies). According to 
Komhauser, a mass society includes:
‘(1) the weakness of intermediate relations, (2) the isolation of primary relations 
and (3) the centralisation of national relations’.10
His core proposition is that in certain conditions society may give rise to masses of 
large numbers of people who are not integrated into any broad social grouping, including 
that of classes. These alienated individuals, not belonging to any specific social group, tend 
to be susceptible for recruitment in mass movements. For Komhauser, therefore, lack of 
organisational affiliation leads to political protest or violence. Significant factors that 
dissolve the individuals’ social bonds, and therefore contribute to the formation of mass 
societies, are large-scale social processes (e.g. urbanisation, industrialisation), severe 
economic crises, or war.
Komhauser’s argument has been repeatedly refuted by resource mobilisation 
theorists who have pointed out that social movements usually recruit not the non- 
incorporated or alienated, but individuals that are already part of secondary organisations. 
Proponents of resource mobilisation have elaborated the way secondary organisations can 
function as a positive indicator for the availability of individuals to recruitment.11
Komhauser’s analysis of secondary organisations has not been confirmed. Still, 
secondary organisations do indicate the influence civil society has on the development of 
social movements. The dissolution of social bonds reduces the ability to build independent
10 Komhauser, William (1960) The Politics o f Mass Society (London, Routledge and 
Kegan Paul), p. 75.
11 Oberschall, Anthony (1973) Social Conflicts and Social Movements (Englewood 
Cliffs, N.J., Prentice-Hall); Freeman, Jo (1973) ‘The Origins of the Women’s Liberation 
Movement’, American Journal o f Sociology, 78 (no. 4).
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spaces between the individual and the state, and decreases the possibility of autonomous 
social movements.
D) Collective Behaviour: The most prominent approach in the classical model is 
Smelser’s theory of ‘collective behaviour’, which questions the predominance of 
psychological factors as set out in previous formulations. Smelser has defined collective 
behaviour ‘as mobilisation on the basis of a belief which redefines social action’.12 Since, 
collective behaviour aims at reconstituting a distinct component of social action, its 
definition is social and not psychological. Accordingly, Smelser has elaborated six 
determinants at the social level, which constitute both the necessary and sufficient 
conditions for collective behaviour to develop. They are: structural conduciveness, 
structural strain, growth and spread of generalised beliefs, precipitating factors, 
mobilisation of participants for action, and the operation of social control. For Smelser, 
structural conduciveness means that social conditions are such as to permit collective 
behaviour, and where collective behaviour is possible, a structural strain is needed to 
create tensions and conflicts both on the social and the personal level The spread of some 
generalised belief interprets the strain, and creates a common culture in which collective 
behaviour can develop. Precipitating factors then function as a dramatic incident that 
reveals the strain and reinforces the generalised beliefs. Individuals must of course be 
available to be mobilised and finally the accumulation of the previous determinants must 
not be inhibited by the exercise of social or personal control. Smelser specified this schema 
as a value-added process, where a temporal sequence of activation of the aforementioned 
determinants must take place, if collective behaviour is to occur.
Smelser’s analysis of collective behaviour differentiates between norm-oriented 
and value-oriented social movements. In the first case, the movement attempts to restore, 
modify or protect norms in the name of a generalised belief (for example, feminist groups 
agitating to establish a private educational system for women). In the second case, the
12 Smelser, Neil (1962) Theory o f Collective Behaviour, (London, Routledge & Kegan 
Paul), p. 8.
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movement aims at a basic reconstitution of self and society (for example, a movement for 
national independence or a religious cult). Smelser argues that norm-oriented movements 
are more likely to develop in societies where institutions are highly differentiated, while 
societies with a low degree of institutional differentiation are more prone to value-oriented 
movements. Smelser’s differentiation expresses the generalised belief of the post-war 
period that conflict in the advanced industrial societies has ceased to centre on 
fundamental principles of social organisation. Social conflicts become mediated and 
elaborated through differentiated institutions and political institutions are an outlet that not 
only aggregates, but also harmonises conflictual interests. Underlying Smelser’s scheme is 
the functionalist assumption that, since political mobilisation becomes channelled via the 
political institutions, the political discourse will focus predominantly on institutionalised 
norms, rather than on social values. However, this premise was later fiercely criticised by 
new social movement theorists, who showed that the demands of these movements 
questioned the very foundations of the post-war consensus.
Smelser’s analysis by incorporating new variables, further elaborates the concepts 
of structural strain and relative deprivation. All theorists of the classical model regard 
structural strain as the necessary precondition for collective behaviour. They give different 
answers, however, to the question whether it is also a sufficient condition. Smelser 
provides an elaborate account of necessary and sufficient conditions, by incorporating in 
his analysis the role of ideology (generalised beliefs) and social controls.13 For him, 
ideology as a crucial component of collective behaviour puts forward the purposive nature 
of such behaviour as well as its correlation to social change.14 On the other hand, Smelser 
reproduced the psychological and irrational premises of the classical model by emphasising 
the ‘magical’ element of generalised beliefs (e.g. belief in the existence of extraordinary
13 Zald, Mayer (1992) ‘Looking Backward to Look Forward: Reflections on the Past and 
Future of the Resource Mobilisation Research Program’ in: Aldon Morris and Carol 
McClurg Mueller (eds.) Frontiers in Social Movement Theory (New Haven and London, 
Yale University Press).
14 Marx and Wood, op. cit., ref. 6.
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forces) and their distinctiveness compared with the social norms guiding conventional 
political action.
1.2.2 Underlying Themes of the Classical Model
The classical model has been associated with the focus on the individual. Social 
movements are not presented as collective phenomena, but as an aggregation of 
discontented individuals.15 This means that the classical model concerns itself not with the 
behaviour of collective actors, but with single individuals. Furthermore, the analysis of 
social structures and dynamics only functions as a background to this initial focus. 
Accordingly, collective behaviour will occur only if objective changes (e.g. structural 
strain) are followed by a change in the individuals’ state of mind (e.g. individual 
frustration). Since the classical model locates the origins of collective behaviour in 
individuals, it will have to explain how individual discontent becomes translated into 
episodes of collective action.
Collective behaviour in the classical model is not a result o f rational decisions but 
of the disrupted psychological state of the individual. In consequence, the motivation for 
movement participation is based not so much on the desire to achieve political goals, as on 
the need to manage the psychological tensions of a stressful social situation. Thus, 
collective action emerges, when the individuals can no longer cope with the psychological 
tension created by structural changes. In the classical model, the association of collective 
behaviour with psychological tension identifies instances of collective action with irrational 
social responses. Consequently, collective behaviour is perceived predominantly as 
formless, unpattemed, and unpredictable.16
A third core assumption of the classical model is that collective behaviour is 
essentially non-institutional, and is therefore juxtaposed to institutionalised forms of 
action.17 The latter represents the long-term, organised articulation of social demands,
15McAdam, op. cit., ref. 1.
16Buechler, op. cit., ref. 1.
17Neidhardt, Friedhelm and Rucht, Dieter (1992) ‘The Analysis of Social Movements: The 
State of the Art and Some Perspectives for Further Research’, in: Dieter Rucht (ed.)
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while the former refers to short-circuited psychological responses to extreme conditions of 
strain.
The classical model is associated with pluralist democracy, where power is widely 
distributed. In the absence of a concentrated power centre, the political system is 
accessible to any social group. Different groups have different goals and utilise different 
resources, but none wields sufficient political power to impose its interests. Every group 
has to ally itself with others in order to achieve its goals. Although the distribution of 
power is unequal, power is so dispersed that no social group monopolises it or becomes 
excluded from the political system. The pluralist model o f democracy posits that any 
political demand can be articulated through the existing political channels. So, the classical 
model perceives non-institutionalised collective behaviour as an irrational response 
generated by intense individual strain.
The classical model underlines the significance of continuous communication and 
interaction between movement participants. Goals are not taken as given, but instead 
become the product of the participants’ interplay. The classical model shares with new 
social movement theory an emphasis on the fluidity of goals and the importance of 
constant interaction by the participants. However, in the classical model the impact of this 
interaction is interpreted in negative terms (for instance, as accumulative irrational 
responses), while in new social movements theory interaction is perceived as an expressive 
and self-reflective process.
1.2.3 Main Critiques
The most common criticism of the classical model is that it oversimplifies the 
connection between structural strain and collective behaviour. The interaction between 
structure and actors is always a complex one, with different theoretical models illustrating 
different balances between the two. The classical model, it is argued, assumes a simple 
one-to-one correspondence between strain and collective behaviour.18 It is for this reason
Research on Social Movements: The State o f the Art in Western Europe and the U.S. A. 
(Frankfurt, Campus).
18 McAdam, op. cit., ref. 1.
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that it cannot explain why collective behaviour is only an occasional phenomenon, 
although there is always some structural strain. The classical model has been criticised for 
assuming either a very static perception of society where social change and hence social 
strain are quite exceptional, or for ignoring the intervening variables that render strain a 
necessary but not sufficient condition. However, as time has passed, the classical model 
has developed from a simple relationship between individual strain and collective 
behaviour to a more sophisticated version (see Smelser), where strain is only one of the 
variables mentioned. Still, the assumption underlying the classical model is of a linear, 
causal sequence between structural strain and the occurrence of collective behaviour. This 
premise equates the macro-question of movement emergence with the micro-questions of 
individual participation, and so seeks to explain the occurrence of social movements with 
the psychological profile of the participating individuals.19
Another common criticism of the classical model is that it ignores the socio­
political environment in which collective behaviour develops.20 Resource mobilisation 
theorists particularly argue that the socio-political environment is a crucial variable for 
explaining the absence of social movements, even in the presence of structural and 
personal strain. Resource mobilisation focuses on the importance of resources and the 
political opportunity structure for the development of collective behaviour. In the classical 
model, social movements are portrayed as mere social responses to situations of extreme 
stress.21 Since they are not seen as purposive and rational actors, they are not able to 
consciously interact and take advantage of the resources available in their broader 
environment.
The different versions of the classical model are all agreed that individual 
deprivation and breakdowns of the social order constitute necessary preconditions for the 
emergence of social movements. Non-institutional collective action is juxtaposed to 
conventional action guided by the existing social norms, and this identification is
19 Mayer, Margit (1995) ‘Social Movement Research in the United States: A European 
Perspective’, in: Lyman, op. cit., ref. 1.
20 Me Adam, op. cit., ref. 1.
21 Banks, J. A. (1972) The Sociology o f Social Movements (London, Macmillan).
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interrelated with its dominant polity model. That model cannot account for non­
institutionalised political behaviour, given that it assumes that a liberal polity is accessible 
and responsive to all forms of interest articulation. This means that extra-institutional 
forms of collective action are regarded either as irrational, or as the political behaviour of 
marginalised and underprivileged groups not using the available channels of interest 
articulation. There is, therefore, an implicit assumption in the classical model that 
collective behaviour embeds elements that may endanger civility and the liberal- 
democratic regime.22
The individuals participating in social movements are assumed by the classical 
model to be under psychological stress (relative deprivation) or to be socially alienated 
(mass- society theory).23 In both cases, social movement participants are seen as different 
from the average citizen. Resource mobilisation theorists have empirically disproved those 
assumptions, by providing data concerning the high degree of social integration of 
movement participants.
Another significant criticism of the classical model is that it is representative of the 
structural-functionalist framework that dominated the social sciences in the United States 
at that time. Thus, especially in Smelser’s analysis, society is perceived as a social system 
consisting of interrelated parts, each of which is assigned a certain function that 
contributes to the stability and reproduction of the system as a whole. The classical model, 
being centred on problems of social order, perceives instances of collective behaviour as 
undennining the existing balance of the system. Moreover, the classical model shares the 
structural-functionalist premise that if social order prevails, this normally prevents 
collective action; if collective behaviour does occur, it must be explained in terms of a 
breakdown of social order.24 This conservative bias in the classical model in favour of the 
dominant social structures has been heavily criticised by other social movements theorists, 
who have underlined the positive role of social movements in bringing about social and 
political change.
22 Zirakzadeh, op. cit., ref. 1.
23 McAdam, op. cit., ref. 1.
24Buechler, op. cit., ref. 1.
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Since the classical model cannot account for collective actors and the social 
properties of collective behaviour, individuals are portrayed as passive respondents vis-a- 
vis structural changes. As they absorb the impact of social changes they become 
frustrated, but never actively intervene in the social order to change it. Although the 
classical model focuses on the individual, it subsumes the individual to the dynamics of 
structure. A partial explanation for this structural determinism is the inability of the 
classical model to perceive of collective actors. It can account only for individuals, who as 
single units obviously cannot determine the dynamic of structures. Moreover, presenting 
social movements as spontaneous emotional outbursts does not accord them the ability to 
influence or change long-term, organised political processes.25 This passive portrayal of 
individuals in the classical model is in sharp contrast with the premises of resource 
mobilisation and new social movement theory, where individuals and collective actors are 
the main protagonists of social and political change.
In summary, the classical model considers collective behaviour the result of 
structural strain disrupting the psychological state of individuals. However, it has a long 
tradition and a variety of different approaches. In the early phase the classical model 
stressed particularly the psychological factor and the irrationality associated with collective 
behaviour. This was reflected in the research into short-circuited collective behaviour 
(panics, crazes, mobs, riots, etc.), rather than into organised forms of political 
mobilisation. An exaggerated contrast was presented between social movements and 
rational, conventional conduct. From the early 1960s onwards, the classical model has 
centred more on organised social movements than on irrational forms of collective 
behaviour. The gap between the classical model and the subsequent models of resource 
mobilisation and new social movements derives partially from their different objects of 
study. The classical model, especially in its earlier versions, focused on short-lived, 
unorganised collective behaviour, while resource mobilisation and new social movements 
concentrated on long-term, organised forms of political mobilisation. However, since both 
objects were lumped together under the same analytical terms (‘collective behaviour’ or 
‘social movements’), this led to definitional vagueness. In others words, the
25 Mayer, op. cit., ref. 19.
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incompatibility of the various theoretical models of social movement theories was both 
reflected in and reinforced by their different objects of research.
1.3 Resource Mobilisation
The resource mobilisation model came as a reaction to the classical framework. 
The civil rights, the antiwar (Vietnam), the women’s, the environmental movement all 
challenged the assumptions of the previous theoretical model. The resource mobilisation 
framework emerged in a totally different social and political environment. Its main 
objective became to analyse the movements of the 1960s (their conditions of emergence, 
dynamic of development, structure of organisation, etc.), while the classical model had 
focused on the mass movements of the 1920s and 1930s (fascist and communist).26 These 
different objects of study meant different analytical questions. Resource mobilisation does 
not try to define the reasons why individuals align with social movements (classical model) 
or the historical meaning a movement may have (new social movements). Resource 
mobilisation is interested in why some movements are more successful than others. It sees 
success as depending on the clear definition of the organisational goals and an effective 
utilisation of resources, both of which ensure a positive response from the established 
institutions. For resource mobilisation theorists, social movements are organisations like 
any other. They articulate specific aims and goals, and strive to realise them by applying 
their resources (capital, manpower, ideas, etc.) in what they see as the most effective way. 
The predominant question asked by the resource mobilisation theorist is, which 
organisational forms are the most effective for mobilising and applying resources.27 Since, 
resource mobilisation studies the mechanisms of recruitment and the mobilisation of 
resources, the model identifies social movements as collective actors pursuing rational 
interests.
26 Mayer, ibid.
27 Eyerman, Ron, and Jamison, Andrew (1991) Social Movements: A Cognitive 
Approach (Cambridge, Polity Press).
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1.3.1 Underlying Themes of Resource Mobilisation
Shared assumptions of resource mobilisation theorists are as follows:
(i) Rational calculations lead to collective action.
(ii) Social movements are an extension of rational and institutionalised conventional 
politics.
(iii) The participants of social movements are not marginalised, alienated individuals. On 
the contrary, their participation in social movements reflects their active participation in 
social networks.
(iv) Collective conflicts occur not in a pluralist model of democracy, but in an elitist 
political system where asymmetries are endemic.
(v) Grievances in societies are constant, collective protest is not. The catalysts that 
transform grievances into collective action are the availability of resources and the political 
opportunity structure.
These assumptions of resource mobilisation theory are analysed in greater detail in 
what follows, in order to illustrate the theoretical premises that differentiate resource 
mobilisation from the classical model as well as from new social movement theory.
The cornerstone of the resource mobilisation approach is Olson’s theory of 
collective action.28 He argues that a necessary precondition of an individual’s rational 
decision to join collective action for providing a collective good is that his/her individual 
cost of participation must not outweigh the individual benefits.29 On the subject of a public 
good, he notes that there is always the possibility of individuals getting a free ride at the 
expense of others’ effort. In order to ensure collective action, therefore, incentives must 
be provided to the individual contributors aside from the objective of the collective good. 
Olson’s theory provides an explanation why people do not take part in collective action 
despite their interest in collective goals.
28 Kitschelt, Herbert ‘Resource Mobilisation Theory: A Critique’, in: Rucht, op. cit., ref. 
17.
29 Olson, Mancur (1965) The Logic o f Collective Action (Cambridge, Harvard University 
Press).
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Resource mobilisation posits that every collective group chooses, by means of a 
cost-benefit analysis, a policy to ensure maximum rewards and minimum costs. To this 
end, collectivities manage their resources so as to achieve the most efficient results. These 
resources are material (money, goods, services, etc.) and non-material (knowledge, 
technical skills, organisation, authority, mass publicity, popular support, friendship and 
moral commitment, etc.).30
Organisation is an important resource since it decreases the costs of participation, 
is vital in the recruitment of participants, and finally increases the chances of success.31 
Although resource mobilisation overstresses the significance of formal organisation, 
empirical research has produced conflicting findings on the role of organisation and 
structure for the success of social movements. McCarthy and Zald have found that 
centralised and bureaucratically organised movements are more efficient, while Piven and 
Cloward have underlined that decentralised, informal movements are more likely to 
succeed, especially in the case of dispossessed social groups.32 Contrary to the classical 
model that focused on the psychological, irrational elements of collective behaviour, as 
well as new social movement theorists who stress the spontaneity and informality of the 
social movements of the 1960s, resource mobilisation theorists argue that at the core of 
social movements are organisations with coherent ideologies and rigid structures. They 
hold that it is these organisations that actually constitute the backbone of social 
movements. In addition they assert that, in the historical context of post-industrial 
societies, the formal elements of social movements are enhanced by the dominant trend of 
professionalisation.
30 McCarthy, John, and Zald, Mayer (1977) ‘Resource Mobilisation and Social 
Movements: A Partial Theory’, American Journal o f Sociology, vol 82, no. 6; and 
Obershall, op. cit., ref. 11.
31 Klandermans, Bert (1992) ‘New Social Movements and Resource Mobilisation: The 
European and the American Approach Revisited’, in: Rucht, op. cit., ref. 17.
32 Piven, Frances Fox, and Cloward, Richard (1979) Poor People's Movements (New 
York, Vintage Books); and McCarthy, Zald, op. cit., ref. 30.
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The emphasis on the significance of organisations for the success of social 
movements has led resource mobilisation theorists to view social movements as an 
extension of institutionalised, conventional politics. In place of the old duality (classical 
model) of unconventional and normalised political behaviour, resource mobilisation 
presents social movements as part of mainstream politics, as coexisting with institutional 
politics within the political arena.33 This premise arose partly in response to the successful 
co-opting of various social movements into mainstream politics.
The classical model, by stressing the isolation and alienation of individuals (mass- 
society theory) or the irrational and hence socially marginal elements in social movements 
(collective behaviour), had presupposed that the participants in social movements were 
deviants on the margins of society or outcasts on the edge of structural strain. The 
resource mobilisation framework overturned this assumption by providing data 
demonstrating the positive correlation between social movement participation and 
membership in secondary organisations. In fact, potential participants in social movements 
are people actively engaged in the existing social networks.34 It is not isolation that makes 
people susceptible to collective action, but knowledge of social processes and the rational 
decision to participate in them.
Resource mobilisation applies an elitist polity model35 According to this, social 
movements are not irrational responses to an open polity, but a tactical response to a 
closed and exclusionary political system So, the unconventionality of social movements 
results not from the disrupted psychological state of the participants, but from the strategic 
problems confronting the movements. In the elitist model of democracy, resources are 
unevenly distributed, leading to the differentiation of elite groups versus non-elites. Those 
deprived of resources may develop the following strategies when trying to compete with 
the other collectivities in the political arena: they will try to utilise innovative practices and 
unconventional resources; they will try to extract resources from reform-oriented factions 
of the elite and they will ask their allies for support. Hence, open access to political
33 McAdam, op. cit., ref. 1.
340bershall, op. cit., ref. 11.
35 Obershall, ibid.
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institutions, the presence/absence of influential allies, and divisions within the elite are 
significant factors for the future development of a mobilised collectivity.
In resource mobilisation theory, collectivities that are excluded from the resources 
of the system become marginalised also on the theoretical level, and the model’s 
preoccupation with formal organisation and resources contributes to the theory’s class 
bias.36 The predominant focus on organised protest reduces lower stratum protest politics 
that are devoid of resources to merely irrational and apolitical eruptions. The resource 
mobilisation model exclusively takes into account collectivities that are capable of 
participating in the elite versus non-elite conflict. The actors, in resource mobilisation 
theory, are therefore in possession of power, which they try to maximise by skilful use of 
resources and cost-benefit considerations.
Resource mobilisation theorists argue that since grievances are always present in 
society, the rise and dynamic of social movements cannot be directly attributed to the 
existence of deprivation in a population.37 It is the variability of resources and the 
opportunities for collective action that will define a social movement’s dynamic. Hence, 
the success of a movement depends on its ability to mobilise resources and to exploit the 
opportunity structure. The focus of analysis shifts from the ‘why’ of the classical model to 
the ‘how’ of resource mobilisation.
Earlier versions of the theory focused mainly on the variability of resources as the 
catalyst for a movement’s success. Then, in response to the criticism that it lacked any 
contextual analysis, it developed new concepts, such as ‘political opportunity structure’, 
‘multi-organisational fields’ and ‘social movement sector’. The term political opportunity 
structure refers to resources that are external to an organisation but can be exploited.38 So, 
the political opportunity structure of a movement refers to the group’s organised allies and
36 Piven, Frances Fox, and Cloward, Richard (1995) ‘Collective Protest: A Critique of 
Resource Mobilisation Theory’, in: Lyman, op. cit., ref 1.
37 Zald, Mayer (1992) ‘The Continuing Vitality of Resource Mobilisation Theory: 
Response to Herbert Kitschelt’s Critique’, in: Rucht, op. cit., ref. 17.
38 Tarrow, Sidney (1994) Power in Movement: Social Movements, Collective Action and 
Politics (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press).
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opponents, as well as to the structure of the institutions (party system, state, etc.) of the 
political system.39 So a social movement has an alliance system, as well as a conflict 
system consisting of representatives and allies of the political system that is being 
challenged.40 A movement’s progress depends on the dynamics of the multi-organisational 
field. For instance, the cleavage between its organisational alliance and its conflict system 
may coincide with other cleavages, such as created by class or ethnic divisions.41 The 
social movement sector is defined as the total of all ‘social movement industries’, meaning 
all the movement organisations oriented toward a similar social goal, which as such 
competes with other sectors of society for resources.42 By introducing the social and 
political environment into the analysis, resource mobilisation presents a more complex and 
elaborated theoretical model, where American elements of resource mobilisation are 
merged with some European elements of the new social movement theory.
A significant theoretical strand, within the resource mobilisation framework, has 
been the political process model.43 This approach focuses on the political and institutional
39 According to Tarrow, the term political opportunity structure has the following 
dimensions: ‘...changes in opportunity structure result from the opening up of access to 
power, from shifts in ruling alignments, from the availability of influential allies and from 
cleavages within and among elites’. See Tarrow, ibid, p. 18 and for a further elaboration 
on the concept: Kriesi, Hanspeter (1995) ‘The Political Opportunity Structure of New 
Social Movements: Its Inpact on their Mobilisation’, in: Craig Jenkins and Bert 
Klandermans (eds.) The Politics o f Social Protest: Comparative Perspectives on States 
and Social Movements, (London, University College of London).
40 Klandermans, op. cit., ref. 31.
41 Klandermans, ibid.
42 Mayer, op. cit., ref 19. There are also other terms, which have been introduced by 
recent resource mobilisation studies (e.g. social movement infrastructure). These, as well 
as those mentioned earlier will be examined more thoroughly later.
43 McAdam, Doug, op. cit., ref. 1; Tilly, Charles (1978) From Mobilisation to Revolution 
(Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley); Jenkins, Craig (1995) ‘Social Movements, Political 
Representation, and the State: An Agenda and Comparative Framework’, in: Jenkins and
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environment, where social movements emerge and become activated, and so elaborates 
further the interaction between social movements and the state as well as institutionalised 
political actors.44 In this way, variables - such as electoral realignments, availability of 
significant allies, changes in governing coalitions, the political conflicts between or within 
elites, the degree of closure/openness of the established political system, and the 
institutional structure of the state - become significant factors for understanding the 
function and evolution of social movements. The political process approach has provided a 
more elaborate account of the interaction between new, non-institutionalised actors and 
traditional, institutionalised forms of interest representation.45 Moreover, it has introduced 
the element of value-systems (e.g. the belief systems of leaders), thereby broadening the 
frontiers of resource mobilisation theory. On the other hand, the model has been criticised 
for neglecting large-scale structural changes and favouring a political reductionism devoid 
of broader social and cultural attributes. 46
While the classical model aimed at depicting the reasons for individuals 
participating in social movements, resource mobilisation has tried to define the process of 
an organisation’s successful evolution. It sees society as collectivities o f rational actors, 
rather than as of individuals. It considers that there is a meso-level of mediating 
institutions and organisations between the individual and society.47 The social agents in 
resource mobilisation are perceived as interacting with the structural elements of their 
environment. Individuals are not simply reflections of structural strains, as in the classical 
model; instead, they become organised and take advantage of the structural potentials.
Klandermans, op. cit., ref. 39; Burstain, Paul, Einwohner, Rachel and Hollander, Jocelyn 
(1995) ‘The Success of Political Movements: A Bargaining Perspective’, in: Jenkins, 
Klandermans, ibid.; Costain Anne (1992) Inviting Women’s Rebellion: A Political 
Process Interpretation o f the Women’s Movement (Baltimore, Maryland, John Hopkins 
University Press).
44 Della Porta and Diani, op. cit., ref. 1.
45 Della Porta and Diani, ibid.
46 Melucci, Alberto (1989) Nomads o f the Present (London, Hutchinson Radius).
47 Eyerman and Jamison, op. cit., ref. 27.
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Thus resource mobilisation, although it studies the restrictions imposed by the 
environment, perceives social agents as active collectivities.
1.3.2 Main Critiques
Resource mobilisation, partly in reaction to the classical model, has focused on the 
mobilisation process. Instead of stressing objective strains and individual beliefs, it has 
tried to depict the underlying rationality of collective action. Its theoretical assumptions 
have been criticised, by both collective behaviour and new social movement theorists, and 
that criticism has led to a less rigid formulation of the model. The cornerstones of resource 
mobilisation theory that have been deprecated are as follows:
(i) Oversimplification o f \rationality Resource mobilisation identifies rationality with 
instrumental rationality, the essence of which is the effective relation between means and 
ends.48 However, disputes about the goals are related to substantive rationality. Resource 
mobilisation takes the goals of collective action for granted, instead of perceiving them as 
the result of communication and learning. Since the objectives are given, resource 
mobilisation can account only for rational strategies based on analytical knowledge. It 
excludes, therefore, collective action guided by substantive rationality, which addresses a 
totally different set of questions (social norms, values, etc.).49 Moreover, a necessary 
premise of resource mobilisation is that individuals are clear about their objectives, and 
have all the necessary information to calculate the cost/benefit ratio of different courses of 
action. This precondition applies only in an ideal situation, however the reproduction of 
which is highly problematic in reality. This means that the collective actor’s rationality 
remains conditional.
(ii) Normalisation o f protest: Resource mobilisation’s reaction to the irrational perception 
of collective action (classical model) has led to the overstatement of similarities between 
conventional and protest behaviour. For example, resource mobilisation has identified
48 Ferree, Myra Marx, (1992) ‘The Political Context of Rationality: Rational Choice 
Theory and Resource Mobilisation’, in: Morris and Mueller, op. cit., ref. 13.
49 Habermas, Jurgen (1970) Toward a Rational Society: Student Protest, Science, and 
Politics (Boston, Beacon Press).
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social movements with their formal organisations, thus normalising collective protest as a 
simply another kind of institutional behaviour. As the distinctions between normative and 
non-normative forms of collective action became blurred, the differentiation disappeared 
between rule-violating and rule-conforming collective action.50
Resource mobilisation’s partial inability to analyse anti-systemic movements is the 
result of its emphasis on resources, and its minimisation of the importance of values as 
well as of repertoires of action. Since it focuses on only the instrumental rationality of 
movements, it cannot incorporate in its analysis the confrontational elements of social 
movements. It sees movements as pursuing given goals by choosing the most effective 
means. However, by instrumentalising social movements, it dismisses their potentially 
confrontational character. Another consequence of the model’s focus on instrumental 
rationality is that it privileges institutional politics and in particular social struggles having 
distributional aims. Only such struggles can conform to the economisation of politics, 
meaning the perception of the political arena as a free market where rational actors bargain 
for resources. By contrast, struggles associated with general values (freedom for 
example), create problems in the theoretical assessment of their ‘rationality’.
(iii) The problem o f  indeterminacy: The usual critique by resource mobilisation of the 
classical model is that it does not account for episodes where the necessary structural 
preconditions (e.g. relative deprivation) or individual beliefs do exist but social movements 
fail to emerge. The same critique can also be applied to resource mobilisation itself51 Its 
preconditions for collective action are mobilisation of resources and an open political 
opportunity structure. Both factors are indeed necessary, but not sufficient conditions for 
collective action. Since the model cannot account for those instances where the above- 
mentioned preconditions exist, yet collective action does not develop, it shows itself 
unable to predict collective action. While resource mobilisation analysis has further 
elaborated the question of preconditions for collective action, it has not solved the 
problem of indeterminacy.
50 Piven and Cloward, op. cit., ref. 36.
51 Piven and Cloward, ibid.
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(iv) Claims o f universal applicability: By summarising the essence of social movements 
as the rational pursuit of interests, the resource mobilisation approach implicitly claims to 
be applicable to all kinds of movement. However, its historical and societal context is the 
United States in the 1970s. There, the existing pragmatist political tradition influenced 
social movement research towards an analysis of mechanisms rather than focusing on their 
objectives. The non-ideological tradition of social movements in the United States is in 
accord with the instrumental rationality of the resource mobilisation paradigm. Moreover, 
in the United States it is mainly self-limiting movements that have developed, which focus 
on single issues and achievable success; in Europe on the other hand, there is a tradition of 
articulating grand projects that aim at a total transformation of society. The two different 
models of social movement analysis are representative of these two traditions.52 Resource 
mobilisation concentrates on instrumental rationality and the analytical level of 
organisation. New social movement theory focuses on ideology, identity and the structural 
level. Resource mobilisation reflects the policy of pressure groups, while new social 
movement theory reflects the articulation of alternative politics. Different types of 
movements require different analytical tools to construct their logic of mobilisation.
(v) The cultural and symbolic dimension: Resource mobilisation does not incorporate 
into its analysis the process of the construction of meaning. It considers the ends of a 
movement as fixed -not as the result of an ongoing process of communication. 
Perceptions and beliefs can change, however, and in order to perceive those changes a 
theoretical understanding of the cognitive dimension is needed. Moreover, resource 
mobilisation reduces social movements to the bearers of instrumental rationality, while in 
reality they are involved in a symbolic struggle over meaning. They are dedicated not only 
to clearly defined distributional goals, but also to values and the significance of identity 
formation.53 While value commitments and dedication are seen by the model as merely 
resources, a positive opportunity structure may be of only marginal importance for a social 
movement in comparison with the transformation of the self. Collective identity and values 
constitute significant variables, which help to explain how instrumental rationality may be
52 Mayer, op. cit., ref. 19.
53 Ferree, op. cit., ref. 48.
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overpowered, thereby also leading to the practical negation of Olson’s free- riders 
problem.
(vi) The assumption o f homogeneity: The resource mobilisation perceives the collective 
actor as a single unit. It does not explore the multiple, potentially conflictual trends that 
compose the identity of a collective actor. By insisting on clarity of the goals pursued, the 
theory excludes diversity from the analysis, as supposedly impeding the process of rational 
decision-making. However, the field of collective action should not be considered as a 
homogeneous entity. Collective actors may play many different games at the same time, 
making the empirical behaviour of a group the result of a variety of systems, orientations, 
and meanings.54 Moreover, the degree of homogeneity of beliefs decreases as one moves 
from the centre of a social movement to the periphery of sympathisers or loosely 
associated individuals. In addition, and contrary to resource mobilisation premises, 
diversity may also fimction as a positive asset.55 Its existence increases the viability of a 
social movement by not making it narrowly dependent on the growth or decline of a given 
organisation.
In summary, resource mobilisation stresses the organisational needs of movements, 
and in particular the need for managing resources. It emphasises the role of pre-existing 
networks for the emergence of new movements, and points out the complex relationship 
between organisation and the political opportunity structure.
1.4 New Social Movement Theory
Since it was developed mainly in Europe, the new social movement theory has 
become known as the European approach to social movements, in contrast to resource 
mobilisation, which became dominant in the United States. The European approach deals 
more with the structural trends that lead to the genesis of new social movements, while the 
American approach examines the mobilisation potentials of already existing movements. In 
other words, the former concerns itself with the emergence of new political and cultural
54 Melucci, Alberto and Diani, Mario (1992) ‘The Growth of an Autonomous Research 
Field: Social Movement Studies in Italy’, in: Rucht, op. cit., ref. 17.
55 Freeman, op. cit., ref. 11.
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trends, while the latter delineates the factors facilitating the organisation and efficient 
contestation of demands.56 Additionally, while it is an important premise of resource 
mobilisation that the model can be applied to all kinds of social movements, new social 
movement theory, for its part, focuses on the historically specific type to be found in the 
advanced capitalist or post-industrial society.
1.4.1 Underlying Themes of New Social Movement Theory
The concept ‘new social movement’ refers to a number of social movements (e.g. 
ecological movement, the peace movement, squatters, the gay liberation movement, 
citizen’s initiatives, feminist movement, anti-racism, urban movements, counter-cultural 
movements, and consumer-protection groups).57 In the literature they are depicted as a 
single category simultaneously representing two major ideological currents: one offensive 
and emancipatory, the either negative and defensive.58 Accordingly, new social movements 
are presented as both bearers of social change and as a form of reaction to social change. 
Hence, on the one hand reflecting the reality of advanced capitalist or post-industrial 
societies, while on the other dissatisfied with the negative effects of continuous 
modernisation and economic growth.
The new social movement model developed in opposition to mainstream social 
theory, which forecasted increasing institutionalisation, routinisation, and the end of 
ideology in advanced capitalist societies.59 At the end of the 1960s, large-scale 
mobilisations in these societies questioned the fundamental values of the societal order. 
The student movement and the New Left articulated an anti-systemic political discourse,
56 Tarrow, Sidney (1992) ‘Comparing Social Movement Participation in Western Europe 
and the United States: Problems, Uses and a Proposal for Synthesis’, in: Rucht, op. cit., 
ref. 17.
57 Rucht, Dieter (1992) ‘Preface’, to Rucht, ibid.
58 Rucht, Dieter (1992) ‘The Study of Social Movements in West Germany: Between 
Activism and Social Science’, in: Rucht, ibid.
59 Maier, Charles (1987) ‘Introduction’, to Charles Maier (ed.) Changing Boundaries o f  
the Political (Cambridge and New York, Cambridge University Press).
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which demanded authenticity, identity, and human liberation.60 This historical legacy, 
together with the civil-rights movement and its tradition of civil disobedience, became the 
ideological foundations on which new social movements have built their own distinctive 
identity.
The next section will outline the main elements in the new identity of social 
movements. After a definition of their common core, the various macro-structural 
explanations for the emergence and evolution of new social movements will be presented.
There is a long on-going debate in the literature about the alternative dimension of 
new social movements features. It is argued that in the concrete historical context of the 
post-war period new social movements represent a rupture with conventional politics, 
embedding constitutive elements that are supposed to be qualitatively different from 
interest groups and the labour movement.61 These novel elements are:
A. Ideology
New social movements have been concerned predominantly with post-materialist 
values (the quality of life, a sense of community, etc.), and their political agenda is 
described as a major historical change in the value system of West European countries.62 
Their ideological platform subordinates traditional materialist values (economic growth, 
military security, and domestic order) to a new set of post-materialist issues (ecological 
balance, anti-racism, gender, sexuality, etc.). The new social movements’ discourse 
seriously criticises the post-war affluent society (and its symbol, the Keynesian welfare 
state) for representing a productivist model of development that concentrates on material 
goods and ignores cultural and individual needs. The criticism goes beyond the specifically 
economic and political arrangements of the post-war era to the broader foundations of 
modem culture. The new social movements question the cultural correlates of
60 Boggs, Carl (1995) ‘Rethinking the Sixties Legacy: From New Left to New Social 
Movements’, in: Lyman, op. cit., ref. 1.
61 Eyerman and Jamison, op. cit., ref. 27.
62 Inglehart, Ronald, and Flanagan, Scott (1987) ‘Value Change in Industrial Societies’ 
American Political Science Review, vol. 81, no. 4.
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instrumental-rationality, aggressive acquisitiveness, and uniformism. In their agenda, 
individual needs acquire a new substance as well as magnitude.63 Cultural regulations and 
collective arrangements that overlook and suppress individual needs become seriously 
questioned. Consciousness-raising, communication, and identity formation are the driving 
forces of their political struggle.
In contrast to political parties and labour unions the new social movements have 
avoided the formulation of grand projects and abstained from articulating principles for 
transforming society as a whole. This attitude arose out of their strong belief in pluralism 
and heterogeneity.64 One of their shared axioms is that the prevailing plurality of social 
struggles is by definition incompatible with any grand manifesto favouring some specific 
aspect of social reality while excluding others.65 In parallel, they also oppose the formation 
of ‘totalising identities’. They argue that there is no such thing as a single unitary political 
subject, since individuals are variously affected by the different social areas to which they 
belong.66 In consequence, new social movements most strongly advocate the right to 
uniqueness within the broader context of a pluralistic culture.67 This support of pluralism 
is not, however, coupled with a politics of individualism. On the contrary, new social 
movements have striven to establish alternative and egalitarian communities, where 
individual autonomy can co-exist with collective identity and belonging. Therefore, their 
ideology contains as important targets the construction of community and the attainment 
of solidarity.68 Active political participation for new social movements consists precisely of
63 Pakulski, J. (1991) Social Movements: The Politics o f Moral Protest (Melbourne, 
Longman).
64 Cohen, J. (1985) ‘Strategy or Identity?’, Social Research, vol. 52, no. 4.
65 Jordan, Tim (1994) Reinventing Revolution: Value and Difference in New Social 
Movements and the Left (Aldershot, Brookfield, Sydney, Ashgate Publishing).
66 Laclau, Ernesto and Chantalle Mouffe (1985) Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: 
Towards A Radical Democratic Politics (London, Verso).
67 Cohen, op. cit., ref 64
68 Epstein, Barbara (1990)‘Rethinking Social Movement Theory’, Socialist Review, vol. 
20, no. 1.
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their members belonging to multiple networks and spheres of solidarity.69 This means that 
their organisational structure is very different from that of political parties and interest 
groups.
B. Organisational Structure
The new social movements have criticised political parties and labour unions for 
creating hierarchical and centralised organisational structures. They themselves try to 
overcome hierarchy and domination by relying on decentralised and fluid organisations. 
Their loose organisational structure is representative of their ideological stand for 
participatory democracy.70 They question the institutions of representative democracy on 
the basis that representation weights power in favour of the representatives, who then 
become autonomous towards those they represent. In other words, the new social 
movements criticise formal democracy for its oligarchic tendencies, and are wary of being 
drawn into institutional politics.71 Where a new social movement has become transformed 
into a political party, it has introduced innovations in its organisational structure (e.g. the 
rotation principle) to help safeguard the party against the development of oligarchic 
tendencies.
Organisation o f the new social movements is based on the principle of de- 
differentiation.72 They rely on neither horizontal (insiders versus outsiders) nor vertical 
differentiation (leaders versus rank-and-file members), and have no strict division between 
supporters and sympathisers or members and leaders. On the contrary: they try to merge
69 Melucci, Alberto (1985) ‘The Symbolic Challenge of Contemporary Movements’, 
Social Research, vol. 52, no. 4.
70 Dalton, Russel, Kuechler, Manfred and Burklin, Wilhelm (1990) ‘The Challenge of New 
Movements’, in: R. Dalton and M. Kuechler (eds.), Challenging the Political Order: New 
Social and Political Movements in Western Democracies (New York and Oxford, 
Oxford University Press).
71 Dalton, Kuechler, Burklin, ibid.
72 Offe, C. (1985) ‘New Social Movements: Challenging the Boundaries of Institutional 
Politics’, Social Research, vol. 52, no. 4.
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members and formal leaders, public and private roles in order to expand the borders of 
democracy.
Although this organisation of the new social movements as a whole is looser than 
that of political parties and labour unions, it is complex enough to embrace a wide range 
of bodies, from formalised and bureaucratised organisations to completely decentralised 
groups. The structure of new social movements can be described as web-like.73 The core 
of the movement includes groups with a quite coherent ideology and rigid structure, and in 
the periphery are more loosely structured associations, networks and circles of 
sympathisers. Corollary of this is that the boundaries of social movements are not clear. 
When resource mobilisation identifies social movements with their formal organisations, it 
misses the fact that the new social movements as a whole lack coherence. What must be 
taken into account are the overall relations amongst its various organisations, informal 
groupings, and single individuals committed to action. While the new social movements 
are decentralised, one can still find within their broad spectrum a wide range o f formalised 
and institutionalised organisations. The organisational rigidity attributed to new social 
movements depends on whether the focus is on the core or on the periphery of the 
movements.
C. Social Base
The social base of the new social movements is not very well defined, but certain 
aspects are held in common by the various social categories that support or are active 
participants in them. Three societal segments can be said to form their backbone:
i. the new middle class (especially individuals working in the public sector or in the 
service professions)
ii. sections of the old middle class and
iii. people excluded from or being only peripherally involved in the labour market 
(students, the unemployed or retired).74
73Pakulski, op. cit., ref. 63.
74 Offe, op. cit., ref. 72.
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Accordingly, new social movements are principally middle-class movements, but they do 
not act on behalf of a class.75 Quite the contrary, they aim at representing multiple social 
groups, without unifying them into a single social category. Their concerns apply to 
society in general, not to the special interests of the middle or any other class. This 
differentiates the new social movements from the discourse and practices of the labour 
movement. Moreover, their self-identification goes beyond established political or socio­
political classifications (e.g. Right-Left, rural-urban, wealthy-poor). Instead, their identity 
results from the issues they are concerned with (gender, race, age, etc.), and may include 
the whole of the human race (e.g. the pacifist and the ecological movements).76
The members of or sympathisers with new social movements are characterised by 
high educational levels and relatively high economic security. Usually they are employed in 
the public sector in the areas of welfare and cultural services.77 This means that, on the one 
hand, they have personal experience of the negative side of bureaucratisation and the 
contradictions of the administrative system, but on the other hand they enjoy considerable 
autonomy from the instrumental rationality of the market. Members or sympathisers are 
not marginal in the socio-economic sense, as the classical model would assume. Neither 
are they the principal victims of the processes against which they protest. They are, 
however, in a certain sense peripheral.78 New social movements espouse values that are 
opposed to the dominant discourse. Hence, there is a ‘normative’ marginalisation of the 
members. Moreover, in a predominantly market economy new social movements’ 
members suffer from a peripherality, which was reinforced in the beginning by their 
exclusion from neo-corporatist deals, and later by the ascendancy of neoliberal policies. 
The significant contraction of the public sector of the economy in the 1980s undermined
75 Offe, ibid.
76 Offe, ibid.
77 Brand, Karl-Werner (1990) ‘Cyclical Aspects of New Social Movements: Waves of 
Cultural Criticism and Mobilisation Cycles of New Middle-class Radicalism’, in: Dalton 
and Kuechler, op. cit., ref. 70.
78 Offe, op. cit., ref. 72.
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the material security and social status of the wage-dependent members of the middle class 
in public employment.79
Concisely and generally, the supporters and sympathisers of new social movements 
are usually well educated, enjoy economic security, and belong to the younger age groups. 
Moreover, their social base presents a higher degree of internal differentiation than that of 
the labour movement.
D. Strategy
Unlike political parties and interest groups new social movements, predominantly 
address the general public and not the elites. In consequence, their strategy lies in 
educating the public in the issues they are concerned with. They reject the political 
practices of elite lobbying, of tactical coalitions or political deals, as belonging to the 
authoritarian and instrumental function of political parties, interest groups, and labour 
unions. In their endeavour to reach the public, the mass media are a very important 
resource for them in building and maintaining mass support.80 A strategy frequently 
applied by new social movements is to stage public incidents, which by attracting mass 
media coverage come to the attention of the public and highlight the issue.
A second fundamental element in the new social movements’ strategy is that their 
modes of action are founded on the concept of civil disobedience. They make extensive 
use of unconventional forms of action (protests, mass rallies, ‘happenings’, unofficial 
strikes, sit-ins, etc.).81 Their political practices deliberately diverge from those of the 
established political actors, given that they eschew the traditional channels of political 
intervention. Their unconventional modes of action underline the value-based and non- 
negotiable nature of their claims, and simultaneously engage the participants in a process
79 Olofsson, Gunnar (1988) ‘After the Working-class Movement? An Essay on What’s 
“New” and What’s “Social” in the New Social Movements’, Acta Sociologica, vol. 31.
80 Dalton, Kuechler, Burklin, op. cit., ref. 70.
81 Klandermans, op. cit., ref. 31.
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of collective learning.82 It is the tradition of civil disobedience that has endowed new social 
movements with the knowledge of practice of dissent and self-organisation.
The loci of action by new social movements have been many. They may disrupt 
political processes in the public sphere, or focus on consciousness-raising in small groups. 
In the literature their new identity is chiefly associated with their function in civil society.83
82 Offe, op. cit., ref 72.
83 There are many different definitions of the concept of civil society, structured around 
two contradictory meanings. The first meaning is a liberal-individualist one, which arose in 
the eighteenth century with the development of capitalism. It referred to the emergence of 
a liberal market economy and a bourgeois public sphere where individuals were free, at 
least in the negative sense, to pursue their own private interests. This first meaning 
underlines the individual economic dimension of civil society without providing any 
intrinsic democratic value in civil society. The second meaning of civil society underlines 
the positive rights of citizens in the context of a highly participatory model of democracy. 
Civil society is composed by self-constituted units (social movements, interest groups, 
ideological associations, etc.), which possess a high degree of autonomy in defining their 
collective interests. Those units resist subordination to the state and market rationality, 
while simultaneously struggling for inclusion into the broader realm of politics. Civil 
society can therefore be defined as the realm of agency, creativity, association, and 
freedom. In the literature on new social movements (e.g. Cohen and Arato) it is almost 
exclusively identified with this second meaning, and so it is in this section of the chapter. 
However, the definition adopted in the thesis generally and the analysis of Greek society 
specifically, is as follows: Civil society ‘refers to all social groups and institutions which, in 
conditions of modernity, lie between primordial kinship groups or institutions on the one 
hand, and state groups and institutions on the other... Political parties, particularly in 
democratic parliamentary contexts, will be considered as the major organisational means 
for articulating civil society interests with the state’. See Mouzelis, Nicos (1995) 
‘Modernity, Late Development and Civil Society* in: John A. Hall (ed.), Civil Society: 
Theory, History, Comparison, (Cambridge, Polity Press), p. 226; Hann, Chris (1995) 
‘Philosophers’ Models on the Carpathian Lowlands’ in: Hall, ibid', Blakeley, Georgina
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New social movements, it is argued, aim to repoliticise the institutions of civil society. 
Thus, the actions of new social movements are not always coterminous with ‘visible’ 
conflicts in the political arena.84 New social movements with a stronger cultural orientation 
may be absent from the public sphere but present in other areas of movement activities, 
such as networks of people sharing a collective identity, groups challenging the routine 
procedures of everyday life, etc. The articulation of new political demands that were 
previously considered as private and personal, as well as the increase in non-institutional 
forms of political participation in civil society, has challenged the established boundaries of 
‘the political’.85 Ever, since the 1970s the delimitations inplied by concepts such as 
‘political’ and ‘private’ or ‘state’ and ‘civil society’ have become increasingly blurred.
The augmenting intrusion of the state in various aspects of social life has led to the 
fusion of the non-political and political spheres of social life. New social movements have 
struggled to protect civil society against state intervention.86 They do not target the 
economy and the state for inclusion, like political parties and labour unions used to do. 
Instead, they try to safeguard the democratic spaces they have built within civil society 
against capital, technology, and the state.
The strategy of new social movements has been based on the premise that the 
means always have an important influence on the ends. Therefore they avoid means 
founded on instrumental rationality, when trying to achieve their goals.87 In their 
endearour to adopt strategies in accord with their ideological commitment to democracy
(1998) ‘Democratisation and Civil society in Chile: A Blind Alley for Feminists?’ 
Contemporary Politics, vol. 4, no. 2; Habermas, Jurgen (1989) The Structural 
Transformation o f the Public Sphere (Cambridge, Polity Press); Cohen, Jean and Arato, 
Andrew (1995) Civil Society and Political Theory (Cambridge, London, Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology Press).
84 Melucci, op. cit., ref. 46.
85 Offe, op. cit., ref. 72.
86 Habermas, Jurgen (1981) ‘New Social Movements’, Telos, no. 49.
87 Pakulski, Jan (1988) ‘Social Movements in Comparative Perspective’, Research in 
Social movements, Conflicts and Change, vol. 10.
46
and identity formation, the participatory procedures and the egalitarian collective 
articulation of ends are often perceived as ends in themselves.
E. New Scenarios o f Conflict
New social movements theorists are concerned with a macro-structural level of 
analysis. The movements are perceived as historical actors articulating long-term trends, 
and are presented as symptoms of a qualitative shift in the nature of capitalist/industrial 
societies. Theories of post-industrial or late capitalism have been developed to explain the 
growth of new social movements in terms of the underlying structural change. These 
explanations can be subsumed in two general categories, as follows.
(1) The post-industrial interpretation: Current class analyses stress the decline of the 
manual working class and the rise of new middle classes, mainly in the service sector, as 
manufacture-based production gives way to knowledge-based industry.88 These structural 
changes are coupled with the tendency to more away from the polarised structure of the 
industrial-manufacturing era towards increased fragmentation and internal differentiation. 
The labour movement, so the argument goes, represents the old industrial society when 
the dominant conflict was between capital and labour. Industrial society has changed, 
however, giving rise to new structures and new political subjects. In post-industrial society 
the central conflict no longer takes place in the sphere of production but concerns the 
production of symbolic goods (e.g. images, culture, information).89 This means that the 
area o f conflict has moved away from the workplace, and the new social movements have 
emerged as the new central social actors.
88 Giddens, A. and Mackenzie, G. (eds.) (1982) Social Class and the Division o f Labour 
(Cambridge, Cambridge University Press); Esping-Andersen, Gosta (April 1992) Post- 
Industrial Class Structures: An Analytical Framework, Working Paper 38, Centre for 
Advanced Study in the Social Sciences, Juan March Institute, Madrid; Wright, E. (ed.) 
(1989) The Debate on Classes (London, Verso Press).
89 Touraine, Alain (1985) ‘An Introduction to the Study of Social Movements’, Social 
Research, vol. 52, no. 4.
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(2) The late capitalism scheme: This shares with the above-mentioned theoretical 
formulation a belief in the decreasing importance of the capital-labour conflict and the new 
significance of the culture industries of knowledge and information. However, use of the 
term ‘late capitalism’ suggests that the theoretical roots of this line of argument lie in the 
Marxist tradition. Although it agrees that social conflict has left the shop floor, it still 
incorporates into the analysis the capitalist mode of production and its impact on the social 
dynamic. The late capitalism scheme can be subdivided into two complementary 
hypotheses:
(a) Corporate capitalism: In the post-war period the Keynesian welfare state developed in 
the countries of Western Europe. Mass political parties as well as the labour movement 
became part of a political consensus, which accepted the logic of profitability and the 
market as the main principle for the allocation of resources in exchange for employment, 
higher wages, and increased union power. Neo-Corporatism - meaning the 
institutionalisation of the relation between capital, labour, and the state - became the 
predominant form of interest intermediation. Political parties as well as labour unions 
stressed the need for economic expansion, distribution, and class consensus and their 
discourses chiefly concerned issues relevant to class cleavages. 90 In this way politics 
became articulated around the workplace, excluding representation of issues referring to 
other areas of what Habermas calls the life world. Moreover, social actors not involved in 
neo-corporatist arrangements became excluded from the political arena.91 The new social 
movements challenged this liberal-democratic welfare state consensus, which had 
remained uncontested by the political forces of the Right and Left.92 In other words, they 
developed in reaction to the bureaucratisation of the political parties and labour unions and
90 Schmitter, Philippe (1981) ‘Interest Intermediation and Regime Govemability in 
Contemporary Western Europe and North America’ in: Suzanne Berger (ed.), Organising 
Interests in Western Europe (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press)
91 Hirsch, Joachim (1988) ‘The Crisis of Fordism, Transformation of the ‘Keynesian 
Security State’, and New Social Movements’, Research in Social Movements, Conflicts 
and Change, vol. 10.
92 Offe, op. cit., ref. 72.
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to their productivist logic. Excluded from the dominant political agenda, the new social 
movements used non-institutional means to articulate their interests. There were opposed 
to the values and the institutional modes of conflict resolution prevailing in western 
societies during the post-war era.
(b) Colonisation of the life-world: New social movements are described in the literature 
also as a reaction to the growing expansion of the economy and the state into the life 
world.93 The capitalist mode of production has generated an economic mechanism that has 
extended the subsystems of purposive rational action (the army, school systems, health 
services, family, etc.). However, since the last quarter of the nineteenth century there has 
been an increase in state intervention in order to secure the system’s stability. State 
regulation of the economic process has meant a change in relations between the economy 
and the political system. Since society ceased to perpetuate itself through self-regulation, 
legitimation could no longer be derived from the order constituted by the relations of 
production. This meant that the ideology of free exchange gave way to government 
initiatives oriented toward the economic system’s stability and growth. This new system of 
state management was coupled with a new ideology, which held that the development of 
social systems was determined by scientific-technical progress.94 In other words, the 
process of societal rationalisation has been dominated by the imperatives of both capitalist 
growth and administrative steering. In late capitalism, the increasing intrusion of the 
capitalist economic system and state administration into the ‘life-world’ (culture, society 
and personality) has led to new forms of crises and conflicts. Struggles over social control 
have been concerned with new issues and taken place in other areas, than in the past.95 
New social movements react against this ‘colonisation’ of the life-world by the system, 
and oppose capitalist and administrative projects with demands for a better quality of life, 
individual self-realisation, and participation.
93 Habermas, op. cit., ref. 86.
94 Habermas, Jurgen (1970) Toward a Rational Society: Student Protest, Science and 
Politics (Boston, Beacon Press).
95 Epstein, op. cit., ref. 68.
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To sum up: The theorists of the new social movements proceed from a macro- 
structural level of analysis, and consider social movements as historical actors articulating 
long-term trends. For them, the polity model of the new social movements is neo-Marxist 
(Offe, Schmitter, Panitch) or post-Marxist (Touraine). Whether it is corporate capitalism 
or remains undefined (as in post-industrial theories), it is a polity with a fundamental social 
conflict. Touraine, for instance, argues that the mobilisation of new social movements 
takes place in opposition to a historical Other. The conflict, therefore, concerns the overall 
system of meaning that shapes the prevalent rules in a given society.96 New social 
movement theory usually situates this core conflict in the socio-cultural sphere, or in the 
control-authority relations of the state apparatus. Concerning relations between actors and 
structures, the theory interprets new social movements as intervening actively in the socio- 
historical process of society’s self-reproduction. These movements are therefore assigned 
an active role as bearers of society’s ‘self-reflection’ and ‘self-creation’.
1.4.2 Main Critiques
New social movement theory perceives new social movements as a structural 
outcome of late capitalism or post-industrial society. The theory’s emphasis on the 
structural origins of social movements goes hand in hand with its tendency to overlook the 
significance of the political environment. The theory has often reduced the political 
context to a residual category, which accords with the theory’s emphasis on macro- and 
micro-levels of analysis.97 By linking its enquiry to the macro-structural tendencies that 
lead to the emergence of social movements, and the micro-processes that lead to the 
crystallisation of the participants’ identity, the theory has neglected the meso-level of 
analysis, which concerns the mediating organisations. This means that contextual questions 
on, for instance, mobilisation potential (Does the movement respond to political 
opportunities?, Did polity members aid the movement?, Are some organisations more co-
96 Touraine, Alain (1981) The Voice and the Eye: An Analysis o f Social Movements 
(Cambridge, Cambridge University Press)
97 Tarrow, Sidney (1988) ‘National Politics and Collective Action: Recent Theory and 
Research in Western Europe and the U.S.’, Annual Review o f Sociology, vol. 1.
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optable than others?), have either never been asked or were underrated in new social 
movement theory.
Another major criticism of the theory has been that it is reluctant to study the 
influence of conventional politics on the development of new social movements. Its focus 
on civil society makes it overlook the interrelationship of social movements and 
conventional politics. Although, a distinction must be made between the internal logic of 
social movements and that of conventional political groups since they do differ 
significantly, the dynamics of collective action, even in their most expressive and anti­
political forms, must be analysed also in relation to the political process.98 A totally 
segregational perspective remains utopian, because it presumes that new social movements 
can build their democratic spaces within civil society without any interaction with the 
other actors of the polity.99 But, if rising movements want to become autonomous and 
attain their purposes, they are compelled to both seek alliances and confront their 
adversaries—neither of whom they can ignore, given that they find themselves in a polity 
already full o f activity.
Moreover the theory, by overstressing the non-institutional character of new social 
movements, cannot account for cases of social movements’ cooptation. This deficiency is 
becoming more serious as more new social movements join conventional politics. The 
relatively strong anti-systemic attitudes of the late 1970s began to blur in the 1980s. The 
mainstream of the new social movements has become more pragmatic, and closer 
collaboration with public authorities is now widely accepted.
New social movements are perceived as a promise of social emancipation, and 
equated with de-alienation and cultural-political activities. From this perspective they 
appear as an articulation of human potential. New social movement theory having included 
in its discourse elements of socialist humanism and especially the critique of technocracy 
articulated by the proponents of Critical theory, can in certain cases be charged with
98 Klandermans, Bert (1990) ‘Linking the “Old” and the “New”: Movement Networks in 
the Netherlands’, in: Dalton and Kuechler, op. cit, ref. 70.
99 Plotke, D. (1995) ‘What’s so New about New Social Movements?’, in: Lyman, op. cit, 
ref. 1.
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essentialism.100 It assumes that there is a ‘true’ human nature from which the capitalist 
process and the institutionalisation of scientific and technical development have alienated 
individuals. This ‘true’ essence of the social subjects has to be liberated again, and (it is 
argued) the new social movements that have replaced the labour movement in its historical 
mission will carry out this emancipatory project. Given that the new social movements are 
very fragmented, the issue of creating a unified force out of these diverse emancipatory 
collectives still remains problematic.101 In addition, analytical categories would have to be 
elaborated to differentiate new social movements from anti-democratic movements 
(neofascism) or neo-traditional ones (neo-religious movements).
The claim of new social movement theorists that these movements represent 
entirely novel forms of social protest has been seriously questioned. It is argued that, quite 
on the contrary, they share many attributes with older dissenting groups.102 Their ‘novel’ 
characteristics can also be found in previous historical periods, and should not be 
attributed exclusively to the structural conditions of post-industrial or late capitalist 
society. There are many studies that point out similarities with cultural and ecological 
movements at the beginning of the century, illustrating that new social movements are not 
an inherent part of any specific historical stage, but a more general reaction to the overall 
process of modernisation. In this respect, new social movements are seen as moralistic and 
idealistic expressions of middle-class radicalism.103 According to this view, they represent 
a cultural criticism of the fundamental aspects of modem life, such as commercialisation, 
industrialisation, political centralisation, bureaucratisation, etc.104 This means, that their
100 Kellner, Douglas (1989) Critical Theory, Marxism and Modernity (Baltimore, John 
Hopkins University Press).
101 Jordan, op. cit., ref. 65.
102 D’Anieri, Paul, Ernst, Clair and Kier, Elizabeth (1990) ‘New Social Movements in 
Historical Perspective’, Comparative Politics, vol. 22, no. 4.
103 Eder, Klaus (1985) ‘The “New Social Movements”: Moral Crusades, Political Pressure 
Groups, or Social Movements ?’ Social Research, vol. 52, no. 4.
104 Brand, op. cit., ref. 77.
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‘novel’ aspects are in fact part of the broader history of middle-class protest against the 
values that underlie present-day modernity.
In brief the theory of new social movements stresses their anti-state/administrative 
character, their location within the realms of civil society, and their claim for participatory 
forms of democracy. New social movements are characterised by discontinuity and 
marked by waves of recurrent mobilisation. Mass mobilisation is perceived by new social 
movement theory as rational, simultaneously promoting self-awareness and collective 
learning. The theory locates the causes of the movements in macro-structural trends.
1.5 Future Challenges for Social Movement Theory
Most of the observers in the mid-1980s agreed that many of the social movements 
had gradually fizzled out. The wave of political participation and movement mobilisation 
that started in the late sixties 60s was followed in the nineties ‘90s by either the 
movements’ institutionalisation or their retreat. However, the literature on social 
movement theory never stopped growing, and research into social movements has become 
an independent field. The growing importance of social movement analysis may be 
attributed to the feet that social movement theory concerns issues fundamental to 
sociology, such as the process of social change, the relation between actor and structure, 
or the emergence of a new historical paradigm. Moreover, social movements did have a 
significant impact. They stimulated collective learning and generated traditions that 
affected the repertoires of action and also left behind multiple networks that were often 
reactivated in later periods.105 Furthermore, social movements, even those that eventually 
fail, stimulate social reform. This suggests that social movement theory will continue to 
develop, seeing that it is related to the fundamental questions of the self-constitution and 
evolution of society.
The proliferation of research on social movements has been accompanied by 
attempts to merge the three different approaches into one.106 Theorists have pointed out
105 Jamison and Eyerman, op. cit., ref. 27.
106 Melucci, Alberto (1996) Challenging Codes: Collective Action in the Information 
Age, (Cambridge and New York, Cambridge University Press); Klandermans, op. cit., ref.
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that all three can be perceived as complementary. More specifically, new social movement 
theory focuses on broader structural changes, resource mobilisation emphasises the 
necessary preconditions concerning the mobilisation process of participants, while the 
classical model illustrates the mediating processes through which people give meaning to 
events and interpret situations.107 Since social movements cannot be reduced to any single 
level of analysis, the convergence of the three models constitutes a precondition for a 
more comprehensive theory of social movements. Such a study of social movements must 
involve three levels of analysis: the actors, the institutions and formal movement 
organisations, and the broader societal context. Analysis on the level of actors highlights 
how individual cognitive and normative orientations are formed and crystallised; the 
organisational framework elaborates the interaction among actors in a concrete 
institutional setting; while finally the structural context specifies the prevailing economic, 
political and cultural changes in society.108
From this we can draw the following conclusions:
(a) All three models of social movement theory have contributed to the 
development of social movement analysis.
(b) All three models have been criticised for their shortcomings and no single 
model has become the dominant paradigm in social movement analysis.
(c) There is a general call for the synthesis of the three models, so as to expand the 
borders of social movement theory, and their complementary character has been 
emphasised in the more recent studies.
A problem that has undermined previous endeavours to synthesise the three 
models has been that each of them predominantly concerned itself with instances of 
collective action in a specific historical period (e.g. the classical model belongs to the 
period 1920-1960) and geographical unit (e.g. the United States). On the other hand, this 
temporal and geographical disparity between the three models also constitutes the most
31, Tarrow, op. cit., ref. 38; Eyerman and Jamison, op. cit., ref. 27; Della Porta and Diani, 
op. cit., ref. 1.
107 Klandermans, op. cit., ref. 31.
108 Kitschelt, op. cit., ref. 28.
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positive asset in terms of their synthesis. For example, in the Greek context the new social 
movement theory has its shortcomings because it refers almost exclusively to advanced 
capitalist societies. By introducing resource mobilization into the analysis, one can 
highlight the political opportunity structure and the tradition of repertoires of action in 
Greece, without being constrained by the historical premises of new social movement 
theory. Or take the classical model, which by focusing on the individual, allows tracing the 
complex process of cognitive orientation in societies with diverse cultures. In view of the 
above, theoretical endeavors to integrate different historical periods or geographical areas 
into social movement analysis contribute to the flexibility of social movement theory. 
Relating structural factors to outcomes particularly requires a significant variation in the 
range of structural factors studied, and this is possible only in cross-national or cross- 
historical research of which there is a marked lack, however.109
While there are numerous studies on the emergence and meaning of social 
movements in advanced capitalist countries, few pursue their line of inquiry beyond those 
countries. The majority of writings on social movements comes from the more advanced 
countries of northern or central Europe.110 They have concentrated on the internal social 
conflicts of western societies (e.g. new social movements versus the state), thereby 
overlooking the possible impact of the international context on the development of social 
movements. Conversely, the emergence of social movements in less developed countries 
has been of mostly marginal interest. During the 1990s, the overall emphasis on 
movements in the advanced capitalist countries caused Latin American intellectuals to 
challenge the existing body of literature, and to introduce new elements associated with 
the political and social history of their own region. This new input is a good foundation for 
elaborating some questions specific to the Greek context. Variables like ‘alternative 
modernities’, ‘models of development’ and ‘geopolitics’ illustrate the complex forms that 
protest politics may take in regions where the international and national dimensions are 
inseparable intertwined.
109 Rucht, op. cit., ref 58.
110 Tarrow, op. cit., ref. 56.
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1.6 Social Movement Theory in Greece and Latin America
In Latin America, increased politicisation in the wake of democratic consolidation 
led to a proliferation of studies concerning the form and meaning of Latin America’s novel 
associationalism. Furthermore, Latin American academics and activists were reacting to 
the growing autonomy of social movement theory vis-i-vis actual movements in society. 
Representative is the argumentation put forward by Joe Foweraker:
‘Social movement theory is necessarily drawn from the experience of particular 
social movements in particular places, but the present generation has seen an 
increasing separation of the sites of theoretical production and collective action. 
Most of the theory has been produced in Western Europe and North America, but 
during the past twenty years, this theory has expanded in direct proportion to the 
decline of their social movements. In the meantime there has been an exponential 
increase in social movement activity in Eastern Europe, South Africa, China and 
Latin America...’.n 1
Thus, in the 1990s a new theoretical challenge to the existing social movement literature 
and the representation of Latin America’s social movements by western theorists gradually 
took shape.112 It was founded on three fundamental axioms: (i) opposition to the western 
intellectuals’ tendency to homogenise different activities and mobilisations in Latin 
America, thereby ignoring the area’s regional and cultural heterogeneity; (if) rejection of 
the devaluation of non-western social movements as of limited radical ability compared to
111 Foweraker, op. cit., ref. 1, p. 1.
112 ‘... many writers in this volume wilfully refuse to judge the movements they discuss by 
presumed standards of progressiveness or other political criteria that might be taken for 
granted by metropolitan intellectuals or their readers...here again one senses an effort to 
vacate a site of metropolitan intellectual authority, the site from which the intellectual finds 
in the action of others the realisation of his own dreams. These essays refuse to interpret 
movements on the periphery as signifiers whose signified rests in the metropolis’. See 
Pratt, Mary Louise (1998) ‘Where To? What Next?’, in: Sonia E. Alvarez, Evelina 
Dagnino, Arturo Escobar (eds.), Culture o f Politics/Politics o f  Culture: Re-Visioning 
Latin American Social Movements (Colorado, Westview Press), p. 432.
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their European counterparts; and (iii) exposure of the ethno-centric bias embedded in 
several concepts applied by many western theorists (e.g. the clear divide between civil 
society and the state).113 The new theoretical writings did not contain propositions in the 
form of universal claims.114 On the contrary, it was specific case studies of indigenous
113 Representative is the work of three important social movement theorists: Laclau, 
Mouffe, and Touraine. According to Laclau and Mouffe, social movements in post­
industrial societies represent authentic struggles against the subordination typical of late 
capitalism (commodification, bureaucratisation, cultural massification of life, etc.) and in 
favour of a radical pluralist democracy. However, social movements in Latin America and 
the Third World constitute more ‘conventional’ popular struggles against despotism and 
imperialism- This is to say that democratic revolution in advanced capitalist societies has 
crossed a certain threshold that has not yet been attained in the Third World. Touraine 
similarly argues that social movements in post-industrial societies constitute a struggle to 
attain control of ‘historicity’ (the set of cultural models that rule social practices), while in 
Third World and Latin American societies they are merely struggles resulting from the 
process of social change and development, targeting the political system and the State for 
inclusion- In other words undeveloped and developing societies have not yet reached the 
level of ‘self-production’ through the control o f ‘historicity’. Laclau and Mouffe, op. cit., 
ref. 67; Touraine, Alain (1988) The Return o f  the Actor (Minneapolis, University of 
Minnesota Press) and Touraine, op. cit., ref 96. See also Slater, David (1994) ‘Power and 
Social Movements in the other Occident: Latin America in an International Context’, 
Latin American Perspectives, vol. 21, no. 2.
114 An indicative bibliography in English is the following: Foweraker, Joe and Craig, Ann 
L. (eds.) (1990) Popular Movements and Political Change in Mexico (Boulder and 
London, Lynne Rienner Publishers); Foweraker, op. cit., ref. 1, (London, Boulder, 
Colorado, Pluto Press); Calderon, Fernando and Piscitelli, Alejandro (1990) ‘Paradigm 
Crisis and Social Movements: A Latin American Perspective’, in: Else Oyen (ed.) (1990) 
Comparative Methodology: Theory and Practice in International Social Research 
(London, Sage); Escobar, Arturo, and Alvarez, Sonia E. (eds.) (1992) The Making o f  
Social Movements in Latin America: Identity, Strategy and Democracy (Boulder, San
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social movements that became the point of reference. This endeavor to explore the 
theoretical flexibility and the inclusive capacity of the existing concepts of new social 
movement literature has provided many useful conceptual tools that can also be used in 
the Greek case.
The relevance of the Greek case derives not from a joint categorization of Greek 
and Latin American societies as ‘semi-peripheral’, ‘backward core’ or ‘late-developing’. It 
stems from the theoretical inquiry of the new literature to map the different forms that 
collective action may take, and the various ways in which ‘the political’ is constituted.115 
This is helpful in the Greek instance because of its endeavour to expand social movement 
theory by tracing the historical and national context of political strategies and cultural 
meanings. In the Greek as well as in the Latin American academic communities new social 
movement literature dominates over that of the classical model and resource
Francisco and Oxford, West view Press); Escobar, Arturo (1992) ‘Culture, Practice and 
Politics: Anthropology and the Study of Social Movements’, Critique o f Anthropology, 
voL 12, no. 4; Escobar, Arturo (1995) Encountering Development: The Making and 
Unmaking o f  the Third World (Princeton, New Jersey, Princeton University Press); 
Slater, ibid., Wignaraja Ponna (1993) New Social Movements in the South: Empowering 
the People (London and New Jersey, Zed Books); Alvarez, Dagnino, Escobar, op. cit., 
ref. 11.
115 I refer here to the distinction applied by David Slater to ‘the political’ and ‘politics’. 
Thus ‘politics’, according to Slater, ‘has its own public space-it is the field of exchanges 
between political parties, of parliamentary and governmental affairs, of elections and 
representation, and in general of the type of activity, practices, and procedures that take 
place in the institutional arena of the political system’. The ‘political’, on the other hand, is 
a broader category and ‘...can be more effectively regarded as a type of relationship that 
can develop in any area of the social irrespective of whether or not it remains within the 
institutional enclosure of politics. The political, then is... a kind of “magma of conflicting 
wills” or antagonisms’. See Slater, ibid. pp. 387-88.
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mobilization.116 As Joe Foweraker notes:
‘On a priori grounds it appears that the different approaches might best be applied 
to Latin American movements in a selective and pragmatic fashion. New social 
movement theory might serve to explain the increasing incidence and broader 
scope of mobilisation in Latin America, while resource mobilisation theory might 
address the political constraints and opportunities, and explicate the mechanisms of 
social movements success. Surprisingly the record shows that it is only new social 
movement theory which has been applied to Latin America, while resource 
mobilisation theory has been almost entirely ignored’.117 
In Greece too, the selective application of both analytical frameworks would facilitate the 
analysis of different historical periods and aspects of the Greek political system. For 
instance, new social movement theory could be used to explain the increased politicisation 
after the junta’s fell in 1974, or the consolidation of direct democratic principles in the 
feminist and ecological movements. Resource mobilisation, on the other hand, would be 
helpful for defining the political opportunity structure that new-sprung parties face in the 
frozen Greek party system. However, in Greece, as in Latin America, resource 
mobilisation theory is almost entirely absent. The dominance in both instances of new 
social movement theory is associated with the correspondence between specific properties 
of the theory and significant attributes of these societies.
As noted earlier new social movement theorists are concerned with a macro- 
structural level of analysis, and so present new social movements as historical actors, who
116 In Greece, new social movement theory has been fragmentary and incomplete. In the 
Greek bibliography, the analysis of concrete social movements or cases of collective 
mobilisation is over-represented by comparison with publications on social movement 
theory. Notable exceptions have been the debates initiated by the magazines Elliniki 
Epitheorisi Politikis Epistimis (e.g. ‘Social Movements and Social Sciences’, special 
issue, no. 8, November 1996) and Leviathan (e.g. no. 6, February-April, 1990). In Latin 
America, on the contrary, numerous studies have explored the applicability of new social 
movement theory to indigenous forms of collective action.
117 Foweraker, op. cit., ref. 1, p. 3.
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are both carriers of social change as well as a reaction to it. While new social movement 
theory focuses on macro-structural changes, resource mobilisation emphasises the 
institutional and organisational context of movements. The different levels of analysis 
explain the integration/marginalisation of the two discourses by the Greek and Latin 
American writers respectively. In both societies collective action has established a 
repertoire of action and a political discourse that has always embedded the much broader 
question of the most desirable course to modernisation. New social movement theory, by 
presenting new social movements as historical actors articulating long-term trends, is 
better fitted to elaborate on those questions than resource mobilisation theory, which is 
restricted to the organisational and institutional settings of a society. The macro-structural 
level of analysis of new social movement theory makes possible the study of social 
movements that attempt to articulate and establish ‘alternative modernities’, while 
resource mobilisation fails to be in accord with broader political projects.118 Accordingly, 
the predominance of new social movement theory in both of these societies reflects the 
strong entrenchment of political projects that transcend mere segments of society, and 
purport to define the course of the nation or the people as a whole. Such holistic projects 
are concerned not only with the internal organisation of the nation-state, but also with the 
relationship between the nation-state and the international community.
In social movement literature there is an underlying assumption of a closed 
(national) political system that is subdivided into different political realms.119 The almost 
exclusive study of social movements as strictly parts of the fixed orbits of nation-states 
and their respective civil societies has been extensively criticised. The inability of social 
movement theory to conceptualise the wider global context in which contemporary
118 Concerning the relation of Latin American new social movements with the cultural 
project of Western modernity see Alvarez, Sonia E., Dagnino, Evelina, Escobar, Arturo 
(1998) ‘Introduction: The Cultural and the Political in Latin American Social Movements’, 
in: Alvarez, Dagnino, Escobar, op. cit., ref. 112.
119 Lindberg, Staflfan and Sverrisson, Ami (1997) ‘Introduction’ in: Staflfan Lindberg, Ami 
Sverrisson (eds.) Social Movements in Development: The Challenge o f Globalisation 
and Democratisation, (Basingstoke, Macmillan).
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movements act leaves out of account the crucial role that the supra-national dimension 
(world politics) plays in the formation and consolidation of this inner realm.120 The 
independent variable of geopolitics has a direct impact on the political tradition and culture 
of nations, influencing political identities, strategies, repertoires of action, and more 
generally the existing political tradition.121 For instance, with regard to a broad number of 
nation-states (especially late developers), the same process of state building and 
consolidation, as well as the consequent function of the political system, have been 
invariably intertwined with the strong presence of the international environment in the 
inner political realm. For these societies, geopolitics, as an element of interdependency or 
mere dependency, has been omnipresent in the historical memories, collective identities, 
political discourses and all the other elements that are constitutive of the terrain of the 
political. This shows that, the concrete form of the ‘political’ in a society cannot be 
separated from the collective political identity of a nation. As Biyant notes,
*... in their historical remembering and forgetting, nations are meta-narratives 
which connect past with present and present with future’122.
The implications of the previous analysis for our understanding of Greek new 
social movements are discussed in Part Two of the thesis, which depicts the specific case 
studies. First the feminist movement is presented, while the ecological movement follows 
next, in line with their historical sequence.
120 Slater, David (1998) ‘Rethinking the Spatialities of Social Movements: Questions of 
(B)orders, Culture and Politics in Global Times’, in: Alvarez, Dagnino, Escobar, op. cit., 
ref. 112.
1211 refer here to David Slater’s definition of the ‘geopolitical’, which is broader than the 
usual confinement of the concept to the transnational environment. According to Slater, 
the concept ‘geopolitical’ can refer to three different but interrelated instances 1) the local- 
regional constitution of the nation-state, 2) the sovereign nation-state and finally 3) the 
global world order. See Slater, ibid.
122 Bryant, Christopher (1995) ‘Civic Nation, Civil Society, Civil Religion’ in: Hall, op. cit., 
ref. 83, pp. 137 and 139.
61
CHAPTER 2
THE GREEK FEMINIST MOVEMENT: 
SOCIAL AND HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
2.1 Introduction
This chapter explores the contextual setting of the Greek feminist movement. 
In the course of the socio-economic variables being assessed, the political system is 
analysed in terms of the role of the state and the political parties. Since the political 
opportunity structure of the Greek feminist movement has been shaped also by the 
existing tradition of movement politics, this will be illustrated in section 2.6, which 
provides a short history of the Greek feminist movement.
2.2 The Sexual Division of Labour
Greece’s economy since World War II has displayed features of both 
advanced and less developed countries.1 It consisted of a significant offshore shipping 
and commercial complex, an extensive patriarchal agricultural economy, and a weak- 
manufacturing base.2 In the early 1950s Greece was still primarily an agricultural 
country, with 47.5% of the population living in rural areas and only 37.7% in towns. 
In 1981, the rural percentage had dropped to 30.3%, and the urban figure gone up to 
58.1%.3 These changes were partially a result of an emigrational flow (1950-1975) to 
the urban centres as well as to countries abroad. In the agricultural sector, the land 
appropriation of 1923 led to the establishment of thousands of peasant smallholdings, 
with concomitant low productivity.4 The economic survival of those smallholdings 
depended largely on the unpaid labour of women and children. Even as late as 1981, 
most of the women engaged in agriculture (70.3%, as against 10.9 % of men) had the 
legal status of ‘auxiliary and non-remunerated family members’, and so were not
1 The data provided in this chapter refer to the period before 1992, and relate to socio­
economic conditions pertaining prior to the emergence and during the development of 
today’s Greek feminist movement. Some significant changes have occurred since 
then, but have been followed by the demise of movement politics and the rise of non­
governmental organisations (NGOs).
2 Stamirii, E. (1986) ‘The Women’s Movement in Greece*, New Left Review, no 158. 
Panayotopoulou, R. ‘The Lost Honour of Greek Women’s Political Culture:
Thoughts and Remarks Concerning Women’s Political Culture’, in: N. Demertzis 
(ed.) (1994) Greek Political Culture in Our Time (Athens, Odysseus -in Greek).
4 Stamiris, op. cit., ref. 2.
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entitled to access to credit, to pensions, and to participation in farmers’ co-operative.5 
According to statistics of 1988, women still constituted a very high percentage of the 
total female labour force in agriculture (37.8 %).6 Although, therefore, their economic 
contribution was extensive and significant, the traditionally strong patriarchal norms 
and values continued to exclude women from the public realm.
Anthropological research into rural life in Greece has investigated the 
assumption that women’s domesticity and their association with the private sphere 
deprives women of control over their own lives. The counter-argument was put 
forward that, since the family is such a significant economic and social unit in the 
Greek village community, the role of the mother within that unit must have important 
consequences for power distribution in Greek society as a whole.7 This inference is 
quite misleading, since it portrays the women’s domestic role as a basis of power, 
even if that power may not be legitimate.8 Any power women may wield depends 
exclusively on their compliance with role expectations.9 Their ‘power’ presupposes 
the successful accomplishment of roles as traditionally defined. That means that even 
if there are instances of women exercising power, they are instances of reproducing 
the patriarchal structure.
As a result of the economic developments of the 1960s, women in the 
agricultural work force left the fields and returned to the house. Throughout this 
decade the increasing commercialisation and mechanisation of agriculture 
significantly altered the sexual division of labour. The expanded mechanisation 
rendered the application of machinery as men’s work on the one hand, and on the 
other it freed men for a wide range of off-farm activities. For the women it meant a
5 Fapagaroufalis, E. (1990) Greek Women in Politics: Gender Ideology and Practice 
in Neighbourhood Groups and the Family, Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, Columbia 
University.
6 Daraki, Pepi (1995) The Vision o f Equivalence o f the Two Sexes (Athens, 
Kastaniotis-in Greek).
7 Friedl, E. (1986) ‘The Position of Women: Appearance and Reality’, in: J. Dubisch 
(ed.), Gender & Power in Rural Greece (Princeton, N.J, Princeton University Press).
8 Dubisch, J. (1986) ‘Introduction’, to Dubisch, ibid.
9 Juliet du Boulay ‘Women - Images of their Nature and Destiny in Rural Greece’, in 
Dubisch, ibid.
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return to their traditional task of food production for the family. So while men’s work 
increasingly took on wage forms, women’s work, both on the land and in the 
household, remained unpaid.10
The dual burden of responsibility borne by women, who also work outside 
their home, is not, therefore an exclusive product of our time. It was a salient feature 
also of pre-industrial relations, as shown by the women’s role in the agricultured 
sector in Greece. While women in farming and urban women share this dual burden, 
the former are usually not paid, do not participate on an equal basis in decision­
making concerning family property, and are excluded from representative political 
bodies. The social position of women in the countryside is very important for 
understanding the dynamic of the feminist movement in Greece since, according to 
the 1981 census, the highest percentage of working women (41.6% percent) were in 
agriculture.11 The social and political marginalisation of these women is reflected in 
their low interest in politics. A 1985-research project, which was conducted by the 
National Centre for Social Research, revealed that only 39.9% women of the 
agricultural population were interested in politics, while the figure for urban women 
was 55.9%.12 Thus, the ‘power’ women may wield by virtue of their participation in 
the productive process or their role in the private sphere, does not contradict their 
obvious exclusion from the public sphere. Moreover, women in the agricultural areas 
are more intensively exposed to the strong ideological influence of the Church, which 
continues to regard the female sex as inferior.13
The 1950-75-urbanisation process significantly changed certain features of 
Greek society. The massive population movement from rural to urban areas had a 
marked effect on women’s participation in education and the non-agricultural labour
10 Stamiris, op. cit., ref. 2.
11 Dobratz, B. (1986) ‘Socio-political Participation of Women in Greece’, Research in 
Politics and Society, no 2.
12 Political Culture in Southern Europe (1985), Research conducted by the National 
Centre for Social Research, Athens (in Greek). The impact of other variables (age, 
education) is illustrated later on in this section.
13 Dobratz, B. (1992) ‘Differences in Political Participation and Value Orientations
among Greek Men and Women’, International Journal o f Sociology and Social 
Policy, 12, 8.
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force, although at a slower rate than in most other European countries.14 All of 
Western Europe experienced a continuous increase in the percentage of women in the 
labour force between 1961 and 1981, but in Greece the figures remained static until 
1971.15 Over fifty years, women’s formal participation in the labour force increased 
by only five per cent (from 26.2% in 1928, to 31.9% in 1981), but in the twenty years 
from 1971 to 1991 the increase was almost the same.16 Yet, although more women 
participated in the workforce, the proportion of paid women remained considerably 
lower than in the rest of Europe.17 If Greek women engage in economic activity, this 
is to a great extent unpaid employment. In 1981, the ‘unpaid family members’ 
category constituted 36% of the women’s work force, with the great majority of this 
unpaid auxiliary female labour in the agricultural sector.18 In 1981 women constituted 
70,3% of unpaid assistants in farming, but unremunerated employment existed in 
other sectors as well. In the same year, unpaid assistants constituted 8% of women in 
the secondary sector, and 13.7% in the tertiary.19 According to the Labour Force 
Survey (Eurostat), by 1991 the category of ‘unpaid family members’ had fallen to 
25.2% in Greece - with the average rate for the European countries being 4.7% at this 
point.20
The persistence of the low degree of women’s integration into the wage 
economy is due to several factors. One of them is the structure of the Greek economy,
14 Kyriazis, N. (1995) ‘Feminism and the Status of Women in Greece’, in: D. Constas 
and T. Stavrou (eds.), Greece Prepares for the Twenty-First Century, (Washington
D.C. and Baltimore, The Woodrow Wilson Centre Press & The John Hopkins 
University Press).
15 Leontidou, L. (1992) ‘Women's Labour in Cities: A Contradictory Acquisition’, in:
E. Leontidou and S. Ammer (eds.), Women’s Greece, (Athens, Alternative 
Publications - in Greek).
16 Women participated in the labour force with 27.7% in 1971, and 32.6% in 1991.
See Panayotopoulou, op. cit., ref. 3; Dobratz, op. cit., ref. 11.
17 Kyriazis, op. cit., ref. 14
18 Kyriazis, ibid.
19 See in Papagaroufalis, op. cit., ref. 5; and Kyriazis, ibid.
20 Simeonidou, C. (1994) ‘The “incompatibility” of women’s family and professional 
lives’, Dini, 7 (in Greek).
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where relations between capital and wage labour have not been generalised to the 
same degree as in more advanced capitalist countries and continue to co-exist with 
widespread self-employment. Another reason is the pronounced role of the family, 
and the sexual division of labour that subjects female labour as auxiliary and 
supplementary to the occupation of the male head of the family.
Another important factor for explaining the low degree of women’s integration 
into the wage economy is their participation in informal employment. Although the 
official figures for women in the labour force remained low in the 1950s and the ‘60s, 
women were not economically inactive during that period of rapid urbanisation. As 
they migrated to the urban centres they became integrated into the informal economy 
through occupations that were actually a direct extension of housework: as live-in 
domestics, house cleaners, seamstresses, piece-workers, etc.21 Being informally 
employed, they were automatically subject to a domestic marginalisation that 
deprived them of social security, union protection, and social recognition.22 This 
domestic isolation of large segments of the female population, during a process of 
rapid urbanisation, functioned as a necessary substitute for the limited state 
expenditures on social welfare. Women provided essential services that elsewhere 
formed part of the social infrastructure of the welfare state.23 The low degree of 
socialisation of reproduction led women either to take employment in jobs that were 
associated with the services of reproduction, or to assume the domestic 
responsibilities of their family themselves. Hence, reproductive activities within the 
family became the exclusive responsibility of women.
Informal employment is still very prevalent in Greece. It can take the form of 
piecework at home, of seasonal engagement and unpaid work in family enterprises, 
etc. It is noteworthy that most women participating in the informal economy today are 
married with children. This reverses some of the earlier tendencies of female labour 
participation. In the 1960s, women with paid employment in the urban centres were 
usually unmarried and worked in order to accumulate a dowry.24 Only a limited 
number of them continued to work after marriage and the birth of their first child. In
21 Stamiris, op. cit., ref. 2
22 Stamiris, ibid.
23 Stamiris, ibid.
24 Kyriazis, op. cit, ref. 14.
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other words, women entered paid employment chiefly during a stage of their life in 
which such outside work did not question or interfere with their traditional status as 
wives.25 The 1980s brought a significant change in women’s attitude to employment 
and their numbers in the labour force increased, including that of married women and 
mothers. However, even if marriage or motherhood has ceased to be perceived as 
excluding outside employment, they are still factors influencing the type of paid work 
that is chosen. The high percentage of married women in paid employment, yet 
selecting occupations that enable them to carry on their family role as well, 
demonstrates on the one hand the erosion of traditional values underlying the 
domestication of women, and on the other the lack of shared responsibilities at home.
With regard to occupational distribution, according to the 1981 census, 41.6% 
of female workers were occupied in the primary sector, 18.2 % in the secondary, and 
40.2% in services. The figures for 1989 were: 32.3% in the primary sector, 17.4% in 
the secondary, and 50.3% in services - i.e. fewer women now worked in agriculture, 
and more in the service sector. According to the Labour Force Survey of 1989, 
occupations where women outnumbered men are: in the professions as office workers, 
in service-sector employment, agriculture and -animal-husbandry; men predominate in 
business as corporate and public executives, craftsmen and labourers.31 A specific 
characteristic of Greek society is the large number of independent small producers. 
Independent production has been a viable strategy for men to make money without 
loosing completely control of the production process.32 The 1981 labour force survey 
found that the category of self-employed accounted for 37.3% percent of the male 
labour force, but for only 20.0% of the women’s.28 It has been more usual for women 
to work in occupations where there is a strong element of dependency (for example as 
auxiliary and non-remunerated family members). An obsolete patriarchal Family Law 
further reinforced the low number of women among the self-employed because prior
25 Kyriazis, ibid.
26 Panayotopoulou, op. cit., ref. 3.
27 Kassimati, K. (1994) ‘Female Education and Employment: Problems of Equal 
Opportunities in Greece’, in: A. Yotopoulos-Marangopoulos (ed.), Women's Rights: 
Human Rights, (Athens, Estia).
28 Dobratz, op. cit., ref. 11.
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to 1982, when the country’s Family Law was revised, married women could not 
legally establish a business without their husband's consent.
It could be argued that the Greek labour market is divided into occupations 
identified as strictly for women and others predominantly for men. In addition there is 
also a huge earnings differential. For the period 1967-80, women on the average 
received only 68.0% of what men were paid. This situation was substantially 
improved in 1982. Following twenty years of relative stability in pay differentials, 
with only small fluctuations, the women’s average hourly wage rose from 67.2% to 
73.1% of men’s pay.30 Not only are Greek women paid less than men, but during 
periods of economic difficulties they are the first to be dismissed.31 In 1983, women 
accounted for 66% percent of the total of unemployed, and for 60-63% of all part- 
time employment.
In the European Community (E.C.) Greece has had one of the highest rates of 
women’s unemployment. In 1991, the unemployment rate for women was 12,9%, 
compared to the average European rate of 10.7%. By contrast, unemployment among 
the men (4.6%) was among the lowest in the E.C. (7,1% average).32 Another 
significant factor concerning female labour in Greece has been the high percentage of 
women (55% in 1991) who either worked continually, or have had to stop working at 
some time and never became integrated into the labour market again. While elsewhere 
in Europe it is quite common for women to stop working more than once and later go 
back to it, in Greece the labour market proves to be inflexible for women.33
Overall, the women’s disadvantaged position in the economic sphere 
expresses itself as greater unemployment, intermittent employment, lower pay and a 
low degree of responsibility in low- status occupations (auxiliary professional roles in 
the public sector and the services, as helpers in agriculture and small- family 
businesses, etc.).34
37 Stamiris, op. cit., ref. 2.
30 Kyriazis, op. cit., ref. 14.
31 Papagaroufalis, op. cit., ref. 5.
32 This has changed significantly during the 1990s. See Simeonidou, op. cit., ref. 20.
33 Simeonidou, ibid.
34 Kassimati, op. cit., ref. 27.
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2.3 Women and Education
The division of labour between men and women is present not only in the 
economy, but is also a marked characteristic concerning education. In the late 1980s 
women accounted for 79% of the country’s illiterates.35 Although the majority of 
them were older women, educational inequality between the sexes has been 
prominent.
Women students at Greek universities have tended to select distinctly ‘female’ 
subjects. In 1989, their main choices were literature/anthropology/ 
psychology/theology. Male students on the other hand chose economics (25.7% 
against 16.4% of women), architecture/engineering/agronomy and veterinary 
medicine.36 The selection of ‘female’ subjects for study, associated with ‘non­
productive’ sectors of the market, strongly affects the women’s future occupational 
choices, of course.
It should be noted that women’s participation in higher education has 
increased significantly in recent years. While, in the 1970s only approximately 30 % 
of university students were women, the 1986 figure was almost 50 % higher.37 
Paradoxically enough, in the 1960s and ‘70s the growing number of women in higher 
education was sometimes associated with a reinforcement of traditional values. 
During that period, education became a factor of crucial advantage in the dowry 
package of women, especially for those who aspired to urban marriages of better 
social standing. In the villages, the family still devoted all its limited resources to the 
education of only the most promising male children, while girls were restricted to 
household training for their domestic roles. In the urban context, however, education 
(together with a dowry-apartment) became a significant asset for women wishing to 
attain a higher social status, not in their own right but through the position of the 
husband.38 Although the educational system may have been perceived instrumentally 
for the prospect of a successful marriage, the more massive entrance of women in the 
educational system has set the preconditions for a more active and equal participation
35 Pollis, A. (1992) ‘Gender and Social Change in Greece: The Role of Women’, in:
T. Kariotis (ed.), The Greek Socialist Experiment (New York, Pella Publishing).
36 Kassimati, op. cit., ref. 27.
37 Pollis, op. cit., ref. 35.
38 Stamiris, op. cit., ref. 2.
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of women in other social spheres (economy, politics, etc.) as well as for the 
articulation of a feminist consciousness. The second -wave Greek feminist movement
•  •  • I Qdrew its support mainly from women that held educational qualifications.
As more women became educated significant changes occurred in the 
composition of the female labour force that, from the 1980s onwards, has been less 
homogeneous and more polarised than the men’s.40 Earlier, women workers, whether 
in the public sector or in factories, were employed only in the lowest ranks, but in the 
‘80s class disparities among working women began to grow and resulted in marked 
differentiation. At one end of the scale are the young professionals of Athens and 
Salonica; at the other are the manual workers in the factories and the informal 
economy. The increased heterogeneity of the social subject ‘woman’ is reflected also 
in the degree of feminist consciousness and the political behaviour of women. The 
changes in women’s political behaviour, as well as the impact of variables such as 
education, age, and occupation on the formulation of a pro-feminist stand, are 
elaborated in the section below.
39 In Greece, the first-wave of a feminist movement emerged during the second half 
of the nineteenth century. The second-wave refers to the movement, as it developed 
during the post-junta period after 1974. Concerning international feminism, the first- 
wave concerned women contesting their fundamental rights (political, economic, 
educational, etc.). The second-wave on the other hand established a very different 
agenda of demands and a new body of feminism, centred on the notions of 
reproduction, experience and difference. Accordingly, the first wave is usually 
associated with the principle of equality (legal and socio-economic), while the second 
is linked to the principle o f ‘women’s liberation’. The second-wave did not propose to 
resolve the conflict between the sexes within the context of the existing society, but it 
argued that the abolition of women’s oppression presupposed overturning the existing 
patriarchal society (e.g. in terms of its values, sexuality, power). See Humm, Maggie, 
(ed.) (1992) Feminism: A Reader (New York and London, Harvester Wheatsheaf).
40 Leontidou, op. cit., ref. 15.
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2.4 The Political Behaviour of Women, and the Development of a Feminist 
Consciousness
In 1987, a U.N. study on the participation of Greek women in decision-making 
processes presented a very negative picture: compared to other Western European 
countries Greece had the lowest proportion of women in Parliament (4.3%). In the 
rest of Europe, the figures for 1987 varied between 6.4% for the United Kingdom and 
34.4% for Norway.41 The Greek women’s participation in official posts, always 
having been very restricted, raises the question of whether this reflects a more general 
political participation gap between Greek men and women. In 1988, the National 
Centre for Social Research conducted an enquiry into the political behaviour of 
women. The research found that women considered politics as less important in their 
lives than did men.42 For example, to the question ‘Would you say that political 
decisions have an impact on your life?’, 20.6% of women, but only 13.2% of men, 
answered ‘No impact at all’. However, the disparity was chiefly due to the traditional 
attitudes of older women.43 Among the younger generation, where age and education 
functioned as homogenising factors, there was no difference in the perception of 
politics by the two sexes. This is to say that in many instances the influence on 
political behaviour of gender was less important than that of age and education. The 
feet that young women and young men often had more in common than young and 
older women shows radical differentiations within the category of women.44 Men on 
the other hand, regardless of age, presented a more homogeneous stand vis-a-vis 
politics.
Another significant variable affecting the political behaviour of women is the 
nature of their occupation. Its impact is, however, less significant than that of age and
41 Kyriazis, op. cit., ref. 14.
42 Pantelidou-Malouta, M. (1992) Women and Politics: The Political Profile o f Greek 
Women, (Athens, Gutenberg - in Greek).
43 Pantelidou-Malouta, ibid.
44 Age has a different impact on the political behaviour of men and women. Older 
men are more likely to discuss politics, older women are less so. See Dobratz, op. cit., 
ref. 13.
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education.45 According to the study by the National Centre for Social Research, 
university students were most likely to declare themselves is support of the feminist 
cause, while women in the agricultural sector, pensioners, or unpaid working family 
members were the most reluctant to do so. Overall, older illiterate, pensioners or 
auxiliary and unpaid working family members constituted the hard core of traditional 
attitudes about the role of women; they were alienated from the political process and 
expressed resignation where political developments are concerned. On the other hand, 
the women who were supportive of the feminist cause also showed a participatory 
interest in politics. In other words, the political participation gap between the two 
sexes was significant only in regard to specific categories of the older population.
The absence of any major divergence between the political behaviour of Greek 
women and men holds also in respect of the political alignment of the two sexes, 
which diverges much less in Greece than in many other European countries 46 The 
results of the 1981 national election showed no major differences in the way men and 
women cast their ballot -  Le. there was no clear identification of the Right or Left 
with either men or women. What does have a significant influence on women’s 
positioning in the political spectrum is their degree of feminist consciousness.47 This 
means that women with a low degree of feminist consciousness usually align with the 
Right, and women with a high degree of feminist consciousness tend towards the 
Left.48 For instance, the National Centre study showed that 44.5% of the women who 
were negative or indifferent to the feminist discourse belonged to the Right, and only 
10.2% to the Left. This is partially explained by the feet that historically it was almost 
exclusively the political forces of the Left that have supported women’s issues.49 
Moreover, the mass-mobilisation and organisation of women took place in the left- 
wing political spectrum, while right-wing women became organised only very
45 According to Pantelidou, the distinction between working woman and housewife is 
less decisive for defining the political behaviour of women than the influence of age 
and education.
46 Dobratz, op. cit., ref. 11.
47 Dobratz, ibid.
48 Pantelidou-Malouta, op. cit., ref. 42.
49 See section 2.6 below: ‘A Concise History of the Greek Feminist Movement’.
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recently (since the 1980s), following the model of political parties of the Centre or the 
Left.
The National Centre study also brought out another significant dimension 
concerning the political stance of women: they predominantly choose one specific 
form of political participation, namely that of conventional politics and the rules of 
parliamentary democracy.50 To the question what citizens should do who disagree 
with a governmental decision, the majority of both men (53.0%) and women (53.9%) 
opted for the institutional processes of the parliament; only 25.0% of men and 20.7% 
of women favoured demonstrations to express their dissent. It was especially women 
with feminist ideas who seemed most positively predisposed towards the 
parliamentary system, and demanded a larger presence of women in the centres of 
political decision-making. They did not, therefore, discredit conventional political 
activity (e.g. electoral campaigning, contact with specialists or party activists), nor 
challenge the legitimacy of its institutional expression (political parties). These 
findings are in accord with the political strategies chosen by most second-wave 
feminist organisations that have aligned themselves with political parties in order to 
promote women’s issues through the party organisations. In Europe, on the contrary, 
second-wave feminism was associated with opposition to the prevailing political 
system, which was regarded as the personification of male supremacy.
We have seen that age, education, occupation and feminist consciousness have 
had a positive influence on the degree of women’s political participation. Concerning 
now the total of the Greek population, there are two significant factors that have 
affected the consolidation of a pro-feminist stand: the vitality of the feminist 
movement, and the incorporation of the principle of equality into the official public 
discourse.
According to the E.C. survey Women and Men in Europe, the participation of 
Greek women in feminist organisations was 4% in 1983, Greece ranking significantly 
above the European average (1%).51 In regard to the sharing of household and family 
duties, Greece and Denmark were the two countries where sexual equality emerged
50 Pantelidou-Malouta, op. cit., ref. 42.
51 The first survey of Women and Men in Europe, which incorporated Greece in the 
analysis, was in 1983, two years after the country became a full member of the 
European Community.
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most clearly as a popular concept of the woman’s role (Greece: 51%, Denmark: 46%,
E.C. average: 36%).52 Concerning contemporary women’s liberation movements, only 
in Greece and France were men and women equally in their favour. This could be 
explained by the similar political context of the two countries, in both of which the 
socialists made ‘equality of the sexes’ a primary target of their policies.
The attitude of Greek society generally has been affected by the presence or 
absence of the feminist movement and the extent to which women have joined its 
organisations. In the early 1980s, the feminist movement flourished and the socialist 
government articulated a clear pro-equality public discourse, influencing thereby 
Greek society positively vis-a-vis the importance and goals of sexual equality. The 
subsequent divisions and eventual demise of the Greek feminist movement, together 
with the government gradually distancing itself from its pro-feminist agenda, was 
clearly reflected in the 1987 Men and Women o f Europe survey. While the idea of 
equality did not disappear altogether in Greece, it certainly lost ground after 1983. 
The survey found that Greek society had retreated ‘...to a more nuanced position: the 
woman has a less absorbing job than the man, and does more of the housework and 
looking after the children’.53 The 1987 Eurobarometer also illustrated a retrenchment 
in social attitudes towards the idea of equality, but provided a far more positive image 
in comparison with later findings. So in the Eurobarometer for 1995, Greece ranked 
higher than the European average in supporting a sexual division of labour in family 
life.54 The data correctly reflect the total absence of a feminist movement and the 
significant de-evaluation of feminist issues in the official public discourse of the 
1990s. It was therefore only the earlier presence of a strong feminist movement that 
had pressured and achieved the introduction of ‘gender’ in the official political 
discourse and so made society as a whole more receptive to feminist issues. The 
strategies of the feminist organisations for achieving this have been various, and 
closely associated with the enduring structures of the Greek political system.
Women and Men o f Europe in 1983, Commission of the European Communities, 
Supplement no. 16.
53 Men and Women o f Europe in 1987, Commission of the European Communities, 
Supplement no. 26, p. 15.
54 Eurobarometer, (Spring 1995), no. 42.
75
2.5 The State, Civil Society, and the Political Parties
When the second-wave Greek feminist movement emerged, it was faced with 
a political tradition devoid of any recent autonomous feminist struggles. Only at the 
time of its initial mobilisation, during the inter-war period, did the Greek feminist 
movement have an independent status, and from 1936 onwards the historical divisions 
of the Greek feminist movement have coincided with major breaks in the political 
process.55 Thus, women’s struggles were considered as rather particularistic in regard 
to the ‘general’ struggle for establishing basic democratic institutions (through the 
coups d’ etat of 1936 and 1967), defending the national integrity (World War II), and 
defining the country’s political regime (civil war of 1945). At all these historical 
junctions the feminist discourse was submerged in the more general political 
discourse that focused on the dominant principles of class or nation, leaving no room 
for the articulation of specifically feminist demands. The association of feminist 
issues with more general political struggles was facilitated by the forces of the Left 
being willing to incorporate women’s demands in their program. So while the second- 
wave feminist movement had to deal with a tradition that knew nothing of 
autonomous feminist struggles, it also found itself vis-^-vis parliamentary forces open 
to and supportive of women’s demands. In the final instance, the majority of the 
second-wave women’s organisations built alliances with the political parties and 
accepted a status of semi-autonomy.
Throughout its development the Greek feminist movement had to contend not 
only with more general conflicts predominating over the feminist cause, but also with 
a political disposition opposed to any attempt at mobilising civil society and 
developing any kind of movement independent of the state and the political parties.56 
By definition, the goal of political parties is the attainment of political power. Their 
political vision encompasses the transformation of society through control over and 
use of the state. The alignment of the second-wave Greek feminist movement with the 
political parties therefore implied a positive attitude towards the state. This aspect of 
the contemporary Greek feminist movement contradicts some basic dimensions of the 
ideal type ‘new social movement’. It can, however, be explained by a historical 
analysis of the statocratic and partocratict characteristics of the Greek political
55 Stamiris, op. cit., ref 2
56 For a definition of the concept ‘social movement sector’ see chapter 1.
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system. An analysis of the evolution of the relations between the state, civil society, 
and the party system is necessary for understanding the political strategies that were 
available to the feminist organisations and their final course of action.
As Tsoucalas notes, the distinctive historical role of the Greek state has been 
its function as a decisive and autonomous factor in determining social and political 
variables.57 The historical causes for this extended role can be traced back to the 
nineteenth century, when liberal political institutions were imposed from the outside 
on the young Greek social formation without any prior development of civil society. 
The imposition of these institutions led to a false modernisation, as well as to them 
not functioning as expected.58 The general non-correspondence between institutional 
structures and the development of social relations resulted in a state apparatus for 
extensive patronage recruitment, instead of a more limited, rationally functioning 
state. The huge size of the public sphere has had a decisive influence on political 
struggles, given that it deprived social movements of any significant resources. 
Moreover, the long tradition of a strong state dominating over civil society eventually 
led to the identification of politics with political forces that are state-dependant. 
Hence, the vastness of the state and the scantiness of other social networks have 
predisposed Greek society to an affirmative stand vis-a-vis the state and the 
administration in general. This is exemplified by the long history of state dependency 
and state intervention in the labour movement. In consequence, Greek society 
developed a corporatist political system Political power became centralised, and 
political participation usually channelled through groups authorized by the state. This 
means that the presence in modem Greek society of a political culture supportive of 
autonomous citizen’s associations has never been more than feeble.59 A brief 
historical account of the party system will outline its main properties and their impact 
on the feminist movement.
57 Tsoucalas, C. (1983) Social Development and the State: The Formation o f  the 
Public Sphere in Greece, (Athens, Themelio - in Greek).
58 Tsoucalas, ibid.
59 Cacoullos, A. (1994) ‘Women Confronting Party Politics in Greece’, in: B. Nelson 
and N. Chowdhury (eds.), Women and Politics Worldwide (New Haven and London, 
Yale University Press).
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The evolution and consolidation of the political institutional structures in 
Greece proceeded in three historical stages: (i) oligarchic clientelism (1863-1909),
(ii) centralised clientelism (1909-67), and (iii) clientelism-populism (1967-92).60 
During the first phase, political representation was restricted. Political parties 
constituted loose coalitions led by patrons whose political power rested on regional 
clienteles. This decentralised form of clientelism was succeeded by the more 
centralised political structures of phase two. Political parties ceased to be mere clubs 
of notables, and developed centralised organisational structures that enabled the 
national leadership to control the centrifugal tendencies of local bosses. However, the 
political parties continued to reproduce the particularistic/clientelistic features of the 
political system throughout the interwar period and until the 1967-74 military 
dictatorship.61 The fall of the dictatorship and the 1981 rise to power of the Socialist 
Party (Panellinio Sosialistiko Kinima - PASOK) brought significant and radical 
changes to the organisation of political parties. PASOK was Greece’s first non­
communist political organisation based on a mass party.62 It developed a large 
political network consisting of local branches that spread all over the country. In this 
way it broadened political participation and .undermined the established power of 
traditional patrons. However, PASOK did not succeed in eliminating the 
personalistic/particularistic features of the political system, but it did make them more 
centralised. Clientelistic bosses gradually lost their power to a centralised party 
structure, which replaced traditional patrons with better-educated party cadres. If the 
personalistic/particularistic politics of the pre-junta parties has persisted, it is in a 
different form. A new type of personalistic/particularistic politics, based on populist 
mobilisation and organisation, has succeeded local bosses. Therefore, in Greece the 
transition from decentralised to more centralised political forms did not go hand in 
hand with the marginalisation of the personalistic/particularistic features of the 
political system as it did in Western Europe.63
60 Mouzelis, N. (1995) ‘Greece in the Twenty-first Century: Institutions and Political 
Culture’, in: Constas, Stavrou, op. cit., ref. 14.
61 Mouzelis, ibid.
f t) Mouzelis, ibid.
Mouzelis, ibid.
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The persistence of clientelist politics is one of the basic features of the Greek 
party system. Another significant characteristic is the prevalence and constancy of 
three political camps, which developed as the result of two major historical conflicts. 
The first of these was the national schism (dihasmos) between Venizelists and anti- 
Venizelists over the issue of the monarchy, which generated the first major cleavage 
between the Right and the Centre.64 The second conflict was the civil war of 1946-49, 
and its violent confrontation between the bourgeois parties of the Right and a 
communist-dominated Left. These historical cleavages have resulted in the 
demarcation of three deeply rooted and lasting political camps: the Centre, the Right 
and the Left.65 All through the 1980s the three-party system kept its structural 
continuity with the past, and at the four national elections in that decade the three 
major parties between them carried more than 94 % of the vote 66
The three-party system is dominated by a bipolar competition between Right 
and anti-Right, which has resulted in a political subsystem the basic feature of which 
is the opposition of Right and Progressive Forces (anti-Right).67 The political 
discourse of PASOK is formulated on the basis of this Right/anti-Right cleavage. It 
has appealed to three generations - the 1941-44 war time generation, the generation of 
the Centre Union and its two ‘relentless’ struggles of 1961-63 and 1965-67, and the
64 The main cause of the national schism was the opposition between Prime Minister 
Eleftherios Venizelos and King Constantine over Greek participation in World War I. 
However, this clash was symptomatic of a deeper conflict between the liberals, who 
supported the broad range of Venizelos’ radical reforms and the conservatives, who 
adhered to the institution of the monarchy. Mavrogordatos, G. (1984) ‘The Greek 
Party System: A Case of Limited but Polarised Pluralism?’, West European Politics, 
7, 4; and Papadopoulos, Yannis (1989) ‘Parties, the State and Society in Greece: 
Continuity within Change’, West European Politics, 12, 2, Clogg, Richard (1979) A 
Short History o f Modern Greece (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press).
65 Mavrogordatos, ibid.
66 Nicolacopoulos, I. (1990) ‘The Electoral Influence of Political Forces’, in: C. 
Lirintzis, I. Nicolacopoulos (eds), Elections and Political Parties in the 1980s: 
Developments and Prospects o f  the Political System (Athens, Themelio - in Greek)
67 Moschonas, G. (1994) ‘The Right -  Anti-Right Cleavage in Post-Junta Greece: 
(1974-1990)’, in: Demertzis, op. cit., 3.
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generation of resistance to the 1967-74 junta - thereby reconstructing contemporary
•  •  •Greek history as the product of bipolar opposition between Right and anti-Right. 
Any political attempt to reconstruct the historical process on a different basis has 
resulted in considerable political and electoral costs.69 Today’s Greek party system is 
divided into the two conflictual subsystems of Right and anti-Right, thereby 
restricting the strategic choices of the three political camps.70 Since the Greek party
68 Mavrogordatos, op. cit., ref. 64. The first ‘relentless’ struggle was the political 
conflict concerning the elections of 1961. The leader of the Centre Union , George 
Papandreou, together with the leaders of other oppositional parties, accused the 
governing ‘National Radical Union’ and the monarchy of instigating widespread 
violence and electoral fraud. In the new elections that were finally conducted in 1964, 
the Centre Union attained an absolute majority and took over the government. The 
second relentless struggle, which commenced in 1965, refers to Prime Minister 
George Papandreou’s opposition to the monarchy. After a series of political crises the 
King forced George Papandreou to resign, which led to a cycle of mass mobilisations 
and popular protests.
69 Moschonas, op. cit., ref. 67.
7ft •Chiefly three parties have expressed the anti-right subsystem since the fall of the 
junta in 1974: the Socialist Party, the Communist Party of the Interior and the Greek 
Communist Party. The Socialist Party was founded by Andreas Papandreou in 1974, 
came to power in 1981, and governed until 1989. The Greek Communist Party, 
outlawed in 1947, split into two in 1968 with the invasion of Prague as the pretext. 
The Stalinist section retained the stronger appeal to the electorate, while the 
Communist Party of the Interior adhered to the ideological tradition of 
Eurocommunism and refused control by Moscow. Both parties were legalised by 
Prime Minister Konstantine Karamanlis in 1974. It is these three political parties that 
have constituted the cornerstone of the anti-Right political subsystem. They also 
compose the left wing of the party system, although the Socialist party, which started 
as a left-wing party, subsequently moved to the centre. In 1989, following a period of 
political crisis and scandals, the Right/anti-Right subdivision of the political spectrum 
was temporarily negated by a brief collaboration of the conservative party with both 
communist parties. In the elections of 1993, 1996 and 2000 the Socialist Party 
(PASOK) received the majority of parliamentary seats and continues to govern.
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system is that of limited but polarised pluralism, competition for government power is
• 71feasible only for the two dominant contenders (the socialists and the conservatives). 
Moreover, the strong presence of the anti-systemic Communist Party only increases 
the political polarisation. 72
The second-wave Greek feminist movement has relied heavily on the already 
developed bureaucratic organisations of the political parties and demanded that the 
state resolve the many women’s issues. The only exception was the Movement for 
Women’s Liberation, which tried to create an independent arena for itself within civil 
society.
The consequences of the political strategy chosen by the party-allied feminist 
organisations were many. Above all, alliance of most of the second-wave feminist 
organisations with the political parties restricted their potential for a radical 
renegotiation of values and power hierarchies. With the principle of democratic 
centralism dominating the political parties of the Left, the possibilities for direct 
participatory practices were limited and political decisions were usually imposed from 
the top. The party-allied feminist organisations took over these organisational 
principles. Although they developed a whole network of branches, policy was usually 
formulated by the top executive body and then disseminated to the local branches. 
The affirmation of the state, as an instrument for the formulation and application of 
policy reinforced centralised perceptions of politics. The party affiliated feminist 
organisations were characterised by a centralised perception of politics, which meant 
that the ideology was decreed at the top. Besides, their alliance with the political 
parties and especially the positive perception of the state by the Union of Greek 
Women (Enosis Ginaikon Elladas - EGE) led to the achievement of a number of 
reforms and meant access to social areas, which autonomous feminist groups could 
not reach. However, some legal changes on social issues were not really assimilated 
by the Greek society. A good example of that is the civil marriage. Marriage in church 
still prevails, while the percentage of civil marriage remains minimal.
EGE’s heavy reliance on the Socialist Party and the state apparatus did not 
permit the development of a counterculture that would strengthen civil society vis-a- 
vis the political institutions. Then again, the party mechanism and state apparatus
71 Mavrogodatos, op. cit., ref. 64.
77 Mavrogordatos, ibid.
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were able to promote gender equality even in social areas that were not receptive to 
women’s demands.
In summary, while control by the state and the parties undermined the 
autonomous status of the Greek feminist movement, the party and state apparatus did 
manage to curb strongly entrenched discriminatory practices through the process of 
social engineering and central administration. The viability and the duration of these 
policies were, however, limited, because no machinery was set up to apply and 
support them on a long-term basis. Moreover, the imposition from the top of the 
principle of sexual equality was effective only as long as a viable feminist movement 
existed to mobilise Greek society around the issue.
The political choice and strategy of the party-affiliated women’s organisations 
was severely criticised by the autonomous feminist groups. They charged the party 
affiliated organisations with circumscribing their activities by the boundaries of 
patriarchy, since they focused only on modernising patriarchy without actually 
questioning its foundations. They further argued that the abdication of autonomy of 
the party-affiliated organisations was a reflection of their unwillingness to trespass on 
men’s political territory. The autonomous feminist groups became the only women’s 
network that remained independent of political parties and articulated an anti-statist 
political stand. They intervened on the micro-level of everyday life -in the schools, 
the neighbourhood, and the work place -in their attempt to create an alternative 
feminist culture. However, the absence of a tradition of independent citizen’s 
associations and the identification of politics with political parties led to the political 
and social marginalisation of the groups.
The issues mentioned above (state, civil society, parties, autonomy, etc.) are 
further elaborated in the two case studies discussed in chapters 3 & 4.
2.6 A Concise History of the Greek Feminist Movement
The beginnings of the Greek feminist movement go back to the nineteenth 
century. Its course, however, has been discontinuous, due to a number of national 
events that put in question either the independence of the nation-state or the 
legitimacy of the prevailing political regime. As mentioned already, the historical 
course of the Greek feminist movement is usually divided into two broad phases: i) 
from the nineteenth century to 1974, and ii) from 1974 to 1990. The nature of claims
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articulated constitutes the distinguishing feature between those two phases.73 The first
phase voiced chiefly demands for political, social, and economic equality with men,
while the second focused on the consolidation of a feminist identity and questioned
male supremacy per se.
The earlier phase of the Greek women’s movement developed within the
context of an industrial boom, when the initial flowering of capitalism gave rise to
demands for a restructuring of women’s position in Greek society.74 In 1834 the
women’s right to elementary education was legally ratified, but women had to wait
another 60 years for the right to receive secondary education (finally granted in
1893).75 For all that, the predominant social practices continued: to educate women
either at home or not at all.
In 1864, a new Constitution defined the political regime of Greece as a
parliamentary monarchy, and Article 66 ratified the right to universal suffrage
concerning national elections. In 1889, a group of women addressed a memorandum
to Parliament and demanded the ratification of equal rights with men in terms of
education, work opportunities and politics.76 By this time a growing number of new
■ ■■■ — 1 ■■'l l 0
The year 1990 is selected as the end of the second wave feminist movement in
Greece on the grounds that: (i) the last and final spark of the movement was the
creation of a united front in 1990 for pressuring the political parties to apply quotas
for women to stand as parliamentary candidates; (ii) the feminist movement had
already, withdrawn from any form of collective activism; (iii) a new social-
movement project had emerged in 1989, the Federation of Ecological and Alternative
Organisations, which incorporated some surviving autonomous feminist organisations
(e.g. the group Katina).
74 In the first part of the nineteenth century, even before national independence, 
women founded institutes and schools for the education of girls, such as the Greek 
School for Young Girls, the Professional School for Greek Women, and the Sunday 
School for Girls. The first secondary school for girls was set up in 1835. See, Kaplan, 
G. (1992) Contemporary Western European Feminism (London, Allen & Unwin, 
UCL).
75 Chronaki, Zogia (1996) ‘Greek Women in the Nineteenth Century: First Attempts 
at Equality and Emancipation’, Kathemerini, 6 Oct. 1996 (in Greek).
76 Chronaki, ibid
83
publications written and published by women reflected the change in women’s social 
position, since from the middle of the century onwards, educated women had searched 
for ways to articulate their own discourse and to write about the living conditions and 
actual activities of women. Publishing became the predominant means for women to 
express themselves collectively, and this in turn gave rise to a public debate 
concerning legal equality with men.77 Women’s journals increasingly changed their 
orientation from women’s issues towards promoting women’s rights to education, 
employment, as well as frill electoral rights. So in 1870, Emilia Ktena brought out the 
women’s journal Evridiki in Istanbul, which demanded equal access for women to 
education and jobs. The founder of the Greek women’s movement is considered to be 
Kalliroi Parren, the first Greek woman journalist, who published the Newspaper for 
Ladies (Eflmeris ton Kirion) in 1887.78 At the head of a group of feminists, Parren 
wrote a petition in 1889 that was signed by 2,850 women demanding electoral rights, 
equal access to employment and to public education.79 In 1911, Parren founded the 
‘Lyceum of Greek Women’, the first long-term women’s organisation to promote 
sexual equality under the law. In the same year the Socialists were the first political 
party to incorporate sexual equality under the law into their political program.80
During the period from 1870 to 1920, the political strategy adopted by the 
women’s organisations was predominantly defensive. They tried to enlist the support 
of prominent men in and out of parliament, and their discourse acknowledged the
77 The issue of equality between the sexes was voiced for the first time in the 
newspaper ‘Socrates: Newspaper of Women and the People’ (O Socratis: Eflmeris ton 
Ginaikon ke tou Laou) in 1838. In 1842 in Instanbul, Efrosini Samartzidou directed 
and published the women’s magazine Kypseli that promoted the equality of the two 
sexes. In 1867, in Athens, Penelope Lazaridou brought out the magazine Thalia. In 
1897 ‘Family’ (Ikogenia) was directed and published by Anna Serouiou. See in 
Chronaki, ibid
78 The first issue of The Ladies' Newspaper sold around 10,000 copies in 1887. Its 
first as well as its second edition were sold out. See Leontidou, op. cit., ref. 15.
79 Papageorge-Limberes, Y. (1992) ‘The Women’s Movement and Greek Politics’, in: 
J. Bystydzienski (ed.), Women Transforming Politics: Worldwide Strategies for 
Empowerment (Bloomington and Indianapolis, Indiana University Press).
80 Daraki, op. cit., ref. 6.
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traditional roles of women. The men were given assurances that women’s struggle 
would not endanger the male status.
It was only after World War I that the early scattered women’s groups 
developed into a women’s movement, though still restricted to a small number of 
prominent educated, urban women.81 Among the new associations that came into 
existence the best known was the Association for Women’s Rights (Sindesmos gia ta 
Dikeomata tis Ginekas) founded in 1920 by Avra Theodoropoulou, Maria Svolou, and 
Maria Negreponti. An important role was played also by the National Council of 
Women (Ethniko Simvoulio Ellinidon), and by the Socialist Association (Sosialistikos 
Omilos), both founded in 1919.82 The latter was set up by a group of socialist 
feminists who were also members of the Socialist Workers’ Party of Greece. The 
Association president, Athina Gaitanou-Gianniou, became one of the outstanding 
figures of the Greek feminist movement.
The demands put forward by the women’s groups during the years after World 
War I concerned
—  economic rights: equal pay, equal access to all public employment, equal 
opportunities for promotion, protective .legislation for female and children’s 
labour;
—  social rights: revision of the family law, the right to abortion, abolition of 
prostitution, repeal of state regulations concerning the functioning of brothels;
—  political rights: the right to vote and to be elected, unionisation of female labour, 
international community: peace among the nations.
The strategies applied by these organisations were many and included efforts to 
increase public awareness of women’s issues, mobilisation of support through the 
press, and lobbying of parliamentary members. Consequently, the women’s 
movement acquired its own autonomous dynamic in the interwar period. A very 
important external factor that influenced its development was the influx of 1.5 million 
Greek refugees from western Turkey after the military defeat in 1922. Most of these
81 Kyriazis, op. cit., ref. 14.
82 There is dispute concerning the exact date that the National Council of Women was 
founded. The date given here is provided by Papageorge-Limberes, op. cit., ref. 79.
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refugees were women, who became integrated into the economy. Another major 
event was the 1923 government decision to appropriate and redistribute big landed 
estates, which resulted in the creation of thousands of family smallholdings. This 
actually led to deterioration in the status of rural woman, since the property-less male 
peasant now found himself a smallholder, while the female member of his household 
became unpaid custodian (as discussed in section 2.2).84
The dictatorship of General Metaxas in 1936 closed down all progressive 
women’s organisations, while most of the conservative groups - such as the Christian 
Union of Young Women, or the Union of Greek Women Scientists - were allowed to 
continue.85 The fascist ideology of the Metaxas regime kept women restricted to their 
traditional roles, but in its efforts to win public support it mobilised women as well as 
men and incorporated them in the public realm. For instance, women played an active 
part in the regime’s youth organisations. As under fascism elsewhere, women were 
subjects to contradictory processes. Their integration in the realm of politics 
reinforced their inferior position in the private sphere.
The German occupation finally dissolved the remaining feminist 
organisations, and women became an integral and important part of the resistance 
movement. Some of them formed their own resistance organisation of Free Young 
Women, which was affiliated to the National Patriotic Youth Organisation and so 
participated actively in the National Liberation Front (Ethniko Apeleftherotiko Metopo 
- E.A.M.).86 Equality of the sexes was accepted into the programmes of the majority 
of resistance organisations, together with the principles of popular sovereignty, social
83 In 1907 women accounted for only 8% of the total registered workforce, while in 
1928 their number had risen to 25%. See Leontidou, op. cit., ref. 15.
84 Women have ever since been disproportionate in the agricultural labour force. For 
instance, in 1928 the total female labour force numbered 663,435 of whom 434,623 
worked in the agricultural sector, and only 99,712 in industry. The rest was employed 
in public services. See Daraki, op. cit., ref. 6.
85 Kaplan, op. cit., ref 74.
86 The National Liberation Front (EAM) constituted the political body of the 
resistance movement against the Germans. The military division was named National 
Popular Liberation Army.
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justice, and socialism.87 In the spring of 1943, the (opposition) ‘mountain 
government’ decided to institutionalise a set of rules for the regions liberated from 
German occupation. In August 1943, two decrees were issued concerning the 
electoral processes for self-government of the free regions. They both set down that
AO
the right to vote and to be elected to be exercised by women as well as men. In the 
popular assemblies in the villages, women now became active participants. On 10 
March 1944, the Political Committee of National Liberation preceeded to the election 
of a National Council. Five women were elected among the 280 members that 
constituted the National Council (Maria Svolou, Chrissa Hatzivasiliou, Keti Nisiriou,
F. Fillipidi, and Makki Mavroidi).89 It was, therefore, during the resistance that Greek 
women were for the first time able to enjoy full rights - if only briefly. The civil war 
that followed (1946-1949) led not only to the elimination of all progressive 
organisations, but also subordinated the women’s struggle secondary to the more 
general civil-war confrontation.
After the end of the war, left-wing women who had participated in the 
resistance against the Germans became the founders of feminist organisations. So in 
1945 the Panhellenic Union of Women (Panellinia 'Enosi Ginaikon - PEG) was 
established by women that were already active in the left-wing National Liberation 
Front. It gained wide support and mobilised thousands of women for the aims of 
promoting women’s equality, the fight against fascism, and working for international 
peace. 90 A distinctive feature of the women’s organisations that emerged after the 
war was the projection of their demands not as specifically women’s claims, but as 
general social issues. One of the last public feminist manifestations before the 
outbreak of the civil war had been the formation of the Panhellenic Federation of 
Women and its conference in May of 1946, at which representatives from over 150
87 Stamiris, op. cit., ref. 2.
88 Vervenioti, T. (1993) ‘The Institutionalisation by the Resistance Movement of 
Women’s Right to Vote (1941-1944)’, Dini, 6 (in Greek).
89 Vervenioti, T. (1992) ‘Greek Women before the War, During the Occupation, and 
the Civil War’, in: Leontidou, op. cit., ref. 15.
90 Samiou, D. (1992) ‘The Feminist Movement in Greece (1860-1960)’, in: 
Leontidou, ibid.
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women’s organisations were present.91 However, when the civil war broke out, all 
left-wing organisations, including the women’s, were crushed and organisations 
supportive of the regime were restricted to charities.
The period from the end of the civil war (1949) to the colonel’s coup d’etat of 
1967 was a time when Greek women acquired important political rights. As 
mentioned earlier, the presidential decree of 5 February1930 granted women the right 
to vote in municipal elections, and law 959/1949 went a step further, so that in the 
municipal elections of 1951 women could actively participate as candidates; 127
O '!
female municipal and communal councillors were elected. Law 2159/1952 led to the 
full enfranchisement of Greek women93 Although women could not yet vote in the 
national elections of November 1952, they did so for the first time in the Salonica by- 
election in January 1953, which returned Greece’s first woman deputy. In 1953 the 
Covenant on Women’s Political Rights, enacted by the United Nations in 1952, was 
recognised by the Greek state.94 This officially ended all political discrimination 
against womea
The significant progress in women’s rights in the 1950s was not, however, 
contingent on the existence of a strong feminist movement. The municipal-vote 
concession of 1930 had been the result of a vigorously active feminist movement, 
while the women’s full enfranchisement of 1952 was mainly a result of international 
influences. The fact that women’s full electoral rights were not acquired in response 
to demands by the women’s movement has meant a devaluation of the significance 
that women have ascribed to the vote.95 Moreover, since the presidential decree of 
1952 and the Law of the same year were both interventions of the state concerning 
women, the idea that it is the centralised state that will find solutions to women’s 
issues was reinforced
The colonels’ coup of 1967 put a stop to all public activities. Women’s 
organisations were forced to dissolve or went underground. During the junta years the
91 Kaplan, op. cit., ref. 74.
92 Pantelidou-Malouta, M. (1989) ‘Greeks and the Women’s Vote’, Greek Review o f  
Social Research, 73, (in Greek).
Pantelidou-Malouta, op. cit., ref. 42.
94 Papageorge-Limberes, op. cit., ref. 79.
95 Pantelidou-Malouta, op. cit., ref. 42.
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restricted entrance of women into the labour force was coupled with a strong 
reassertion of family values. The ideology of the regime was codified in the slogan 
‘Fatherland, Religion, Family’, and the state-controlled media presented child-care 
and household duties as the natural sphere of women’s activities.96 Hence, in the late 
‘60s and beginning of the ‘70s the Greek feminist movement encountered the 
prohibition of political activities by the regime together with the official projection of 
a strong patriarchal identity. During a period when the second-wave feminist 
movement was proliferating and thriving in Western Europe and the USA, in Greece 
the movement was once again subdued to the broader struggle for democracy. When 
second-wave Greek feminism gathered momentum in the mid-1970s, it was in the 
context of a general political mobilisation for the consolidation of democracy.
After the fell of the junta in 1974, women from the political Left came 
together in an organisation that called itself the Movement of Democratic Women 
(Kinisi Dimokratikon Ginaikon -  KDG). Its immediate aim was to contribute to the 
firm establishment of a genuine democracy, in which process women’s equality with 
men was perceived as a fundamental component. KDG was a non-partisan, broad 
umbrella organisation, which however soon split into different factions representative 
of different party affiliations. In 1976, two of these fections from the KDG set up new 
women’s organisations. Thus, the Union of Greek Women {Enosi Ginaikon Elladas - 
EGE), ideologically and strategically linked to the Socialist Party (as already 
mentioned) and the ‘Federation of Greek Women’ {Omospondia Ginaikon Elladas - 
OGE), politically affiliated to the Communist party were established. What was left of 
the KDG eventually allied itself with the Communist party of the Interior. In 1975, the 
first autonomous feminist group was formed, the ‘Movement for Women’s 
Liberation’ (Kinisi gia tin Aepeletherosi ton Ginaikon - KAG). It represented radical 
feminism within the Greek context and remained aloof from any political institutions.
In other words, by the end of the 1970s there was a full spectrum of feminist
•  0 7 ___organisations. The traditional Marxist position was represented by OGE, which 
denounced any independent feminist struggle as petty bourgeois. Gender issues were 
seen as part of a larger critique of capitalist society. It was claimed that the low status
96 Lazarides, G. (1994) ‘The Feminist Movement in Greece: An Overview’, Journal 
o f Gender Studies, 3, 2.
97 Stamiris, op. cit., ref. 2.
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of Greek women derived primarily from their position in the structure of production 
as a reserve army of labour. This made the women’s struggle an integral part of the 
broader working-class struggle against capitalism. It also meant that the emancipation 
of women could be achieved only in a socialist society.98 The chief practical focus of 
OGE became the working conditions of women employees. The socialist-feminist 
approach was represented by the EGE and KDG, both of which regarded the 
oppression of women a result of the complex interplay of patriarchy and capitalism. 
The class struggle and women’s oppression, the mode of production and reproduction, 
therefore became the main theoretical tools of these two organisations. Their attempt 
to keep a balance between their struggle for feminism and socialism led to semi- 
autonomous relations with the respective political parties (the socialists for EGE, and 
the Eurocommunists for KDG).
The KAG represented radical feminism. Its members considered women’s 
oppression the most fundamental of all social inequalities. Their target was patriarchy 
per se. They formed small groups trying to raise feminist consciousness and rejected 
all existing authoritarian structures and processes. In consequence they refused to ally 
themselves with political parties, and vehemently denounced them for colonising and 
deradicalising the feminist movement in Greece.
A more liberal form of feminism also existed in Greece by the end of the 
1970s." It was represented by a group of organisations pursuing progressive policies 
for women and struggling for the frill integration of women in society on a basis of 
legal equality with men. These groups never acquired an active social base, did not 
aim to become a mass organisation, and were never registered as a recognised 
component of the Greek feminist movement. They restricted themselves to the role of 
pressure groups and to lobbying political elites, thereby focusing on the established 
political system and on legislative reforms; they also participated in coordinated 
feminist activities.100
98 Stamiris, ibid.
99 Stamiris, ibid.
100 The contribution of these organisations has not been generally evaluated and texts 
on contemporary Greek feminism do not mention them. However, some of those 
organisations played an important role, for instance the League for the Rights of
90
The theoretical premises and actual strategies of the various feminist 
organisations mentioned above seem not altogether compatible, but they did have 
some common denominators. All these organisations having been set up during a 
period of democratic reconstruction, they all perceived women’s issues as an integral 
part of the broader political context. Following the seven years of political repression 
by the junta, all the feminist organisations emphasised issues like democracy, 
freedom, and social change. Gender inequalities were regarded as a symptom of the 
existing social and political institutions, and integrated into the agenda of social 
change for the collectivity as a whole.101 Even the autonomous feminist groups in 
their early stages sought co-operation with political parties of the Left and elaborated 
a broader anti-capitalist discourse. Another common element was the association of 
equality for women with the ongoing process of modernisation. The years 1974-85 
were a period of economic development and institutional revision. The party-affiliated 
women’s organisations perceived feminist issues as a by-product of the modernisation 
in progress. Thus, it was commonly assumed by the women’s organisations as well as 
the parties that patriarchy is associated with backward societies, and that the process 
of modernisation will gradually erase inequality.between the sexes.102
The party-affiliated women’s organisations also shared many organisational 
principles, given that they adopted the organisational structure of the parties on which 
they relied. Their organisational model included a constitution, a centralised and 
hierarchical leadership, work in committees, an electoral system, and a wide network 
of branches.103 The autonomous feminist movement, on the other hand, deliberately 
avoided hierarchical organisational structures and of course political affiliations.
Greece’s second-wave feminist movement has on occasion engaged in 
collaborative efforts, such as the campaign concerning the Family Law. However, in 
the 1980s there was increased tension between EGE, which was seen as representing
Women (Sindesmos gia ta Dikedmata tis Ginekas), which was one of the chief 
protagonists in the struggle of the reform of Family Law.
101 Kyriazis, op. cit., ref. 14.
Varika, E. ‘Confronting Institutional Modernisation: A Difficult Feminism’, in 
Leontidou and Ammer (eds.), op. cit., ref. 15.
103 Stamiris, op. cit., ref. 2.
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‘state feminism’, and the other women’s organisations.104 It was the impact of the 
Socialist Party’s policies concerning women’s issues that paradoxically led to a 
temporary stagnation of the feminist movement. After its 1981 election victory, 
PASOK proceeded to carry out a barrage of legislative and institutional changes that 
fulfilled many of the feminist demands.105 As Stamiris notes:
‘Since women’s struggles had for so long been waged at the level of equal 
rights and opportunities, the government’s thorough reformulation of laws and 
policies based on the principle of equality eliminated for a while the militant 
cutting-edge once characteristic of the movement’.106 
A revitalisation of the feminist movement, in the form of a collective effort, took 
place in early 1990. Before the April parliamentary elections, women’s organisations 
with different ideological perspectives presented a united front in order to pressure 
political parties into adopting women’s demands. They formed the Co-ordinating 
Committee of Representatives of Women’s Organisations (Sintonistiki Epitropi 
Ginaikon Ekprosopon Syllogon - SEGES) and demanded that the government and the 
political parties guarantee a 35% minimum quota for women parliamentary 
candidates.107 Neither sex should exceed 65% of each party’s list. They also 
demanded a 35% participation of female representatives in all centres of decision-
104 ‘...State feminism...refers to activities of government structures that are formally 
charged with furthering women's status and rights’. See Stetson, D. and Mazur, A. 
(1995) ‘Introduction’ to Stetson and Mazur (eds.) Comparative State Feminism 
(London, Sage Publications), pp. 1-2.
105 The Socialist Party changed the Greek Family Law, the penal code and made other 
legal reforms in favour of sexual equality under the law. See chapter 3 on the Union 
of Greek women (EGE).
106 Stamiris, op. cit., ref. 2., p. 110.
107 The radical feminists groups did not participate in SEGES, which comprised 12 
organisations : National Council of Greek Women, Union of Greek Women, Union of 
Women Soroptimists, Mediterranean Women's Studies Institute, Democratic 
Women's Movement, Lyceum of Greek Women, Panhellenic Union of Women Civil 
Servants, Union of Housewives, League for Women's Rights, Hellenic Association of 
University Women, Association of Professional/Business Women, and YWCA of 
Greece. See in Papageorge-Limberes, op. cit., ref. 79.
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making (e.g. institutions of local self-management).108 Unfortunately, this last co­
ordinated effort by Greek feminist organisations was unsuccessful. Although many 
women were mobilised, the parties refused to apply the proposed quota.
Overall, the history of the Greek feminist movement is one of semi-autonomy. 
The movement has always been to some extent or other dependent on the general 
political developments in Greek society or the political parties that were the legitimate 
bearers of political power. The case studies to follow in the next two chapters - that of 
the Union of Greek Women and of the autonomous feminist groups - elucidate the 
dilemmas and impasses that the movement as a whole met with in its endeavour to put 
forward the principle of either ‘equality’ (EGE) or ‘women’s liberation’ (autonomous 
feminist groups). The significance and impact of these two cases on feminist politics 
is still intensely debated in the Greek feminist spectrum.
108 Daraki, op. cit., ref. 6.
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CHAPTER 3 
THE UNION OF GREEK WOMEN
3.1 Introduction
The feminist organisation of the Union of Greek Women (Enosis Ginaikon 
Elladas, EGE), consolidated itself after the fall of the junte (July 1974). Party- 
affiliated, it dominated the Greek feminist scene until the late 1980s when the whole 
feminist movement began to decline. Selecting the EGE for closer study serves two 
distinct purposes. First it challenges the theoretical boundaries of the concept of new 
social movement. While the EGE has developed many attributes that are 
representative of the Greek feminist movement as a whole, some of these attributes 
come into direct conflict with the qualitative properties of the new social movement 
concept. Secondly, the EGE is the country’s only feminist organisation that, through 
its affiliation with the Socialist Party, acquired access to government power. The 
organisation’s political project to inaugurate social change by promoting certain social 
policies and legislative changes illuminates the complex relationship among state 
agencies, feminist organisations, and social awareness.
A brief account of the EGE’s historical trajectory is followed by a discussion 
of the categories pertaining to the concept of new social movement (ideology, 
organisational structure, social base, strategy, new scenarios of conflicts). The 
summary at the end both advances the main argument and serves as a theoretical 
background for the second case study, the autonomous feminist groups. The latter 
case exemplifies an entirely different political project to that put forward by the Union 
of Greek Women. Chapters 3 and 4 are, therefore, in juxtaposition.
3.2 1976-1990: From a Women’s Organisation to State-Feminism
The 1974 fall of the dictatorship set into motion a strong political current of 
collective action, with Greek society entering a prolonged period of politicisation and 
intense mobilisation.1 To begin with, the political vacuum created by the fall of the
1 Laiou-Antoniou argued that the fall of the dictatorship reinforced public awareness 
that political mobilisation could bring about social change. See Athens interviews of 9 
Nov. 1998 with Chrysanthi Laiou-Antoniou, EGE co-founder, Head of the Council of 
Equality (1983-‘85), Secretary of the General Secretariat of Equality (1985-‘89), 
member of the legal committee for the reform of Family Law (1985), ex-member of 
the United Nations Committee for the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination 
against Women.
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junta was promptly filled by a pluralistic party system. The re-established or new 
political parties exerted a powerful and pervasive influence over all social sectors, and 
became extensively involved in all Greek mass movements (labour, student, peace, 
feminist.). The consolidation of the party system led many women to leave the 
Movement of Democratic Women {Kinisi Dimokratikon Ginaikon Elladas -  KDG) 
and join the newly founded party-aligned organisations of the EGE or the Federation 
of Greek Women {Omospondia Ginaikon Elladas - OGE). In September 1976, 
Margaret Papandreou, wife of the president of the socialist party, and 29 other women 
proceeded to the official establishment of the Union of Greek Women.2 Most of the 
founders of this organisation had not previously been politically active. A significant 
number of them were the wives of prominent members of the socialist party. These 
two attributes - no prior political involvement and legitimation by the husband’s status 
- were persistently reproduced throughout the EGE’s history. Since the organisation 
consisted mostly of women, who at that time had not yet formulated a feminist 
identity, it functioned initially as a general women’s group without specific 
ideological orientation. The process of forging a concrete ideological framework took 
six years, and in December 1982, at the first EGE Panhellenic conference, an 
overwhelming majority of members voted in favour of declaring the EGE a socialist-
2 Margaret Papandreou was bom in 1923 in Illinois, USA. After graduating in 
journalism, she completed a master’s degree in public health. While at university, she 
joined the Democratic Farm-Labour Party in Minnesota and was sent as an official 
delegate to several state conventions. She was also a founding member of the 
Stevenson Forum Board. While living abroad during the Greek dictatorship, she was a 
founding member of the Panhellenic Liberation Movement (Panellinio Apeletherotiko 
Kinima - PAK), a resistance group against the junta. After her return to Greece in 
1974 she participated actively in PASOK and became a member of the International 
Relations Committee. She was president of EGE from 1982 to ‘89. Margaret 
Papandreou’s American origins were often an easy target of criticism and her ability 
to perceive the status quo between the sexes in Greece was often questioned. For a 
short biographical note on Margaret Papandreou see ‘Greece: Hellenic Republic’ in: 
Robin Morgan (ed.) (1984) Sisterhood is Global (New York, Anchor Press/ 
Doubleday). The 30 founding members are named in the EGE Constitution, dated 
Athens, 15 Sept. 1976.
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feminist organisation.3 Socialist feminism has remained part of its overall ideological 
framework ever since.
After its early years as a small women’s organisation, the EGE’s development 
into a mass organisation with branches all over Greece was as prompt as the rise to 
power of the socialist party.4 Between 1976 and 1981 (from the founding of the EGE 
until PASOK’s election victory) the organisation developed on three different fronts: 
it built up an extensive network of branches and organised debates on gender issues 
all over Greece; it participated in international conferences and expressed its 
solidarity with women’s organisations in countries under imperialistic domination; 
and it actively supported the anti-right strikes of progressive labour unions.5 
Building a mass organisation:
The Union of Greek Women and the Federation of Greek Women were the 
only two post-dictatorship women’s organisations to have an extensive network of 
branches spread all over the country. To achieve this, both these organisations 
strongly relied on the mechanisms of the parties they were allied with (the socialist 
and communist parties respectively). In 1981 the EGE membership numbered over 
25,000 women. In 1983 its network consisted-of over 120 branches plus 132 cells in 
1984.6 During the period 1976-81, branches were set up in Salonica, Ldrissa, Volos,
3 Athens, interviews: on 30 Oct. 1998 with Constantina Giannopoulou, EGE co­
founder, president 1989-‘94, honorary president 1994-; on 14 Oct. 1998 with Soula 
Merentiti, ex-president of EGE’s branch in Trikala, ex-councillor of the municipality 
of Trikala; on 11 Nov. 1998 with Anni Pitsiori-Kavadia, ex-member of the EGE 
Executive Board and councillor at the General Secretariat of Equality.
4 PASOK succeeded in gaining power just eight years after it was established, with 
votes figures during the period 1974-‘81 as follows: 13.58% in 1974,25.34% in 1977 
and up to 48.07% in 1981. In the elections of 1981, PASOK gained 172 of the 300 
seats in the National Assembly and took over the government. See Papadopoulos, 
Yiannis (1989) ‘Parties, the State and Society in Greece: Continuity within Change’, 
West European Politics, 12, 2.
5 In the Greek political discourse the term ‘progressive’ denotes the anti-right (non­
conservative) political forces.
6 See Doulia, Dora (1994) ‘To Didi Giannopoulou’, Open Window: Feature 1982- ‘94, 
Athens; Feminism-Socialism: The Route to Social Liberation, publication by the
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Yiannina, Katerini, Martino (Lokrida), Trikala, Patras, Nafplion, Tripoli, Agrinio, 
Sparti, Iraklion (Crete), Sitia (Crete), and elsewhere.7 Cells were established to cover 
a broad range of towns and small villages- in Kalavrita, Drama, Kastoria, Argos, 
Corfu, Larymna, Rethymno, Ierapetra, in Cretan villages (Xirokampos and Profitis
o
Ilias), in Mazeika near Kalavrita, in Pyli and Neochori (near Trikala), etc. At the 
same time the EGE was expanding its network in the prefecture of Attica by 
establishing branches in geographical areas with dissimilar social composition, in for 
instance Maroussi, Gyzi, Aigaleo, Nea Smymi, Piraeus, Nikea, Glyfada, Lykovrisi 
and Aghia Paraskevi.9 Its branches and cells came to span the entire country.10 In this 
way the EGE became a mass feminist organisation that managed to penetrate into 
different social strata and even integrated women in the countryside who had never 
been involved with gender issues.
The public debates, which were organised by the EGE all over the country, 
concerned primarily the legal framework of the existing Family Law, the status of 
Greek women in family and society, abortion and family planning, the significance 
and consequences of child-rearing, children’s rights, and women as part of the labour 
movement.11 The issues that were addressed in these open discussions show the
Union of Greek Women, Athens, 1984; and interview with Constantina 
Giannopoulou, op. cit., ref. 3.
The branches constitute larger organizational units than the cells. According to the 
Constitution, a cell can be upgraded to a branch if the Regional Council proposes this 
and the proposal is approved by the EGE Executive Board. See Constitution of 29 
Nov. 1983, and ‘Bimonthly Chronicle of EGE Activities’, Open Window, issues 1-14.
8 ‘Bimonthly Chronicle of EGE Activities’, ibid.
9 ‘Bimonthly Chronicle of EGE Activities’, ibid.
10 EGE founded branches and cells even in the scattered islands (e.g. on Rhodes, 
Kalymnos, Mytilini, Skopelos, Alonisos)
11 The following are few examples of the open discussions organized by EGE 
between 1976 and ‘81: in Piraeus on 27 Nov. ‘78: ‘The Impact of the Family 
Environment on Children’s Future Development’; in Volos on 29 Nov. ‘78: ‘Children 
and the Environment’; in Nea Smymi on 19 Jan. ‘79: ‘Women and Advertising; in 
Nafplion in 1979: ‘The Abused Child’; in Volos in 1980: ‘Family Planning and 
Abortion’; in Yiannina in 1980: ‘Legislation and Equality between the Sexes’; in
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organisation’s strong ideological commitment to the family and to motherhood, as
well as its endeavour to ally itself with other political movements in Greek society.
The international dimension:
The EGE has always worked towards linking the Greek feminist movement
with progressive feminism in the developing countries. It has also sided firmly with
the struggles of peripheral or semi-peripheral nations for national independence or
democratic consolidation. EGE’s focus on developing countries has largely been the
result of Greece’s historical legacy of unremitting foreign dependency (particularly
the U.S. support of the 1967-74 military junta) and PASOK’s political vision of a
‘third way to socialism’.12 In furtherance of these aims the EGE forged links
predominantly with women’s organisations from the Arab world, from Africa and the
11Balkans, as well as with feminist organisations in southern Europe and Scandinavia. 
Between 1976 and 1981, the EGE participated in national and international 
conferences, hosted international conferences in Greece, and collaborated closely with 
the General Secretariat of the Socialist Parties and Progressive Organisations of the
Martino on 27 Feb. ‘81: ‘Relations between the Sexes in the Greek Countryside’; in 
Katerini on 30 May ‘81: ‘Family Law’; in Lefk&da on 25 July ‘81: ‘The Greek 
Woman Today’. See ‘Bimonthly Chronicle of EGE Activities’, op. cit., ref. 7.
12 The socialist party formulated an ideological platform that questioned ‘... the 
essence of the country's orientation since the Second World War, which had been 
based on strong ties with the United States, active participation in the Atlantic 
alliance, and integration into Western Europe’s political and economic institutions, 
especially the European Community. Instead PASOK’s world view was based on the 
premise that the bipolar system of the Cold War was a thing of the past and that 
Greece’s international role would be transformed from that of a mere link in NATO’s 
southern flank into a bridge connecting Western Europe with the Balkans, the Arab 
world, and Africa’. Iatrides, J (1992) ‘Papandreou’s Foreign Policy’, in T. Kariotis 
(ed.), The Greek Socialist Experiment: Papandreou’s Greece 1981-1989, (New York, 
Pella), pp. 127-28.
13 The Scandinavian social democratic model was one of the political archetypes of 
the Greek socialist party.
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Mediterranean (PSOM).14 Its global perspective was also manifested by the 
organisation’s active participation in the United Nations.
Class solidarity:
The organisation has always emphasised that it is not limited to any single 
class Nevertheless, one of its prime objectives has been to support ‘non-privileged’ 
social groups as well as building an alliance with the labour movement.15 In this 
connection, the EGE from 1974 to ‘81 supported labour strikes, regularly visited 
companies employing female workers, provided aid to regions struck by earthquakes, 
protested against employment cuts, and mobilised against gender discrimination in the 
labour market.16 It also took part in commemorative events associated with popular
14 The following are examples of the activities the EGE initiated between 1976 and 
1981. The organisation visited the Union of Yugoslav Women in Belgrade (1979); 
condemned the repression of the Organisation of Progressive Women in Turkey 
(1979); participated in the Moscow Conference on the occasion of International 
Child’s Year (1979); participated in the 9th Conference of the Federation of Iraqi 
Women in Baghdad (11-15 March 1980); also jn the International Women’s 
Conference in Copenhagen (14-30 July 1980); met with the women’s branch of the 
Polisario Liberation Movement in Athens (1980); organised the Conference of 
Progressive Women in the Mediterranean in Athens (10-13 October 1980), and 
participated in the Athens International Conference on Developments in the Middle 
East in regard to Nasser’s policy (23-24 July 1981). EGE’s ideological stance in 
favour of non-allied countries has at times led to the uncritical support of women’s 
organisations that were merely the tools of authoritarian and highly patriarchal 
regimes (e.g. Libya, Iraq). See ‘Bimonthly Chronicle of EGE Activities’, op. cit, ref.
7.
15 The term ‘non-privileged’ was used by Andreas Papandreou to describe the social 
groups the socialist party was targeting politically. It had no clear class reference, but 
populist connotations encompassing all social groups that identified with a sense of 
exclusion from the economic and political privileges of Greek society.
16 Some indicative examples of EGE activities during that period are the following:
The organisation supported the workers’ 1979 strike at the paper factory Thessaliki; 
issued resolutions supporting the prolonged strike of Public Power Corporation 
employees (1979); visited the female workers in the cotton factory in Martino (1980);
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struggles - such as against economic exploitation (e.g. the peasants’ uprising against 
the landlords in Kileler); for democracy (e.g. the students’ uprising in Nov. 1973 
against the junta); and for national liberation (e.g. a tribute to the people executed by 
the German occupation forces in Kalavrita). These commemorations functioned as 
ideological symbols of the Left, and marked a clear dividing line between the 
governing conservative party and the anti-right political forces.
Between 1974 and 1981, the EGE occasionally joined other Greek feminist 
organisations in common campaigns. So the organisation took part in the rallies of the 
Coordinating Committee of Representatives of Women’s Organisations (SEGES), the 
struggles of the Coordinating Committee of Women’s Organisations against the 
instalment of new missiles in Europe (1979); as well as in 1980 in the Committee of 
Women’s Associations for the five-year plan of women’s development.17 The latter 
committee directed research projects undertaken by women’s organisations
supported the 1980 protest of the workers’ wives at Larko against the high incident of 
industrial accidents; supported the 1980 strike of employees at the infant centre 
Mitera; protested against the 1980 decision by the government and the administrative 
council of the National Telecommunication Organisation to exclude women from 
certain divisions; supported the 1980 hunger strike of employees at the National 
Organisation of Tourism; protested against the ‘terrorist activities’ of the American 
Management towards Greek employees on the American Military Bases (1980); 
organised mobilisations to help the 1981 earthquake victims in southern and northern 
Greece (Corinthia and Yiannina); and protested against the dismissal in 1981 of 210 
female workers from the ‘Pyrgos’ company in Salonica. Bimonthly Chronicle of EGE 
Activities, ibid.
17 The Coordinating Committee of Representatives of Women’s Organisations 
(Syntonistike Epitrope Ginaikon Ekprosopon Syllogon -  SEGES) was set up in 1976 
specifically to protest against the government’s plans to induct women into the armed 
services, but it soon became the coordinating body for the reform of Family Law. It 
was a short-lived endeavour, but one of the few examples of coalition building in the 
history of the post-junta Greek feminist movement. Cacoullos, Ann (1994) ‘Women 
Confronting Party Politics in Greece’ in: Barbara Nelson and Najma Chowdhury 
(eds.) Women and Politics Worldwide (New Haven and London, Yale University 
Press).
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• 1 ftconcerning the status of Greek women in the sectors of health and education. While 
there were also isolated instances of co-operation between the EGE and other party- 
affiliated women’s organisations (KDG, OGE), a clear dividing line separated the 
EGE from the autonomous feminist groups.19
By the early 1980s the EGE had already become a mass feminist organisation. 
Its continually growing membership as well as the rise to power of the socialist party 
in 1981 significantly changed its initial functioning. The new contextual setting meant 
major organisational changes and a boost in lobbying activities. On 11-13 Dec. 1982 
the first Panhellenic conference of the EGE met in Athens.20 It was attended by 90 
branches from all over the country and 400 elected representatives. Since the 
Constitution of 1976 had not provided for the functioning of EGE branches in the 
countryside, constitutional modifications were needed. The conference decided to 
establish the organisational autonomy of the branches by setting down their internal 
function and their relationship vis-a-vis the EGE representative bodies. On 28 Nov. 
1983 the EGE General Assembly voted in the new Constitution, embodying the 
decisions taken at the first Panhellenic conference.
One year later (5-6 May 1984), the second Panhellenic conference was held. It 
witnessed the organisation’s first major crisis, which ended with an overt violation of 
democratic procedures. The EGE’s organisational expansion had rendered the 
Regional Committee a remarkably powerful body within the Union, and the Executive 
Board reacted to this by proposing certain changes that would restrict representation 
of the rural branches at the decision-making centres and thereby curb the power of the
18 The Committee of Women’s Associations for the Five-Year Plan of Women’s 
Development was founded prior to the International Women’s Conference in 
Copenhagen (14-30 June 1980). See Pampouki, Eleni (ed.) (1984) Agenda, Athens (in 
Greek).
19 For instance, the EGE branch in Trikala collaborated with the OGE on the occasion 
of a public debate on the Greek National Resistance. Interview with Soula Merentiti, 
op. cit., ref. 3.
20 For a concise overview of the successive EGE Panhellenic conferences see Open 
Window: Feature 1982-‘94, op. cit., ref. 6.
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Regional Committee.21 However, the latter refused to accept the Executive Board’s 
guidelines and proposed organisational changes of its own.22 The conflict ended with 
the expulsion from the Union of all 12 Committee members, who were not granted 
the right to defend themselves (but who took the matter to court).
Two years later the third Panhellenic conference took place (21-23 March 
1986). Its dominant themes were autonomy, democracy and the promotion of 
equality. This last issue was especially acute, since the EGE had already achieved 
significant legal changes, which it wanted to take further by launching nation-wide 
information campaigns. The representatives of EGE district branches declared 
themselves dissatisfied with the insufficient representation of the Union’s rural 
members. They were, however, already reduced to a too small minority to carry their 
point.
The fourth Panhellenic conference (22-24 April 1988) was marked by a 
further reduction of members from the district branches. The prevailing topics at that 
meeting reflected the uneasy alliance between EGE and the socialist party. The issue 
of autonomy from party mechanisms was thoroughly examined, as well as the 
increasing perception by the new members of the EGE as a job providing mechanism. 
The meeting also discussed ideological issues such as the impact of the global 
economic crisis on the status of women, the necessity of women actively participating
21 The Regional Committee was responsible for the organisation’s branches in the 
countryside, and the strong presence of the EGE in the rural areas had given the 
Committee a very strong voice within organisation.
22 According to Anni Pitsiori-Kavadia, the Executive Board feared that the growing 
power of the district branches would lead to their autonomy, and the conflict centred 
on procedures for the election of the Executive Board. Until then, it was the Union’s 
branches in the capital that elected it. Now the Board proposed an indirect election of 
the body by elected representatives from the branches, but excluding the cells, which 
were numerically predominant in the countryside. The Regional Committee’s 
counterproposal was that all EGE members should elect the Board directly. The 
Board proposal would mean that the Athens region would obtain the majority, while 
the Committee’s proposal favoured the rural areas. Interview with Anni Pitsiori- 
Kavadia, op. cit., ref. 3.
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in the production process, and the incorporation of women in the decision-making 
centres.
The fifth Panhellenic conference (1989) brought the second significant crisis 
within the EGE and the beginning of the organisation’s gradual decline. From its 
inception in 1974, the EGE had openly supported the socialist party and prior to 
elections had always urged women to vote for PASOK.23 This was the official line of 
the Executive Board as expressed by Margaret Papandreou, but there was always a 
minority that opted for a vote of conscience, free from any political commitments. In 
the period after 1985, the organisation began officially to question the established 
alliance with the socialists. The main reason for this was the deterioration in the 
personal relations between Margaret and Andreas Papandreou. The mass media 
widely publicised the husband’s extra-marital affair, while a newspaper under the 
influence of the socialist party (Avriani) launched severe attacks on Margaret 
Papandreou. The personal tension between these two public figures (Prime Minister: 
Andreas Papandreou and EGE President: Margaret Papandreou) had irrevocable 
political repercussions on the highly centralized and personalistic function of the 
socialist party and the EGE. This intermingling of private and public affairs showed 
itself at the fifth Panhellenic conference, where the EGE president (Margaret 
Papandreou) proposed that at the forthcoming national elections members should be 
encouraged to vote according to their conscience. This sudden turn-about by the 
previously inflexible majority generated severe internal clashes, which were made 
worse when the socialist party intervened. The conference ended with the departure of 
its president, of the members of the Executive Board, and a number of ordinary 
members, most of them from the Athens area. On 2 July 1989 an ad hoc meeting was 
called to elect the new Executive Board, which then voted in Constantina 
Giannopoulou as president of EGE.24 The next regular Panhellenic conference met in 
Athens 28-29 March 1992, but henceforth the EGE had to face not only internal 
divisions, but also the steady decline of the Greek feminist movement as a whole.
Editorials in the organization’s official magazine Open Window.
24 The successive EGE presidents have been: Kakia Gennimata (1976-1980), Kalliopi 
Bourdara (1980-1982), Margaret Papandreou (1982-1989), Constantina Giannopoulou 
(1989-1994), Maria Kipriotaki-Perraki (1994-). Margaret Papandreou was vice- 
president from 1976 to 1982.
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Moreover, following the clash of 1989, the EGE lost its privileged status vis-a-vis 
PASOK, which regained power in the national elections of 1993. While, therefore, the 
EGE continued after 1989 as a united socialist-feminist organisation, its political 
authority was greatly diminished.
Between 1981 and 1987 the EGE was successful in introducing a number of 
legal changes that radically altered the gender status in Greek society. With PASOK’s 
ascent to power in 1981 the EGE had acquired novel resources that facilitated the 
enactment of legal revisions and the nation-wide dissemination of the feminist 
discourse. The three most significant legal reforms are briefly set out below.
I) Revision o f Family Law:
Under the existing Family Law, the man was the head of family and had 
exclusive authority to decide on every aspect of marital life (Art. 1387). The wife was 
confined to ‘management of the household’ (Art. 1389) and had to obtain her 
husband’s permission for social and economic activities outside the household (for 
instance, for entering into agreements with third persons, starting a business, even 
placing her children in school).25 Responsibilities of child-rearing (supervision, 
education, residence, disciplinary measures, etc-) rested with the head of the household, 
and it was exclusively the right of the father to decide on matters concerning the child’s 
life (Art. 1500).26 The new Family Law of 1983 abolished the concept of ‘head of the 
family’ and introduced that of a ‘family founded on equality’ for which both spouses 
had joint responsibility. The dowry system was legally abolished, and for the first time 
the wife’s right was established to part of any property acquired in the course of the 
marriage. The system of joint ownership was introduced. Civil marriages became as 
legally binding as religious ones. The no-fault divorce based on mutual consent was 
introduced. Concerning children, the new law abolished the terms ‘true’ or ‘illegitimate’ 
and replaced them by ‘bom to married’ or ‘bom to unmarried parents’. Children of 
unmarried mothers came automatically under their mother’s care, no court decision
25 ‘Women... ’, pamphlet published by the Committee of Stmggles for the Reform of 
Family Law. See ‘Appendix’, Skoupa, issue 4, July 1980.
26 ‘Women...’, ibid.
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being required. Children bom out of wedlock had exactly the same inheritance rights as 
those bom to married parents.27
II) Amendment o f penal code:
The former penal code defined rape as a ‘crime against morality’ and rape was 
prosecuted only after indictment. This provision often facilitated financial or marital 
settlements in incidents of rape. The new penal law (1419/1984) classified rape as a 
‘crime against the sexual freedom of both sexes’, while sexual harassment (‘any 
improper actions and propositions that insult another person’s sense of dignity’) was for 
the first time defined as a criminal offence.28 Under the new law, rape is prosecuted 
automatically.
III) Legalisation o f abortions:
The old Law determined that obtaining or self-inducing an illegal abortion was 
punishable by three years’ imprisonment. Legal abortions could be obtained only in the 
case of rape, incest, seduction of girls under 15 years of age, abuse of women incapable 
of defending themselves, medical evidence showing that the birth would severely 
damage the health of the mother, and where the foetus was seriously not healthy. In 
May 1986, the socialist government passed a new law on abortion (Law 1609/86).29 
This provided for abortion on demand during the first twelve weeks of pregnancy and in 
case of rape or for medical reasons, concerning the health of the mother or the foetus, 
for 24 weeks. Abortion is provided free of charge, being covered by health insurance.30
The principle of equality between the sexes was also applied by law (N. 1414) 
in the sector of employment.31 For the first time in Greek history, demands that had 
formed the cornerstone of the Greek feminist movement since the turn of the century
27 National Report o f  Hellas (Ministry to the Presidency, Hellenic Council for 
Equality, 1985)
28 National Report, ibid.; Kyriazis, Nota (1995) ‘Feminism and the Status of Women 
in Greece’ in D. Const as and T. Stavrou (eds.) Greece Prepares for the Twenty-First 
Century (Washington D.C. and Baltimore, The Woodrow Wilson Centre Press and the 
John Hopkins University Press).
29 Kyriazis, ibid.
Kaplan, Gisela (1992) Contemporary Western European Feminism (London, UCL).
31 Singh, Rina (1998) Gender Autonomy in Western Europe: An Imprecise Revolution, 
(London and New York, MacMillan Press and St. Martin’s Press).
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were partially met. The establishment of an official service to monitor their 
implementation backed up the legal provisions. Moreover, the crucial role of the state 
in promoting gender equality resulted in the unprecedented incorporation of gender 
issues in official government pronouncements. All the above legal and institutional 
revisions were the outcome of persistent pressure and lobbying by the EGE that, in 
most cases, met indifference or open hostility from the socialist party.33
The Union of Greek Women combined lobbying activities with its own 
autonomous agenda. Between 1981 and ‘89 it gave many public talks, focusing 
primarily on legal amendments; organised meetings with women in industry, 
hospitals, reformatory institutions, co-operatives, and local councils; participated in 
demonstrations for peace and mobilisations against the American military bases in 
Greece; attended international conferences and forged links with other women’s 
organisations at international level.34 It also extended its organisational network, 
although the peak of its membership had been reached in the period 1981-83.35
32Cacoullos, op. cit., ref. 17.
The negative and often degrading stance of the socialist party towards the feminist 
agenda of EGE was a recurrent theme in all the interviews conducted with the former 
leadership of the Union.
34 For instance, open discussions were held in Salonica, Mytilini, Halkida on the new 
Family Law; Drama and Corfu on family planning; in Igoumenitsa and Yiannina on 
the legalization of abortion. The EGE participated in two rallies against the American 
Bases. One was organised by the Peace Committees (03 March 1983), the second by 
the General Federation of Workers (28 April 1983). At both of them the EGE slogans 
stressed national independence, nuclear disarmament of the Balkans, and peace. The 
EGE also sent delegates to international conferences like: the International Peace 
Conference in Moscow (10-17 June1985), the World Conference for the U.N.’s 
Decade of Women in Nairobi (July 1985), the Meeting of Peace and Amity between 
Bulgarian and Greek Women in Bulgaria (9-10 May 1986), and the Fourth European 
Meeting of Women’s Organisations in the European Community in London (5-7 
Nov. 1987). See Bimonthly Chronicle of EGE’s activities, Open Window, issues 15-43 
and Agenda, published by the Union of Greek Women, Athens 1995.
Interview with Chrysanthi Laiou Antoniou, op. cit., ref. 1.
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The feminist movement initially reacted to the legal and institutional reforms 
by the socialist government with perplexity and inertia, which gradually took the form 
of two tendencies within the movement. The first trend involved a positive stand 
towards the accomplished reforms, and developed a strategy of promoting gender 
issues on both, the institutional and the societal level. This positive evaluation of the 
reforms by the feminist organisations was coupled with severe criticism of the EGE, 
which was accused of arrogating to itself the place of spokeswoman for the rest of the 
Greek feminist movement. The charge was based on the EGE persistently employing 
the state machinery for legitimising its own ideological platform as the only plausible 
version of feminism. Moreover, it was exclusively women loyal to the socialist party 
or personally close to Margaret Papandreou, who were chosen to staff the newly 
founded institutions on women’s issues. Other feminist organisations felt excluded 
from the decision-making process, as well as marginalised ideologically. The second 
trend in the feminist movement denounced the recent reforms as mere modernisations 
of patriarchy, and developed a decidedly confrontational stance towards the EGE. 
This section adopted an anti-institutional strategy and focused exclusively on civil 
society.36
In brief, the 1980s witnessed an unfruitful tension between the EGE and other 
feminist organisations. The contradiction between EGE’s dominance in the public 
domain and its isolation in the feminist spectrum gradually resolved itself by the 
decline of the Greek feminist movement as a whole. The withering away of many 
organisations, combined with gender issues losing much of their urgency in the public 
discourse, drove the surviving feminist organisations to co-operate in many of their 
activities. The last organisational endeavour, (as already mentioned), was the re­
establishment of SEGES in April 1990.
3.3 Ideology
The discourse formulated by the Union of Greek Women is a blend of several 
different elements. The aims of the organisation, as stated in its Constitution, originate
This current within the Greek feminist movement consisted predominantly of 
various autonomous feminist groups. Their ideology and political strategy is further 
elaborated in chapter 4.
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in the feminist tradition itself, in socialist humanism, and in dependency theory. To 
quote the Constitution:
‘Aims of the association, within the framework of the feminist-socialist ideology, are:
1. To build a society of equality, justice and freedom for all people, where men 
and women will have equal opportunities, equal rights, equal responsibilities 
and obligations in all areas of life.
2. To inform and enlighten women, to make them aware of and to sensitise them 
to the causes of their oppression, which are patriarchy and capitalism.
3. To achieve equal participation of women in the economic, political, social and 
cultural sectors of society.
4. To attain the institutionalisation, by the State, of a set of measures that will 
provide the necessary infrastructure for motherhood and child-rearing. The 
aim of this struggle is to end motherhood and child-rearing being the source 
and pretext for the economic, social, political and cultural marginalisation of 
women.
5. To co-operate with mass movements, especially in matters that concern the 
workplace, the living environment and'education, with the condition that this 
co-operation furthers the aims of the Association, as well as to participate in 
the struggles for the advancement of popular institutions.38
6. To become aware of our popular tradition and cultural heritage. To detect and 
indicate our cultural alienation.
7. To develop women’s creativity and to reclaim women’s product in all its 
various forms.
8. To develop a relationship of mutual support, confidence and respect among 
the women of all the world and most particularly women of the Third World.
9. To participate in the effort to secure national independence, to defend 
democracy, to preserve peace and to bring social liberation’.39
37 ‘Aims of the Association’, Art. 2, Constitution, op. cit., ref. 7.
38 People’s meetings, neighbourhood councils, city councils, prefectural councils, etc. 
See Women’s Union o f Greece, EGE pamphlet (in English).
39 Art. 2 (Aims of the Association) of the 1983 EGE Constitution is a revised version 
of the original formulation in the 1976 Constitution. The differences are the 
following: (1) The 1976 Constitution included two paragraphs subsequently omitted,
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The above aims specify the Union’s ideological premises, which can 
be expressed in three fundamental axioms:
1. Patriarchy is the exclusion of women from a male-dominated society. Feminism is 
the participation of women in that society. The aim of the organisation is equality 
of men and women.
2. The role of the state is crucial for bringing about a liberated society.
3. Feminism is a political movement and therefore an integral part of national and 
international political struggles.
These three theorems form the basis of the organisation’s ideological 
framework that combines elements of political radicalism and social conservatism. 
The EGE ideological agenda is analysed further in the pages to follow, in terms of 
first feminist and then socialist orientations.
A) Feminist Identity
The EGE, loyal to the ideological tradition of socialist feminism, has 
developed its feminist identity around the concept of capitalist patriarchy.40
i.e. par 6, ‘To confront the exploitation through high prices (inflation), 
misinformation and poor quality of products and services’; and par 8, ‘To mobilise for 
the improvement of the local environment: schools, health, recreation, etc.’. (2) The 
statement on motherhood and child-rearing had strong conservative and nationalistic 
overtones in the initial formulation: par 4: ‘To attain the institutionalisation by the 
State of a set of protective measures for the mother and the child. To recognise 
officially the mission of motherhood in relation to our nation’s future’. (3) The initial 
wording on international solidarity and understanding amongst women did not 
mention third-world women, (4) The 1976 Constitution confined EGE membership to 
Greek citizens, while that of 1983 also provides for the enrolment of non-Greeks, (5) 
The most significant difference is that in the 1976 Constitution the word patriarchy 
does not appear at all, thereby illustrating the organisation’s initial ideological 
vagueness. See Art 2, Constitution, op. cit., ref. 2 and Art 2, Constitution, op. cit., ref.
7.
40 Zillah Eisenstein was the first to use the term capitalist patriarchy. The term 
illustrates the socialist-feminist belief that the origins of women’s oppression lie in the
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3.3.1 Capitalist Patriarchy
At the first Panhellenic meeting in 1982 the members voted in favour of 
declaring the EGE a socialist feminist organisation, thereby acknowledging two 
distinct origins of women’s oppression: patriarchy and capitalism.
‘Patriarchy constitutes one of the essential reasons for women’s oppression 
and exploitation, since it predetermines the social roles on the basis of sex’.41 
In other words, gender lies at the root of the unequal distribution of ‘human roles, 
goals, activities, labour, and thereby it also becomes the predominant criterion for the 
segregation of social functions and individual power’.42 Patriarchy, according to the 
EGE, precedes as a system the class divisions of society. The historical origins of 
patriarchy are located in men’s control over women’s reproductive abilities. Hence, 
human reproduction and its political control by men constitute one site of women’s 
oppression.43 If patriarchy is one face of women’s oppression, capitalism is the other.
complex interaction between capitalism and patriarchy. Socialist feminists have
rejected both radical feminism, which locates women’s oppression predominantly or
exclusively in patriarchy, and Marxist feminism, which locates it in capitalism. There
0
have been diverse ideological currents within the framework of socialist-feminism, 
but they all share the following essential premises: (i) behind the political, social, 
cultural and psychological phenomena of women’s oppression lies a material root, (ii) 
Marxism has used historical materialism to analyse production; women should use the 
same methodological tools for exploring the sphere of reproduction; (iii) patriarchy 
does not constitute an a-historical system, as radical feminists argue, and the concrete 
connections between patriarchy and the capitalist social reality must be explored. See 
Fox, Bonnie (1988) ‘Conceptualising “Patriarchy” ’, The Canadian Review o f  
Sociology and Anthropology, 25, 2, Evans, Judith (1995) Feminist Theory Today: An 
Introduction to Second-Wave Feminism, (London, Sage); and Sargent, Lydia (ed.) 
(1981) Women and Revolution: A Discussion o f the Unhappy Marriage o f Marxism 
and Feminism (Boston, South End Press).
41 ‘The Union of Greek Women: A Feminist-Socialist Organisation’, Central 
Proposal distributed at the EGE’s First Panhellenic Conference, 26-28 Nov. 1982 in 
Athens, p.l.
42 ‘The Union of Greek Women: A Feminist-Socialist Organisation’, ibid., p. 2.
43 Feminism-Socialism: The Route to Social Liberation, op. cit., ref. 6.
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‘Capitalism constitutes the other fundamental reason for women’s oppression 
and exploitation. Capitalism, of course, exploits the totality of the working 
people, but especially, from an economic point of view, women. Capitalism 
keeps women in the margins of society, because women’s domesticity 
safeguards: (1) the free upbringing of children, who are capitalism’s future 
labourers, and (2) the free care of men, who are its present labourers. 
Additionally, capitalism uses women as a cheap reserve labour force, 
whenever this is economically dictated’.44 
The organisation emphasises that capitalism and patriarchy are not two independent 
systems but one complex whole.
‘The awareness that elements of one system are absolutely necessary for the 
maintenance of the other is extremely important for a socialist-feminist 
political analysis’ 45
So, by determining every aspect of women’s social life, patriarchy serves capitalism’s 
interest to have political control over women.46 Moreover, by establishing a class 
system, that is based on profit and involves women’s economic dependency, 
exploitation and oppression capitalism reinforces patriarchy47 The ideological 
premise that women’s oppression is due to a combination of patriarchy and capitalism 
carries with it the belief that women’s liberation can be achieved only by a 
combination of feminism and socialism. The EGE’s dominant slogan throughout its 
historical trajectory has therefore been:
‘There is no women’s liberation without social liberation; there is no social 
liberation without women’s liberation’.48 
The organisation’s emphasis on the interdependency of capitalism and patriarchy has 
also had practical implications. If the EGE had adopted the dual-systems theory, 
which is based on the belief that capitalism and patriarchy each have their source in 
distinct social systems, the necessity for an independent women’s movement would
44 ‘The Union of Greek Women: A Feminist-Socialist Organisation’, op. cit., ref. 41,
pp. 1-2.
45 ‘The Union of Greek Women:...’, ibid., p. 2.
46 ‘The Union of Greek Women: ...’, ibid., p.2.
47 Feminism-Socialism: The Route to Social Liberation, op. cit., ref. 6, p. 54.
48 Women’s Union of Greece, op. cit., ref. 38.
112
have been a perfectly reasonable inference.49 In fact, the EGE found ideological 
legitimation for its alignment with the socialist party by emphasising the elements of 
interdependency between the two.
To sum up: Initially founded as a general women’s organisation, the EGE’s 
original ideological vagueness was eventually succeeded by a clear demarcation of its 
feminist agenda. While its ideological platform is based on the premises of socialist 
feminism, the organisation’s positions in matters of concrete policy have frequently 
contradicted them. Let us look at the Union’s ideological distinctiveness as expressed 
in its publications and declarations.
3.3.2 Social Values, Socialisation, Education
The fundamental axiom of socialist-feminism that women’s oppression has a 
material basis is clearly stated in the book Feminism-Socialism: The Route to Social 
Liberation, the only EGE publication, which gives an extensive account of the 
organisation’s ideological framework. Others texts put out by the EGE have, however, 
projected a different interpretation of patriarchy. There has been continuous emphasis 
on gender inequality being caused by the dominant system of social values, which is 
said to induce social prejudices and generate patterns of behaviour that have led to 
women’s marginalisation and oppression.
‘As a women’s organisation, our struggle is directed towards two fronts: the 
capitalist system and the prevalent patriarchal mentalities’.50 
‘Official statistical evidence proves that women, although they constitute half 
of the country’s population, are the most oppressed. Women’s problems have
49 The dual-systems theory is one ideological strand within the spectrum of socialist- 
feminism. It conceptualises patriarchy as a system parallel, and with a status similar to 
capitalism. Since it regards the two systems as separate and self-contained, it tends to 
locate patriarchy in the family and capitalism in the economy. However, other 
ideological currents within socialist feminism view patriarchy and capitalism as 
interdependent, each one permeating the totality of social relations. See Young, Iris 
(1981) ‘Beyond the Unhappy Marriage: A Critique of the Dual Systems Theory’, in 
Sargent, op. cit., ref. 40.
50 ‘The Participation of Women in Politics and Public Life’, Open Window, issue 8, 
Feb.-March 1980, p. 1.
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resulted from the myths and prejudices that have been propagated in societies 
and have denied women access to decision-making centres. Thereby, women 
have been denied the right to take part in the formation of the society, they live 
in’.51
This locates patriarchy in the sphere of social values, yet the argument hardly ever 
links it to social structures or vested interests. The EGE, therefore, reduces social 
values to an abstract entity that arbitrarily imposes on society patterns of behaviour 
beyond or against the interests of both sexes.
‘We women are struggling to change not only the relations of production, but 
also human relations and we know that this can be achieved only if there is a 
conscious effort to change the system of values that oppresses all of us, 
women and men’.52
Accordingly, the organisation clarifies in various ideological statements that its 
struggle is not directed against men but against the dominant patriarchal mentality.
‘We do not fight against men. We fight against the mentality of the patriarchal 
society, which has turned the prejudice against women into an unwritten moral 
code’.53
What this means is that, by interpreting social values as autonomous from social 
structures and interests, the organisation has deprived patriarchy of its core 
dimension, which is the notion of conflicting interests. The socialist-feminist 
definition of patriarchy as the collective male dominance over the interests of the 
socially inferior group of women, has given place to considering patriarchy as a mere 
ideological abstraction. This confinement of patriarchy to the realm of ideology has 
enabled the Union of Greek Women to criticise patriarchy without ever targeting men 
as the bearers o f patriarchal oppression.54 The EGE discourse has consistently 
eschewed the question of the origins of the prevailing value system, and always 
confined itself to abstract terms like ‘the system’, ‘society’, ‘human beings’, etc. It has
51 ‘Women’s Problems and the Struggle for their Solution within the Context of the 
forthcoming National Elections’, Open Window, issue 14, July-Sept. 1981, p. 1.
52 ‘8th March: Day of Struggles for Women’, Open Window, issue 12, Jan.-March 
1981, p. 1.
53 To the Women, pamphlet by the Kifissia-Athens branch of the EGE (in Greek).
54 ‘The Participation of Women in Politics and Public Life’, op. cit, ref. 50, p. 1.
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limited itself to a merely descriptive account of women’s oppression, avoiding any 
specification of the origins of that oppression. It may have denounced the patriarchal 
institutions of society, but it has repeatedly called on men to actively support the 
feminist cause.
‘The road to equality and emancipation of women is the road of the common 
struggles of all the citizens, men and women, for democracy, social progress 
and liberation’.55
The Union has ideologically shielded its alliance with the socialist party by 
articulating a self-confined feminist discourse, which rarely targeted the beneficiaries 
of women’s oppression. In the few instances when the origins of the prevailing 
patriarchal mentality were specified, they were located within the capitalist system.
‘The fundamental cause of women’s oppression should be sought in the 
capitalist system and the assumptions it has generated in relation to women’s 
role. These assumptions operate in an autonomous manner...\56 
An outright attack on men would unavoidably mean a critique of the male-dominated 
society and political system, and this would generate friction in the organisation’s 
collaboration with the socialist party. The EGE, in contrast to the Movement of 
Democratic Women (KDG), has avoided any criticism of the patriarchal elements of 
the socialist party or of the mainstream values of Greek society.57
In other words, the EGE has tended to portray patriarchy as a mere cultural 
phenomenon, while in the rare instances when a material grounding of patriarchy was 
given; this was placed within the capitalist system.
55 ‘8th March: Day of Struggles for Women’, op. cit., ref. 52, p. 1.
56 ‘The Participation of Women in Politics and Public Life’, op. cit., ref. 50, p. 1, 
(emphasis added).
57 The KDG was allied with the Communist Party of Greece of the Interior. A 
significant section of women in the KDG articulated a severe critique of male culture 
and the male-dominated public domain. Their aim was to ‘feminise’ the communist 
party, hoping to alter its established practices and ideological premises, which were 
perceived as reproducing the androcentric logic o f ‘formal politics’. However, the 
strong reaction to this from the party and from opposing sections within the KDG led 
many members to resign and form an alliance with the autonomous feminist groups.
See chapter 4.
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The predominant focus on the sphere of ideology also manifested itself 
by a strong emphasis on gender-role socialisation and the emancipatory potential of 
education. The EGE has persistently underlined that children are socialised into 
specific clearly differentiated roles, and in the process they internalise their society’s 
dominant social values and structures. Their socialisation develops those attributes 
that are considered appropriate for females and males respectively.
‘The myth of ...man’s superiority and woman’s inferiority has been cultivated 
by the dominant ideology via its different channels (the family, school, church, 
media, etc.). This myth of inequality has influenced the relation between the 
sexes, leading to alienated individuals, women and men, who have developed 
false hypocritical relations and feelings, instead of aspiring to establish
c o
relations grounded on equality and earnestness’.
EGE’s publications have again and again stressed the family and schools, the agents 
of primary socialisation, as the most significant elements in the formation of gendered 
subjectivities. Numerous articles in Open Window (Anichto Parathiro) have been 
dedicated to child-rearing and the educational system, while a constant claim of the 
organisation has been the founding of ‘Parental Schools’, for creating family 
environments that could take full advantage of children’s potential. The organisation’s 
emphasis on socialisation has gone hand and hand with its belief in the emancipatory 
potential of education.
‘A socialist polity’s duty is to assist its citizens to become mature, liberated 
and fulfilled individuals. This can be realised by means of information and 
further education’.59
In this way, the EGE has reproduced the dominant social-constructions belief of the 
Greek Left (of the 1970s and early ‘80s) that, if social institutions (family, school, 
etc.) became agents of democratisation, and objective information and education were 
provided freely to every citizen, society would cease to be an arena of competition 
and domination and would instead become a sphere of social awareness and social 
fellowship. This line of argument has been an integral part of the EGE’s broader 
humanistic discourse.
58 ‘The Relation between the Sexes is “Predefined”’, Open Window, issue 14, July- 
Sept. 1981, p. 16.
59 ‘The Family in Greece’, Open Window, issue 7, Dec-Jan 1980, p. 14.
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3.3.3 Humanism, Equality, Androgyny
The EGE’s ideological discourse has projected equality as inherent part of the 
broader political project to achieve human liberation.
‘The Women’s Union of Greece believes that by working initially on the 
problems of daily life, and trying altogether to solve those problems by 
collective action, we can achieve our final goal - THE LIBERATION OF THE 
HUMAN BEING’.60
In other words, the EGE would like to see a social order, where all human beings are 
entitled to universal moral equality simply by virtue of being human. Accordingly, the 
organisation has grounded its claim for equality on the notion of human rights.
‘We believe that true sexual equality is the claim of human rights, since it 
refers to human relations in society’.61 
Hence, a common humanity forms the moral underpinning of the EGE’s feminist 
platform:
‘...The present demands of the women’s movement aim at a different way of 
life, where all human beings will be liberated from exploitation, oppression, 
domination and the multiple forms of alienation’.
Throughout, the organisation has emphasised the common humanity of both sexes and 
has underplayed women’s distinctive experiences and social identities, given its 
implicit assumption that there is no difference between men and women. The EGE 
has consistently argued that the existing social differences between the sexes are the 
product of the prevailing patriarchal order. In a society of gender equality, women and 
men would not only share their common human essence, but would also be free to 
develop their equal capabilities. Accordingly, the projection of the equal qualities of 
the two sexes has constituted, for EGE, a fundamental precondition for a uniform 
treatment of women and men. The Union’s emphasis on the sameness of the sexes 
embodies the idea of gender-neutral human beings or citizens, an ‘androgyny’.63 The
60 ‘Greek Women Forward in Action’, in Greece through new Eyes, EGE pamphlet 
(in English).
61 ‘The Woman’s Question in Greece’, Open Window, issue 7, Dec-Jan 1980, p.8
62 Feminism-Socialism: The Route to Social Liberation, op. cit., ref. 6, p. 18.
63 The term ‘androgyny’ refers to the premise that between the sexes there is an 
absence of differences and therefore they are both entitled to equality. Thus,
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EGE’s feminist vision of an egalitarian society in which women and men will have 
equal rights, equal opportunities, and equal responsibilities presupposes a society of 
‘androgyny’ individuals with qualities in no way different from those of his or her 
fellow citizens, and therefore entitled to exactly the same rights.64 This association of 
equality and androgyny was much reinforced during the rule of the socialist party, 
since the incorporation of gender issues into the national policy agenda led to a 
gender-neutral state discourse.65
The ideological foundations of the EGE (humanism-equality-sameness) came 
under severe attack from other groups of the Greek feminist movement. The 
autonomous feminists and the KDG charged that the Union by emphasising women’s 
equality with men was encouraging women to take part in and become integrated into 
the patriarchal system. Moreover, they argued that any gender-neutral discourse in a 
patriarchal society obscures the existence of inequality by placing both sexes on the 
same level, although one of them holds power over the other. Their own feminist 
discourse denounced women’s integration into the existing patriarchal society and
‘androgyny’ is a descriptive term for the gendeMieutral perception of human beings. 
The opposite of androgyny is gynocentrism, which latter term is associated with 
cultural feminism that emphasises the differences between women and men. Cultural 
feminism ascribes a positive value to those differences, and celebrates women’s 
qualities as superior to men’s. The first feminist perspective (equality, androgyny) 
endorses social constructionism, while the latter (cultural feminism, gynocentrism) is 
based on essentialism or biological determinism. On the international level, the 
association of equality with sameness and androgyny has been a common feature of 
second-wave socialist-feminist organisations. Cott, Nancy (1986) ‘Feminist Theory 
and Feminist Movements: The Past Before Us’, in Juliet Mitchell, Ann Oakley (eds.) 
What is Feminism? (Oxford, Blackwell); and Evans, op. cit., ref. 40.
64 ‘General Aims’, in Greece through New Eyes, op. cit., ref. 60.
65 Sweden has been representative of the correlation between the bureaucratisation of 
issues related to sex equality and a gender-neutral state discourse. See in Elman, Amy 
(1995) ‘The State’s Equality for Women: Sweden’s Equality Ombudsman’, in 
Dorothy McBride Stetson, Amy G. Mazur (eds.) Comparative State Feminism, 
(London, Sage).
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emphasised the differences between women and men. In Greece, therefore, the 
controversy of sexual equality versus difference, which has been a major feature of 
the international feminist movement, was manifested in the ideological conflict 
between the Union of Greek Women, which pursued ‘equality through sameness’, and 
the bloc of the autonomous feminist groups allied with the KDG, which struggled for 
‘equality through difference’. However, even the latter groups, have persistently 
argued against any positive evaluation of women’s existing attributes. There has been 
a strong consensus throughout the Greek feminist spectrum that qualities bom out of 
oppression should not be celebrated.
3.3.4 Men, Family, Motherhood, Sexuality
The EGE’s humanistic discourse has embraced both women and men 
as alienated individuals, oppressed by the double burden of patriarchy and capitalism. 
It has on many occasions called on men to become comrades in the women’s struggle. 
In view of that, the EGE has severely attacked the radical feminist organisations’ 
confrontational stance towards men.
‘We want men to become comrades imour struggle, because only women and 
men together, hand in hand, equal, ...will make the dream of a better life come 
true’.66
‘In nearly all countries the progressive political parties have not persuaded 
women of their positive disposition to gender issues. This has led to the 
disorientation of women, who have started adopting increasingly extremist 
positions’.67
According to the EGE, the number of women who consider patriarchy to be the prime 
opponent and so disregard the significance of the political regime has proliferated 
significantly. This has led to a separatist struggle carried out by women only and in 
permanent conflict with men.
‘This apolitical feminism has failed to provide a solution. Men are equally 
trapped with women in the networks of society. It is totally unrealistic to argue 
that our father, brother, husband or professional associate is competing with us
66 ‘Legally Equal’, Open Window, issue 20, Jan.-April 1983, p. 1.
67 ‘Woman and the European Community’, Open Window, issue 6, Sept.-Oct.- Nov. 
1979, p. 8.
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because of his nature. We must realise that emancipation comes into direct 
conflict with the fundamental needs of capitalism and of any other system 
based on oppression’.
While officially the organisation, both on the practical and the ideological level, has 
persistently sought an alliance with men, it was divided on the issue internally. The 
younger members took a more confrontational stance vis-a-vis men than did the older 
generation. The latter was reluctant to endorse ideological tenets that pointed to men 
as the beneficiaries of patriarchy. Their viewpoint clearly expressed itself at the first 
Panhellenic conference. The older members, who considered the feminist label as too 
radical and extremist, objected to the specification of the organisation’s ideological 
identity as ‘socialist feminist’.69 Although the official EGE pronouncements have 
usually accommodated both tendencies, they have favoured the projection of the 
feminist cause as conjoint to the men’s struggle for socialism.
In the mid-1980s the EGE, which previously had rejected radical 
feminism as apolitical and elitist, began to adopt its premises and language.70 It now 
attacked the political system as male-dominated, and identified male culture with 
power, domination, competitiveness, and war. It also started praising women as 
superior to men.
‘Every country’s political system reflects predominantly the male point of 
view...This is valid for all societies, since there is nowhere in the world any 
society that is not patriarchal and male dominated. What form would society
68 ‘Woman and the European Community’, ibid., p. 8.
69 ‘Chronicle of the First Panhellenic Meeting’, Open Window, issue 20, Jan.-April 
1983, p. 17.
*7 ft The EGE’s opposition to the autonomous feminist groups temporarily changed to 
one of reconciliation. So, in 1986 it issued its first invitation to an autonomous group 
(‘Single Mothers’), and the year after, its magazine published an interview with Alice 
Schwartzer. See ‘Single Mothers’, Open Window, issue 32, Jan.-Feb.-March 1986; 
and Skepers, Amalia ‘Justice is Male: Interview with Alice Schwartzer’, Open 
Window, issue 37, Jan.-Feb. 1987.
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have, if its civilisation was based on women’s values, meaning the principles 
of care and nurture, non-violence, non-oppression and non-exploitation?’.71
And:
‘Patriarchy is a value system that involves competition, aggressiveness,
77hierarchy, denial of emotions and the use of violence’.
The most obvious reason for this sudden turn-about was the collapse of the marriage 
of Margaret and Andreas Papandreou. The fact that it was mostly Margaret 
Papandreou and her supporters who expressed the new EGE orientation proves the 
personalistic aspect of this ideological rupture. The EGE majority continued to adhere 
to the organisation’s previous humanistic agenda.73 Following Margaret Papandreou’s 
departure, the Union’s official discourse once more endorsed the alliance with men 
and the socialist party.
Aside from the personal element in the EGE’s sudden antagonism towards 
men, there were two subtler reasons behind this ideological discontinuity. The 
socialist party, before it came to power, had included in its election program a number 
of feminist demands articulated by the EGE, but later showed itself most reluctant to 
keep its promises (for instance concerning the'legalisation of abortions), fearing their 
high political cost.74 Persistent pressure by the Union, and the continued refusal by the
71 Speech by Margarita Papandreou at the Conference ‘Woman and Local Self- 
Management’, Open Window, issue 35, Sept.-Oct. 1986, pp. 9-10.
72 ‘Together for Peace’, (Speech by Margarita Papandreou at EGE’s celebration of the 
‘International Woman’s Day’ (8/03/86)), Open Window, issue 32, Jan.-Feb.-March 
1986, p. 6.
73 Illustrative is the statement of the organisation’s branch in Argos (08/Mar ./1986): 
‘We believe that men’s involvement and support is necessary for the positive outcome 
of our struggle. We do not regard men as rivals, but as partners in life and our 
struggles for better interpersonal relations’. ‘Woman and Peace’, Open Window, ibid., 
p. 14.
74 The Minister of Health refused to have abortions legalised, on the grounds that 
Greek society was too conservative for this. The socialist party arranged a series of 
meetings with the EGE Executive Board to persuade the organisation to withdraw its 
demand. In reply, the organization set a deadline for the realization of the reform, and 
when it had expired, it joined the mobilisations by the autonomous feminist groups
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party to satisfy the organisation’s demands inevitably created tension in their alliance. 
Margaret Papandreou was quite explicit when she addressed the conference ‘Woman 
and Mass Media’:
‘Women’s vision of the future society... is repressed by the traditional 
patriarchal mentality, which becomes even more apparent whenever policy 
issues concerning the relation between the two sexes are raised. We have to 
deal with ‘socialist patriarchs’ or ‘patriarchal socialists’, since the perceptions 
about women’s roles are the same in all male-dominated parties’.75 
The second reason for EGE’s change in outlook was conjunctural. It was the 1980s 
that witnessed the peak of the Greek feminist movement, with particularly the 
autonomous feminists and the KDG organising frequent demonstration to pressure the 
government into satisfying long-outstanding feminist claims. The building-up of a 
grass-roots movement, independent of political parties and the ascendancy of a more 
radical feminist discourse, forced the EGE to readjust its ideological platform to the 
new reality in the feminist spectrum.
A marked feature in the organisation’s feminist identity has been the 
continuous and whole-hearted support of the family institution as the most significant 
agent of socialisation.
‘The family environment has an enormous formative power. Morals and 
customs, tradition and practices are transferred from generation to generation 
within the family. Thus, the family becomes the regulatory factor of our social 
life. A democratic structure of the family is going to be reflected also at the 
level of the community and society’.76 ‘The focus of contemporary sociology on 
the institution of the family follows the realisation that the family constitutes 
society’s most effective, stabilising and rejuvenating social group possible’.77
and the KDG that eventually forced the government to get the law through in 
Parliament. Interview with Margaret Papandreou, 07/Nov./ ‘98, Athens; interview 
with Constantina Giannopoulou, op. cit., ref. 3.
75 ‘Woman and Mass Media’, Open Window, issue 31, Oct.-Nov.-Dec. 1985, p. 14.
76 ‘The Family in Greece’, op. cit., ref. 59, p. 13.
77 ‘The Family in Greece’, ibid., p. 13.
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The family received high praise not only in terms of societal, but also individual 
development.78 Consequently, in EGE’s discourse the oppression within the family is 
not built-in the institution itself. Since the institution is not inherently patriarchal, 
oppression is a concomitant of the existing authoritarian structure and function of the 
institution.79 In accordance with this view, the EGE has argued that restructuring the 
institution along democratic lines would bring out the emancipatory potential of the 
family.80 Therefore, its analysis of the family has centred on the democratic- 
authoritarian duality. Both notions embrace the humanistic and gender-neutral 
perspective of the organisation. The fundamental axiom of second-wave feminism that 
it is above all through heterosexual marriage that men exert control over women’s 
labour and sexuality has been totally absent from the EGE discourse.
‘We want to create a human society that is going to be supportive to the family 
and to women’s new social role. When we analyse women’s issues, we must 
take into consideration that both men and women believe in marriage. Our aim 
is not to destroy marriage because it oppresses women. Our aim is to reform 
marriage as an institution’.81
The organisation’s strong pro-family stance has been inseparably 
linked with its positive attitude to motherhood. Since its founding, the EGE has stated 
unequivocally that it perceives motherhood as a social good, and one of its 
constitutional aims has been the official recognition of the social contribution of 
motherhood.82 This perception of motherhood as a valuable social function is coupled 
with the projection of childbearing as a women’s natural role. In the EGE’s discourse, 
motherhood is part of a woman’s nature. It is not a matter of choice, but the social 
function expected of women. Instead of challenging the social construction of
The organisation has insistently argued that the family is the only environment 
where people can become ‘psycho-mentally mature’. ‘The Family in Greece’, ibid., p.
13.
79 ‘Woman and the European Community’, op. cit., ref. 67, ‘The Family in Greece’, 
ibid.
o / \  _
Athena Rapitou, ‘Beating has not come from Paradise’, Open Window, issue 7,
Dec.-Jan. 1980, p. 12
81 ‘Meeting at “Ocean”’, Open Window, issue 42, Feb.-Dee., 1988, p.8.
82 Article 2, op. cit., ref. 39.
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motherhood as the ‘biological fate’ of women, the EGE has denoted it as women’s 
collective duty, and in relevant discussions frequently associated it with the country’s 
demographic difficulties. The Union has proposed:
‘...the provision of incentives for the increase of the birth rate, like social care 
for working mothers... economic accommodations and allowances... in 
collaboration with the Ministries of Finance and Coordination’.83 
It has not, therefore, tried to dissuade women from bearing children, but has focused 
instead on the existing social and economic impediments to the social role of 
motherhood:
‘Only the social and economic liberation of women will ensure that women 
are befitted and worthy of the role of motherhood’.84 
Demands for the social protection of motherhood have been coupled with the premise 
that the ‘socialisation’ of motherhood enables women to break through the boundaries 
of the household. The organisation has struggled for state provisions and allowances 
that would socialise the cost of child-rearing and free women for participation in the 
public domain. Moreover, it has fought against motherhood being used as a pretext 
for women’s marginalisation.
‘Feminists are not against motherhood or maternal care; in reality feminists 
are the best mothers. However, they are against the utilization of motherhood 
as a means to undermine them’.85 
In parallel, it has just as fiercely opposed the idea that motherhood is women’s 
exclusive purpose However, when the organisation’s pamphlet on legalisation of 
abortions asserts a woman’s right to decide when to have children, there is no 
suggestion that she might not have any:
‘It is the indefeasible right of every woman to decide when and how many 
children she will bring into the world’.86
83 ‘EGE’s positions on Abortion’, Open Window, issue 5, June-July-Aug. 1979, p. 2.
84 Amelia Skepers, ‘Day of the Mother’, Open Window, issue 4, Apr.-March 1979, p. 
3.
85 Speech by Margaret Papandreou at the Conference Woman and Local Self- 
Management, op. cit., ref. 71, p. 13.
86 We Say Yes to Legal Abortion, EGE pamphlet (in Greek - emphasis added).
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A noteworthy feature of the organisation’s program has been that 
sexuality did not appear as an issue until 1981, when the EGE’s Committee of Young 
Women drew up the first ideological draft on sexual liberation. The project was 
assigned to the Union’s younger members, given that their seniors had usually more 
conservative attitudes to family, motherhood, and sexuality. Even so, the ideological 
positions of the Committee reveal the organisation’s deep distrust of the concept of 
sexual liberation’:
‘We believe that whoever speaks of women’s sexual liberation should first of 
all aim to develop women’s awareness. Every woman must have control of 
and be aware of her actions ...The contemporary fake sexual liberation is just a 
veil that conceals the sexual immaturity, conflicts and personal anguish of the 
people involved. The myth of sexual liberation has assigned to women new 
duties. Women must now pretend that they experience satisfaction, even 
though it may not exist. In older times, women could at least out of prudery or 
fear of an undesired pregnancy, refuse sex ... Nowadays, because of sexual 
liberation and the contraceptive pill, they are obliged to be available’.87 
This text is representative of the EGE’s critical attitude to ‘sexual liberation’ as the 
ideological tool of ‘apolitical’ and ‘extremist’ radical feminism. EGE has, therefore, 
preferred the term ‘sexual emancipation’. Moreover, the EGE has denounced the 
capitalist commodification of sexuality without ever discussing the role of sexuality in 
the consolidation of patriarchal domination. Thus, the EGE has hardly ever 
investigated the social and cultural meanings that are bound up with sexuality in a 
patriarchal society.
‘The ...exploitation of human eroticism alters enormously our lives and 
mentalities. When the press, advertisements and finally Art project only 
‘suspicious’ eroticism, sex, vulgarity and degeneration, human relations lose 
their quality. The ‘erotic dream’ becomes merely an object of exploitation, 
while humans themselves are trapped in a spiritual impasse’.88
87 Committee of Young Women, ‘Thoughts and Concerns in regard to Sexual 
Liberation of Women’, Open Window, issue 13, Apr.-June 1981, p. 9.
88 ‘Porno Movies’, Open Window, issue 10, July-Aug.-Sept. 1980, p. 17.
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In the Union’s pronouncements sexuality has always been associated with family 
planning and women’s health.89 Even when considering matters that have constituted 
the cornerstone of the second-wave’s campaign for women’s control over their own 
bodies and sexuality -such as abortion- they were invariably seen as part of the wider 
questions of women’s health and the family institution. The pamphlet demanding the 
legalisation of abortions states:
‘Abortion, the consequences of which are borne predominantly by women, but 
also by the whole family and society, is a medical act that takes place every 
day in incredible numbers. Abortions often take place under unacceptable 
conditions and always in a state of illegality...The legalisation of abortions will 
help Greek women and their families by providing a realistic solution to this 
immense social problem. Every woman’s indefeasible right is the protection of 
her health and life...We call you altogether in our struggle for our health and 
our life. We demand the immediate legalisation of abortion’.90 
All mention of sexuality is notably absent. In EGE’s discourse sexuality is reduced to 
women’s reproductive ability. Therefore, it is brought up only to illustrate oppression 
in the capitalist system or to address women’s health. Accordingly, the issue of 
homosexuality is passed over in complete silence. In brief, the fundamental premise 
of feminism that women’s sexual desire has been defined and categorised by men has 
been excluded from the organisation’s discourse. The socially constructed content of 
sexuality is never mentioned. Instead, there is the implicit assumption that sexuality is 
universal and therefore gender-blind. This neutral perception of sexuality by the EGE 
has ruled out any endeavour to investigate female desire, cleansed from any 
patriarchal connotations.
89 ‘Family planning means controlling the out-of-hand birth rates and programming 
births’. Amelia Skepers, ‘Family Planning Centres’, Open Window, issue 2, p. 12.
90 ‘We Say Yes to Legal Abortion’, op. cit., ref. 86.
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3.3.5 Public and Private
The EGE’s ideological manifesto states quite clearly:
‘Feminist theory has aimed to theorise and politicise the dimension of 
women’s oppression, which the traditional socialist thought has overlooked as 
personal’.91
And:
‘We believe that the “personal” is “political”’.92
The declaration is in accordance with the feminist assertion that the 
public/private dichotomy devalues women’s experiences. However, the Union’s 
ideological program as well as its political strategy has been founded on the socialist 
belief that social change can occur only by collective action in the public realm. In 
view of that, the EGE has emphasised that the marginalisation of women can be 
overturned only if women’s private issues become transformed into collective, public 
matters. It has consistently argued that integrating women into the public realm is a 
necessary precondition for elevating their civil status and endowing them with 
political resources. The participation of women in the decision-making centres has, 
therefore, been one of the Union’s constitutional aims and prime objectives.93 Its 
political strategy has not been founded on a second-wave positive re-evaluation of the 
private sphere, but on the contrary on a ceaseless struggle to end the oppression of 
women by freeing them from the restriction of the private sphere. While, therefore, on 
the one hand the EGE acknowledged the political oppression of women in the private 
sphere, on the other it shared the deep distrust of the socialist tradition towards it. As 
Anne Phillips notes:
91 Socialism-Feminism: The Route to Social Liberation, op. cit., ref. 6, pp. 40-41.
92 The slogan ‘The Personal is Political’ was coined by Carol Hanisch in 1970 and has 
since then been identified with second wave feminism; Humm, Maggie (ed.) (1992) 
Feminisms: A Reader (New York and London, Harvester and Wheatsheaf); and 
Socialism-Feminism: The Route to Social Liberation, ibid., p. 11.
93 Constitution, op. cit., ref. 2 and ref. 7.
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‘Where there was a more substantial theoretical partnership of socialism with 
feminism, it lay in the socialist equation of domesticity with confinement, and 
the socialist preference for whatever was collective, public and social’.94 
This negative ideological predisposition towards the private sphere has 
constituted a clear dividing line between the EGE and the autonomous feminist 
groups’ attempt to expose the constitution and function of patriarchy in private 
everyday practices. Additionally, the Union’s adherence to the political primacy of 
the public sphere over the private one has led to a strategy focused on the traditional 
institutions of the public realm - namely political parties and the state. The 
organisation’s emphasis on the significant role of the state apparatus in promoting 
sexual equality is representative of the political project of state feminism.95 The EGE 
was also clearly opposed to individual initiatives, because they belonged to the 
country’s tradition of liberal feminism, which was confined to charitable activities.96
B) Socialist Identity
Socialism has been defined by the EGE as the only political order able to 
provide the necessary framework for human liberation:
‘We deeply believe that Socialism is the only socio-political system that 
originates from and simultaneously aims at the free development of human 
personality and its elevation into an ethical entity. Therefore we believe that 
socialism is the only system that can give the Greek people the necessary 
provisions for their victory’.97
The Union has shared with the socialist party the vision of a ‘third 
way’ to socialism. This was articulated by PASOK on the following premises: (i) 
since the socialist systems of Eastern Europe have not abolished dependent labour, 
they are incompatible with true socialism; and (ii) the capitalist system, undergoing a
94 Phillips, Anne (1997) ‘What has Socialism to do with Sexual Equality? ’, in: Jane 
Franklin (ed.) Equality (London, Institute for Public Policy Research), pp. 104-05.
95 The term state feminism describes the political project of utilising the state 
apparatus, which is considered gender-neutral, for promoting gender equality. See 
Stetson and Mazur, op. cit., ref. 65.
96 Interview with Anne Pitsiori-Kavadia, op. cit., ref. 3.
97 ‘The Family in Greece’, op. cit., ref. 59, p. 13.
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deep economic crisis, facilitates the realisation of ‘third way’ socialist alternatives at 
the national level. PASOK considered essential for building a socialist alternative the 
socialisation of economic sectors, state intervention, and regional decentralisation.98 
The EGE adopted this ideological framework and used its tools to outline the 
transition to socialism. The ideological clusters below sum up the EGE’s 
interpretation of the socialist alternative.
3.3.6 Monopoly Capitalism, Imperialism, Peace
From the very beginning, the Union of Greek Women took a strongly 
anti-capitalist stand, opposing the capitalist system as exploitative of the working 
class and of women in particular. Moreover, it portrayed the capitalist logic of profit 
as a mighty force that resulted in the dissolution of social bonds and in alienated 
individuals. The organisation professed its solidarity with the labour movement, and 
worked for the protection of workingwomen against the effects of worldwide 
capitalist crises. 99 It denounced all international institutions, which it considered to 
embody the logic of market profitability (e.g. the European Community):
‘The European Community is a narrow materialistic scheme that has not yet 
projected any humanistic agenda. The Europe of the merchants and the 
multinational corporations is exclusively interested to promote the commercial 
and industrial interests of its members’. 100 
And:
98 Kapazoglou, Eni ‘The Result of the Transition to Socialism is Eventually 
Democracy’, (Speech by Andreas Papandreou at the International Academic 
Conference ‘Transition to Socialism: The Dimensions of the Structural Change’, 
Athens 30 June-03 July 1980), Open Window, issue 10, July-Aug-Sept. 1980, pp. 13-
14.
99 The EGE demanded social security for all employed women (incuding piecework at 
home and unpaid female labour in family businesses), the combating of female 
unemployment, and social recognition of women’s invisible labour. See Half o f  the Sky 
and the Earth is Going to Change the World, E.G.E pamphlet; and ‘Goals for 
immediate fulfilment’ in ‘Women’s Union of Greece’, op. cit., Ref. 38.
100 ‘Woman and the European Community’, op. cit., ref. 67, p. 10.
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‘The European Community is only interested in opening up new markets for its 
products. In this process women will be reduced to a cheap labour force’.101
The organisation’s opposition to capitalism went hand in hand with its 
unwavering stand against imperialism. This was the more acute as Greece had 
recently been subjected to a seven year military dictatorship with the acquiescence of 
the United States.
‘...Greece’s participation in the military branch of NATO... has set off the 
anger of the Greek people, since they cannot forget NATO’s responsibility for 
the seven-year long dictatorship, induced by the United States, and the treason 
of Cyprus. Furthermore, Greek people cannot disregard United States’ obvious 
support to the Turkish claims over the Aegean...The common enemy, which is 
imperialism, undermines people’s effort for Democracy, Social Liberation and 
Peace’.102
The organisation’s discourse underlined the interrelation between monopoly 
capitalism and imperialism. In Greece, it was the Communist Party that had first 
pointed out the unity of the anti-junta, anti-imperialist and anti-monopolistic 
struggles. This ideological approach was quickly adopted by the socialists and 
reproduced by the EGE, which thereby demonstrated its adherence to the broader 
political spectrum of the Centre-Left.
The Union also participated actively in the Greek peace movement, 
wishing to build an effective mass movement to curb the military power of 
imperialistic nations. In this connection, it has persistently demanded the abolition of 
all nuclear power weapons, the reduction of conventional weapons held by the two 
superpowers, an agreement not to intervene in the Third World, and the withdrawal 
from Greek soil of all foreign armies and military bases.103 The EGE’s opposition to 
the country’s age-long foreign dependency expressed itself in its mobilisation for 
peace as well by the articulation of a strongly nationalistic ideology.
101 ‘Women’s Rights on Trial in the European Parliament’, Open Window, issue 12, 
Jan.-March 1981, p. 12.
102 ‘Peace, Disarmament’, Open Window, issue 11, Oct.-Dec. 1980, p. 13.
103 Week o f Peace and Disarmament: 24-30 October 1987, EGE pamphlet, (in Greek).
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3.3.7 Nationalism.
A prominent feature of the organisation’s ideology has been an 
identification of the political forces of the Right with the betrayal of national interests. 
The EGE has reproduced the nationalistic discourse of the socialist party, which has 
presented itself as the political force that led to the merging of three different 
generations of democratic struggles: the resistance against the German occupation, the 
struggle against the monarchy (by the Centre Union in the 1960s) and the fight against 
the junta (1967-74).104 All three of these appear in the EGE discourse as struggles 
against the right-wing forces that functioned as bearers of foreign interests. In other 
words, the EGE, like the socialist party, has re-interpreted recent Greek history in 
terms of the Right/anti-Right divide, which it pronounced the chief historical cleavage 
of the political system.105
‘The foreign powers and their local collaborators substituted the Turks and 
imposed foreign dependency on Greek society... They have grounded their 
policy on the triptych: falsification-alienation and finally domination over any 
economic-social-political change in our homeland. Their policy has resulted in 
the enslavement of our nation throughout its course of existence’.106 
In parallel with calling for the restoration and defence of Greece’s national interests 
against foreign powers and their national collaborators, the EGE also endeavoured to 
forge alliances with Third-World countries that had experienced imperialist 
domination, and sought common objectives with countries of the periphery or semi- 
periphery against the metropolitan centre as exemplified by Western Europe and the 
United States.107
104 Christaki, Pepi ‘The Role of Greek Woman in the National-Liberation Struggles’, 
Open Window, issue 31, p. 7 and Chapter 2.
105 Moschonas, Gerasimos (1994) ‘The “Right-Anti-Right” Divisive Split during the 
Post-Junta Period (1974-90)’, in: Nicos Demertzis (ed.) The Greek Political Culture 
Today (Athens, Odysseus -  in Greek).
106 ‘The Family in Greece’, op. cit., ref. 59, p. 13.
107 Margaret Papandreou in her speech at the Pre-Conference of Mediterranean Women, 
stated: ‘We will struggle all together for the national independence of our countries, so 
that the exploitation of the foreign imperialist powers comes to an end’. See in
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Another facet of the EGE activities to safeguard the countries national 
interests was its pride in the Greek cultural heritage and its denunciation of the West 
for imposing what it called cultural alienation.
‘The West has undermined our cultural values and traditions to such an extent 
that women instead of becoming liberated, have become even more dependent. 
Moreover, women and men have become trapped in predefined roles and 
ideologies that have served the system. The authoritarian family, the school 
and the church have been saved in their present form, because they have 
served the system...They have encumbered us with a decadent and falsified 
Christian tradition that has no relation to the free spirit of Ancient Greece or 
with the values of equality and freedom, inherent in the original revolutionary 
Christian dogma’.108
For the EGE, therefore, imperialism is associated not only with foreign imposition 
and economic penetration, but also with cultural imperialism, Americanisation and the 
consumer culture.
In the EGE creed, nationalism is synonymous with ‘self- 
determination’. However, ‘nationalism’ is not reduced to a merely relational concept, 
meaning a reaction to foreign aggression. The organisation has praised the unique 
attributes of Greek culture as well as its unquestioned historical continuity. Thus, the 
organisation’s anti-western stand is coupled with a celebration of authentic Greek 
culture and the true national interests of the Greek people.109 The EGE, critical of the 
dominant political discourse of the conservative forces, declaring the Left a traitor to 
the national interests, juxtaposed to it a different nationalistic discourse, which 
proclaimed the Left as the only true bearer of national interests because of its 
opposition to foreign penetration. In other words, the nationalistic duality in the
Nikolaidou, Eleftheria ‘Women and the Mediterranean’, Open Window, issue 4, Apr.- 
March 1979, p. 9.
108 ‘Women in Education’ (speech by the EGE representative at the Conference of 
Mediterranean Women). See in Papayannaki, Marina (1981) ‘The voice of their 
master’, Skoupa, issue 5, p. 69.
109 A very popular political slogan of the Socialist Party has been: ‘Greece belongs to 
the Greeks’.
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country’s political culture (patriots/anti-patriots) became part of the organisation’s 
identity.
3.3.8 The State, Social Engineering, Decentralisation, Community
As we have seen, the EGE adopted the socialist party’s strong 
ideological adherence to the state as an effective means to promote social liberation. 
By stressing that the existing capitalist and patriarchal institutions create alienated 
individuals who are not only unequal in terms of gender but also victims in terms of 
market profitability, it made it a duty of the state to inform its citizens of their true and 
objective interests and provide intellectual and moral training.
‘A socialist polity’s duty is to assist its citizens in becoming mature, liberated 
and fulfilled. This can be achieved by information and further education’.110 
The role of the state as educator presupposes a large state apparatus extending into the 
heart of the private sphere where consciousness and ideology are moulded. This 
means that for the EGE traditionally private issues have become public matters and 
subject to state regulation:
‘The upbringing of children is not a private issue. It is the polity’s duty to 
establish consulting centres in every town, neighbourhood in order to instruct 
young parents’.111
Hence, the organisation has cherished the collective objective, as morally superior to 
individual choices or personal strategies. Accordingly, it has endorsed social 
engineering, as a socialist polity’s duty, while it has overlooked the hierarchical 
elements inherent in the process.
The organisation’s discourse has outlined the necessity of extensive 
state intervention, but it has also argued for the institutionalisation of local self­
management. Its ideology comprises both state intervention and decentralisation. This 
discrepancy arises from the EGE’s dual commitment: to social engineering by the 
state, and to decentralisation for the revitalization of the country’s rural areas. The 
EGE has loudly demanded institutions of popular participation and the transfer of 
power to the country’s regional districts to counteract the highly centralised state 
apparatus. It has constantly monitored the welfare of agricultural communities,
110 ‘The Family in Greece’, op. cit., ref. 59, p. 14.
111 Skepers, op. cit., ref. 84, p. 3.
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emphasising that it is the existing economic marginalisation that has brought these 
communities to the verge of extinction. It directed so much of its attention to the 
countryside also because gender inequalities are far more powerful there than in the 
cities. In consequence, the EGE formulated a series of demands to raise the social and 
economic status of woman peasants, and organised many campaigns to reach the 
patriarchal communities of the Greek countryside.
The organisation’s commitment to forward social change in the 
regional districts has been in accord with its ideological appraisal of the community as 
superior to society. It considers that:
‘The consolidation of industrial society led to the deification of society and an 
aversion to community. This process ensured the greater economic 
dependency of human beings accompanied by a rise in production and profit. 
However, this whole process has led to a terrible social impasse’.112 
For the EGE ‘society’ is synonymous with the dissolution of social bonds, since 
individuals become alienated from each other, keeping together only because of 
economic dependency.
‘The social bond in the community is stronger than the one in society. It is a 
bond originating from the personal participation of individuals in common 
affairs. This social bond reflects individuals, who are internally liberated and 
mature’.113
The organisation’s analysis of ‘community’ manifests its strong ideological 
commitment to the concept of collectivity. Thus, the organisation’s agenda has taken 
over the two fundamental axioms of socialism: community and equality.114
Generally speaking, the ideological identity of the EGE has in many 
instances been dissimilar to the premises articulated by second-wave feminist 
movements abroad. While there the second wave established a new body of feminism 
centred on the notions of reproduction, experience and difference, the EGE adhered to 
the first-wave tenets concerning institutional restriction of women’s capacities. It has 
remained convinced of the fundamental premise of the first-wave that if institutions 
(such as the family) were reformed, women would be able to unfold their potential to
112 ‘The Family in Greece’, op. cit., ref. 59, p. 14.
113 ‘The Family in Greece, ibid., p. 14.
114 Cohen, G.A. (1997) ‘Back to Socialist Basics’, in: Jane Franklin, op. cit., ref. 94.
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the full, and has made, therefore, women’s full participation in the existing social 
institutions a point of priority. Equality as the ideological cornerstone of the EGE was 
severely attacked by the autonomous feminist groups, which argued that such equality 
presumes women’s compliance with and participation in the structures of the existing 
patriarchal society.
The organisation’s positive evaluation of the state also contradicted the 
second wave’s defiance of the traditional meaning of politics (as consisting of the 
state, political parties etc.), and its slogan ‘The personal is political’. To a certain 
extent the EGE’s focus on legal equality and socio-economic distribution reflected the 
absence of conventional reforms in Greek society, as well as the limited scope of the 
welfare state. Moreover, the Union originally created its ideological framework with 
the ideological tools of a newly arrived political force (the socialists). This means that 
its ideological aims, which incorporated socialist theorems and axioms of dependency 
theory as well long stated feminist claims, challenged the established social morals 
and political norms associated with the then-ruling conservative party. Even so, its 
discourse was limited in the sense that it persistently avoided challenging men as the 
beneficiaries of patriarchy. While focusing on *the right of women’s full participation 
in all areas of the social spectrum, it made sure that men would not become the target 
of the organisation’s struggle.
The EGE’s ideology is concerned with both the internal organisation of 
the nation-state and the international community. It sees these two realms as 
interdependent, and any feminist or socialist struggle as inseparably linked with a 
restructuring of the country’s position in the international community. In 
consequence, feminism and socialism are considered possible only after Greece has 
become self-reliant within the world order. For the EGE, ‘self-determination’ always 
has two points of reference: the internal organisation of the Greek polity and the 
international community
3.4 Organisational Structure
The party-aligned women’s organisations that emerged after the fall of 
the junta modelled their organisation on that of the existing left-wing political parties, 
which consisted of a constitution, centralized and hierarchical leadership, work in
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committees, an electoral system and a spreading network of branches.115 All of these 
were features of the EGE structure. Its Constitution (of 29 Nov. 1983) sets out the 
duties of its representative bodies. These bodies are:
—  Panhellenic Conference: The Panhellenic conference, as the organisation’s most 
prominent organ, elects and has the right to expel the members of the Executive 
Board and the Disciplinary Committee; defines ideological guidelines; approves 
the budget; and may make changes in the Constitution. It is also empowered to 
dissolve the organisation or to change its legal status.116 Attendance at the 
Conference, which meets every two years, consists of members of the Executive 
Board and the elected representatives of the local branches.
—  Executive Board: This is the EGE’s second most important body and consists of 
15 regular and 5 alternate members. It elects the president of the organisation; has 
the right to inspect the functioning of the other organs; defines the discussion 
topics at the Panhellenic Conferences; and decides the creation of new branches. 
The Board holds sessions twice a month, with an absolute majority necessary for 
its decisions.117
—  Panhellenic Council: This defines the organisation’s annual program; works out 
the ideological themes to be discussed at the Panhellenic Conference; calls ad hoc 
meetings of the Panhellenic Conference; and appoints the members of the 
Regional Meeting (see below). The Council is made up of the members of the 
Executive Board, plus one elected representative from each branch. The 
representatives must be elected members of the administrative committee of their 
branch. The Executive Board calls the Panhellenic Council into session twice a
115 Stamiris, Eleni (1986) ‘The Women’s Movement in Greece’, New Left Review, issue 
158, p. 107.
116 Other competencies of the Panhellenic Conference are: to approve reports by the 
departing Executive Board, to elect the members of the Supervisory Committee of the
Panhellenic Conference, to discuss topics specified by the Executive Board, to elect
honorary members to the organisation, and to elect its nine-member chairing committe. 
Constitution, Chapter 4, Art. 12, op. cit., ref. 7.
117 Constitution, Chapter 4, Art. 16 & 17, ibid.
118 Constitution, Chapter 4, Art. 19, ibid.
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The Constitution defines also the function of the regional bodies of the 
organisation (i.e. the Regional Meeting, the Regional Council) and local branches. 
The Regional Meeting consists of members appointed by the Panhellenic Council but 
elects its own president.119 The Regional Council is made up of two members of each 
branch, one of whom must be a branch representative at the Panhellenic Council; the 
other must be an elected member of the branch’s administrative committee.120 Both 
these bodies draw up programmatic guidelines on issues pertaining to the rural areas. 
The establishment of new branches is, however, a competency of the Panhellenic 
Council, which will suggest it at the Panhellenic Conference to the Executive Board. 
The local branches of the organisation are structured like the national ones. Each has 
an administrative and disciplinary committee, with the general assembly of its 
members the most superior body of the branch.121 It is the general assembly that elects 
members of the administrative committee and the representatives to Panhellenic 
Conference meetings. Absolute majority takes decisions at the general assembly. The 
administrative committee consists of 9 regular and 2 alternate members, who serve for 
two years.
The smallest organisational unit is the cell. Since the Constitution does not 
include provisions for cells, the function and representation of cells are regulated 
according to the stipulations of the Internal Regulation.
To summarise, the organisational structure of EGE according to the 
hierarchical ladder is the following:
At national level;
1. The Panhellenic Conference
2. The Executive Board
3. The Panhellenic Council 
At regional level:
1. The Regional Meeting
2. The Regional Council 
At local level:
1. The Branches
119 Constitution, Chapter 4, Art. 20, ibid.
120 Constitution, Chapter 4, Art., 21, ibid.
121 Constitution, Chapter 4, Art. 22,23, 24, ibid.
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2. The Cells
A striking feature of EGE’s organisational structure is the lack of any 
representation of the cell members at higher levels of the organisation. The cells are 
not represented even in the largest of the organisation’s organs, the Panhellenic 
Conference. Their exclusion from all decisions-making, as well as the fact that 
representatives at the Regional Meeting are appointed by the Panhellenic Council, and 
that the latter needs the authority of the Executive Board to decide on the upgrading 
of a cell to a branch, all clearly manifests the leadership’s determination to retain full 
control over the organisation in the countryside.122 This situation actually violates the 
principle of representation at the expense of the cells in the countryside and in favour 
of the Union’s branches in the larger cities. Therefore, at the second Panhellenic 
conference in 1983, as already mentioned, the clash between the rural representatives 
and the leadership led finally to the expulsion of all 12 members of the Regional 
Committee from the Union. While, therefore, the organisational structure of the EGE 
is based on the principle of representation, it has strong centralised tendencies, and the 
leadership has repeatedly made use of the organisational set-up to impose its political 
imperatives.
The EGE has also set up a number of committees dealing with specific 
issues: the Committee of Working Woman, Financial Committee, Neighbourhood 
Committee, Seminar Committee, Press Committee, Committee of International 
Relations, Peace Committee, Regional Committee, Committee of Peasant Women, 
Committee of Young Women, Syndicalist Committee, etc. The broad range of these 
bodies reflects the EGE’s belief that the women’s movement is inseparably linked to 
the political struggles in Greek society and the international community.
The ideological manifesto of the Union of Greek Women declares its 
organisational autonomy, and although the EGE has been aligned with the socialist 
party, there have been no formal links between the two. Membership of the EGE has
122 According to the Constitution cell members have the right to attend branch 
meetings as visitors, but are not included in the numeric assessment of the branch. This 
of course affects the number of representatives the specific branch may elect for the 
Panhellenic Conference. Moreover, if the Regional Council proposes the upgrading of a 
cell to the Executive Board, and the Board declines the proposal, then the cell is obliged 
to dissolve itself. Constitution, Chapter 2, Article 5, ibid.
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not automatically been translated into membership of the socialist party. In fact, 
however, nearly all EGE members were registered members of PASOK. The question 
of autonomy has created a rift within the Union, because certain factions (always a 
minority) have attempted to change the organisation’s formal autonomy from the 
socialist party to a substantive one.
The organisational structure of the EGE has many of the salient 
features of that of the socialist party. After the fall of the junta, in 1974, PASOK 
introduced a significant change in the established tradition of political organisation by 
becoming the first non-communist party to set up an extensive network across the 
country.123 The EGE, likewise, was the first non-communist women’s group to have 
an extensive network of branches and cells penetrating into even the remotest regions 
of Greece. PASOK and EGE’s introduction of an organisational scheme with a 
constitution, specific election procedures, and mass participation was in direct 
opposition to the personalistic /particularistic politics o f the prejunta clientelistic 
parties.124 However, they both developed informally a highly centralised pattern of 
decision-making., where the opinions expressed at district level had no or little bearing 
on decisions by the leadership of the party or the Union respectively.125 The formally 
democratic organisation was in practice highly centralised and personalistic, and to a 
large extent lacking in intra-party or intra-Union democracy.
The organisational structure of the EGE is closely linked up with its 
political strategy. A recurrent theme in new social movement literature is whether 
‘the adoption of strategies emphasising institutionalised politics necessarily 
lead to increasingly formal organisation. In short, does the internal
123 Mouzelis, Nicos (1995) ‘Greece in the Twenty-First Century: Institutions and 
Political Culture’, in: D. Constas and T. Stavrou (eds) Greece Prepares for the Twenty- 
First Century, (Washington D.C., Baltimore and London, The Woodrow Wilson Centre 
Press and the John Hopkins Press).
124 Mouzelis, ibid., p. 19.
125 C. Lyrintzis, II. Nicolakopoulos, D. Sotiropoulos (1999) ‘Introduction’ in C. 
Lyrintzis, II. Nicolakopoulos, D. Sotiropoulos (eds.) Society and Politics: Facets o f  the 
Third Greek Democracy (1974-1994) (Athens, Themelio-in Greek).
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organisational structure of a movement bear any necessary relationship to its 
strategy of contending power?’.
The two distinct expressions of the Greek feminist movement, the EGE and the 
autonomous feminist groups, demonstrate that the organisational set-up does vary 
with the strategies employed. The EGE, which set out to forge an effective mass 
organisation for women that could deliver policy success, adopted a centralised and 
bureaucratised organisation. The autonomous feminist groups, on the other hand, 
which focused on women’s self-actualisation, adopted an organisational form of 
small, informal, non-hierarchical groups.
3.5 Social Base
The Union of Greek Women has persistently stressed its objective of 
building a trans-class organisation.
‘There are real differences in the everyday life of women, however there are 
also issues of convergence that provide possibilities for a trans-class 
organisation’.127
EGE emphasised that a tran-sclass character* is a precondition for building a mass 
organisation. While its strategy, therefore, targeted several social strata, the social 
composition of its membership has been predominantly middle-class.
The social base of the EGE corresponds to that of the socialist party. In 
the post-junta years there was a gradual increase of middle strata, whose economic 
activities were rooted in small-size family enterprises, redistribution of state 
resources, the underground economy and various lucrative secondary activities.128 
The socialist party addressed itself politically to those strata, when it coined the 
political term of ‘non-privileged’. Influenced by the writings of Samir Amin, the 
socialist party asserted that in semi-peripheral countries, like Greece, the working
126 Aminzande, R. (1995) ‘Between Movement and Party: The transformation of Mid- 
Nineteenth Century French Republicanism’, in C. Jenkins and B. Klandermans (eds) 
The Politics o f  Social Protest, (London, UCL Press), p. 40.
127 Feminism-Socialism: The Route to Social Liberation, op. cit., ref. 6, p. 55.
128 Panagiotopoulou, Roi ‘ “Rational” Individualistic Practices in the Context of an 
“Irrational” Political System’, in: Lyrintzis, Nicolakopoulos, Sotiropoulos, op. cit.. ref. 
125.
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class actually comprises several social strata. The political bearer of social change 
cannot, therefore, be a single class (the working class), but ‘a broad alliance of 
popular forces’.129 So PASOK’s social base was formed by the middle strata, which 
have likewise dominated in the EGE membership. For all that, the organisation also 
targeted working-class women and peasants, and was active in visiting labour unions, 
expressing its solidarity with labour strikes, and mobilising against economic 
exploitation of the female labour force.130 These initiatives did not, however, 
translate into an increased membership of working class women, since they have 
traditionally been represented by the women’s organisation of the communist party 
(OGE). The EGE activities in remote agricultural communities also foiled to change 
the social composition of its membership.131 The highly patriarchal conditions of the 
villages minimised the possibility of local women becoming involved in a feminist 
organisation.
The majority of the organisation’s members were middle-aged, 
married and had no prior experience of political involvement. The small number of 
younger unmarried women did not affect the ideological stand of the organisation. 
The majority of the members had developed their social and personal identity in 
accord with the institutions of marriage and motherhood. They perceived, therefore, 
any radical questioning of these institutions as a questioning of their own status. Thus, 
they gave their uncritical support to those institutions and demanded social 
recognition for their contribution to society (such as their role as mothers). Since most 
of the members had no record of prior political involvement and were unfamiliar with 
feminist objectives, the EGE initially functioned as a ‘training school’ for introducing 
women to collective decision-making, organisational planning, political activism, and
129 Kapazoglou, op. cit., ref. 98.
130 The EGE has consistently opposed the introduction of part-time employment 
schemes, on the basis that it would make women in particular a marginalised mobile 
labour force, stripped of any social protection and vulnerable to economic crises. See 
Interviews with Constantina Giannopoulou, Soula Merentiti, Anni Pitsiori-Kavadia, op. 
cit., ref. 3.
131 For instance, the EGE organised many information campaigns to introduce the 
smear test in the countryside, since in many villages women refused to undress in the 
presence of a doctor, considering it immoral.
141
the feminist discourse.132 At first, the members’ lack of any concrete political identity 
had a positive effect by making the organisation heterogeneous. As one member said: 
‘We moulded our identities in the course of the organisation’s development’. 
However, it also limited the EGE’s potential for articulating a rigid feminist discourse 
critical of the ideological premises in the existing political tradition.
The EGE acquired many of its members in the wake of their husbands 
joining PASOK. This meant that these women saw the feminist cause as 
complementary to their husbands’ political involvement in the socialist party. 
Moreover, the EGE leadership frequently legitimised its activities by referring to the 
husbands’ status in the socialist party. This meant that the organisation limited its 
feminist agenda to a self-confined discourse, which deliberately avoided labelling 
men as the bearers of patriarchy. Promotion of well-known politicians’ wives to the 
EGE leadership was part of the organisation’s broader strategy to create a legitimate 
non-confrontational profile that would allow the building-up of a mass organisation, 
capable of penetrating even into social areas hostile to feminist issues.
In summary, the EGE’s social base consisted mostly of middle-class, 
middle-aged women. This, in combination with its strong presence in the countryside, 
became a decisive factor in the moulding of its moderate feminist agenda, suitable for 
social strata and regions not receptive to feminism.134 As one EGE member noted: 
‘Any discussion of personal issues, about our marriage or sex life for instance, was 
inconceivable in our branch. We were living in a small provincial town, where any 
personal revelation would have enormous costs in terms of our personal and social 
life’.135
In terms of social movement theory, the social base of the EGE refutes 
the premises of both the classical model and resource mobilisation. The members
132 Interview with Margaret Papandreou, op. cit., ref. 74.
133 Interview with Anni Pitsiori Kavadia, op. cit., ref. 3.
134 Another example of the EGE’s extended activities in the countryside was the 
mobilisation of the Trikala branch against the custom in the surrounding rural villages 
to marry off girls at the age of 14. The autonomous feminist groups, on the other hand, 
denounced the institution of heterosexual marriage altogether. Interview with Soula 
Merentiti, op. cit., ref. 3.
135 Interview with Soula Merentiti, ibid.
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were neither isolated nor marginal individuals; on the contrary, they belonged to the 
middle strata, but most of them had no previous history of political involvement. For 
them, the EGE became the agent of their introduction to the procedures and rules of 
politics. These middle-class women cannot also be identified with the middle classes 
that give their support to new social movements. They were too dependent on party 
cadres, accepted and supported the expansion of state intervention and the 
development of a full-blown welfare state, and their demands were for institutional 
reforms and material prosperity. New social movements’ social base consists of 
middle classes that are already part of a fully developed Keynesian welfare state, 
which they criticise heavily. They, therefore, voice post-materialist demands and 
focus on civil society. The social base of the EGE can be understood best by looking 
at the new scenarios of conflict, which the socialist party and the EGE convey.
3.6 Strategy
The political strategy of the organisation has been deployed in three 
ways: (i) building up a mass organisation with effective lobbying capacities; (ii) 
linking the feminist movement to other mass movements on the national and 
international level and (iii) productive use of the resources provided by the socialist 
party. The EGE relied heavily on its alliance with PASOK and the potential of its 
machinery for the effective implementation of political projects. The organisation’s 
political strategy was almost exclusively based on the vast control exerted by Greek 
political parties over civil society and the state administration. From 1981 onwards 
the EGE was engaged in a process of social engineering that would closely link state 
expansion and intervention with its own and the party’s objectives. State intervention 
and party control became the two cornerstones of its strategy. It was only in the 
beginning that the EGE saw civil society as an effective means to put pressure on the 
existing decision-making centres, while as soon as the socialist party gained power, it 
became the object of increased state intervention and party control. Cases in point 
were the newly established women’s bureaus. These new agencies did not function as 
a mechanism for channelling communication with feminists active outside the 
organisation. On the contrary, they persistently blocked any direct connection with 
feminists not within the political orbit of the socialist party. In brief, the EGE’s 
political strategy concerned itself primarily with the established institutions in the 
public sphere.
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The organisation, after gaining access to governmental resources in 
1981, developed a diversified strategy that significantly altered the gender status in 
Greek society. It promoted legal changes, provided much-needed social infrastructure 
and services, institutionalised the question of gender issues and changed social values. 
As already discussed in some detail (section 3.2), the EGE effectively promoted the 
reform of Family Law, the Penal Code in respect of sexual violence and rape, the law 
on abortion, and introduced legal provisions for the practical implementation of the 
principle of equality in labour relations. Additionally, it succeeded in rescinding the 
legal provisions restricting women’s participation in co-operative organisations,136 
ratifying the decisions taken at international conventions, and abolishing sex
117discrimination for entrance to tertiary education.
Concerning the state’s infrastructure and social services, the Union was 
able to provide: 1) new day-care and pre-school centres and the country’s first infant 
day-care centres; 2) the first health advisory centres for women and children with free
136 Under Law 1257/82 all married women, regardless of whether they owned land used 
for agricultural production or whether they assisted in the production process, now had 
the right to participate in agricultural co-operatives, with the same rights and obligations 
as men. See in National Report, op. cit., ref. 27; Kyriazis, op. cit., ref. 28.
In 1983, the U.N. convention on the eradication of discrimination against women, 
and the International Convention (103) on the protection of motherhood were ratified. 
In 1984, the International Labour Agreement on discrimination in employment and 
work, as well as the International Labour Agreement (122) on employment policy were 
ratified. Legal provisions concerning the admittance of only one sex for particular 
institutions, or of a quota for men and women were abolished. See National Report of 
Hellas, ibid.,‘Greece: Hellenic Republic’, op. cit., ref. 2; and Singh, op. cit., ref. 31.
136 The Greek Council for Equality (Law 1288/82) was an independent department 
within the Ministry to the Prime Minister’s Office, by whose budget it was covered, and 
its function was to counsel the Prime Minister. It: 1) collaborated with the various 
Ministries in the drafting of bills for Parliament on matters concerning the equality of 
the sexes; 2) formulated the programs for the promotion of equality to be included in 
the government’s Five-Year Development Plan; 3) arranged seminars and lectures; 4) 
advised the relevant authorities and organisations for the solution of day-to-day 
instances of discrimination that had been brought to its notice;
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health-laboratory tests for low-income women, who also became eligible for free 
childbirth and hospitalisation services at state maternity hospitals; 3) family-planning 
centres nation-wide; 4) social insurance, pensions paid to women farmers and 
farmers’ wives at the same level as men’s, 5) policies adapted to interrupted working 
patterns (i.e. part-time workers’ entitlements to unemployment benefits and pension 
benefit arrangements to enable women to combine child-raising with labour market 
participation). In parallel, the EGE pressured the government to institutionalise gender 
issues as part of the state’s competencies. Thus, an extensive network was developed 
consisting of Committees for the Equality of the Sexes and Equality Bureaus in every 
single prefecture. A sex equality section was set up in the Ministry of Labour to deal 
with cases of discrimination and most important of all, the Council for Equality was 
established in 1982.138 It was the first governmental body on gender issues ever 
established in Greece. All during the socialist government, the EGE kept emphasising 
that legal reforms and institutional changes were a prerequisite for bringing about 
social change, but not in themselves sufficient.
‘Even if we achieve full-scale legal equality, the women’s question will 
continue to exist until we succeed bringing about genuine and actual equality. 
Therefore, there is the need for vigilance and practice on the level of the 
family, school, working place, so that women’s demands, which at the 
moment are chiefly articulated by the women’s organisations, expand into a 
general popular demand for a better quality of life’.139
5) produced a series of publications explaining the law on the equality of the sexes; and
6) collaborated with the Ministry of the Interior for the implementation of the 
government policy for decentralization with respect to sexual equality
In 1985 (Law 1558/85) the Council was upgraded to General Secretariat for Equality 
between the sexes. The Secretariat is an independent office of the Ministry of the 
Presidency, and has its own budget. Its competencies are identical with those of the 
Council. See in Greek Council for Equality, and General Secretariat o f Equality, both 
of them information pamphlets by the General Secretariat (in English).
139 ‘The Woman’s Question in Greece’, Open Window, issue 7, Dec-Jan 1980, p. 8.
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To this end, the Union focused on moulding a new collective consciousness and 
engaged in a series of activities to put an end to the existing patriarchal constructions 
of femininity and masculinity. Between 1981 and ‘89 school books were rewritten to 
express the principle of equality; domestic science at schools was extended to boys; 
physical education at schools was taught to girls and boys together; local extra-mural 
programs on gender issues were arranged; state-run programs were introduced to train 
women for traditionally ‘male’ jobs; a number of co-operative projects were promoted 
run by women in agrotourism, handicrafts, wool dying and poultry raising.140
The reforms and policies instigated by the EGE radically altered the 
‘gender-regime’ of Greek society.141 The new gender-regime, which was gradually 
consolidated, is usually described in the feminist literature as ‘state patriarchy’ or 
‘state feminism’.142 The two terms are not interchangeable. The first refers to the 
reproduction and perpetuation of patriarchy by means of the state apparatus, while the 
latter perceives the state as a positive asset for reducing the effect of patriarchy in 
society. Both of them refer to changes in the gender order that historically had already 
taken place in many countries of Western Europe. So state patriarchy and state 
feminism refer to the gender-regime that was inaugurated with the development of the 
Keynesian welfare state after World War II. Before the expansion of state services, the 
gender regime is usually labelled as ‘private patriarchy’, meaning that patriarchy was 
personified by the male heads of the household. It was they who gained directly from 
the sexual division of labour and the oppression of female sexuality. With the growth of 
the Keynesian welfare state, regulation of the division of labour and issues of sexuality 
became the responsibility of the state. This new gender-regime has transferred 
significant power from the individual male to the state. The feminist literature places 
this new regime historically within late monopoly-capitalism.143 The policies, which
138 ‘Excerpts from a Statement by Margaret Papandreou’, Atlantis, 12 (2), 1987.
139 According to R. W., Connell, ‘Each empirical state has a definable “gender regime” 
that is the precipitate of social struggles and is linked to - though not a simple reflectio n
of - the wider gender order of the society’. See in R. W. Connell (1990) ‘The State,
Gender, and Sexual Politics: Theory and Appraisal’, Theory and Society, 19, 5, p. 523.
142 Carol Brown, ‘Mothers, Fathers and Children: From Private to Public Patriarchy’, in 
Sargent, op. cit., ref. 40; Stetson and Mazur, op. cit., ref. 65; and Connell, ibid.
143 Brown, ibid.
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EGE promoted, led to an unprecedented expansion of state competencies and rendered 
equality of the sexes a public issue. Relations between individual men and women 
ceased to belong exclusively into the private sphere and became instead an official 
policy of the state. When the EGE decided to use the machinery of the governing party 
for promoting gender equality, it based itself on the fundamental premise of state- 
feminism that the state is not inherently sexist. The organisation has, therefore, 
identified state feminism with social policies that improve women’s status and 
undermine patriarchy. The autonomous feminist groups, on the other hand, see the state 
as the embodiment of patriarchy and an indispensable instrument for consolidating male 
power. In their discourse, state feminism has no positive connotations and is identified 
with state patriarchy. In fact, they have accused the EGE of ‘modernising’ and playing 
down patriarchy, by rendering the recipients of women’s oppression more impersonal. 
In general terms, the EGE policies have constituted a definite rupture in the gender- 
regime of Greek society. Regardless of whether the new regime is defined as state- 
feminism or state-patriarchy, it means a significant change in the traditional male­
headed family that is increasingly becoming the subject of state policies.
3.7 New Scenarios of Conflict
The relevant literature associates the emergence of new social movements 
with the institutionalisation of corporatism and the expansion of the Keynesian 
welfare state into the private realms of the life-world. It depicts the rise of new social 
movements as a manifestation of the new social conflicts prevailing in post-industrial 
or late-capitalist society. The EGE, however, is associated with a totally different 
scenario of conflict, that of the process of social and political modernisation. What is 
novel in the case of this feminist organisation is that it is related to the previous 
political tradition of clientelism and political exclusionism. Until the rise to power of 
the socialist party, the EGE was representative of the conflict between a model of 
development articulated by the conservative political forces (clientelism, political 
exclusion, foreign aid), and one articulated by the socialist party (political mass- 
organisations, popular participation, economic autarky and political autonomy). 
Moreover, the Union of Greek Women challenged the established conservative 
tradition that associated women with domesticity, and juxtaposed to it a model of 
political and economic development in which women were active participants. The 
two models were founded on different visions about the internal organisation of the
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Greek nation-state and the country’s integration in the international community.
After 1981, the socialist rule and EGE policy gave rise to a new scenario of 
conflict. PASOK, instead of empowering civil society, developed a strategy of 
controlling the system of interest representation. To this end it established party 
cadres that became mighty centres of power in various sectors of society, and 
exercised control over the public administration, the judiciary, and the federations of 
workers, peasants and civil servants. The Union of Greek Women also used the party 
and state apparatus to control the articulation of collective interests. Although it 
brought women into the policy-making arenas, the women’s agencies it built were 
highly partisan and staffed by feminists loyal to the organisation and the socialist 
party. It encouraged the creation of a new neo-corporatist women’s movement, where 
a patron-client relationship developed between the EGE and the women’s policy 
machinery. This meant that from 1981 onwards, the expansion of the state apparatus, 
coupled with increased control over collective interests, became a new scene of 
conflict. The protagonists of that conflict were the Union of Greek Women, as 
embodying state feminism, and the allied block of the autonomous feminist groups 
and the KDG that aimed to mobilise civil society.
The EGE in the course of its history has, therefore, experienced two different 
conflicts. The first was predominantly related to Greece’s internal social and political 
order and its position in the global world order. The second was linked to a newly 
established regime of interest representation, which was characterised by increased 
state intervention and party control. The common denominator of these two conflicts 
was the issue of autonomy and self-determination. In the first conflict, the EGE 
functioned as a bearer of this political premise; in the second it was accused of 
consolidating a regime of party dependency.
3.8 Summary
Any overall review of the Union of Greek Women should take into 
account not only the reforms promoted by the organisation, but also its impact on the 
formation of a new collective consciousness. As Joyce Gelb notes:
‘Because feminism is a movement as well as an ideology, its impact must be 
judged both in terms of specific reforms and in terms of the development of a 
collective consciousness...among supporters, allies and/or the general public.
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Such a collective consciousness refers to a transforming set of ideas related to 
new norms, roles, institutions, and/or redistribution of resources’.144 
The EGE has substantially alleviated gender inequalities and incorporated gender 
issues into the official state discourse, thereby achieving the nation-wide 
dissemination of the principle of equality.
The Union has played a decisive role in the second-wave feminist movement 
of Greece, and has been representative of the strong presence of party-aligned 
women’s mass organisations. In this way, it has manifested a set of properties that 
diverge markedly from the usual attributes associated with new social movements. It 
has articulated a feminist discourse with striking conservative connotations. Its 
organisational structure has formally intensified the oligarchic tendencies of 
representative democracy, while informally it has rendered the leadership immensely 
powerful. The EGE’s social base was composed predominantly of middle-aged 
women with no prior political involvement, and the organisation’s strategy has 
favoured restriction of the private sphere and expansion of state intervention. All 
these qualities contradict the political project of new social movements. The latter 
have produced new cultural codes, experimented with participatory forms of 
democracy and defended civil society against state intervention. Their members or 
sympathizers have been young, politically active, and espousing post-material values. 
The EGE was not, however, an isolated case in the Greek feminist movement, but on 
the contrary a decisive force and representative example of second-wave feminism. 
The development of the Greek feminist movement was linked, during the 1970s and 
‘80s, with the strong presence of the left-wing political parties as the exclusive 
challengers to the established political regime. The historical tradition of foreign 
dependency, coupled with political exclusionism, lack of socio-economic distribution, 
and the nation-wide function of the state as an extensive patronage-recruitment 
mechanism, gave rise to political projects focusing on the empowerment and 
democratisation of Greek society as a whole. In this way parties became the key 
holders in the political conflict concerning the nation’s course of development. In 
consequence, the social movements that emerged during the post-junta period relied
144 Gelb, Joyce (1990) ‘Feminism and Political Action’, in: R. Dalton, M. Kuechler 
(eds.), Challenging the Political Order, (Oxford, New York, Oxford University Press), 
p. 152.
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heavily on the political parties of the Left as the main bearers of the broader struggle 
of political change and national self-determination. Illustrative of the dominant 
political culture of the post-junta period is the following statement by EGE:
‘Let’s not forget...that the participation of women in the anti-imperialistic, 
anti-reactionary, anti-dictatorial and syndicalist struggles is imperative. 
However, the realisation of these primary objectives could never put an end to 
the participation of women in the social processes’.145
The case of EGE also illustrates the strong statocratic and patrocratic elements 
in Greece, where the large state apparatus and firm party control over civil society 
have led most second-wave feminist organisations to rely on political parties. This 
meant that the EGE confronted a series of strategic problems that are best delineated 
by the resource-mobilisation model. It had to deal with a political system with limited 
openness to political institutions, no divisions within the elite, and the absence of an 
autonomous social movement sector. The organisation took advantage of the political 
opportunity structure by relying heavily on the presence of influential allies (the 
socialist party). The EGE represents a typical case study for resource-mobilisation 
theory, since it constituted a collectivity that was able to participate in the elite versus 
non-elite conflict, and increased its chance of success by forming a highly 
institutionalised formal organisation. By exploiting the opportunity structure and 
mobilising resources it achieved its successful integration into mainstream politics.
The strategy of the EGE vis-a-vis the structural elements of its political 
environment has been entirely different from that adopted by the autonomous feminist 
groups. The latter rejected and denounced any notion of instrumental rationality (e.g. 
the effective relation between means and ends) and political opportunity structure. 
Instead of aiming to seize power at some future time by means of an effective, 
centralised organisation, they focused on realising feminist principles in the present 
by means of small, non-hierarchical consciousness-raising groups. They therefore 
directed their struggles from the international and national level to the local and the 
personal. Chapter 4 explores the political project of the autonomous feminist groups 
further.
145 ‘Let’s not forget...’, Agenda, op. cit., ref. 34.
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CHAPTER 4 
THE AUTONOMOUS FEMINIST GROUPS
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4.1 Introduction
In the mid 1970s a new feminist response emerged in Greece, modelling itself 
on radical feminism abroad. In 1975 the Movement for Women’s Liberation (Kinisi 
gia tin Apelefterosi ton Ginaikon - KAG) was founded. This was the beginning of a 
process of feminists disengaging themselves from the political parties of the Left. The 
autonomous feminist groups never constituted a homogeneous entity. Their ideological 
range stretched from anarchist feminism to socialist feminism. The denominator, 
common to them all, was their declared commitment to autonomy - from men, from 
political parties, and from the state. In Western Europe and Northern America second- 
wave feminism has been seen as identical with the flowering of an autonomous feminist 
movement, and autonomy from the state and the political parties was taken for 
granted. In Greece, as already mentioned, second-wave feminism took mainly the form 
of party-affiliated women’s organisations. The issue of autonomy, therefore, became 
the dividing line between the core mass-organisations with various degrees of party 
dependency, and the smaller autonomous groups that denounced general politics as 
male-centred and male-dominated. The post-junta feminist movement witnessed many 
ideological clashes between these two sides.
4.2 1975-1990: The Construction of an Autonomous Feminist Culture
The first autonomous feminist body, the Movement for Women’s Liberation -  
KAG, consisted of two separate groups of about thirty women each.1 The KAG 
members had two distinctive characteristics: they came from the political Left, and 
some of them had experienced second-wave feminism abroad. The discourse 
articulated by the KAG was closer to socialist feminism than to radical feminism.2 Its
1 Varika, Eleni (1992) ‘Facing Institutional Modernisation: A difficult Feminism’, in: 
E., Leontidou and R. Ammer (eds) Women’s Greece (Athens, Alternative Publications 
- in Greek).
Radical Feminism has been the most militant ideological current of the second-wave 
feminist movement. Socialists feminists’ analysis of the relation between patriarchy and 
capitalism perceives the link between the family and the economy as the theoretical key 
to women’s oppression. Radical feminists, on the other hand, arguing that patriarchy is 
the oldest and prime conflict in human society, view patriarchy as a trans-historical and 
universal system of domination, in the context of which other secondary social
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analysis of patriarchy was coupled with its struggle against capitalism, but its vision of 
women’s liberation was based on the dissociation of women from the male culture.
‘We do not ask to surpass or even to draw level with men, because the patriarchal 
civilisation has led men to neurosis, hostility and castration’.
The KAG was the first Greek women’s group to proclaim the need to formulate an 
alternative feminist discourse, one that is based on women’s experiences. The 
development of women’s consciousness presupposed the autonomy of the feminist 
movement: ‘From now on, we women will fight ourselves for our rights’.4
The pursuit of autonomy went hand in hand with the introduction of issues of 
sexual politics (abortion, sexuality, contraception, sexual violence, rape, etc.). During 
the period 1975-79, the KAG was active in various ways - for instance with a publicity 
venture on contraception (July 1976), opposition to government plans for inducting 
women into the army (October 1976), bringing out the newspaper For the Liberation 
o f Women, (February 1978) and opposition to the government bill on terrorism 
(September 1978).5
These were the years when the KAG dominated the autonomous feminist 
spectrum.6 After 1979, several other autonomous feminist groups were established, 
mainly at University level -  for instance: Women of the School of Commerce (1979), 
Women of the School of Philosophy (1980) - and some based on neighbourhood 
residence - e.g. Women’s Group of Piraeus (1980), Women’s Group of Ampelokipi; 
others united women who shared some personal characteristics: Group of Homosexual
conflicts develop (class conflicts, racial and ethnic problems, etc.).
Gia tin Apeleftherosi ton Ginaikon, No. 1, February 1978, Athens.
4 Avdela, Efi, Papayannaki, Marina and Sklavenitis, Costoula ‘Abortion 1976-86: A 
Retrospective Account of a Feminist Issue (the Greek Experience)’, Dini, No. 1, 
December 1986.
5 Pampouki, Eleni (ed) (1984), Agenda, Athens (in Greek); and Avdela, Papayannaki, 
Sklavenitis, ibid.
6 During the time that the KAG was dominant some other autonomous feminist groups 
had begun to appear, for instance the Women’s Group of the Law School (1976), the 
Group of Medical Students (1978), The Revolutionary Struggle of Women (1978), the 
Women’s Groups of the School of Biology (1978). See in ‘Autonomous Women’s 
Groups’, Sfigga, No. 1, July 1980.
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Women, Group of Foreign Women, Group of Single Mothers; or who were in the 
same profession: e.g. Group of Women of the Greek Organisation of
Telecommunication; or in publishing activities: Group of Women in Publishing 
(.Ekdotiki Omada Ginaikon -  EOG, 1979), Broom {Skoupa - 1978) and Wasp (Sfigga 
- 1980). More than 50 groups were set up in the Athens area between 1975 and 1983, 
but they were not constricted to the capital.7 Autonomous groups in Salonica were 
equally active, and groups were formed also in Patras, Yiannina Volos, Zakynthos, 
Veria, Xanthi, Kefalonia, etc.8 Many of these groups lasted only a short time, were 
dissolved, and succeeded by new ones. There was great horizontal mobility in the 
autonomous feminist spectrum, which led to a relative fluidity concerning specific 
characteristics of the groups.9
The establishment of more and more autonomous feminist groups was coupled 
with the increased publishing activities. Magazines, newspapers, periodicals, bulletins, 
pamphlets and declarations came out hard and fast, and their format reflected their 
ideological premises.10 So, the refusal by some publishing groups to set up an editorial
7 ‘Invitation to a Meeting of Women in autumn ‘83’, Poli ton Ginaikon, No. 10, Oct 
1983.
g
There are very few references in the autonomous feminist press to the peripheral 
groups and it is difficult to obtain information about their activities.
Interviews with Vicky Kotsovelou, former member of the feminist group of the 
Communist Party of the Interior and co-founder of Diotima (Centre of Women’s 
Studies and Research), 3 March 1998,15 March 1998, Athens.
10 Some of the magazines, newspapers and bulletins published were: Gia tin 
Apeleftherosi ton Ginaikon (1978) by the KAG; Epanastatiki Pali Ginaikon (1978) by 
the Revolutionary Struggle of Women; Skoupa (1979); Deltio (1979) by the Women’s 
Group of the Law School; Sfigga (1980) by ex-members of the KAG and the 
Women’s Group of the Law School; Kathreftis (1980) by the Women’s Group of the 
School of Biology; Poli Ginaikon (1981); Lavrys (1982) by the Autonomous Group of 
Homosexual Women; To Milo kai to Fidi apo ti Skopia tis Evas (1982) by the 
Women’s Group of the Law School; Gaia (1983) by the Women’s House of Salonica; 
Medousa (1983) by autonomous women’s groups in Salonica; Thravsmata (1984) by 
the Women’s Group of Kypseli; Phoni Ginaikas (1984); Mousidora (1984) by The 
Witches; Dini (1986); Newspaper of the Unaligned Movement of Women (1986);
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board illustrated their opposition to any hierarchical scheme whatsoever.11 The
magazines Broom and Wasp became the main voices for the theoretical elaboration of
feminist issues. The autonomous feminist literature concerned itself with, above all, the
social construction of female nature, the relation of patriarchy to capitalism, the
androcentric character of existing political institutions, the delusion of the discourse of
‘equality’, the debate on matriarchy, women’s domestic labour, and also the history of
women’s mobilisations in Greece, translations of foreign feminist texts, reports of
feminist activities abroad, etc. The subjects that defined the distinctiveness of the
autonomous feminist press were those that opened up the intimately personal sphere of
women: abortion, contraception, sexuality, sexist violence, rape, the family,
prostitution child- bearing and child-rearing, homosexuality - all these became common
12themes in the women’s press. The objective of these diverse publications was to
Katina (1987) by the Autonomous Group of Women of Salonica; Telesilla (1988) by 
Telesilla: Greek Feminist Network of Information, Solidarity and Mobilisation; Kouti 
tis Pandoras (1990) by the Women’s Group of Volos; Ginaikii Psithiri by the 
Women’s Group of Elefsina; Agenda by Eleni Pampouki; and Logia, Nefeli. Academic 
or literary bulletins were also published, such as Psapfa (1982). See Kotsovelou, Vicky 
and Repousi, Maria, ‘Feminist Magazines 1978-‘85: A First Interpretation’, Diavazo, 
No. 198,14 Sept. 1988.
11 In the autonomous feminist press it is common for the authors to leave articles
anonymous, stressing thereby the collective dimension of the women’s struggle.
12 The autonomous feminist groups addressed multiple times the issue of 
homosexuality and organised many common activities with lesbian activists (e.g. on the 
occasion of the International Day of Contraception). The Autonomous Group of 
Homosexual Women, which was established by lesbian activists of KAG and the 
Liberation Movement of Greek Homosexuals (Apeleftherotiko Kinima Omofllofilon 
Elladas - AKOE) in autumn 1979, played a central role in the lesbian movement. The 
Autonomous Group of Homosexual Women participated in the Coordinating 
Committee of Women’s Struggles and was co-founder of the Athens Women’s House. 
Although, both (the homosexual and the autonomous feminist groups) aspired to 
eradicate sexism in all its manifestations, lesbians often complained about being 
excluded by the autonomous feminist groups. This led to temporal schemes of 
cooperation either with the autonomous feminist groups or the official organ of the
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make women visible, and to break the silence concerning women’s experiences, 
feelings, and desires. By their publishing activities the groups attempted to link 
together the different aspects of oppression in order to allow a collective feminist 
consciousness to form. The focus on the creation of a culture of radical feminism was 
also expressed through the consciousness-raising groups. These were not restricted to 
only making individual women aware of the specific nature of their oppression, but
13reached out in their work to the wider public. Such consciousness-raising groups 
proliferated during the first period of the autonomous feminist movement (1979-81). In 
the years thereafter, a shift occurred towards groups for the study of specific topics.
The late 1970s/early ‘80s were the most vigorous and dynamic for the 
autonomous feminist spectrum. The groups kept increasing, all kinds of publications 
multiplied, and the first mass-demonstrations were held. On 7 March 1980, the 
Committee of Struggles for the Reform of Family Law organised a big rally on the 
occasion of International Woman’s Day. The rally was intended to put pressure on the 
government for the abolition of the articles of Family Law that buttressed the role of 
men as the heads of family. A popular slogan at the demonstration was ‘I don’t belong 
to my father, I don’t belong to my husband, I want to be myself.14 That day 
demonstrations took place also in Salonica and Patras.15 Many more demonstrations 
were held in the years to come. All through 1980 the demonstrations urged the reform 
of Family Law, from 1981 to ‘83 they concentrated on sexist violence. These were 
demonstrations calling for the reform of the law on rape (e.g. on 7 December 1982 in 
Athens), expressing solidarity with rape victims (e.g. December 1981 in Athens and 14 
June 1982 in Salonica), and denouncing the ever-present threat of rape (e.g. on 25 
June 1981, ‘Reclaim the Night’ demonstration in Athens, and on 11 March 1982
homosexual movement in Greece, the AKOE. See Psevdonymou, Charoula (1992) 
‘Cries and Whispers: On the Lesbian Issue in Greece’, in Leontidou, Ammer, op. cit., 
ref. 1 and Lavris, magazine published by the Autonomous Group of Homosexual 
Women.
13 ‘Women’s Groups’, To Milo kai to Fidi apo ti Skopia tis Evas, No. 1, 1982.
14 ‘ The 8th of March’, Sfigga, No. 1, July 1980.
15 Vicky Kotsovelou, Indicative Chronology o f Groups/Publications/Mobilisations o f  
the Greek Feminist Movement during the decade 1975-1985, Diotima, Athens.
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‘Reclaim the Night’ demonstration in Salonica).16 In April 1983, the autonomous 
feminist groups began a national campaign on the issues of sexuality, contraception and 
abortion. Then, 1983-1986, the autonomous feminist groups demanded reform of the 
law on abortions, and free abortions on demand (e.g. 25 January 1985 in Athens, April 
1986 in Athens).
The proliferation of the autonomous feminist groups and the organisation of 
the first mass-demonstrations gave rise to the idea of coordination. In 1980, the 
Committee of Struggles for the Reform of Family Law was established, and its rally on 
International Woman’s Day in time led to the founding of the Coordinating Committee 
of Women’s Struggles. This new organisational body became the largest coordinative 
body the Greek autonomous feminist movement has known. It consisted of more than
15 autonomous feminist groups as well as individual woman members.17 The KDG was
the only party-affiliated women’s organisation to participate in this coordinating organ.
18What all the participating groups shared was their advocacy of autonomy. The 
Coordinating Committee set up working groups on topics like motherhood, the family, 
sexuality, sexist violence, rape and autonomy, which became part of a more general 
project for a two-day women’s festival in September of the same year. The festival 
never took place, and in October the Coordinating Committee was dissolved as a result 
of escalating conflict among its constituent groups. The disagreements concerned 
autonomy, the question of men-participants and how the festival was to be organised.
The Committee’s dissolution deprived the autonomous feminists of 
organisational cohesion, during a period when the groups continually stressed the need
16 Other slogans at the demonstration in Athens were: ‘No to violence and rape. It is a 
woman’s right to walk safe at night. The city is ours too’; ‘Every woman can be raped. 
Women charge the rapists’; ‘The press rapes us daily’. See in Alevizou, Fofi, 
Korassidou, Maria and Samiou, Dimitra ‘Feature: Violence and Rape’, Dini, No. 2, 
October 1987; and Rape/Press/Rape by the Press, publication by the Mass Media 
Group of the Women’s House of Athens.
17 ‘Recent Activities in the Feminist Spectrum’, Skoupa, No. 4, July 1980; Kotsovelou, 
op. cit, ref. 15 and pamphlet by the Committee of the Struggle for the Reform of 
Family Law, Skoupa, No. 4, July 1980.
18 ‘Recent Activities in the Feminist Spectrum’, ibid.
19 ‘Chronicle’, Skoupa, No. 5, July 1981.
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for co-operation. To fill the vacuum, a number of Athens autonomous feminist groups
20in 1980 proceeded to establish the Women’s House. Several study groups were set
up, for elaborating especially issues related to sexuality. In 1982, the Mass Media
group was formed, introducing for the first time an extensive analysis of the sexist role 
21of the press. In 1981, the second Woman’s House was founded in Salonica, with 
associated working groups on contraception, abortion, consciousness-raising, violence 
and rape, family labour, and self-expression.22 Consciousness-raising groups were 
beginning to give place to study groups for specific issues.
In the early years of the autonomous feminist movement (the 1970s), the 
dividing line between the ideology of the party-affiliated women’s organisations and 
that of the autonomous feminists was straightforward. The former, as we have seen 
(Ch. 3) were working for emancipation and/or equality, and emphasised that the 
conflict between the sexes could be resolved in the context of the existing society. To 
this end they had a positive attitude towards legal and institutional reforms. The 
autonomous feminist groups, on the other hand, stressed women's liberation, a 
concept based on the premise that abolition of women’s oppression required 
overturning the existing patriarchal society. Theirs was a revolutionary outlook that 
aimed to wholly recreate society. The autonomous feminist groups introduced issues of 
sexual politics in a more radical way than the party-affiliated women’s organisations, 
which emphasised equal employment opportunities, improved social services by the 
state, the social value of motherhood, and the advancement of peace and democracy. 
Towards the end of the 1970s the ‘traditional’ organisations began to incorporate 
issues previously stressed only by the autonomous groups, which led to a blurring of 
the dividing line between them. This was accentuated by the rise to power of the 
socialist party in 1981.
20 The Women’s House was founded in Athens by the Group of Autonomy, the
Autonomous Group of Homosexual Women, Women’s Group ofNea Smymi, Skoupa,
and a number of individuals. See in ‘Chronicle’, ibid.
21 The Mass Media Group explored the representation of feminism in the press, the 
relation of the autonomous feminist groups with the press, and particularly the 
ideology disseminated by the press representation of sexist violence and rapes. See in 
‘Rape/Press/The Rape by the Press’, op. cit., ref. 16.
22 ‘The Magazine’, Gaia, No. 1, June 1983
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The previous exclusion of feminism from the dominant party-political discourse 
now gave way to propagating the discourse of equality as articulated by the EGE. 
Incorporating the claim for sexual equality into the dominant political agenda, the 
socialist party’s promise of legal reforms, and increasing references by political parties 
and the mass media to women’s issues, resulted in the ideological ascendancy of a 
feminist project that focused on political and social reforms for women’s emancipation. 
The dissemination of this discourse by state institutions, political parties and the mass 
media ideologically undermined the autonomous feminist groups’ vision of women’s 
liberation. Moreover, the eventual adoption by the EGE of specific demands that had 
long been voiced by the autonomous feminist groups clouded the ideological premises 
underlying those demands in the context of the autonomous feminist discourse. In 
these circumstances the autonomous feminists angrily denounced the appropriation and 
distortion of their discourse by the EGE and the state institutions.
1982 and ‘83 were a period of growing predicament for the autonomous 
feminist movement. In September 1983, the Group of Women’s Studies began to 
function at the University of Salonica, founded by academic women wishing to 
introduce a new feminist reading of science, and constituting the first inter-
23departmental project to bring a feminist discourse into the academic community. In 
October 1983, the Women’s Bookstore was established in Athens, which also 
collected feminist texts together and created an archive on women’s issues.24 The 
women’s groups that were formed at this time were short-lived.
From 1984 onwards, the difficulties experienced by the autonomous feminist 
groups kept growing. The consciousness-raising groups were no longer effective, and 
the study groups had run out of subjects. The legal reforms by the socialist party put a 
stop to agitation by the autonomous feminists concerning reform of Family Law and 
the Penal Code. The absence of new groups and new campaign topics, coupled with 
the ideological ascendancy of the ideological discourse of the party-affiliated women’s 
organisations, did not help to reverse the decline of the autonomous feminist groups. 
Their demonstrations continued for a number of years, and in 1985 and ‘86 the 
autonomous groups were quite active on the subject of abortion.
23 ‘Women’s Studies at the Universities’, Athens daily newspaper Eleftherotypia, 24 
Oct. 1993.
24 ‘Women’s Bookstore in Athens’, Gaia, No. 2, 1984.
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In October 1984, a Panhellenic meeting of autonomous feminists took place in 
Salonica.25 Its objective was to find a way of reanimating the movement, perhaps by 
some scheme of cooperation. While the participants at the meeting acknowledged the 
crisis in the autonomous feminist spectrum and realised the need for redefining 
objectives and how to obtain them, their views remained too diverse to be reconciled. 
The meeting ended without any prospects for further cooperation. It was the last major 
collective event within the autonomous feminist movement.
In two years to come, mobilisations by autonomous feminist groups focused on
the campaign for free abortion on demand, on violence and rape. An illustration of
their endeavour to broaden the movement’s agenda was the 1986 mobilisation in
26connection with the trial of a woman accused of killing her husband. Declarations and 
publications followed in the years thereafter. However, 1987 saw the end of 
mobilisations by the autonomous feminist groups, and the ascendancy of theoretical 
debates in forums that functioned as centres of a women’s community (e.g. House of 
Women, Women’s Bookstore, Bookstore Selana).
In time, the difficulties experienced by the autonomous feminists led to a 
significant change of direction. The criticism expressed at the Panhellenic meeting was 
not forgotten. Many feminists were against the introspective attitudes of 
consciousness-raising groups and wanted the movement to be associated with general 
political issues. In this context, active alliances with other social movements were 
considered. The autonomous feminist press began more and more to mention practical 
objectives held in common with other social minorities. An exception to this was the 
group formed around the magazine Whirl (Dini), the first issue of which came out in 
December 1986, at a time when the movement had already shrunk and was kept going 
mainly by the efforts of committed older members. The group around Dini articulated 
the purest form of radical feminism in Greece, and the magazine represented the return
25 ‘Feature: Panhellenic Meeting of Women’, Gaia, No. 2,1984.
26 The husband’s continual physical abuse of the accused, her denomination by the 
mass media, and her physical battering by the police provoked a campaign by the 
autonomous feminist groups, denouncing the misogynism of Greek society and the 
sexism permeating the state apparatus and the judicial system. See pamphlets'. ‘Women 
Present at the Trial of Kolitsopoulou* by the Women’s House and Women’s Bookstore 
(Athens) in Dini, No. 1, December 1986.
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of a significant section of autonomous feminists to theoretical issues. Another response 
to the difficulties of the autonomous feminist movement was the initiative to establish 
institutions of solidarity with rape victims or women physically abused.
In brief: the impasse in the affairs of the autonomous feminist movement was 
never positively resolved. Three different tendencies developed: (i) an effort to 
associate feminism with more general socio-political issues, (ii) to focus on the 
construction of a female identity and the elaboration of theoretical issues, and (iii) to 
set up alternative institutions in civil society (SOS-lines, shelters for raped women, 
etc.).27 By the 1990s the number of the autonomous feminist groups still functioning 
was extremely small.
The course of the autonomous feminist movement can be divided into four 
phases. The first phase was dominated by the formation of consciousness-raising 
groups; the second was marked by the rise of feminist activism and the formation of 
the Coordinating Committee; during the third phase the dissolution of the Coordinating 
Committee was followed by the proliferation of study groups and the founding of
Women’s Houses; in the fourth phase, when the difficulties began, the Women’s
28Bookstores were set up.
The autonomous feminist movement lived for more that a decade. It strove to 
develop a new body of feminism based on the politics reproduction. It started from 
zero, aiming to reconceptualise knowledge and construct a positive female 
subjectivity.29
27 Indicative is the founding of the group ‘SOS-Line - First Aid Group to Abused and 
Raped Women of Salonica’. See also Gouliarou, Theodora ‘Some thoughts about the
past and the present of the women’s movement’, Katina, No. 3, June 1988, Salonica.
28 Interviews with Vicky Kotsovelou, op. cit., ref. 9.
29  •This has been a painful process for many women, who have described in the 
autonomous feminist press the long periods of solitude they have suffered, ‘...the 
course of liberation leads with a mathematical precision to solitude and 
disappointment. The most important is that it leads to the exclusion from a community, 
which a women needs...’, in EOG (1979) ‘Introduction’ in Alice Schwartzer, The 
Small Difference and its Great Consequences (EOG publication, Athens), p. 16.
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4.3 Ideology
The autonomous feminist movement founded its struggle for women’s 
liberation on the fundamental axioms of collectivity and autonomy.
4.3.1 Collectivity
The autonomous feminist discourse emphasised that the universality of 
women’s oppression under patriarchy led to the formation of the collective subject of 
‘woman’. Throughout history, woman was the collective or individual property of 
men. Women’s deprivation of control over themselves has split society into two 
separate categories: the collective subject ‘woman’ and the collective subject ‘man’. 
Power relations between those two categories has permeated all forms of social and 
personal life, and so rendered patriarchy ubiquitous. It is this shared oppression 
suffered by women throughout history in different societies and distinct classes that 
constitutes the basis of the collective character of the female subject.
The autonomous feminist movement’s emphasis on the collective dimension
30was coupled with emphasis on its own class-transcendent character. Although the 
autonomous feminist groups frequently incorporated class elements into their discourse 
and elaborated the relationship of capitalism to patriarchy, they never applied class 
considerations to the development of the feminist movement. On the contrary, they 
stressed the common nature of the struggle against patriarchy and the need for 
women’s solidarity. Exceptions to the class-transcendent character of the feminist 
movement were the Revolutionary Struggle of Women (Epanastatiki Pali Ginaikon) 
and the KAG. The latter declared outright: ‘The autonomous feminist movement is not
•  31only a social but also a class movement’. Both of these organisations were founded 
not long after the fall of the junta, and reflected the ideological ascension of the 
political Left and its projection of class conflict as the major conflict of Greek society. 
In the years thereafter, several autonomous feminist groups took class elements into 
their analyses, but never questioned the classlessness of the feminist movement as a 
whole.
The strong embedment in the autonomous feminist discourse of the collective 
essence of the female subject was also reflected on the marginal influence of the
30 Interviews with Vicky Kotsovelou, op. cit., ref. 9.
31 Gia tin Apeleftherosi ton Ginaikon, No. 4, December 1978.
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discourse of ‘difference’. The subject ‘woman’ was never broken up into the study of 
different identities and dissimilar experiences. The right to differ within the context of a 
pluralistic culture is stated or implied in all autonomous feminist writings, but by never 
fragmenting the category ‘woman’, the collective dimension of the women’s struggle 
to overturn patriarchy was kept intact. The discourse of difference was attacked by the 
feminist groups associated with the magazine Skoupa, one of the most influential in 
theoretical feminism. The group argued that promotion of women’s issues on the basis 
of ‘difference’ constituted an ideological trap for the feminist movement, because it led 
to a glorification of women’s characteristics while concealing that they were the 
historical products of a long period of oppression and exclusion. They argued that the 
much-valued difference was never the end product of choice, but a forced outcome.32
Since it was the collective subject of women that formed the foundation for the 
belief that women’s united and conscious struggle can overthrow patriarchy, the 
concept of collectivity was never questioned, not even during the most difficult times 
for the autonomous feminist movement, when many of its goals and means were 
challenged.
‘...In face of the impasses and the tension originating from the crisis, there are two 
things we must save no matter what: the minimal collectivity, which is necessary for
33the reproduction of our vital space and the communication of our ideas’.
This belief led to a strong subjectivism in the autonomous feminist culture, where the 
abilities of the collective subject woman were constantly praised.
‘ The new feminist movement has provided a neglected, but crucial component to 
revolution, ... the conscious character of the revolution, ...meaning the irreplaceable 
role of the human-Subject that intervenes and transforms history, changing 
simultaneously her (his) own self.34
Collectivity was one of the preconditions for women’s liberation. The second 
one was autonomy.
32 Skoupa, No. 3, December 1979.
33 Avdela, Efi ‘About the crisis’, Dini, No. 4, June 1989, p. 9.
34 ‘Group of Women in Publishing’, EOG Pamphlet, 1979, p.2.
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4.3.2 Autonomy
A decisive rupture in the previous tradition of feminist politics in Greece came 
with the autonomous feminist groups breaking all ties with the state, political parties, 
and men generally. The quest for autonomy was perceived as an absolute necessity for 
the self-definition and determination of women. The autonomous feminists denounced 
traditional politics as male-centred and proclaimed their belief in the right of an 
oppressed group to define its own needs and goals.
i) Autonomy andformal politics
The strong influence exerted by political parties over the Greek feminist 
movement led the autonomous feminist groups to proclaim their autonomy principally 
in relation to the political parties. However, the terms ‘formal politics’ or ‘traditional 
politics’ that often appeared in their writings, referred to all social institutions, political 
subjects and ideological apparatuses (the mass media, labour unions, the church, the 
judicial system, the police, medical science) that were perceived as reproducing the 
patriarchal structures. The autonomous feminists denounced not only the agents of 
formal politics but also the concomitant practices and ideological premises (e.g. mass 
organisations, leadership, planning for the acquisition of power, hierarchy, 
competitiveness, dominative logic, instrumental rationality, division between 
intellectual and manual labour). The refusal to have anything to do with formal politics 
constituted a rejection of their patriarchal nature, hierarchical structures, and their 
dominative practices as well as of the entire value system on which it rests. This 
rejection of formal politics was an inevitable corollaiy of the ideological vision of 
women’s liberation. The autonomous feminists’ goal of women’s liberation was a 
revolutionary one that could not be achieved through the existing political system and 
its institutions. These were regarded as expressing the power relations between the 
sexes. For the autonomous feminists the political system was a bulwark of sexism, 
thereby negating any possibility for women’s liberation without challenging the very 
foundations of this system. The political objective of overturning the existing 
patriarchal society could hardly be achieved through institutional reforms in the realm 
of formal politics. The autonomous feminist groups, therefore, denounced women’s 
equality in a male-centred political order, and did not deviate from their aspiration to 
abolish patriarchy, as a system endlessly reproducing relations of oppression,
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subjection and exploitation. ‘A political proposal means the articulation of a project for
35a different model of society’.
Autonomy from formal politics was a basic element in the feminist struggle for 
self-determination. The autonomous groups endeavoured to formulate a feminist 
discourse based on women’s experiences, needs, and desires. This process of self- 
determination presupposed the creation of groups that were independent from formal 
politics, where women could analyse collectively what they had experienced 
individually. It was this knowledge shared between them that became the basis of a 
feminist identity. The feminist groups considered the many consciousness-raising
36groups as a project of self-definition, feasible only in a context of autonomy. They 
created their own social arenas, where they proceeded to a feminist reading of social 
reality, so minimising the influence of the masculine language of formal politics. In this 
way, autonomy helped to create feminist alternatives to the existing (male-dominated) 
social representation of women; it epitomised the women’s exploration of their social 
and personal identity, and reflected their belief that patriarchal power is not only 
visibly, but also invisibly sexist.
Rejection of formal politics by the autonomous feminist groups was coupled 
with a redefinition of the subject of politics generally. For one thing, they challenged 
the universality of formal politics, demonstrated against the exclusion of women from 
formal politics, and strove to redefine politics on the basis of the women’s life-world. 
The point of such a reconceptualisation of politics was to make women more visible by 
introducing them into history as a political subject. For the autonomous feminists, 
politics ceased to be limited to the public space of male supremacy and extended to the 
social spheres associated with women’s activities. In other words, the radical denial by 
the autonomous feminist groups of formal politics as a male-dominated sphere was 
coupled with their projection of an alternative conceptualisation of politics -  one that 
made women a major actor in politics and a motivating force of social change.
35 Gouliarou, Theodora and Kavka, Meri, ‘Women’s alliance or what does the fox look 
for in the bazaar?’, Katina, No. 2, December 1987.
36 Gouliarou, op. cit., ref. 27, p. 43.
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ii) Autonomy and men
One of the autonomous feminist canons was the need to break women’s
37 •emotional and intellectual dependency on men. In the declaration of the Movement 
for Women’s Liberation it is clearly stated:
‘We need our own organisation separate from men because their presence suspends 
our ability to express ourselves and to develop initiatives. Because their privileged
•  •  •  38position in society renders them advocates of their position vis-a-vis us’.
The exclusion of men from the women’s groups was considered absolutely 
necessary for constructing a feminist identity: only women could apprehend women’s 
particular experiences as gendered beings, and articulate a discourse that defied the 
patriarchal ideology. The construction of a women’s language through the process of 
consciousness-raising did not permit the participation of men. The ultimate aim of the 
autonomous feminists was to build a collective feminist consciousness that would assist 
in the struggle for liberation. In brief, the exclusion of men was part of the project of 
self-definition. Men were perceived as either adversaries, profiting from patriarchy and 
acting as advocates of their privileged position, or as representatives of a distorted 
patriarchal image of women’s particular social experience.
The women’s shared belief in autonomy from men was also of decisive 
importance for the discussions in the study groups. The focus on personal emotions, 
experiences and issues referring to the private sphere (sexuality, abortions etc.) 
presupposed a social environment receptive to the expression of private thoughts and 
desires. The absence of men made it easier to overcome ingrained habits of 
concealment and psychological repression. Another reason for the exclusion of men 
was that it was thought that their presence would undermine the bonds created by 
women among themselves in a community of sisterhood. Many groups argued that 
women’s emotional entrapment in relation to men hindered the development of 
women’s solidarity and therefore the formation of a collectivity.
37 Despite the universal application of this, the issue could become a source of conflict. 
For example, one of the clashes that led to the dissolution of the Coordinating 
Committee concerned the exclusion of men.
38 Kotsovelou, Repousi, op. cit., ref. 10, p. 54.
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iii) Autonomy and double militancy9
Autonomy was a principle unequivocally adhered to in the autonomous feminist 
spectrum. There were, however, two diametrically opposed interpretations of 
autonomy. The one held that autonomy excluded all and any participation by feminists 
in political parties or other political formations; the other argued that autonomy does 
not conflict with the participation in additional political formations. In time, double 
militancy became the dominant conflict in the autonomous feminist spectrum. The two 
interpretations reflected a profound disagreement over the ideological conception of 
feminism.
Some of the autonomous feminists considered feminism a holistic concept, with 
women the dominant subject of political struggles. It was they who represented the 
purest version of radical feminism in Greece.40 Advocates of the holistic character of 
feminism rejected any definition of the feminist struggle as a partial struggle that can 
coexist with the political struggles of other oppressed groups. They asserted that not 
considering the feminist struggle as of singular priority meant to reproduce the 
patriarchal marginalisation of the women’s movement as a fragmentary struggle of a 
particular segment of society. For the radical feminists, it was the conflict of the sexes 
that was the chief social conflict. With patriarchy defined as a separate political system 
of women’s oppression, the feminist movement a priori had to dissociate itself from all
39 Double militancy refers to new social movements’ members, who combine their 
participation in the social movement sector with their membership in political parties or 
other political organisations outside the social movement sector. Double militancy in 
the Greek case refers chiefly to the social movements’ participants, who are also party 
members. The phenomenon of double militancy has been extensive not only in Greece, 
but also in Latin America (e.g. Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay, Peru, Chile), and signifies 
the strong presence of the state and the political parties in the public life of the two 
countries respectively. Double militancy became a major issue of the feminist 
movement during the ‘70s and ‘80s. This was illustrated by the ideological clash 
between the feminists, who demanded complete autonomy of the feminist movement 
and the double militants, who combined their struggle in civil society with their 
struggle in party politics. During the ‘90s it has subsided as an issue. Heilman, Judith 
Adler (1990), ‘Latin American Feminism’, Review Article, Socialist Review, 90/3.
40 These were mainly the groups formed around the magazines Skoupa and Dini.
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other political movements.
‘A disengagement from the male-centred trap and a feminist perception of politics 
would mean that women would become the centres of the struggle for a new world. 
The patriarchal structure of society, the hierarchical relation between the sexes causes 
our problems. This patriarchal structure pre-existed capitalism and follows capitalism. 
It will follow any social change and will perpetuate itself, unless we define the 
oppression of one sex by the other as our central problem’.41
Feminists who advocated this belief saw as a main reason for the difficulties 
their movement was experiencing, the strong influence of the Left and its enforcement 
of a political tradition that divided struggles into general and particular. The holistic 
vision of feminism was opposed to the entrenched political tradition in the Greek 
feminist movement that admitted the existence of two conflicts: one of them general 
and concerning all the progressive forces in Greek society, and one of them partial, 
concerning women in their specific struggle for liberation.
A large number o f feminists in the autonomous feminist spectrum did not share 
this holistic vision. They argued that the conflict between the sexes is only one among 
many others, and that in consequence women do not constitute the overriding political 
subject. They did not contest the political vision of transforming society in its entirety. 
All autonomous feminists shared the belief that there are no social relations that are not 
affected by the conflict between the sexes, and that the feminist challenge of the 
prevailing values presupposes a total recreation of the existing social order. However, 
the less radical segment of the autonomous feminists saw feminism coupled with a 
multiplicity of other social conflicts. For them, feminism challenging the universality of 
male-centeredness demonstrated the fallacy of a single universal subject. Therefore, 
they argued in favour of the principle of diversity. In their view, society must not be 
reduced to the conflict between the sexes, but be allowed diverse social arenas, where 
different social subjects construct their collective identities. They juxtaposed to the 
holistic vision of feminism, based on the men/women dichotomy, a discourse founded 
on exploring the various sites of social oppression. The autonomous feminists, who 
proposed this alternative, were usually women taking part in other political formations 
and seeking political alliances with other social movements.
41 Papayannaki, Marina and Fragoudaki, Anna ‘Which policy for Feminism?’, Dini, No. 
3, July 1988, p. 10.
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To summarise: autonomy ‘emerged as an inviolable principle and was entwined 
with the very existence of the feminist movement’.42 Autonomy became the principle 
that differentiated the autonomous feminist groups from the party-affiliated women’s 
organisations, and was perceived by the former as the indispensable precondition for 
women’s self-definition and self-determination.
Additional basic tenets in the ideology of the autonomous feminists were the 
political dimension of the private sphere, an anti-hierarchical stand, the strong presence 
of class analysis, and the articulation of a humanistic discourse.
4.3.3 The Personal is Political
The autonomous feminist movement went beyond the agenda set by the party- 
affiliated women’s organisations when it introduced issues referring to areas of social 
life previously treated as private and personal. They did so for three reasons: because 
(i) the internalised social constructs of femininity can be recognised and overcome only 
by exploring the dynamic of women’s daily lives; (ii) the origins of patriarchy lie in the 
private domain; (iii) the personal reflections of the individual are valueless.
The autonomous feminist movement aimed to explore and liberate women’s 
consciousness.
‘Women’s liberation presupposes not only the abolition of the material conditions that 
enforce it, but also a deep transformation of consciousness and human relations’.43 
Such a transformation of women’s consciousness was recognised as being very 
difficult, given that patriarchal power becomes less visible as a collective practice in the 
personal domain. It was important, therefore, to initiate processes to get women to talk 
about personal experiences in light of the oppression they were enduring because of 
their gender. These accounts were then collectively analysed to show that many other 
women had similar experiences, and thereby to point to their political character. 
Sexuality, women’s control over their own bodies, abortion, contraception, domestic 
violence, rape, psychological repression, the sexual objectification of women, and 
motherhood - all were thoroughly examined. The focus on the private sphere was 
meant to reveal the social grounding of interpersonal relations. In this way, the private
42 Kotsovelou, Vicky and Repousi, Maria ‘Some Thoughts about the Political Identity 
of Feminism in Greece’, Dini, No. 4, June 1989.
43 ‘Group of Women in Publishing’, op. cit., ref. 34, p. 7.
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sphere became the locus for the formulation of a new feminism that revealed the 
‘invisible’ politics of reproduction. Productive rights were replaced by the focus on 
reproductive rights, which grounded women’s ability to liberate themselves from a 
socially constructed ‘biological fate’.
By exploring women’s daily reality in the private domain, the autonomous 
feminist groups exposed the political foundations of sexism in its daily manifestations. 
For the first time in the history of the Greek feminist movement it was proposed that 
there is no single private issue of a person’s life that is not political. The autonomous 
feminists opposed the private/public dichotomy, underlying formal politics, with a 
discourse of ‘sexual politics’ that established the personal domain as a site of political 
struggles. The slogan ‘The personal is political’ redefined the spectrum of politics, and 
introduced women as a political subject in an infinitely expansive political domain.
While the party-affiliated women’s organisations focused primarily on issues 
such as women’s participation in the labour process, educational opportunities, legal 
reforms, or domestic labour, the autonomous groups redirected the focus from the 
material conditions of women’s oppression to the private domain as the linchpin of 
male power. There was, however, no consensus amongst the autonomous feminists on 
the origins and nature of patriarchy. It was explained in three not mutually exclusive 
ways: as an ubiquitous structure of hierarchical sexual relations, as male control over 
women’s reproductive capacity, and as male control over women’s labour power (in 
both the industrial mode of production and the domestic sphere). There was 
unanimous agreement in the autonomous feminist press that the second and third are 
the two most fundamental functions of patriarchy, but the emphasis varied with the 
political orientations of each group. Opposition to hierarchical structures and power 
relations usually went hand in hand with extensive analysis of the role of socialisation. 
Groups closer to radical feminism stressed the significance of men’s control over 
women’s sexuality, whereas autonomous feminists ideologically linked to the political 
Left studied the allocation of labour power and the partnership between patriarchy and 
capitalism. There were no clear dividing lines in the analysis of patriarchy, and all three 
dimensions were usually present in the discourse of the autonomous groups. But, 
contrary to the ideological tradition of the party-affiliated women’s organisations that 
stressed the material conditions of women’s oppression, the different interpretations of 
patriarchy by the autonomous feminists always incorporated the decisive role of
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sexuality in the reproduction of patriarchy.
The dictum ‘The personal is political’ also signified a positive apprehension of 
individuality. The autonomous feminists stressed the infinitive richness of the individual 
constitution of women and the variations among them. This positive value bestowed on 
individuality meant a critical stance towards domineering collectivities:
‘ “Politics” does not care for the individual as a distinct, unique and irreplaceable 
personality. The aim of “politics” is to conquer and lead the masses. Feminism, on the 
contrary, has caused the downfall of the concept “masses”, because feminism has as a 
starting point the needs of the individual and the personal dimension’.44
The autonomous feminists accused the political parties of suppressing 
individuality and creating docile masses. They themselves celebrated individuality by 
focusing on personal reflections and emphasising the neglected role of subjectivity. The 
consciousness-raising groups, which focused on individual liberation, were an 
organisational index of the positive apprehension of individuality.
The autonomous feminists strove to re-establish the dialectic unity between 
individuality and collectivity. They argued that the feminist struggle develops 
simultaneously on two levels: it is linked on the one level to ‘an impersonal but 
omnipotent mechanism constituted by institutions, laws and repressive structures’; and 
on the other to ‘an oppression more immediate and personal’ relating to daily life in the 
private domain.45 Therefore, feminism
‘...has a better chance to proceed more easily to this dialectic unity of the subjective 
and objective, particularly because the practical rebellion of women induces women to 
confront both levels of reality’.46
Thus, the autonomous feminists strove to reintroduce the individual as a valuable and 
decisive factor of politics, and thereby to restore the dialectic unity between 
individuality and collectivity.
4.3.4 Hierarchism, Science, Capitalism, Humanism
All of the autonomous groups, without exception, took a clear stand against 
hierarchical relations and structures of domination. The small consciousness-raising
44 ‘...Continuation of a presaged death’, Gala, No. 2,1984, pp. 29-30.
45 ‘Group of Women in Publishing’, op. cit., ref. 34, p. 7.
46 ‘Group of Women in Publishing’, ibid., p.7.
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groups that functioned organisationally on the basis of unanimity expressed this. 
Hierarchical relations and dominative practices were identified with the male culture 
based on competitiveness, aggression, and authoritarianism. Patriarchal ideology was 
denounced for promoting male domination and violence both in daily life and on the 
level of institutional structures. When autonomous feminists who perceived women’s 
liberation as an integral part of a broader political project examined issues referring to 
the construction of social hierarchies, they extended the analysis of sexual hierarchies 
to the study of power relations underlying the institutionalised forms of social 
inequalities. A case in point is the pamphlet (dated 28 April 1980) distributed in 
solidarity with women prisoners who staged a revolt to demand better living 
conditions:
Tut an end to prisons, reformatory institutions, psychiatric clinics and to all the 
supposedly humanistic institutions that perpetuate sexual and racial relations. We 
women support the struggle of our sister prisoners as well as the struggles of all the 
minorities, believing firmly that our problems are related to the same repressive power 
mechanisms’.47
In this context the judicial, penal, medical and educational system, the army, the police, 
the alienating labour process, and finally the institution of the family were attacked for 
creating hierarchical relations of domination.
‘From the student halls to the displacement of homosexuals, the police control 
penetrates every aspect of public and private life’.48
The formation of submissive individuals through the socialisation process, and the 
existing repressive institutions (prisons, psychiatric institutions, etc.) were passionately
49criticised. For many autonomous feminists, hierarchism, exploitation, domination and 
repression, aside from being part of women’s personal experience, extended to the
47 The Women’s Group, Women’s Group of the Law School, EOG, Autonomous 
Group of Homosexual Women, Initiative Group of Women of Piraeus, Women’s 
Group of the Committee of Lawyer’s Struggle, Women’s Group of Sfigga, and the 
Revolutionary Struggle of Women signed the pamphlet. Pampouki, op. cit., ref. 5.
48 Gia tin Apeleftherosi ton Ginaikon, No. 1, Feb. 1978, p. 13.
49 The anarchist feminists argued that behind patriarchy, capital and the state lies the 
common principle of power. See the magazine Poli ton Ginaikon, which approaches 
feminist issues from an anti-authoritarian perspective.
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broader context of society. This, they argued, united women with other social 
minorities in the common struggle for the humanisation of social relations.
‘One of the most fundamental claims of women’s uprising is the abolition of any 
system that integrates and accommodates humans to hierarchical castes that prohibit 
their free and autonomous development’.50
The opposition to hierarchical relations illustrated the ideological influence of the 
tradition of May ‘68 on the autonomous feminists’ political vision. Another element in 
the autonomous feminist discourse associated with the tradition of May ‘68 was the 
critical stand over science and rationality.
It was specifically rationality and science, which the autonomous feminists 
denounced for creating hierarchical divisions founded on the supremacy of men. They 
challenged the claim by the scientific discourse to universalism, objectivity and 
rationality. They strove to unmask scientific concepts that were supposedly universal 
and gender-neutral as mere constructs of a particular male bias. The autonomous 
feminists emphasised that science relegated women to the role of the ‘other’, as a 
‘lesser’ adjunct to the ‘superior’ male. They questioned the validity of associating 
science/mind/reason with men, and emotion/nature/body with women. They rejected 
the dichotomies projected by the patriarchal ideology (such as public/private, 
culture/nature, mind/body, reason/emotions) and denounced what were considered 
peculiarly female aspects as social constructs of patriarchy. The identification of 
theoretical work with male privilege and science with male domination, oriented many 
groups to a personalistic, subjectivist, expressive language. This became the norm in 
the autonomous feminist groups, where frequently theoretical generalisations were 
eschewed in favour of an immediate reflection on personal experiences.
‘Because feminism, besides its aim of the total political overthrowing of society, pays 
attention also to that which is not political; to that zone of experiences, which cannot 
be regulated, measured or organised. It is the area of emotions, fantasy, sexuality’.51
50 EOG, op. cit.y ref. 29, p. 15.
51 ‘Women’s liberation and class struggle’, Gaia, No. 1, June 1983. The focus on 
personal emotions and desires was often associated with a humanistic discourse: 
‘...because sensitivity, sentimentality and any human element is what feminism tries to 
give to every individual, male or female, as human attributes’. ‘...Continuation of a 
presaged death’, op. cit, ref. 44, p.30.
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A marked feature of the autonomous feminist movement was the strong 
influence of the Left, which had provided a considerable number of the members. In 
Greece, contrary to the experience abroad, there was no mass exodus of feminists from 
the left-wing parties. This dual commitment meant dual militancy, with many women 
working simultaneously in the political parties or the extra-parliamentary Left as well 
as in autonomous feminist groups. These women (as already mentioned) rejected the 
fundamental premise of radical feminism that the principal oppression is patriarchal sex 
oppression, and strove to elaborate the partnership of capitalism with patriarchy and 
applied class-analysis. The issues they addressed included the globalisation of 
capitalism, the consumerist ideology of advanced capitalism, state patriarchy and 
advanced capitalism, economic crisis and neo-conservatism, private property and 
patriarchy, differentiation of women’s oppressions in diverse classes, the potentiality of 
a classless society, capitalism’s capability to survive without women’s oppression, the 
anti-capitalist elements of the feminists discourse, women’s domestic labour and 
capitalism, the legal reforms postulated by the capitalist modernisation of Greek 
society, and the deterioration of position of women due to neo-liberal economic 
policies.
The class element and anti-capitalist stand were especially marked in the early 
publications by the autonomous feminist movement, which appeared at a time when 
the groups often adopted a vigorously defensive attitude to criticism from the Left that
52they were both apolitical and imitators of foreign patterns. This was partially due to 
the ideological hegemony of the Left during the early period of democratic 
reconstruction after 1974. Overall, the autonomous feminists made no clear theoretical 
elaboration of the relations of capitalism to patriarchy. The two systems were 
presented as having basically the same interests, and most analyses attacked capitalist 
patriarchy as a single non-conflictual whole. The existing social and political 
institutions (family, state, church, school, etc.) were seen as serving the functions of 
both systems and were attacked on both fronts simultaneously, without specifying their 
role in each of the two systems separately. All assessments of capitalism by the 
autonomous feminists were as hostile as those of patriarchy, expressing their dual
52 For example in the newspaper Gia tin Apeleftherosi ton Ginaikon, published by the 
KAG, some articles defensively counter criticism from the Left that feminism is divisive 
of the working class. Kotsovelou, Repousi, op. cit., ref. 42; Varika, op. cit., ref. 1.
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commitment to the abolition of both.
A premise implicitly shared by the autonomous feminists was the limited 
analytical power of Marxism for the examination of sexism, and the groups did not
•  53apply class analysis to provide insights into sexual oppression. On the contrary, the 
autonomous feminists found that it was women’s personal knowledge of sexual power- 
relations that provided a new explanation of socially constructed hierarchies and a new 
radical perspective. In addition, class analysis was not coupled with a strictly 
materialist analysis. The accent was predominantly on civil society and the 
institutionalised methods of maintaining the political hegemony of capitalism and 
patriarchy.
The strong ideological influence of the Left was manifested also by the 
formulation of a humanistic discourse. While all autonomous feminists agreed that 
women must search for their personal autonomy through acknowledging and 
expressing their inner needs, a section of them emphasised the common struggle of 
both sexes to re-establish their pre-existing, pre-social human identities. This 
humanistic discourse exemplified the political origins of a significant number of 
autonomous feminists from the left political forces.
Contrary to the tradition of radical feminism abroad, many autonomous Greek 
feminists perceived the movement as a project for human liberation and therefore 
intrinsically linked to the political struggle of other oppressed groups. The women 
associated with the extra-parliamentary Left emphasised the common struggle against 
the existing power relations and structures of domination, while those with Marxist 
origins emphasised the common struggle against capitalism. Both of these ideological 
currents expressed a firm belief in humanity as one unitary whole, in the dictum that 
human nature is formed by historical determinants, and consequently in people’s ability 
to reconstruct society by collective action. The belief that humanity is unitary 
differentiated this section of feminists from the more radical ones who founded their 
discourse exclusively on the opposition of men and women. Generally speaking, many 
of the autonomous feminists shared the premise that women’s struggle for liberation is 
part of a broader political project to re-establish the lost humanitarian nature of social
53 The only exception was the group Revolutionary Struggle of Women, which 
concluded that the origins of women’s oppression lie in capitalism. Epanastatiki Pali 
Ginaikon, bulletin published by the Revolutionary Struggle of Women, 1978.
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relations.
‘The ultimate goal is the creation of a new form of structures and relations in a 
liberated society, relieved from relations of power, poverty and any other form of 
alienation, where the roles of men and women will have been replaced by the 
humanisation of the two sexes’.54
4.3.5 Family, Sexuality, Male Violence
The autonomous feminist groups took the lead in mobilisations for abortion on 
demand, the reform of Family Law, and of the Penal Code concerning rape. Their 
campaign went beyond the issue of legal reforms as such and was intended to expose 
the real content of women’s oppression, freed from the camouflage of patriarchal 
mystification. Their analysis of the institution of the family, women’s sexuality, and 
male violence utterly contradicted the conservative tone of the party-affiliated 
women’s discourse.
The campaign was launched by the KAG on 1 May 1976, when it issued and 
distributed a manifesto demanding free abortion on demand, sexual education at 
schools, workplaces, and neighbourhoods, 2nd free distribution of contraceptive 
devices.55 In April 1983, the Autonomous Movement of Women initiated a national 
campaign about abortion contraception and sexuality. Their pamphlet stated:
‘We start this campaign because we believe that the natural reproductive ability of 
women, meaning the body that gives birth, has become historically the cause, the 
excuse and the object of the multiple oppression of women’.56 
The autonomous feminist groups approached the issue of abortion and sexuality from a 
perspective different from that of the party-affiliated women’s organisation. The 
traditional discourse associated sexuality with women’s health, family planning and a 
positive attitude to motherhood. The autonomous feminist groups denounced this 
conjunction and stressed that sexual oppression is a fundamental aspect in the 
reproduction of patriarchy. They also pointed out that childbearing is different from
54 Self-presentation by the Initiative Group of Women of Piraeus in ‘Autonomous 
Women’s Groups’, op. cit., ref. 6, pp. 26-27.
55 Avdela, Papayannaki, Sklaveniti, op. cit., ref. 4.
56 Campaign for the Right to Abortion, Contraception, Sexuality, pamphlet by 
‘Autonomous Movement of Women’. Avdela, Papayannaki, Sklaveniti, ibid.
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child-rearing. The identification of those two functions in the patriarchal ideology 
served to put women into a socially constructed ‘biological fate’. Restricting women to 
the role of motherhood had the ideological support of the social construction of female 
attributes (emotion, compassion, caring, etc.) that were projected as innate in a woman 
as such and in harmony with the ‘motherly instinct’. The autonomous feminists set out 
to liberate women from their ‘biological fate’ and to make motherhood a matter of 
conscious choice.
The questioning of motherhood as a predestined fate was coupled with 
questioning the institution of the family.
‘Family is the space that prohibits the autonomy of the will and the existence of women 
...It is the sphere that forces women to assimilate and internalise their subjection as
57their “nature” and thereby negates any possibility for women to revolt’.
The autonomous feminists kept repeating that in the context of the family women were 
reduced to sexual objects for the service and satisfaction of men and became limited to 
the role of motherhood. They argued that sexuality transcends the institution of the 
family and the function of procreation. They considered that women’s familiarisation 
with their own bodies and sexuality is a precondition for women’s self-definition, and 
thereby a means of empowerment. It is indicative that only the autonomous feminist 
groups addressed the issue of homosexuality and organised many joint activities with 
lesbian activists. In the context of women’s control over their own lives, the 
autonomous feminists called for free abortions on demand, sexual education in schools, 
information centres at workplaces and neighbourhoods run exclusively by women, free 
distribution of contraceptives, research on male contraception, and sexual information 
centres at public hospitals under the direct control of women. They also denounced the 
state, the medical system, and the church as hypocritical for spreading fears about 
contraception, continuing the profitable system of illegal abortions, and consolidating 
patriarchal power.58
57 ‘Women...’, pamphlet by autonomous feminist groups (6 October 1980). Pampouki, 
op. cit., ref. 5.
58 •In May 1986 the socialist government passed the new law on abortion (Law 
1609/86) After ratification of the bill in parliament, the autonomous feminist groups 
continued their mobilisation, demanding abolition of the Articles of the new law 
referring to: parental consent being required for under-age girls, the time restriction of
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The autonomous feminist groups were the first to tackle the issue of male 
violence and rape. In 1978 an article entitled ‘Violence and Rape’ in the newspaper 
published by the KAG linked rape to sexist violence.59 In October 1979, the Women’s 
Group of the Law School distributed a pamphlet entitled ‘Violence against Women’ 
and organised a public debate from which men were excluded.60 Male violence became 
a central theme of the autonomous feminist activities from 1980 onwards. The 
campaign took several forms. ‘Reclaim the Night’ demonstrations were organised, the 
names of rapists were widely publicised, there were study groups on rape and public 
discussions, demonstrations were held at the trials of rapists, solidarity groups with 
rape victims were formed, and pamphlets were distributed. In 1982 the Women’s 
Group of the School of Philosophy organised a demonstration at the Ministry of 
Justice. The proclamation they distributed was the first to state the need to reform the 
legal status of rape. The concrete demands of the autonomous feminist groups 
concerning the reform of the Penal Code were as follows:
—  1. Rape, which Art.336 of the Penal Code defined as a crime ‘against morality’, 
should be reclassified as a ‘crime against personal freedom and the individual’s self­
disposition’.
—  2. In the existing Penal Code rape was prosecuted only after indictment. The
autonomous feminists pointed out that this facilitated financial or marital settlements in 
cases of rape and demanded that rape be prosecuted directly, the same as murder or 
manslaughter. Moreover, the autonomous feminists denounced
‘the “covering” provisions of the penal code, whereby rapists could be exonerated and 
cases ruled out of court on the grounds that the prosecution would involve 
psychological and public damage to the victim’, 
and demanded the irrevocability of the rape charge.61
twelve weeks, the practical exclusion of under-age girls and uninsured women from 
free abortions, and the restriction of information on contraception only to family 
planning centres.
59 Alevizou, Korassidou, Samiou, op. cit., ref. 16.
60 Alevizou, Korassidou, Samiou, ibid.
61 Cacoullos, Ann (1994) ‘Women confronting party politics in Greece’, in B., Nelson 
and N. Chowdhury (eds) Women and Politics World-wide (New Haven, and London, 
Yale University Press), p. 319.
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—  3. The law defined as rape only sexual acts involving penis penetration of the 
vagina. The autonomous feminists demanded that any other form of sexual assault 
should also be treated as rape, a crime, instead of as a misdemeanour.
—  4. They also demanded the legal recognition and punishment of marital rape. 
Besides matters concerning the legal framework of rape, the autonomous
feminists took up many other issues in connection with the interrogatory and judicial 
procedures a woman had to face from the moment she charged a rapist. They asked 
the right of representatives from women’s organisations to attend rape trials as civil 
plaintiffs, if the victim was in agreement. Moreover, they stressed the need for a non­
sexist composition of the court, demanding that it should consist of an equal number of 
men and women, all of whom should have had special training in this context. They 
called for the abolition of the requirement for technical corroborative proof, and the 
prohibition of any inquiry into the previous sexual history of the claimant, both of these 
processes being humiliating to the rape-victim’s personality and dignity.
The autonomous feminists did not limit themselves to legal reforms concerning 
rape but wanted to publicise male violence generally. As the pamphlet of the Women’s 
Group of the School of Philosophy said:
‘We know that the essential solution to the problem of violence by men at the expense
of women (which is generated in the spheres of family, education, mass media, in the
•  •  62 whole “patriarchal society”) is not going to be given solely by some laws’.
Rape was seen as strongly embedded in the social relations of the two sexes.
‘Rape is the extreme reconstruction of daily life, which is marked by male aggression at
the expense of women on the physical and mental level. On the contrary, women’s
sexual behaviour has been shaped by the threat that surrounds her. That fear can
persist without the need to be justified every moment. It is sufficient that it is kept up.
Rape is there to remind women that freedom is utopian’.63
In this way, the autonomous feminists strove to demystify rape as a pathological 
phenomenon. They declared that it was founded on masculine social power, and 
associated it with the social mechanisms of the patriarchal society that continue to 
produce men as sacrificers and women as victims. Rape in the autonomous feminist
62  •Alevizou, Korassidou, Samiou, op. cit., ref. 16, p.9.
63 ‘Rape: Myth and Content’, publication by Women’s House of Athens, 4 December 
1982.
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discourse became the act that linked socially constructed male aggression to patriarchy. 
It essentially constituted a violent act of degradation and possession that reflected the 
patriarchal perception of women as the private property of men (fathers, husbands). 
The autonomous feminists pointed out that in the existing patriarchal penal code rape 
is considered as the theft of one man’s property by another. They incorporated the 
issue of rape into the whole complex of sexist violence women were experiencing 
daily. Their own definition of rape extended to the entire network of social relations 
between the two sexes. The proclamation Women’s Initiative against Violence and 
Rape (dated 25 June 1981) stated that rape happens daily, because rape is not limited 
to the sexual act but extends to women’s upbringing and their objectification by the 
mass media and pornography, to sexual harassment at workplaces and in the streets, 
etc.64. They stressed that individual instances of rape afflict all women, because the 
threat of rape functions as a social mechanism of control and repression and subverts 
the women’s struggle for liberation.
The autonomous feminists’ deep belief that women’s sexuality is a major 
terrain of their oppression was a reflection of their belief that the personal is political. 
They therefore aimed to build a collective feminist consciousness that would be strong 
enough to resist and fight the patriarchal structures and strictures of everyday life.
4.4 Organisational Structure
Dissatisfied with and opposed to the political tradition of organisational 
patterns as exemplified by the political parties and the party-affiliated women’s 
organisations, the autonomous feminist movement created a new organisational form 
This was not ruled by any constitutional declaration, but emerged out of the political 
practices of the groups and their adherence to a common ideological framework.
The autonomous feminists were organised in many small anti-hierarchical 
groups with a fluid membership. Although some of the groups focused on some 
specific issue, most of them combined various elements. The process of consciousness- 
raising was associated with work on theoretical issues, and the organisation of 
mobilisations. This many-sidedness differentiated the autonomous feminists in Greece 
from similar groups abroad.65 There, consciousness-raising groups, for instance,
64 Alevizou, Korassidou, Samiou, op. cit., ref. 16.
65 ‘Women’s Groups’, op. cit., ref. 13.
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focused exclusively on the development of a feminist consciousness, and after a while 
were dissolved again In Greece on the other hand, concern with several objectives 
extended the life period of the group. In fact, it was the stress resulting from these 
multiple responsibilities that was often presented in the autonomous feminist press as a 
major reason for the groups not always being able to fulfil the objectives they had set 
themselves.
The size of the groups varied. The largest of them was the Movement for 
Women’s Liberation, the first autonomous feminist organisation to be set up.66 Overall, 
the size of the autonomous Greek groups (usually more than 12 members) was greater
67than second-wave feminist groups abroad (8 to 12 members). The groups were
formed on a non-hierarchical basis, promoting direct democracy and challenging the
68principle of representation. The members of a group took collective decisions on the 
principle of unanimity. The internal organisation rested on the premise of autonomy. 
These feminist groups strove not only for their own autonomy from the political 
parties, the state, and men, but also for the autonomy of the organised individual 
woman vis-a-vis the group. This was an expression of their objection to any 
dominative collectivities and honoured the uniqueness of the individual. It meant that 
members always had the right to their own point of view within the group.
‘ ... the formation of a new feminist consciousness and the quest for different terms of 
existence presupposes internal informal procedures without hierarchical structures and 
the acceptance of the conflicts and the diverseness of opinions it may generate’.69
The organisational scheme of the autonomous feminist movement was part of 
the endeavour to create a women’s community that would facilitate the attainment of 
personal liberation. The autonomous feminists argued that the prevailing social 
conceptions set women apart and circumscribed their activities, isolating them socially
66 ‘Women’s Groups’, ibid.
67  •  •  •  •Indicative is the size of the Women’s Group of the Law School, which for a time had 
around 30 members. Self-Presentation by the Women’s Group of the Law School in 
‘Autonomous Women’s Groups’, op. cit., ref. 6; ‘Women’s Groups’, ibid.
68 Avdela, op. cit., ref. 33
69 ‘ “House of Women”: A proposal open to discussion’, To Milo kai to Fidi apo ti 
Skopia tis Evas, No. 4, April 1982, p.3.
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and usually restricting their lives within the institution of the family. Moreover, it was 
argued that women are socialised into a competitive mentality towards other women, 
which increases their subjective sense as well as their objective isolation: this prevents 
them from developing the consciousness of belonging to a social collectivity. 
Organisation into small, anti-hierarchical groups aimed to encourage women to speak 
out about their sense of isolation, and to express their personal experiences as 
gendered beings. The topics discussed included sexuality and rape, subjects about 
which women felt especially vulnerable. In that respect the small size of the groups 
encouraged its members to talk about difficult experiences, and the group’s feelings of 
solidarity reassured the individual women that they were no longer alone and socially 
isolated. The objective of the autonomous feminist groups was to transform women’s 
personal discontent into knowledge of the social conditions of their existence, by 
means of sharing what they had experienced internally and analysing it collectively. The 
personal autonomy of the group members was the basis on which to proceed from self- 
consciousness to a collective feminist consciousness. The small size of the autonomous 
groups was well suited to enhance the personal transformation of the individuals and to 
develop a broader collective feminist consciousness.
Generally speaking, the small size of the groups was usually coupled with an 
introspective orientation. The discussion of sensitive issues and the focus on personal 
liberation did not invite the development of open groups. The latter were primarily 
defined by developments on a societal level, whereas the orientation of the small 
groups towards issues related to micro-level behaviour resulted in their political 
intervention on the micro-level of everyday life - in the neighbourhood, the school, etc. 
The small size and introspective orientation of the autonomous feminist groups differed 
in terms of political function from that of the party-affiliated women’s organisations. 
The autonomous feminists never set themselves the development of political support as 
a primary goal; whereas the party-affiliated women’s organisations based their political 
strategy on how best to enlarge their political audience.
The organisational structure of the autonomous feminists aimed to produce 
communities of solidarity that would enhance intersubjectivity. However, many of the 
women questioned the political viability of this organisational scheme in several 
respects. The most common criticism was that this type of organisational structure 
meant a fragmentation that was harmful to the movement’s ideological and political
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vitality. The small groups having very little intercommunication and co-operation led 
on the ideological level to the absence of a common theoretical framework. For 
instance, study groups of certain topics (e.g. rape, abortion, the family) did not 
collaborate, which resulted in duplication of the analysis and inability to build on a 
common body of knowledge. Moreover, isolation and introspection meant greater 
reliance on empirical findings based on personal reflections. The request for co­
ordination amongst the groups often expressed the desire to obtain a holistic 
perspective that would encompass the broader societal developments.
There was also some criticism of the existing organisational structure for 
generating informal hierarchical relations and dominative practices. A common 
complaint was that certain women tended to monopolise the group discussions and in
•  •  70some cases dogmatism developed that prevented the expression of different opinions. 
The closed nature of the groups also created problems for bringing in new members,
71who might be cold-shouldered by the older ones. The subject of recruitment became 
a growing preoccupation when the difficulties of the movement came to a head. There 
was a quest for change during the last years of the autonomous feminist movement, 
when increasing stagnation led to demands for hew organisational solutions:
‘Our small groups have reached their limits. We must try to achieve a form of co-
72ordination and co-operation*.
The largest co-operative scheme in the life of the autonomous feminist movement was 
the Co-ordinating Committee of Women’s Struggles. It lasted for only a very short 
time (approximately 7 months), revealing the movement’s inability to overcome 
problems involving broader co-operation.
Many autonomous feminists were additionally members of political formations, 
but there were never any organisational links between those and the autonomous 
groups. Such participation in the political struggles of other political schemes remained 
a matter of individual commitment. Even those of the autonomous feminists, who 
strove for alliances with other political forces, never questioned the organisational 
autonomy of their own movement.
70 ‘Report from the Panhellenic Meeting of Women in Salonica’, Gaia, No. 2, October 
1984.
71 Report, ibid.
72 Report, ibid., p. 6.
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To summarise: the organisational structure of the autonomous feminist 
movement was based on autonomous single groups. This organisational segmentation 
was meant to avoid hierarchical structures and dominative practices amongst the 
various groups, but in fact generated practices of discontinuance that could not be 
resolved by the formation of an enduring co-ordinating scheme.
4.5 Social Base
Information about the social base of the autonomous feminist movement is very 
limited. The only available data are unofficial mentions by the group members, from 
which we know that the social base of the autonomous feminist movement was far 
more homogeneous than that of the party-affiliated organisations. From start to finish 
it was chiefly young, middle-class women from the larger urban centres who comprised 
its membership.
Broadly speaking, the Greek feminist movement was urban-based, with a
73circumscribed participation of rural women. A distinguishing feature of the 
autonomous feminist groups was that they developed in urban centres exclusively. The 
majority of the activists were in the two largest cities (Athens, Salonica), and women in 
smaller cities usually followed their lead. The restriction of the movement to urban 
centres was reflected in the thematic of the autonomous feminist press, which included 
no analysis of gender relations in agricultural communities.
The autonomous feminist movement consisted mostly of students and young 
women employed in the tertiary sector or self-employed, which is to say that the 
movement attracted predominantly women of the middle classes.74 Since young 
students and intellectuals dominated, the university community was the hub of the 
movement’s activities. Two significant social categories the autonomous feminists 
never managed to penetrate were: housewives and working-class women. Part of the 
reason for this was perhaps that the radical spirit of the university communities 
contrasted too sharply with the conservative family community of housewives. There 
were occasions when the strong presence of students and intellectuals promoting a 
radical agenda put the few housewives, who were willing to take a look at feminism,
73 Cacoullos, op. cit., ref. 61.
74 Varika, op. cit., ref. 1.
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75on the defensive. With respect to working-class women, the early writings were 
extensively concerned with the living conditions of working-class women, and 
autonomous feminists participated actively in mobilisations against discrimination and
76exploitation of female workers (telephone operators, midwives, etc.). However, this 
was largely a concomitant of the strong anti-capitalist stand of the autonomous 
feminists in the early years of democratic reconstruction. If on the one hand the 
autonomous movement had a very limited appeal to working-class women, on the 
other, its overruling focus on sexual politics indicates that the production process did
77not play much of a part in the lives of the activists.
Most of the members in the autonomous feminist movement were young, as 
explicitly stated in is the self-presentation of the Women’s Group of Piraeus in the 
magazine Sfigga.
‘In February 1980 a company of young women in Piraeus decided to found a women’s 
group. A direct aspiration of ours is to found our own space, that will become the
78meeting point of young women’.
Many of these young women were still unmarried and had not yet faced the issues of 
motherhood and family. Some of them said later that their subsequent socialisation as 
wives and mothers strongly influenced and in some cases changed some of the 
theoretical perceptions they had had when they entered the movement.79
The early, generationally homogeneous composition of the autonomous 
feminists was followed during the years of stagnation by an increased generational 
heterogeneity and inter-generational conflicts. The older activists had experienced 
feminism as the discovery of women’s identity, the newer members had experienced
75 Report, op. cit., ref. 70
76 •Varika, op. cit., ref. 1; and Gia tin Apeleftherosi ton Ginaikon, No. 1, February 
1978.
77 •For instance, the groups in the Athens Women’s House consisted entirely of students 
and intellectuals. There was no participation of working class women. Interviews with 
Gianna Athanassatou, ex-member of the editorial board of Dini and member of the 
Athens Women’s House, 15 Feb. 1998 and 24 March 1998, Athens.
78 Self-presentation by the Women’s Group of Piraeus, in ‘Autonomous Women’s 
Groups’, op. cit., ref. 6, p. 21.
79 Gouliarou, op. cit., ref. 27.
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feminism in crisis.80 The women’s press mentioned many functional problems 
associated with inter-generational conflicts in the groups.
Some of the members of the core groups of the autonomous feminist 
movement had participated in the second-wave feminist movement abroad (England,
France, Italy), and had already been politically active before joining the autonomous
81 •  •  •feminists in Greece. Also, as already mentioned, the overwhelming majority of the
autonomous feminists were active in the political formations of the Left. For instance, 
all members on the editorial board of Skoupa, the magazine with the broadest 
circulation, had taken part in the political struggles of their time - either as members of 
the pre-dictatorial Left (e.g. the Youth of Lambraki) or the post-junta euro-communist 
Left (e.g. EKON Rigas Feraios)).82 In this regard, the autonomous feminist movement 
confirms one of the basic premises of resource-mobilisation theory: that the potential 
participants of social movements are individuals who exhibit an active engagement in 
social networks and secondary organisations.
Compared to the party-affiliated women’s organisations the social base of the 
autonomous feminists was remarkably narrow. To begin with, this did not become an 
issue, since it agreed well with their emphasis' on consciousness-raising and personal 
liberation. It was only during the later phase of the movement, when the difficulties 
were already all too apparent, that many of them criticised the movement’s closed 
nature and introspective orientation. At the Panhellenic Meeting of Women in Salonica 
(1984), it was charged that the limited social base militated against any hope to open 
up the movement to a wider spectrum of social forces. For instance, the movement 
was prevented from becoming the political voice of working-class women because it 
had always under-represented them. To enlarge the role of the autonomous feminist
83movement required a different composition of social forces in the individual groups.
80 Gouliarou, ibid.
81 Athens interview with Martha Kaloudaki, former member of the Administrative
Council of the EGE, co-founder of Unaligned Movement of Women, co-founder of the
feminist network Telesilla, 26 Feb. 1998; and Interviews with Vicky Kotsovelou, op.
cit., ref. 9.
82 Mihopoulou, Anna ‘The first steps of feminist theory in Greece and the journal 
Skoupa: The Women’s Case (1979-81)’, Dim, No. 8, 1995-96.
83 N., P., ‘Panhellenic Meeting of Women in Salonica’, Rupture, No. 16, autumn 1984.
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While, therefore, the autonomous feminists stressed the classless character of 
their movement and addressed all of the women in Greek society, the social base of 
their movement was restricted to only the middle strata. In practice, their aspiration to 
give a voice to the collective subject ‘women’ was impeded by the narrow range of 
social origins of their members.
4.6 Strategy
The autonomous feminist movement applied a political strategy that was well in 
line with the tradition of new social movements. It rejected institutional representation 
and party affiliation in favour of forming a grass-roots movement in the sphere of civil 
society. While frequently divided in regard to its strategy in the context of current 
political aflairs, concerning the long-term objective there was a unanimous agreement: 
the dominant male culture must be challenged by means of anti-institutional politics 
and by consciousness-raising among women.
The autonomous feminist movement introduced a new repertoire of direct 
political action in civil society. Since it owed its origins and support to forces outside 
of party politics; its political activism was quite different from the tradition of 
electioneering and institutional penetration, practised by political parties and the party- 
affiliated women’s organisations. Instead, the autonomous feminists endorsed 
‘disorderly politics’ as did second-wave feminism abroad.84 The principle underlying 
disorderly politics is civil disobedience. So, the autonomous feminists organised 
marches, sit-ins outside government buildings, ‘Reclaim the Night’ demonstrations 
with candles and torches, made public admissions of having illegally aborted, staged 
public exhibitions at central points in the cities, printed pamphlets publicising the names 
of rapists, gave press conferences, distributed contraceptives, etc.85
84 Cacoullos, op. cit., ref. 61.
85 500 women supporting the national campaign by the Autonomous Movement of 
Women for the legalisation of abortion signed a petition in 1983 stating that at one 
time or another they had illegally aborted. In January 1985, a district attorney 
proceeded to the legal prosecution of seven of them. Demonstrations by the 
autonomous feminists supported the defendants. Finally, the Minister of Health and 
Social Insurance gave in to the growing social pressure and withdrew the charges. See 
in Avdela, Papayannaki, Sklavenitis, op. cit., ref. 4.
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Disorderly politics centres on the organisation of unconventional forms of
political expression, thereby attracting public attention and facilitating the
dissemination of the organising actors’ ideology. The role of the mass media is
fundamental in this process. The autonomous feminists were handicapped in this
respect, however, because the media’s attitude towards them was extremely negative,
which meant constant distortion and caricaturing of activities by the groups. The
mainstream media referred to them in such derogatory terms as ugly, celibates,
86lesbians, failures, hysterical, etc. The hostility was mutual. The autonomous feminists 
often attacked the media for reproducing dangerous sexist attitudes, even in sensitive 
cases like rape, and consolidating the patriarchal ideology. All in all, no other social 
movement in Greece was ever so negatively portrayed in the mass media as the 
autonomous feminists.
The decision to engage in direct political action by the autonomous feminists 
stemmed from their belief in direct democracy, and their refusal to participate in any 
organisational structure that reproduced hierarchical relations and dominative 
practices. Although their anti-institutional stand was quite clear, the appropriate 
political strategy was often a matter of intensive debate.
In the early years of the autonomous women’s movement (the 1970s and early 
‘80s), participation in official political institutions was unanimously rejected. This 
complete rejection of official political institutions went hand in hand with the attempt 
to build a grass-roots feminist movement that would defend its autonomy from the 
male-dominated and male-centred world of politics. The strategy of the autonomous 
feminists was to mobilise civil society in order to undermine and finally overthrow the 
patriarchal order.
‘The old feminist movement had as a central aim the equality of women in the context 
of the male world, while the new feminist movement aims to liberate women, discard
86 ‘ ... The media response was a caricature of both the issues and the activism of 
women, prompting a homophobia hitherto unexpressed in Greece. Women’s demands 
were characterised by the media and in Parliament as the sexual frustration of ugly 
women and, worse, lesbian women’. Cacoullos, op. cit., ref. 61, p. 321; Chronaki, 
Zogia, ‘The need for a new feminist movement: Thoughts and agonies of a feminist’, 
Alpha, No. 1, February 1995; and ‘Rape/Press/Rape by the Press’, op. cit., ref. 16.
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87and overturn the male world’.
Since, the autonomous feminists stressed the decisive role of the private domain in the 
reproduction of patriarchy, the way to women’s liberation required the women to 
revolt against the institutions and social practices of the private sphere. Thus, the first 
target of the autonomous feminists was not to conquer the state and the political 
institutions, but to overthrow the powerful institution of the family and revolutionise 
everyday life. This attitude meant that the traditional forms of political struggle, which 
targeted the political authority, were useless for the realisation of the feminist 
objective:
‘One of the fundamental political principles of feminism is that any social change, in 
order to lead to a fundamental changeover of society must contain the transformation 
of the subjective personal relations. Politics, for us feminists, is our own life; therefore 
any logic founded on the administrational policies as a means of liberation is 
expelled’.88
There was consensus among the autonomous feminist groups concerning the limited 
capacity of administrative policies and legal reforms as a means of political 
intervention. Nevertheless, the persistence of obsolete, traditional patriarchal 
institutions in Greek society (such as the dowry system) made mobilisation for legal 
reforms imperative. While, therefore, legal reforms were considered necessary, they 
were seen as only one resource among others for the radical restructuring of relations 
between the two sexes. Moreover, legal reforms were never regarded as an end in 
themselves but simply a means for raising women’s consciousness, and mobilisations to 
that end aimed principally at publicising the autonomous feminists’ views about the 
underlying patriarchal premises of the existing legal framework. So, for instance the 
struggle for the reform of Family Law was coupled with a campaign that questioned
89the very institution of the family. The final purpose was always to generate a debate 
that would reach as many women as possible and initiate their feminist awakening.90
The promulgation by the socialist government of a number of legal reforms 
created confusion and friction among the autonomous feminists. One of the
87 ‘For our autonomy...’, Sfigga, No. 1, July 1980.
88 •‘Municipal elections’, Adesmevti Kinisi Ginaikon, 1986, p.l.
89 •  •  •Interviews with Vicky Kotsovelou, op. cit., ref. 9.
90 ‘Feminist groups discuss about feminist politics’, Dini, No. 3, July 1988.
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contradictions of the autonomous feminist movement was that it acted against the state 
and party institutions, while at the same time demanding that the state should produce 
specific legal reforms (Family Law, on abortion, rape).91 The perplexity and inertia that 
was caused by the partial satisfaction of these demands meant endless discussions
92about whether or not feminists ought to participate in the institutions. In time, two 
different reactions crystallised within the autonomous feminist movement as to what 
was the appropriate strategy.
A significant number of autonomous feminists took a totally negative stand 
towards the recent legal and institutional reforms. They argued that the socialist 
government and its women’s organisation (the EGE) had appropriated and distorted 
the autonomous feminists’ discourse in an attempt to modernise and create a new 
‘soft’ image of patriarchy. They charged that the socialist party and EGE had taken 
over the autonomous feminists’ demands and deprived them of their radical and 
confrontational dimension to make them applicable to their own goal of modernising 
patriarchy. The opposition of autonomous feminists to the new reforms was opposition 
to any institutional or legal reform as a strategical option for their movement.
‘The deductive reduction of feminism to institutional politics deprives feminism of its 
conflictual dimension. This reduction is on the expense of feminism and its
93autonomy’.
And:
‘Our intervention in the institutions for social change leads to their improvement, 
instead of leading to our liberation. It gives one more alibi to the state for its supposed 
liberalism’.94
The reforms confused a section of autonomous feminists also because they took place 
at a time when the movement was already in severe difficulties.
‘Because of the absence of a movement, it is easy to promote a technocratic political 
perception of the feminist movement and its objectives’.95
91 Varika, op. cit., ref. 1.
92 Avdela, op. cit., ref. 33.
93 Kondyli, Marianna, ‘Nostalgic Inertia’, Dim, No. 3, July 1988, p. 8.
94 ‘Classness’, Gaia, No. 2, 1984.
95 ‘A feminist claim or a process of assimilation ?’ Adesmevti Kinisi Ginaikon, April 
1989, p.3.
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In consequence, a segment of the autonomous feminists excluded from the 
movement’s strategic options the approval of any legal and institutional reforms.
Another section of the autonomous feminist movement formulated a different 
strategy appropriate for the movement. These women argued that the legal and 
institutional reforms had not been the brainchild of the existing political authorities but 
owed a very great deal to the dynamic of the feminist movement and the 
transformations in social consciousness and social relations it had brought about. The 
reforms should, therefore, be regarded as a positive victory for the feminist movement, 
instead of being denounced as the end-result of appropriation and distortion.96 
‘The approbation by the state discourse of the principle of equality between the sexes 
as a means for the democratisation and the expansion of freedom to whole society, is a 
very positive phenomenon’.97
Moreover, they pointed out that any process of appropriation functions 
simultaneously as a process of dissemination. The incorporation of feminist demands in
98the discourse of political actors should, therefore, be evaluated positively. 
Institutional structures and legal frameworks, they argued, define the everyday reality 
of women, and any movement that ignores these structures and frameworks disregards 
the actual living conditions of women in society.99 Given that any political strategy that 
excludes reforms in expectation of the moment of revolutionary change remains 
trapped in an utopian objective, intervention in political institutions should certainly be 
part of the autonomous feminist movement’s strategy - on condition that feminists 
strive for the transformation of women’s consciousness and the creation of bonds of 
women’s solidarity. This section of autonomous feminists also emphasised that 
unification of the private and the public domain can be achieved only by a strategy 
incorporating intervention on the level of the political institutions. The private/public 
dichotomy can, they said, be overcome by a strategy that combines intervention in the 
private sphere, where social identities are constructed, with intervention in the public 
sphere, where official power structures are consolidated.
96 N., P., op. cit., ref. 83.
97 *Papayannaki, Marina and Fragoudaki, Anna ‘Does our new room have a balcony 
with a view towards the cliff?’, Dini, No. 4, June 1989.
98 ‘Feminist groups discuss about feminist politics’, op. cit., ref. 90.
99 Kotsovelou, Repousi, op. cit., ref. 42.
191
Certain divisions in the autonomous feminist spectrum were generated also by 
the elaboration of specific issues. For instance, analysis of the subject of rape and sexist 
violence by the Mass Media Group gave rise to a great number of conflicting opinions. 
Was it better to take the law into one’s own hands or seek legal redress? Should one 
demand exemplary punishment of rapists or denounce the reformatory system 
altogether? etc.100 However, these divisions never led to any great clashes or ruptures. 
This can be attributed to the pluralistic culture within the autonomous feminist 
movement, the deep commitment to collectivity and autonomy, and finally the strong 
dividing line between the autonomous feminist groups and the party-affiliated women’s 
organisations.
To recapitulate: the strategy of the autonomous feminist movement focused 
above all on the formation of a collective feminist consciousness. It targeted civil 
society because it wished to create a grass-roots movement for overturning the 
patriarchal order. It adopted disorderly politics as its repertoire of action, thereby 
manifesting its extra-parliamentary and anti-institutional character. However, the 
strong anti-institutional stand of the early years was followed by debate within the 
movement of whether or not to participate in the existing political institutions. 
Nevertheless, an abiding common denominator of all autonomous feminist groups was 
the belief that women’s liberation can never be achieved through government policies. 
This ideological component decisively marked the difference between the autonomous 
feminist groups and the party-affiliated women’s organisations.
4.7 New Scenarios of Conflict
The autonomous feminist movement developed in correlation with the rapid 
modernisation of Greek society and the consolidation of state feminism.
The years 1974-‘86 were a period of intense economic development, 
institutional reforms, and legislative changes. The rapid process of modernisation led to 
the relation between the sexes being incorporated into government policy. The wide 
range of internal developments in Greek society dictated the legal revision of a number 
of obsolete institutions. Women had increased their participation in the wage economy, 
and in education and were registered as a decisive electoral force. At this time, a 
vibrant feminist mass-movement developed that targeted the state for legal reforms and
100 ‘Rape/Press/Rape by the Press’, op. cit., ref. 16.
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for socialisation of the cost of reproduction. Moreover, the process of democratic
reconstruction, after the 1974 fall of the junta, favoured democratic revisions in areas
of social life that manifested strong inequalities. Thus, the Constitution of 1975
promised the revision and amendment within the next seven years of any legislation
that violated the principle of equality between the sexes. Such internal developments
were paralleled by external pressure for legal reforms. As a member of the European
Community, Greece was obliged to comply with its directives on equal opportunities
for men and women. In addition, in 1983 Greece ratified the United Nations
convention for the elimination of all discrimination against women.101 Thus, partly in
response to the Greek women’s movement, partly to Greece’s membership in the
European Community and partly to domestic socio-economic changes, successive
•  102governments promoted a series of legal and institutional reforms. The autonomous 
feminist movement reacted to the new legal provisions for relations between the sexes 
with a discourse that dissociated gender inequalities from the process of modernisation. 
It opposed the idea that patriarchy is a characteristic of backward societies and that
103modernisation gradually erodes the conflict between the sexes. The autonomous 
feminists sought to undermine the modernising discourse by pointing out that 
modernising patriarchy does nothing to remove it. The project of women’s liberation, 
they argued, presupposed not the revision but the abolition of the existing social 
relations.
Modernisation took a new form when PASOK came to power and with the 
subsequent consolidation of state feminism As mentioned earlier (Ch.3), the legal 
reforms and the creation of a new women’s policy apparatus brought the Union of 
Greek Women and the autonomous feminists into conflict. The latter argued that while 
the new social policies may benefit some women, in the end the state was the new tool
101 Kyriazis, Nota (1995) ‘Feminism and the Status of Women in Greece’ in D. Constas 
and T. Stavrou (eds) Greece Prepares for the Twenty First Century, (Washington, 
D.C. and Baltimore, The Woodrow Wilson Centre Press and the John Hopkins
University Press).
102 Pollis, Adamantia (1992) ‘Gender and Social Change in Greece: the Role of 
Women’, in T. Kariotis (ed.) The Greek Socialist Experiment: Papandreou’s Greece 
1981-89, (New York, Pella Publishing).
103 Varika, op. cit., ref. 1.
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of maintaining women’s dependency. Moreover, they drew attention to the feet that 
welfare intervention, together with the rise of consumer capitalism, facilitated new 
forms of social regulation in social and private life. They accordingly denounced 
expansion of the state competencies as a new gender regime imposed by the state 
patriarchy, which served for the co-ordination and control of social relations right 
across society.
‘The state integrates everything and renders it part of its machinery. Through the 
labour unions, local management, political parties and youth organisations, massive 
information and controlled women’s organisations, it penetrates every area, like the 
neighbourhood, the block of flats, the individual houses, and consciousness. Therefore 
the issue of autonomy annexes an additional dimension’.104 
And:
‘...The growth of the welfare state has as a result its greater intervention in the family 
life’.105
In brief, therefore, the autonomous feminist movement developed during a 
historical conjuncture characterised by rapid modernisation. In the first stage the 
autonomous feminists endeavoured to dissociate the process of modernisation from the 
annihilation of ‘patriarchy’. In the second stage, they denounced the new gender 
regime in Greek society, and underlined that expansion of state control and social 
engineering endangered the autonomy of the life-world.
4.8 Summary
The autonomous feminist movement in Greece shared many elements with the 
second-wave feminist movement abroad. In Sommerville’s words:
‘The “second wave” feminist movement was characterised by grassroots activity, a 
loose, democratic structure and information network based on personal contacts; the 
adoption of a multi-targeted strategy to include personal life and direct action modes of 
political operation; an over-riding ideology of Utopian liberationism; the adoption of 
personalist, subjectivist and expressive forms of relating; a self-determined sexuality, 
not confined by conventional morality’.106
104 ‘Feature: Panhellenic Meeting of Women’, op. cit., ref. 25, p. 9.
105 ‘Women, Reforms and Political Change’, Gaia, No. 1, June 1983, p. 23.
106 Sommerville, Jennifer ‘Social Movement Theory, Women and the Question of
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Correspondingly, the movement developed multiple autonomous local groups with 
minimum national co-ordination, no permanent bureaucracies, and an organisation 
based on networks. In this way and within the groups everything was done to avoid the 
consolidation of hierarchical relations. The strategy of the autonomous feminist 
movement combined consciousness-raising centred on personal liberation with 
mobilisations to obtain a social arena for the discussion of the collective subject 
‘woman’. It applied ‘disorderly’ politics and adopted a personalistic, subjectivist 
language, which challenged the established traditions of male politics. In other words, 
the autonomous feminist movement had a number of features that were in accordance 
with the ideal type of new social movements. Moreover, its social base consisted of 
young urban women with a high educational profile, who also scored high on socio­
economic indicators - categories that are typical supporters of new social movements.
Another feature of the autonomous feminist groups was the introduction of 
‘identity politics’ in post-dictatorship Greece. In the definition of Taylor and Nancy 
Whitter, a collective identity consists:
‘o f three interrelated processes: the construction of group boundaries that establish 
differences between a challenging group and dominant groups; consciousness, or 
interpretative frameworks that emerge out of a challenging group’s struggle to define 
and realise its interests; and the politicisation of everyday life through the use of 
symbols and everyday actions to resist and restructure existing systems of 
domination’.107
The autonomous feminist movement embodied this theory by its collective efforts for 
social change in the realms of culture, women’s personal identity, and everyday life, as 
well as in direct engagement with the political system. It, thereby, constructed for itself 
a collective identity that included new understandings of consciousness and a new 
terminology. Although, all social movements in varying degrees create some form of 
culture, the autonomous feminists were the first and only movement in post-1974 
Greece to stress the need of cultural autonomy for the rise of a social movement. This 
focus on the significance of an autonomous alternative culture as well as on the
Interests’, Sociology, 31, 4, November 1997, p. 679.
107 •  •Taylor, Verta and Whittier, Nancy (1995) ‘Analytical Approaches to Social 
Movement Culture: The Culture of the Women’s Movement’ in H. Johnston, B. 
Klandermans (eds) Social Movements and Culture (London, UCL Press), p. 173.
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subjective, discursive dimension of collective action made the movement a generator of 
‘identity politics’ in the Greek context.
Social movements embody not only oppositional values that emerge in the 
course of their development, but also pre-existing principles and insights. They are not 
homogeneous empirical actors but always comprised of both synchronic and diachronic 
elements. The autonomous feminist movement was no exception to this. It introduced 
many innovative elements but also reproduced components of the left-wing political 
tradition specific to the Greek context. The strong influence of the Left showed very 
clearly in the movement’s adherence to a social-constructionist position concerning the 
origins of women’s attributes, and the movement’s consistent opposition to the 
essentialist view that identifies the female attributes with biological functions. This
undermined the future development in Greece of any eco-feminist theoretical
108current. Another illustration of the strong influence of the Left was the autonomous 
feminists’ unanimous belief in collectivity. Writings about new social movements 
usually associate the emergence of such movements with the fragmentation of post­
modernist societies. However, the autonomous feminist movement not only exhibited a 
strong sense of collectivity, but also formulated a holistic vision that aimed to change 
society in its entirety. Its project of women’s liberation reveals the deep roots of a 
political tradition linking oppositional political forces with the goal of totally 
reconstituting society. In consequence, the autonomous feminist movement can be seen 
as an extension of the libertarian tradition of the Left, and its life cycle was not so very 
different from that of the radical Left.
The autonomous feminist movement began to decline when its revolutionary
108 According to eco-feminism women are more likely to have an affinity with the non­
human world, due to their nurturing role, which derives from their reproductive 
abilities. This role provides women with a set of values (caring, compassion, etc.), 
which are more compatible with and conducive to identification with the natural world. 
Eco-feminism criticises and exposes the consequences and impact of the patriarchal 
culture on both women and non-human nature. Ecofeminism is in direct opposition 
with the dominant social constructionist position of the Greek feminist movement. See 
also Ch. 6; Gamer, R (1996) Environmental Politics, (London, Harvester 
Wheatsheaf); and Eckersley, R. (1992) Environmentalism and Political Theory: 
Towards an Ecocentric Approach (London, University College London).
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vision of society showed itself to be utopian. Excluded from the official political 
agenda for a radical restructuring of society the autonomous feminist movement 
became marginal, in terms of both the social-democratic hegemony and the 
opposition’s more liberal discourse. Its demise was followed by the creation of small 
democratic arenas in civil society, where individual women’s communities; alternative 
institutions (e.g. SOS-Line) or academic research programs took over where the 
autonomous feminist movement had left off.
The two case studies - the Union of Greek Women and the autonomous 
feminist groups -  represented two conflicting ideological frameworks and two sets of 
political strategy. The Union adopted ideological and organisational tools that took full 
advantage of the existing social and political order. The autonomous groups, on the 
other hand, constituted the purest form of new social movement politics in the Greek 
context. The former accomplished their integration into the political system; the latter 
remained marginal throughout their existence. The case study of the Federation of 
Ecological and Alternative Organisations, which follows, illustrates a third strategy. 
This aimed at applying new social movement ideological axioms while making the most 
of the existing political opportunity structure. This strategy was built on the experience 
of the feminist movement, but proved to be unsuccessful.
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CHAPTERS
THE GREEK ECOLOGICAL MOVEMENT: 
SOCIAL AND HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
5.1 Introduction
The analysis of the Greek ecological movement follows the same structure as that 
of the feminist movement: an account of the contextual setting and a short historical 
review are succeeded by the findings of the case study of the Federation of Ecological and 
Alternative Organisations (ch.6). First, however, we need to decide the theoretical 
implications of the word ‘ecological’. How does it differ from ‘environmental’? This work 
follows Dobson’s definition of the two terms:
‘Environmentalism argues for a managerial approach to environmental problems, 
secure in the belief that they can be solved without fundamental changes in present 
values or patterns of production and consumption, while ecologism holds that a 
sustainable and fulfilling existence presupposes radical changes in our relationship 
with the non-human natural world, and in our mode of social and political life’.1 
Environmentalism can be limited to finding methods of production and consumption that 
are in harmony with sustainable development. Ecologism on the other hand is an 
emancipatory political vision. Hence the term environmental will here be used as a broad 
category that encompasses all activities aiming at the protection of the non-human natural 
world. The term ecological, on the other hand, will denote those phases of environmental 
politics that are characterised by the elaboration of a political vision.
The section on the social background of the ecological movement considers five 
major factors that have conditioned its development: (i) the impact of socio-economic 
variables, (ii) the nature of environmental problems, (iii) the state’s administrative 
response to environmental issues, (iv) the political opportunity structure, and (v) the 
dynamic of environmental consciousness. The contextual analysis begins by looking at 
Greece’s post-war economic development and the environmental problems this has 
generated.
5.2 Rapid Economic Growth and Regional Imbalances
The environmental problems in Greece are the result of the specific course of the 
country’s post-war economic development. Greece being less industrialised than most
1 Dobson, A  (1990) Green Political Thought (London and New York, Routledge), p. 1.
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other European countries has not so far experienced severe environmental damages due to 
extensive or heavy industry. Also, Greece still has no nuclear-power plants. In the absence 
of environmental problems resulting from high levels of industrial development, the 
problems that have dominated are mainly connected with the lack of infrastructural 
modernisation and effective state regulation.2 Greek industrial establishments are mostly 
small. In 1980 establishments with fewer than 100 employees represented 70% of the 
manufacturing labour force.3 For all that, Greek factories are a significant source of 
environmental pollution, since most have old-fashioned and fuel-inefficient machinery. The 
actors contributing to the process of environmental degradation are the state, industrial 
actors and ordinary citizens, while the role of the European Community remains 
controversial.
The late industrialisation brought the consolidation of major structural weaknesses 
of the Greek economy, set up earlier in the twentieth century. The civil war was followed 
after 1949 by a burst of intensive economic development, aided significantly by 
multinational capital and funds from the Marshal Plan. The energy sector, transportation, 
mining and the traditional sectors of weaving, clothing, and beverages, as well as shipping 
and tourism, became the main areas to attract economic investments.4 In the mid-1960s 
the value of industrial production for the first time surpassed that of agriculture.5 From a 
predominantly rural society, Greece had gradually become an urban industrial one. The 
high rate of economic growth continued during the 1970s. From 1974 to 1979, the Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) went up by more than 5% per annum, approximating double the
2 Demertzis, N, (1995) ‘Greece: Greens at the periphery* in D, Richardson, C Rootes 
(eds) The Green Challenge: The Development o f Green Parties in Europe, (London and 
New York, Routledge).
3 Lavdas, K. (1997) The Europeanisation o f Greece: Interest Politics and the Crises o f 
Integration (London, Macmillan ).
4 Papaspiliopoulos, S. (1996) ‘New Organisational Formations’ in S. Papaspiliopoulos, 
Th. Papagiannis, S. Kouvelis (eds) The Environment in Greece, 1991-1996 (Athens, 
Bodosaki Foundation - in Greek), p. 94.
5 Papaspiliopoulos, ibid.
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rate of most OECD countries.6 A striking feature of this economic growth was the role of 
housing construction: in 1977 it absorbed 45% of capital investment.7 This housing boom 
resulted from increased demand generated by the mass emigration from the countryside to 
the urban centres, which was accompanied by land speculation. The high foreign demand 
for land, the insecurity in respect of other economic investments, the relative low taxation 
on property, and the lax state control over building regulations made construction one of 
the country’s main economic activities.
The post-war modernisation of the economy helped the industrial sector increase 
its share of the GDP from 22.8 to 27.8 % in the period 1960-80.® The sector was highly 
uneven, however, consisting of a few very large capitalist enterprises employing a 
significant part of wage earners, and a plethora of small, family-oriented units of low 
productivity.9 The economic growth that had begun in the 1950s was largely in small 
manufacturing and middle-range enterprises, where capital and property were much 
fragmented. This meant that the improved economic indicators concealed the structural 
weakness and imbalances of the Greek economy.10 At the same time a large number of 
economic activities flourished illegally in the black economy.
The fact that the early structural weakness of the Greek economy was never 
corrected, later constituted an impediment for the application of environmental policies. 
The internationalisation of the market put Greek enterprises on the defensive, confronting 
them with problems of survival in a highly competitive world. Greek enterprises lack 
qualified personnel and face a shortage of capital for technological innovations of the 
production process. Moreover, they have to compete with economies of scale.11 The state,
6 OECD (1983) Environmental Politics in Greece (Paris, OECD).
7 OECD, ibid
8 OECD, ibid
9 Kousis, M. (1994) ‘Environment and the State in the EU Periphery: The Case of Greece’ 
in S. Baker, K. Milton, S. Yearly (eds) Protecting the Periphery: Environmental Policy in 
Peripheral Regions of the European Union (London, Frank Cass).
10 Papaspiliopoulos, op. cit., ref. 4.
11 Lavdas, op. cit., ref. 3.
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not wishing to add to the survival difficulties of the enterprises, has become reluctant to 
introduce strict and costly environmental regulations, and has therefore assumed 
environmental costs itself. The industrialists are using the infirm industrial structure of the 
Greek economy as a strong argument against the imposition of environmental costs. This 
subject will be discussed further, in section 5.4.2 when the environmental policies of the 
Greek state are presented.
Economic growth between the 1950s and 1970s was intense and became the 
source of many environmental problems. As an OECD report notes,
‘the growth of GDP is an approximate but still relevant indicator of pressures on 
natural resources and the environment ... Moreover, industrial production in 
Greece has increased even more rapidly than GDP’.12
A major factor that contributed to environmental degradation was that industrial 
production increased mainly in sectors that were potentially heavy polluters (textiles, 
chemicals, and non-metallic minerals).13 The environmental problems created by the 
economic development were magnified by the rapid pace and concentrated pattern of 
expansion. In Greece, industrial installations and activities are strongly concentrated near 
the major cities of Athens and Salonica. In 1981, the urban industrial axis of Kalamata- 
Patras-Athens-Volos-Salonica-Alexandroupolis concentrated 76.6 % of the workforce in 
the secondary sector and 75,9 % in the service sector.14 This was the result of the 
extensive urbanisation of the post-war period. The country’s two largest urban centres are 
Athens and Salonica, but cities like Volos, Larissa, Patras and Iraldion also became 
important locations of economic activities. The most heavily populated area still remains 
the capital. In the 1960s and the ‘70s, the Greater-Athens region accounted for over 85 % 
of the country’s demographic growth.15 In 1981, it was inhabited by nearly one-third of 
the Greek population. Such a concentration of economic growth in only a few areas
12 OECD, op. cit, ref, 6, p. 11,
13 OECD, ibid
14 Pelekasi, K., Skourtos, M. ‘Air Pollution in Greece: An Overview’, Ekistics, 348 
(1991).
15 OECD, op. cit., ref. 6.
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exacerbated its negative impact on the environment. Relatively moderate amounts of 
pollution had major environmental consequences because of their concentration.
In brief, the Greek ecological movement has had to deal with a number of 
structural features that were the result of late capitalist industrialisation. The state’s weak 
extractive capabilities, the weak capital-goods sector, the dominance of small firms in 
manufacturing, the considerable role of the illegal economy and the restricted extent of the 
welfare state were the main structural features, differentiating the contextual setting of the 
Greek ecological movement from the historical framework provided by new social 
movement theory. In Greece, the ecological movement is not a factor of the transition 
from an industrial to post-industrial or advanced capitalist society, but developed in the 
context of a semi-peripheral economy. It calls in question the desirability of full-grown 
modernisation and the path to advanced capitalism.
5.3 Environmental Problems
Because of its geographical position as the meeting point of Europe, Africa, and 
the Middle East, and due to its relatively large range in terms of latitude as well as 
altitude, Greece has a very rich flora and fauna.16 Its climate and geomorphology, favour 
the existence of a large number of different ecosystems. However, the rapid and 
concentrated economic growth of the post-war years has had very harmful consequences 
for the environment. The resulting problems and their sources are outlined below.
• Atmospheric Conditions: The most serious environmental problem in Greece, and one 
that is widely publicised in the mass media, is air pollution. The grey cloud that hangs over 
Athens most days is referred to familiarly as the nefos (smog). The geographical position 
of Athens reinforces the symptom since Athens lies in a basin encircled by mountains that 
hinder the dispersal of the nefos, which is the result of repeated emission of photochemical 
smog in recent years. In the Greater-Athens area, air pollutants are generated by industrial 
sources (factories and power stations), car exhausts, and space heating equipment.17 In
16 Kiflki Foliton, Evaluation o f the Environmental Status o f Greece in 1990, Athens: 
Kinisi Politon, May 1991.
17 OECD, op. cil, ref. 6.
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1982, the Greek government declared that air pollution in the capital had reached the level 
of an environmental crisis. Measures introduced to combat air pollution have included 
restrictions on the use of private cars, control of industrial emissions, and improvements in 
central-heating systems. Most of the smog comes from the southwestern edge of the 
Athens basin (Drapetsona) and the Thriasion Plain, shipyards and refineries in 
Skaramangas, Aspropyrgos, Elefsina.18 Although air pollution is a problem that is chiefly 
associated with Athens, it has become a growing concern also in the cities of Salonica, 
Patras, Volos, Kavala and Iraklion.
• Marine Environment: The excessive use of fertilisers and pesticides in agriculture and 
industrial waste as well as domestic sewage, are the main sources of sea pollution in the 
marine environment. Intensification of cultivation methods in agriculture and the increased 
efficiency through extensive use of fertilisers and pesticides has led to a significant 
proportion of these chemicals leaching into sweet-water supplies as well as the marine 
environment. Industrial activities too have contributed much to poisoning the seas. About 
80% of the country’s industrial establishments are concentrated in coastal regions, and a 
large number of them (36%) discharge their industrial waste without any biological 
processing.19 Raw domestic sewage is also a common problem. A 1992 survey by the 
Ministry of Commercial Shipping found that 68% of 111 domestic sewage systems 
discharged their waste directly into the sea without any previous waste management.20 
Another threat for the marine environment is the transportation of petroleum products and 
toxic substances.
Environmental protection requires strong protective measures in areas of intensive 
shipping, or offshore oil and gas exploration. Tourist development too has contributed 
significantly to post-war economic growth, and in the coastal regions to the pollution of 
the marine environment.21 In some cases, it has threatened the habitats of endangered
18 Pelekasi, Skourtos, op. d t.t ref 14.
19 Karavellas, Dimitris, Paleras, Christos (1996)‘The Marine Environment’ in 
Papaspiliopoulos, Papayannis, Kouvelis, op. cit., ref. 4 and Pelekasi, Skourtos, ibid
20 Karavellas, Pateras, ibid.
21 Karavellas, Pateras, ibid.
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species (like that of the widely publicised case of the Mediterranean turtle caretta-caretta 
in Zakynthos). Damage to the marine environment can also result from stepping up its 
economic exploitation. European Community subsidies for the development of fish farms 
and the like have raised their number from 12 in 1993, to 190 in 1996. This has led to not 
only the local deterioration of the marine environment, but also to clashes between people 
economically involved in tourism and fishing.22 In general terms, the pollution of the sea is 
worse in closed-in gulfs and in the proximity of urban centres (eg. in the Saronic Gulf).
• Sweet-Water Supplies: In the course of recent years, Greece has had serious difficulties 
to meet the demand for fresh water, although it is one of the Mediterranean countries 
richest in water supply. Water shortages, together with periods of drought (especially 
1989 and 1990) alternating with floods, are an indicator that the hydrological cycle has 
been seriously disrupted.23 The demand for water comes from three types of consumer: 
from agriculture, urban and domestic needs, and industry. Of these, agriculture requires 
the most -  in 1991, irrigation was responsible for 83% of the total water consumption.24 
This is due partly to the dry climate, but has been exacerbate by the extension of the 
irrigation system due to structural funds of the European Community.
• Forest Regions: Half of Greece’s land-area is covered by forests and scrubland. The 
forestal ecosystems have the important function of maintaining the balance of the 
hydrological cycle, preventing soil erosion, contributing to climatic and atmospheric 
conditions, and preserving the biological diversity of the Greek flora and fauna as well as 
being economically productive (wood, resin, etc.). The major problems facing the forests 
come from stock farming, hunting, large infrastructural public works, and lack of an 
organised institutional framework for forest management. The biggest danger of all, 
threatening mainly in summer, is fire. Approximately 59,344 acres of woodland were
22 Karavellas, Pateras, ibid\
23 Kouvelis, S. (1996) ‘Water Supplies’ in Papaspiliopoulos, Papagiannis, Kouvelis, op. 
cit., ref. 4.
24 Beopoulos, N. (1996) ‘The Impact of Agricultural Activities’ in Papaspiliopoulos, 
Papagiannis, Kouvelis, op. cit., ref. 4
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burned down in 1991 by 1,041 separate outbreaks of fire.25 While many of the burned 
areas become scheduled for reforestation, uncontrolled stock farming and illegal building- 
constructions often destroy them altogether. Deforestation and soil erosion have become 
persistent environmental problems in Greece.26
• Environmental Pollution and Agriculture: Greece is using ever-increasing amounts of 
chemical fertilisers. This is due to the intensification of agricultural production mainly in 
the broad plains of Thessaly, in Western Macedonia, in Crete, etc., where fertiliser 
consumption is particularly high. In the mountainous regions, where there has been no 
restructuring of agricultural production, the use of fertilisers remains very much lower. 
Overall, Greece’s per-acre consumption of fertilisers and pesticides is less than the E.C. 
average,27 but enough chemical substances are released to have led to the deterioration of 
many ecosystems, such as that of Amvrakikos.28 Agricultural activities, therefore, have an 
important impact on the biodiversity of the ecosystem and affect the chances of survival of 
species in a given habitat.
• Environmental Pollution and Urbanisation: The process of the country’s urbanisation is 
characterised by regional imbalances and rapid and unregulated urban growth. One of the 
serious environmental problems associated with it is the disposal of solid waste. There are 
not enough existing inland sewage plants, and local authorities are fiercely opposed to the 
creation of new ones. Another environmental problem brought on by urbanisation is the 
unplanned encroachment of urban centres on the surrounding environment. Illegal 
housing-construction on the edge of towns and cities has endangered the surrounding
25 Gatzogiannis, S. (1996), The Country’s Forestal Resources’ in Papaspiliopoulos, 
Papagiannakis, Kouvelis, ibid.
26 Soil erosion affects more than one-third of the country and has become the main form of 
soil degradation in Greece. G. Pridham, S. Vemey, D. Konstadakopoulos, ‘Environmental 
Policy in Greece: Evolution, Structures and Process’, Environmental Politics, 4 (2), 
(1995)
27 Beopoulos, op. cit., op. cit., ref. 24.
28 Kinisi Politon, Evaluation o f the Environmental Status o f Greece in 1989 (Athens 
Kinisi Politon, March 1990).
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ecosystems. The towns and cities themselves usually suffer from a lack of spatial planning, 
and so from a reduced quality of life. In Greece, a widely used practice is ‘self-bunding’. 
Many ‘self-built’ houses are put up without permits or violating those permits. Moreover, 
they are often built on land not zoned for housing, or owned by the state, the Church, or 
other institutions.29 Environmental pollution is related also to the living patterns of the 
urban population. The country-house, frequent use of the car, the development of leisure 
activities, etc., are all putting pressure on natural resources and the environment.
• Environmental Pollution and Tourism: The Greek economy is highly dependent on the 
economic returns from tourism. In 1980, the share of international tourist receipts in the 
GDP was 4.3 %.30 Further development was often rapid and uncontrolled. In 1993, 
foreign tourists arrivals numbered 9.9 million, roughly equalling the country’s 
population.31 The prevailing type of tourism has been of the cheap package-deal variety, 
leading to the rapid construction of tourist resorts at the expense of the environment. The 
spillover effects of tourism have been many, ranging from illegal building, increased 
amounts of sewage, garbage and litter, to noise pollution and traffic congestion.32
Greek tourism policy can be divided into three phases. During the first period, the 
focus was chiefly on the expansion of services and accommodation. Then, from the early 
1980s onwards, tourism became gradually integrated into economic-development plans 
and regional policies. The late ‘80s were marked by increased international competition 
concerning the tourist market. This brought a revision of the then-current policy towards a 
better-quality tourism, and integrating into this also environmental concern.33
• Environmental Pollution and Public Works: Large infrastructural projects are another 
problematic. They often lead to the broad destruction of the natural environment, due 
mainly to the poor quality of the relevant environmental studies, and the persistence of
29 OECD, op. cit., ref. 6.
30 OECD, ibid
31 Pridham, Vemey, Konstadakopoulos, op. cit., ref. 26.
32 Pridham, Vemey, Konstadakopoulos, ibid.
33 Pridham, G. ‘Towards Sustainable Tourism in the Mediterranean? Policy and Practice in 
Italy, Spain and Greece’, Environmental Politics, vol. 8, no. 2, Summer 1999.
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clientelistic practices that undermine the process of selection and construction.34 Permits 
for public works are often the product of vested political interests, which totally ignore 
environmental considerations. Large infrastructural projects, such as the diversion of the 
Akheloos River, have often become the focus of protest by the environmental movement 
in Greece. The criticism is usually founded on inadequate studies of environmental 
consequences. In addition, large infrastructural projects are also opposed because they 
represent centralised state planning that contradicts the environmental movement’s belief 
in small-scale self-management. Moreover, investments in public works usually manifest 
the government’s higher evaluation of economic productivity than of sustainable 
development.35
• Energy Conservation: Concerning energy production, Greece is mainly dependent on 
non-renewable and imported sources of energy. Imported petroleum and domestic lignite 
remain the chief sources of energy production.36 Between 1920 and 1980, Greece’s 
energy system changed from self-sufficient to being 73% dependent on foreign sources.37 
However, the per-capita energy consumption is quite low; in 1991 it was only 60% of the 
average in the EC member states.38 A considerable amount of energy is consumed by the 
transportation sector -  43.4% of the total in 1991.39 This is an index of the huge increase 
in the number of automobiles, which almost doubled in the decade 1980-90. Energy 
consumption by the industrial sector, on the other hand, has been decreasing since 1980, 
demonstrating the general malaise in Greek industry. Concerning energy consumption
34 Papagiannis, T. (1996) ‘Introduction’ in Papaspiliopoulos, Papagiannis, Kouvelis, op. 
cit., ref. 4.
35 Large infrastructural investments need not be bound up with environmental degradation. 
For example, in Athens expansion of the metro system was necessary to reduce the high 
levels of air pollution.
36 Pelekasi, S., op. cit., ref. 14.
37 Pelekasi, S., ibid.
38 Plagianakos, P. (1996) ‘Energy’ in Papaspiliopoulos, Papagiannis, Kouvelis, op. cit., 
ref. 4.
39 Plagianakos, ibid.
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relative to the GNP, 1991 saw 50% more energy consumed for the production of one unit 
GNP, than did 1970. This demonstrates a lack of energy conservation, and shows that the 
Greek economy has not been able to disentangle energy consumption from economic 
development. Even so, attempts have been made to harness renewable sources of energy 
from the sun, wind, and waves. Research projects on solar and wind energy were set up in 
the 1970s in the Aegean islands. Hydraulic energy has been used since the 1950s, and 18% 
of the economically productive water supplies were being exploited by 1980.40 There have 
also been attempts to use geothermal power, as in the geothermal public power plant on 
Milos.
• Outside Effects: Environmental degradation of Greece’s ecosystem also results from 
certain international causes. Some very obvious influences are due to pollution in the 
neighbouring countries. For example, the reduction in the water supply by rivers from 
beyond the northern borders of Greece, pollution of the Black Sea, atmospheric pollution 
and acid rain, and the nuclear threat posed by Bulgaria’s nuclear power plants are some of 
the environmental problems that illustrate the interdependency of the natural elements.41
An overview of the nature of environmental problems in Greece suggests that, 
aside from the big industrial polluters, the social origins of environmental degradation are 
quite diffused. In some way or another a high percentage of the population produces 
pollution (e.g. through the many small family enterprises, the practice of ^ self-building’, 
and in tourist enterprises). The dispersed nature of the country’s environmental problems 
is also accentuated by the absence of nuclear-power plants, which probably would become 
the focal point of environmental protest in Greece.
Historically, the attitude to environmental problems in Greece has been variable. 
Expressed together with a variety of other political discourses, they have been interpreted 
in different ways. For example, in the early 1970s the junta regime ‘cleansed’ the 
environmental discourse from any socio-economic dimension or political elements that 
might be potentially subversive, and the problem was presented as a purely technocratic
40 Plagianakos, ibid.
41 Papaspiliopoulos, op. cit., ref. 4.
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one.42 In the late 1970s, with the restoration of democracy, the environmental discourse 
being articulated together with the ideology of the left parties transformed it into an 
ideological subject with a strong class content. The Left saw air pollution as the result of 
the government’s dependency on big capital and the unregulated and unrestricted function 
of large enterprises in the Greater-Athens area. Left-wing protests emphasised the 
environmental damage done by large companies and underplayed that of small ones that 
were potential political supporters. The Right on the other hand emphasised the significant 
contribution to air pollution caused by means of transportation (private and public), in this 
way showing the diffuse social origins of pollution and presenting environmental 
protection as an exclusively administrative issue. The state and party attitude to 
environmental problems has usually rested on a utilitarian framework within which 
environmental issues were part of the more general question of human welfare. The 
ecological movement, on the contrary, has emphasised the independent status of the 
environmental question, and criticised the perception of the non-human world as a means 
for the self-determination of the political community. Section 5.4 will review how the 
Greek state has responded to the environmental dilemma.
5.4 State Administration and the Environment
The state’s response to the augmenting environmental problems of Greece was to 
establish an institutional framework and implement certain policies that have had a marked 
influence on the country’s ecological movement. The relationship between the ecological 
movement and the state highlights the significant role of political opportunities. A 
dominant theme in social movement writings is that political opportunities are central to 
the timing and course of such movements. Systematic analysis of the political environment 
of social movements has led to the elaboration of the concept of political opportunity 
structure. As mentioned in chapter 1, this has four dimensions: (i) the degree to which 
formal political access is open or closed, (ii) the stability or instability of electoral
42 Spanou, C (1995) ‘Public Administration and Environment: The Greek Case* in M, 
Skourtos, K. Sofoulis (eds) Environmental Policy in Greece (Athens, typothito-G. 
Dardanos).
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alignments, (iii) the availability and strategic position of potential allies, and (iv) divisions 
within the elite.43 In other words, the term political opportunity structure encompasses the 
formal institutional structure, the configuration of power, and the informal procedures of 
the political system. In this section of ch. 5 the focus is on the state, on exploring how the 
state has shaped the trajectory of the Greek ecological movement by organising the 
political environment within which the movement has operated. First, a brief history of
government attempts to solve environmental problems may help us understand the 
extensive role of the state as well as its complex interaction with the ecological groups.
5.4.1 A Short History of Environmental Policy
• The Environment as a Public- Policy Issue (1945-1974)
The earliest official policies for the environment concerned only the Greater- 
Athens area. The problems experienced in the capital were studied in the 1950s, with the 
aim of making Athens a more efficient economic and administrative centre.44
Before 1962, legislation with regard to the location and function of industrial units 
did not include any environmental factors.45 Then, however, the gradual economic 
modernisation led to regulations for industrial zones imposing technical controls and 
special processes for the disposal of industrial waste. The term ‘environment’ did not 
appear as part of public policy until the early 1970s.46 Even so, by 1971 there were already 
around fifty laws, decrees, and regulations dealing with environmental protection, the 
most important among them concerning industrial waste and the protection of 
archaeological sites.
43 Tarrow, S. (1989) ‘Struggle, Politics, and Reform: Collective Action, Social 
Movements, and Cycles of Protest, Western Societies Program?’ Occasional paper no.21, 
(Ithaca, N.Y., Cornell University).
44 Stevis, D. ‘Political Ecology in the Semi-Periphery: Lessons from Greece’, 
International Journal o f Urban and Regional Research, 17, (1), 1993.
45 Spanou, op. cit., ref. 42. .
46 Stevis, op. cit., ref. 44.
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The trend of economic rationalisation initiated in the early ‘60s was reversed by 
the dictatorship in 1967. The authoritarian regime prohibited political mobilisation, and so 
greatly reduced social pressure on the government to incorporate environmental 
considerations in its public-policy making.47 However, in the 1970s professionals in the 
public administration, managed to introduce environmental considerations into the agenda 
of the politically isolated Greek administration. Environmental planning was, of course, 
cleansed from any socio-economic or political dimension that could potentially undermine 
the regime.
‘The environment was presented as an issue concerning “humankind”, a problem 
of “contemporary civilisation” that could effectively be solved by technological 
development’.48
The junta tolerated organisational initiatives concerning the environment, because this was 
a subject by means of which it hoped to win legitimation at home and abroad. It agreed, 
therefore, to admit the environment as part of the state’s competencies. In 1970, the 
Ministry of Agriculture organised a National Conference for the Protection of the 
Environment to celebrate the E.C.’s Year of the Environment. In 1971, the Ministry of 
Culture organised a similar conference, and ensured the participation of foreign 
delegations.49 The colonel’s junta also made a collaborative arrangement with the United 
Nations Development Program and the World Health Organisation concerning problems 
related to the lack of infrastructural planning and rapid increases in population growth and 
pollution. This collaboration resulted in the Environmental Pollution Control Project for 
Athens (EPCP), which was to gather data and train personnel. The state’s Centre for 
Planning and Economic Research (CPER) also began to incorporate environmental 
variables into its agenda. The main urban problems to which both the EPCP and the CPER 
addressed themselves were atmospheric pollution, noise, waste and water contamination.50
41 Spanou, op. cit,, ref. 42.
48 Spanou, ibid. pp. 121-22.
49 Spanou, ibid
50 Stevis, op. cit., ref. 44.
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In 1972, the environment was mentioned for the first time as part of the government’s 
fifteen-year plan (1970-85).
• Constitutional Provision for Environmental Protection: Founding the First 
Ministerial Body (1974 -1981)
In 1974, a democratically elected government replaced the junta, and the new 
Constitution of 1975 became one of the few in the world to include an Article on 
environmental protection.51 Article 24 of the Greek Constitution assigns the duty for the 
protection of the natural and cultural environment to the state and declares that it is the 
state’s obligation to take the necessary preventive and punitive measures to preserve the 
environment.52
In 1975, an EPCP report delineated the main deficiencies of the existing 
environmental policy of the state. It listed four essential shortages: paucity of 
environmental data, insufficient personnel, scattered administrative authority, and lack of 
comprehensive planning. Comprehensive legislation and a separate ministry or agency 
have ever since been the two chief issues in the quest for effective environmental 
management.
In 1976, Law 360 established a new, high-level Council for Environmental 
Planning, which was given overall responsibility for environmental policy, including the 
introduction and supervision of plans and programs for the protection of the natural
31 Source of reference for the Article 24 of the Greek Constitution had been the Yugoslav 
Constitution of 1974, and the Article 9 of the Italian Constitution of 1948. See 
Papadimitriou, G. (1995) ‘Environmental Constitution’ in Skourtos, Sofoulis, op. cit., ref. 
42.
52 Article 24 declares that ‘Protection of the natural and cultural environment is a state 
responsibility’. The second paragraph of the Article concerns city planning. It makes it a 
state responsibility to provide the citizens with ‘the best living standards possible’. The 
next three paragraphs (three, four and five) specify the rights and obligations of citizens 
and the government in terms of city and regional planning. Paragraph six defines as a state 
competency the protection of monuments and wilderness areas. Pelekasi, Skourtos, op. 
cit., ref. 14.
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environment.53 The Council was actually a committee at ministry-level for establishing the 
state’s environmental policy priorities.
In 1977, the EPCP began to release data regarding air pollution in the Greater- 
Athens area. One of its measures was to prohibit the use of crude oil for domestic central 
heating. The opposition criticised the government for not advancing a more radical 
policy.54
In 1979, the ministries of Labour and Industry presented a draft-law, applying 
environmental criteria to industrial activities. The parliament voted against it, on the 
grounds of the negative consequences it would have for the country’s shaky industry that 
had hardly survived the second oil crisis and the economic recession in Europe. In the late 
1970s the number of new environmental laws and decrees kept increasing, and the 
competencies of several government agencies were broadened. The most significant 
development of that period was the 1980 establishment of the Ministry of Regional 
Planning, Housing and the Environment. Law 1032/1980 established the Ministry as the 
sole responsible body for the control, development, and implementation of general 
environmental policy.55 Setting up this official body was an important step in unifying the 
dispersed environmental policies, although certain ministries retained their authority over 
specific environmental issues. The new socialist government during the 1980s pursued the 
objective of comprehensive environmental planning by a single ministerial body.
• State Administration and Ecological Movement in Close Collaboration (1981-
1985)
In 1981, the socialist party (PASOK) won the general election and remained in 
power for the next eight years. With regard to environmental policy, PASOK’s tenure was 
divided into two periods, in parallel with its two terms of office. The first period (1981 to 
1985) was marked by the government’s influential role in setting the environmental
53 OECD, op. c it, ref. 6.
54 Stevis, op. cit., ref 44.
55 Pelekasi, Skourtos, op. cit., ref. 14
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agenda.56 The second period (1985 to 1989) saw increasing discord with the ecological 
movement.
During its first three years in office, PASOK was trying to solve the major 
environmental problems of the Athens region. Soon after the elections, it introduced wide- 
ranging measures to combat air pollution in the capital. It froze the large infrastructural 
projects of the previous government and established forms of local participation in urban 
and regional planning. It set up environmental criteria for the building of new factories, 
declared itself opposed to the creation of a nuclear plant in Greece, and promoted eco- 
development and eco-tourism through the Undersecretaiy’s office of Youth.57 In 1982, the 
Athens Environment Pollution Control Programme, along with three other services, was 
merged with the Ministry for Regional Planning, Housing, and the Environment. A special 
office was set up for developing co-operation with international organisations on 
environmental issues. In 1983, the government presented a draft-law outlining the 
direction of its environmental policy, and amalgamating the various ministerial 
competencies under a new coordinative body.58 However, serious opposition by the 
industrialists and the technical ministries resulted in the draft-law being withdrawn for 
revision.
During this first period, the socialist government perceived environmental 
problems as a ‘crisis of participation’, and aimed for a more equitable distribution of 
environmental benefits (e.g. urban amenities) and hazards (such as air pollution). Its 
environmental policy included decentralisation and reinforced local participation. In fact, 
PASOK’s commitment to decentralisation and environmental protection became the 
foundation of close co-operation between the government and the ecological movement. 
Some prominent environmental activists were given government positions, while many 
urban planners were drawn into PASOK’s ambitious, countrywide urban planning
56 Stevis, op. cit., ref. 44.
57 Papadopoulos, P. (1987) ‘For a Greek Political Ecology’ in C. Orfanides (ed.) The 
Ecological Movement in Greece, (Athens, Meta te Vroche - in Greek).
58 Spanou, op. cit., ref. 42.
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project.59 The support of the socialist party by a large number of ecologists paralleled the 
political affiliation of the ecological movement with the Left. When PASOK came to 
power in 1981, left-wing forces within the ecological movement celebrated the election 
victory by expressing their strong support.
• Economic Growth versus Environmental Protection (1985-92)
PASOK gradually changed its initial focus from planned decentralisation with local 
participation to emphasising economic productivity and the need for certain large 
infrastructural projects. Already by 1983 the economic ministries had reasserted their 
dominance over the Ministry of Regional Planning, Housing, and the Environment.60 In 
1985, the government reorganised the latter by adding public works to its competencies. 
This created a conflict of interests - environment versus public works - within the new 
Ministry.
Escalating economic difficulties in the mid-1980s demanded a new economic 
policy. In 1985 the government announced a stabilisation program and began aggressively 
to procure E.C. funds for regional development and industrial investment. The 
unwillingness o f domestic and international capital to invest in the modernisation of the 
Greek infrastructure prompted the state to promote a strategy of large public works 
(urban thoroughfares, new airport, etc.).61
In 1986, after three years of reviews and negotiations, PASOK submitted its 
Environmental Policy Act to parliament62 Law 1650/1986 set out to clarify and specify 
the fundamental environmental principles that would act as guidelines for governmental 
policies. Although the law encouraged bold environmental principles and standards, it was 
criticised for its vagueness concerning the implementation of its major provisions. 
Moreover, it did not envisage the establishment of an independent agency, and it did not 
provide safeguards against the economic ministries’ ability to bypass environmental
39 PASOK’s program for its first 100 days in office included new legislation for the 
protection of the environment. Spanou, ibid.
60 Stevis, op. cit., ref. 44.
61 Stevis, ibid
62 Stevis, ibid
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regulations.63 What it did do was to specify a framework for limiting industrial pollution 
without affecting economic growth.
The socialist party’s efforts towards decentralisation at first attracted members of 
the ecological movement. In due course, however, government neglect of sustainable 
development, as well as the pursuit of a centralised command-and-control policy, 
estranged ecological activists and drove then to seek autonomous political representation.
• State Administration co-operation with Non-Governmental Environmental 
Organisations since 1992
The clash of ecologists with the state apparatus in the late 1980s was followed in 
the 1990s by the state administration co-operating with non-governmental environmental 
organisations on strictly defined environmental issues. Many of these organisations 
originated in the late 1970s, but their role became vital only in the course of the 1990s. 
Their extensive technical knowledge, financial resources, and international networks 
prompted the government to ask for their collaboration. This has taken the form of co­
management of the European Community’s ACE program, concerning habitat and the 
protection of the Mountain Pindos’ ecosystem.64 Another example is the Greek Centre of 
Habitats and Wetlands (Elliniko Kentro Viotopon-Ygrotopon) acting as an advisor to the 
Ministry of Agriculture.65 Co-operation has been facilitated by both sides concentrating on 
techno-scientific specialisation and underplaying the political dimension of ecological 
issues.
To recapitulate: the state’s environmental policy has varied with the political forces 
in power. Overall, however the formerly fragmented and ad hoc institutional and legal 
arrangements concerning environmental management have increasingly been consolidated 
and strengthened.66 Certain administrative and decision-making aspects were held is 
common by all governments since 1945. These are:
63 Stevis, ibid
64 Spanou, op. cit., ref. 42.
65 Papaspiliopoulos, op. cit., ref. 4.
66 OECD, op. cit., ref. 6.
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i) Centralisation: The centralised nature of the Greek administration has been an 
important impediment for the development of a successful environmental policy, and 
curbed the creation of a strong network of peripheral environmental services.67 Only in 
1990 did a ministerial decision (84498/2579/13 Dec. 1990) counteract this tendency by 
creating environmental offices at the level of prefectures.
ii) Fragmentation: The centralised structure of the Greek administration did not 
lead to comprehensive environmental planning which, compared to other Southern 
European countries (Spain and Italy), is the most fragmented, since the Ministry of 
Environmental Planning and Public Works, has only a veiy limited power. Important 
environmental functions are held by other ministries: the Ministry of Merchant Marine is 
responsible for the marine environment; the Ministry of Health for monitoring the 
pollution of sea water and for classifying beaches; the Ministry of Agriculture for forests 
and rivers; and the Ministry of Transport for car emissions.68
iii) The symbolic nature o f resolutions: The symbolic nature of the environmental 
resolutions is illustrated by Presidential Decree 1180/1981, the European Community’s 
Directive 85/337, and the Environmental Policy Act 1650/1986.69 They all demand 
environmental studies for certain categories of public or private works likely to endanger 
the environment, none of which were undertaken in Greece, until in 1990 the country was 
threatened with trial at the European Court of Justice for not complying with the 
European Directives.70
iv) The reactive nature o f policies: In Greece environmental policies are 
predominantly reactive.71 Proactive policies require planning and monitoring mechanisms, 
efficient data collection, regular environmental information, and the availability of expert
61 Spanou, op. d t.f ref. 42
68 Pridham, G. ‘National Environmental Policy-Making in the European Framework: 
Spain, Greece and Italy in Comparison’, Regional Politics and Policy, 4(1), Spring 1994.
69 Spanou, op. cit., ref. 42.
70 Spanou, ibid.
71 Spanou, ibid.
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services.72 In these areas Southern European countries are at a decisive disadvantage 
compared with Northern Europe.
The crucial question is not, however, the availability of policy facilities, but the 
capacity for environmental adaptation. The state’s unwillingness to establish strict 
environmental criteria for the private sector is due in part to its weak infrastructural ability 
capacity to mobilise financial resources.
5.4.2 Environmental Policy and Economic Surplus
‘Having a strong and vibrant economy feeding off increasing productivity and 
international trade advantages is a major source of infrastructural power’.73 In other 
words, the most significant factor when analysing state regulation of environmental 
problems is the absence of funds to finance a serious anti-pollution policy or corrective, 
even in the context of the existing system. Since the early 1960s, the Greek state has 
attempted to offset the structural weakness of the Greek economy by providing economic 
incentives such as low-interest loans, subsidies, and tax allowances.74 It was the imperative 
of economic growth and business survivability that led to Parliament’s repeated 
unwillingness to pass legislation on environmental pollution control (e.g. in 1979, 1983).75 
The reason given was uneasiness about the ability of economic enterprises to survive in a 
highly internationalised and competitive world. Whereas in countries of the capitalist 
centre the environmental costs are assumed by the producers, in Greece it is the state that 
must meet the bulk of them so as to assure business survival. The state has, indeed, played 
a crucial role in directly promoting environmental projects.
‘During both the 1970s and 1980s, national development plans included state 
environment rehabilitation projects founded through the government’s Public
11 Pridham, op. cit., Ref. 68.
73 Jenkins, C. (1995) ‘Social Movements, Political Representation and the State: An 
Agenda and Comparative Framework’ in C Jenkins and B. Klandermans, (eds) The 
Politics o f Social Protest, (London, University College of London), p. 23.
74 Kousis, op. cit., ref. 9.
73 Kousis, ibid.
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Investment Programme (PIP)... those projects literally placed the burden of 
environmental protection on the state rather than the private sector’.76 
The large role of the state in paying the environmental bill of the productive 
process has made it a major target of criticism by the ecological movement. This 
dissatisfaction has its origins not only in the state’s substantial involvement in the 
economy, but is due also to state control of political resources. The acute centralisation of 
power and decision-making in Greece stems from a tradition of intensive state interference 
in the political and social life. The strategic dilemmas the Greek ecological movement has 
had to face in its relation with the state apparatus are not dissimilar to the political 
problems of new social movements in Latin America. The central importance of the state 
in Latin American society as the dispenser of scarce resources has forced social 
movements there to develop a certain strategic approach to the state.77 The greatly 
asymmetrical relation between the state and civil society in Greece has likewise influenced 
the overall trajectory of the ecological movement. Another factor has been the dynamic of 
the Greek party system.
5.5 The State versus Civil Society
Theorists locate the emergence of social movements within the realms of civil 
society, the institutions of which they aim to repoliticise by introducing into the political 
agenda issues previously regarded as predominantly private.78 New social movements are 
primarily interested in public-oriented education, not in lobbying elites or making political 
deals. Their anti-state position is a distinctive element of their identity. While the 
contextual setting of new social movements is therefore assumed to be a dense and
76Kou§is, ibid. p. 127.
77 Foweraker, J. (1995) Theorising Social Movements (London and Colorado, Pluto 
Press).
78 Offe, C. ‘New Social Movements: Challenging the Boundaries of Institutional Politics’, 
Social Research, 52 (4), Winter 198; Cohen, J. ‘Strategy or Identity: New Theoretical 
Paradigms and Contemporary Social Movements’, Social Research, ibid; Habermas, J. 
‘New Social Movements’, Telos, 49, Fall 1981.
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communicative civil society, the strong statocratic elements of Greek society have (as 
mentioned in the analysis of the feminist movement) constituted a major impediment for 
their autonomous development.79
The weakness of the country’s civil society is demonstrated not only by the course 
the labour and feminist movement have taken, but also by that of the peace movement. In 
many Western European countries the peace movement has been a staunch ally of the 
ecological one (e.g. in former West Germany, the Netherlands), whereas in Greece the 
peace movement was afflicted with state repression and party dependency.80 Its origins go 
back to the 1950s, when the first peace organisation, the ‘Greek Committee for 
International Detente and Peace’ (Elliniki Epitropi gia ti Diethni Yfesi ke tin Irini - 
EEDYE) was established (15 May 1955). It became a mass movement only after 1963, 
when it collaborated closely with the student movement. Both of them organised big 
rallies (Marathon Marches of Peace), questioning post-war political settlement and 
protesting against the political repression of the Left and the labour movement. The junta 
of 1967 put a decisive end to these mobilisations. The return to democracy in 1974 saw 
the establishment of three different peace organisations, affiliated respectively with the 
three largest political parties of the post-junta Left (PASOK, the Communist Party, thee 
Communist Party of the Interior).81 The peace movement, therefore, has not been 
dissimilar to the feminist movement in the sense that its trajectory was closely associated 
with the political parties of the Left. In addition, it was likewise committed to safeguard 
political democracy and was opposed to the capitalist mode of production.
For civil society in Greece, the post-war period meant a closed political system 
that paid little if any attention to civil rights or a social contract. The prevailing tradition of 
clientelistic politics favoured the extra-institutional mediation of collective interests on a
79 Foweraker, op. cit, ref. 77
80 Richardson, Rootes, op. cit., ref. 2.
81 Floros, G. ‘From terrorism and court martial to the rallies for peace’, Anti, No. 186, 11 
Sept. 1981; Papoutsanis, G. ‘The Peace Movement Nowadays: Splitting or Many- 
Voiced?’, Anti ibid.
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personalistic basis and so inhibited the development of both collective action and civil 
society.
Although after the fall of the junta a democratic regime with a pluralistic party 
system safeguarded government accountability, in the absence of a strong civil society 
state corporatism persisted and so did the limited autonomy of the state bureaucracy and 
the judiciary vis-a-vis the executive power. Collective interests were mediated by the state 
and inter-party competition, leaving no space for independent representation. This meant 
that the party-dependent feminist and the peace movement, as well as the state-colonised 
labour movement, could not become political allies of the ecological movement. The 
strategic approach of the ecologists towards the strong asymmetrical relation between 
state and civil society was to orientate themselves towards institutionalisation: 
transforming themselves into a political party gave them formal access to the state. Even 
so, the openness of the Greek state to political challenges being limited; the ecological 
movement has not found it easy to overcome the barriers in its way.
According to Kriesi, the degree of formal access to the state is a function of its 
(territorial) centralisation; the degree of separation between the executive, the legislature, 
and the judiciary; the coherence of the public administration; and the degree to which 
direct democratic procedures are institutionalised.82 The Greek state is territorially 
centralised and leaves few access points on either the regional or the local level.83 It is a 
system with an all-powerful executive, greatly delimiting formal access. However, its 
administration is fragmented and it lacks internal coordination, both of which 
characteristics are illustrated by the competing competencies of several ministries in regard 
of environmental policy. Concerning direct democratic procedures, the Greek state has no 
established tradition of popular initiatives or referendums. All of which is to say that, with 
the formal openness of the Greek state being restricted, the informal procedures and 
strategies of political challengers have traditionally been met with policies of exclusion and
82 Kriesi, H, (1995) ‘The Political Opportunity Structure of New Social Movements: Its 
Impact on their Mobilisation’ in Jenkins, Klandermans, op. cit., ref. 73.
83 The analysis refers to the period until 1993. In 1993 major changes towards 
decentralisation, affected many aspects of the Greek administration.
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repression. This practice was aimed above all at the exclusion from power of the 
communist Left. Given, however, that the ecological movement developed chiefly during 
PASOK’s terms in office, the early 1980s saw government strategies that resulted in co­
operation with the ecological movement.
The ecological orientation towards the state was influenced not only by the 
strongly asymmetrical relation between civil society and state, but also by the 
configuration of power in the party system. As already mentioned, the Greek political 
parties capitalised on the feebleness of civil society and became the exclusive centres of 
power.84 In that sense the Greek party system has manifested a seamless structural 
continuity with the past that left no room for the development of an alternative political 
pole. This safe reproduction of the party system resulted from the low volatility of votes, 
the limited choices of political alliances, and the polarised nature of the party system.
In the late 1980s, however, the Greek party system experienced a serious political 
crisis when its main features were openly being questioned, and this was the moment of a 
positive political conjuncture for the ecological movement. After 1986, the political 
opportunity structure was increasingly positive. The earlier attempts by PASOK and the 
communist parties to co-opt segments of the environmental movement had proven 
unsuccessful in the long run.85 Then, in 1988, PASOK’s involvement in a series of 
financial scandals entangled the party in a severe political crisis, and the Koscotas scandal 
led to widespread disapproval of the parliamentaxy political parties. Meanwhile the 
Communist Party of the Interior had split into two (1987). The smaller section was 
renamed Communist Party of the Interior-Renovative Left (Kommounistiko Komma- 
esoterikou -  AA), while the larger part the Greek Left (Elliniki Aristera — EAR). In 1989 
the Greek Left and the Communist Party decided to collaborate so as to provide a political 
answer to the augmenting crisis of the political system. The Coalition (Synaspismos - 
SYN) was short-lived. In 1991 they split apart again, reinforcing the public feeling of a
84 Demertzis, N, (1994) ‘Introduction to Greek Political Culture: Research and 
Theoretical Issues’ in Nicos Demertzis (ed.) The Greek Political Culture Nowadays, 
(Athens, Odysseus - in Greek)
85 Stevis, op. cit., ref. 44
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political impasse. During the period 1989-90 there were three national elections - a vivid 
illustration of the emergency. In 1989, the New Democracy (conservative party) and the 
Coalition, consisting of the united communist Left (SYN), decided to collaborate for the 
judicial persecution of the protagonists in the Koscotas scandal. Co-operation between 
these two political camps was so alien to the fundamental character of the Greek party 
system that it negated the Right/anti-Right cleavage and bipolar dynamic. It estranged a 
segment of supporters of the communist Left, so creating a political vacuum. This highly 
volatile situation was certain to make a lot of voters change allegiance. At the same time 
the political climate was finally conducive to the arrival of new political formations.
The crisis in parliamentary politics and the search for new political actors is 
illustrated by the findings of an enquiry conducted by the National Centre for Social 
Research, which investigated the political culture and electoral behaviour during the 
period 1988-90.86 It showed that in 1985 the Greeks had been generally more positively 
predisposed towards politicians and official power holders than citizens of other Southern 
European countries, but in the period 1988-90 they became disappointed with politicians, 
whom they now saw as serving chiefly their own personal interests. Nevertheless, political 
alienation did not mean a decrease in political interest. This remained on the same 
relatively high level, revealing a discord between involved citizens and their representation 
by the established political institutions. In the late 1980s, Greeks presented the same 
degree of political alienation from the established political parties as did Italian and 
Spanish citizens.87 Their normally high interest in politics now took the form of a search 
for new carriers of political representation. This political conjuncture brought discussions 
among ecologists about participating in the elections.88 PASOK added to these positive 
conditions by making certain changes in the electoral law that unexpectedly provided the 
ecologists with parliamentary representation (in 1989 and 1990).89 Hoping that the general
86 Kafetzis, P. ‘Political Crisis and Political Culture’ in Demertzis, op. c i t ref, S4.
87 Kafetzis, ibid
88 Nikolopoulos, P. ‘Social Dynamic and Electoral Processes’, New Ecology, 53, March 
1989.
89 Stevis, op. cit., ref. 44.
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political discontent would be transformed into political support for them, the ecological 
movement had formed a new party, the Federation of Ecological and Alternative 
Organisations (Omospondia Ikologikon kai Enallaktikon Organoseon - FEAO). Despite 
everything, the Greek party system continued to demonstrate a strong structural continuity 
with the past, belying thereby the high hopes of the ecologists. This is discussed in greater 
detail in chapter 6, which presents the trajectory of the FEAO.
The ecological movement’s political project was enhanced by a series of political 
alliances. Given that many of the ecological supporters came from the Left, the movement 
first approached the parliamentary Left. As mentioned earlier, the socialist party initially 
absorbed some of these anti-Right elements. The ecologists also approached professionals 
and intellectuals of the Euro-Communist left (Communist Party of the Interior), which was 
open to political alliances with social movements.90 (Its feminist branch Movement of 
Democratic Women (KDG) played a significant role in the Greek feminist movement). 
The reconstituted Greek Left (EAR) continued in the tradition of social movement politics 
and willingly formed an environmental sectioa However, in 1989 the co-operation of 
EAR with the Communist Party of the Exterior caused many ecologists to break away. 
The smaller Communist Party of the Interior- Renovative Left (KKE-es. -  AA) then 
embraced the principles of social ecology and became a steady political ally to the 
ecological federation.91
Although the ecologists shared with all these parties a common belief in a socialist- 
humanist discourse, there were also strong political differences between them. These 
concerned issues such as the autonomy of civil society, direct democracy, and the role of 
the state. The anti-institutional stand of a section of the ecological movement, its strong 
belief in participatory practices, and the anti-developmental aspect of the ecological 
viewpoint resulted in the ecologists approaching alternative groups as well as the extra- 
parliamentary Left. This would not have been possible without the prior radical 
restructuring of the radical Left and the development of an alternative spectrum - two 
interrelated processes both originating in the post-junta revolutionary Left.
90 Stevis, ibid\
91 Stevis, ibid.
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The fall of the junta straightaway brought an initial flourishing of organisations of 
the revolutionary Left: Maoists, Trotskyites, Marxist-Leninists, Stalinists, supporters of 
the Albanian socialist regime, Anarchists, anti-authoritarians, etc. They were organised in 
small groups and supported primarily by students and labour unions. This expansion of the 
radical Left was partly due to the radicalisation after the end of the dictatorship, when 
legalisation of the Communist Party (in 1974) and the gradual consolidation of the 
parliamentary regime resulted in its step-by-step transformation.
‘A process started, where the Maoist organisations started dissolving, the 
Trotskyite barely survived and the Communist Parties witnessed many departures. 
All these changes led to the formation of a new political space that was self­
defined as the ‘anentahtoi’ (non-allied).92 
Supporters of this new political spectrum, who rejected both social democracy and the 
‘socialism’ of Eastern Europe and China, shared three political viewpoints: they were anti­
capitalist, anti-developmental, and anti-authoritarian.93 Some of these forces established 
new political formations (e.g. Rupture - RIX1), while others allied themselves with the 
alternative groups.
The ideological agenda of the alternative spectrum was clearly anti-industrialist 
and anti-capitalist. However, the groups differed ideologically from the extra- 
parliamentaiy leftists by denouncing the primacy of the economic sphere and admitting no 
reference to a future revolution for overturning capitalist society. Instead, they focused on 
the social level and argued in favour of immediate action in everyday life. They underlined 
the omnipresent intrusion of the state and capitalist society, and the consequent need to 
redirect politics towards the personal and social level. In brief, the alternative groups 
focused primarily on redefining social needs and everyday social practices. They argued 
that a liberated society could be realised only by the self-mobilisation of citizens on the 
level of everyday social practice.
92 Rapt is, M (19S5) ‘Alternative Movements in Europe’ in M Raptis, Giorgos Karabelias, 
N. Chrysogelos (eds) An Alternative-Revolutionary Movement (Athens, Alternative 
Publications Commune - in Greek).
93 Raptis, ibid.
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The alternative movement consisted entirely of social critics: anti-authoritarians, 
supporters of non-violence, feminist groups, supporters of alternative lifestyles, naturalists, 
alternative medicine groups, organisations for the alteration of the Penal Code and prisons, 
groups for the rights of the mentally ill, organisations against the military, homosexual 
groups, organisations concerned with drug abuse, groups against sexual abuse, 
organisations for the rights of immigrants and political refugees, etc. To sum up: 
supporters of alternative ethos struggled: (i) for the political rights of groups oppressed by 
the prevailing liberal political regime (e.g. conscientious objectors, soldiers, prisoners), 
and (ii) the rights of minorities socially and economically excluded or marginalized (drug 
abusers, the elderly, homosexuals, ethnic minorities, etc.). Thus, all alternative groups 
demanded specific rights, and at the same time criticised the existing societal organisation 
in all its manifestations.54 In 1984, a series of meetings began among the alternative groups 
to construct a broader alliance. Ecological organisations participated at those meetings, 
thereby initiating a closer collaboration of the Greens and the Alternatives.
With regard to the extra-parliamentary Left, the growing crisis of Marxism in the 
1980s made many Marxists rethink their anti-capitalist stand. This transformation process 
is best illustrated by the political writing of Giorgos Karabelias, a leading activist in the 
extra-parliamentary forces and a co-founder of the Federation of Ecological and 
Alternative organisations. His political argumentation carries weight, since he became the 
main representative of the radical Left within the Federation. He argued that the forces of 
the revolutionary and extra-parliamentary Left should be changed because the nature of 
capitalism had changed. The new phase of capitalism, Karabelias argued, had radically 
reduced the industrial working class. The working class was now to be found more and 
more outside the factory, and surplus value was being extracted from all of society. All of 
society had become the locus of class confrontation, and the factory had lost its centrality:
94 ‘A week of liberational alternative movements’, Ecological Newspaper, No. 11, 
February-March 1984; ‘An Alternative Week’, Rupture, No. 14, Feb. 1984; I. E., 
‘Alternative Meeting 1985’, New Ecology, No. 13, Nov. 1985; G. M., ‘Alternative’, 
Ecotopia, No. 8, April 1990; Voiklis, G. (1992) Ecologism (Athens, Alternative 
Publications - in Greek).
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society as a whole had become a social factory.95 This transformation, according to 
Karabelias, has led to the formation of a new revolutionary subject, namely the ‘social 
labourer’. The new revolutionary subject consists of new social strata (women, youth, 
immigrants, soldiers, etc.), all of whom are exploited in the process of production and 
reproduction of capital.96
The ecological movement, Karabelias argues, became part of the new 
revolutionary subject from the moment capital began to destroy nature.97 The ecological 
discourse, because of its cross-class and universal nature, makes it possible to unify the 
diverse alternative movements. He thought that to focus on the ecological discourse was a 
very clever political move of the alternative movements in Western Europe, because it 
made their unification feasible.98 However, he did not want to see the Green movement 
reduced to matters of ecology:
‘We demand not only an ecological viable society, but also a society of autonomy, 
that lacks exploitation and domination ... An ecologically viable society cannot 
specify the nature of the existing social regime, the type of distribution, gender 
relations, not even the technology of the society. The ecological perspective 
cannot be sufficient. This is also valid for the feminist movement’.99 
While, therefore, a good part of the extra-parliamentary Left proceeded to adjust its anti­
capitalist stand, it retained its belief in the class structure of contemporary capitalist 
societies. It considered new social subjects (women, immigrants, homosexuals, etc.) as 
part of the exploited classes. The industrial working class having ceased to be the sole 
symbol of capitalist exploitation, certain forces of the extra-parliamentary Left approached 
the new social movements with proposals for a political alliance. However, the ecological 
discourse was perceived as too limited for founding a political project, and more as the
95 Karabelias, G ‘Beyond Socialism’ in Raptis, Karabelias, Chrysogelos, op. c it, ref. 92.
96 Karabelias, ibid.
97 Karabelias; ibid
98 Karabelias, G. ‘Green-Alternative Politics in an Altering World’, Rupture, 39, January 
1991.
99 Karabelias, ibid., p.8
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necessary means to achieve a unification of the extra-parliamentary leftist and alternative 
groups.
The second radical restructuring of the extra-parliamentary Left concerned the 
means for fulfilling its political objectives. A growing number of activists had become 
sceptical about the marginalisation of the revolutionary Left. The anti-parliamentary 
character of all the post-junta movements had conduced to a severe political impasse, 
which in turn led to two significant changes: rejection of any armed seizure of power, and 
belief in the priority of society’s self-education in terms of self-management and direct 
democracy.100 Part of the extra-parliamentary Left now turned towards the established 
political institutions. Karabelias stated in one of his articles:
‘...we believe that an alternative political strategy, on the condition that no 
antidemocratic restrictions exist, includes political participation in parliament, 
municipalities, etc., even in government. Participation in politics means 
participation in any possible version of politics. We would obviously desire to win 
the majority of votes in order to apply our programme’.101 
These changes made it possible for the radical Left to collaborate with the ecological 
movement. As a result of this, the majority of the ecological movement, together with 
forces of the extra-parliamentary Left and alternative groups, agreed to form a new 
political party, the Federation of Ecological and Alternative Organisations (FEAO). Social 
movements are largely the products of their immediate political environment, and 
influenced by the alliances they form in the bid for power. The co-operation of the Greek 
ecological movement with a segment of the radical Left and alternative groups resulted in 
the articulation of a rather homocentric ecological discourse influenced by the traditions of 
communism and anarchy.
By way of summarising, we may say that the enduring features of the Greek party 
system (limited but polarised pluralism) markedly reduced the ecological movement’s 
chances of finding allies within the party system. The stable domination of the political
100 Kastrinakis, M, ‘Ecology and Authority*, Ecotopia, No. 2, June 1989,
101 Karabelias, G. ‘The volcano cannot be tackled with exorcisms’, Rupture, 39, January 
1991,
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scene by three established camps militated against competition from outside challengers. 
Given the lack of potential allies, the Greek ecologists turned to the extra-parliamentary 
Left and the alternative organisations. The ecological movement had only a limited 
capacity for political autonomy, but it pursued a strategy of independence, by taking 
advantage of the changes in the political opportunity structure during the late 1980s.
5.6 Environmental Consciousness
Publications on environmental consciousness in Greece repeatedly stress the 
absence of well-developed environmental consciousness.102 This has been a strong factor 
inhibiting the development of an effective ecological movement. The following section is 
going to look at the various influences on the Greek environmental consciousness.
5.6.1 The Middle Strata and Collective Identity Building
The limited political appeal of the environmental discourse is often associated with 
the marked individualism due to the inflated role of the middle strata in Greek society. The 
country has always had a large petit-bourgeois stratum composed chiefly of artisans, 
shopkeepers, civil servants, and small landowners.103 The post-war development further 
added to these social middle layers, whose mentality is recognised in the relevant literature 
as strongly self-centred and state-oriented.104 The weakness of civil society and the 
domination of personalistic, clientelistic practices have fostered this individualism, and 
made the articulation of a collective consciousness very difficult. Moreover, rapid upward 
social mobility has meant higher expectations as well as a sense of relative deprivation,
m  Katsoulis, I ‘What hinders the development of an ecological consciousness?’, 
Ecological Newspaper, No. 14, Dec. 1984-Jan. 1985; Demertzis, op. cit., ref. 2.
103 Diamantouros, N. (1991) ‘PASOK and State - Society Relations in Post-Authoritarian 
Greece (1974-1988)’ in Spyros Vryonis (ed) Greece on the Road to Democracy: From 
the Junta to PASOK, (New York, Aristide D. Caratzas).
104 Demertzis, op. cit., ref. 2.
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which have been expressed through a rush of consumerism and material greed. In such 
circumstances environmental protection is unlikely to rank high in the public interest.105
I would object that this view of the new middle strata as associated with self­
centredness and consumerism is too generalised and obscures other significant elements of 
Greek society. First, political support for environmental issues derives precisely from the 
new middle classes. Young people of good educational background, mainly professionals 
belonging to the new middle classes, compose the majority of Green voters.106 Statistical 
data of the social strata that exhibit high levels of environmental consciousness will be 
given later (section 5.6.3). The role of the new middle classes should not, therefore, be 
identified in such wholesale fashion with clientelistic/personalistic politics. Besides, there 
was considerable collective consciousness building in the post-war period. The growth of 
the labour and student movements was based on strong collective identities. Both these 
movements expressed forceful anti-systemic sentiments that could not have been sustained 
without the crystallisation of collective identities. They, as well as the political parties of 
the Left, were guided by grand-narratives irreducible to any individualistic cost-benefit 
analysis. Emphasis on middle strata individualism cannot explain the polarisation of the 
Greek party system or the high incidence of political mobilisations.
The greatest obstacle the Greek ecological movement had to face was not diffused 
individualism or the lack of collective consciousness, but the strong identification of 
politics with political parties. Since politics and the public sphere were party-dominated, 
the ecological movement had to redefine the boundaries of politics. It had the dual task of 
convincing the people that its discourse was political, and establishing an autonomous 
political arena where collective interest representation would not be mediated by inter­
party competition. In brief, the low environmental consciousness in Greece is not due to 
the lack of strong collective identities, but to the lack of a tradition of independent social 
movements that allow collective identities to be formed independently of party influences.
105 Demertzis, ibid.
106 Spanou, op. cit., ref. 42.
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5,6*2 Post-War Ideology
At the end of World War II the country was still economically backward. Native 
industry was almost non-existent, and agriculture remained underdeveloped. Within this 
historical context, economic development was considered as highly desirable by both the 
governing conservatives, and the opposition Left.107 The successive governments 
envisaged a development that would sooner or later catch up with the advanced capitalist 
societies of the West. This goal also functioned as a means for legitimising the pre-junta 
authoritarian conservative regime, and the official political discourse tried to offset its 
political repression and exclusion by the promise of future prosperity. The role of the 
Marshal Plan was decisive in supporting this economic project.108 The concept of 
development was entirely positive, therefore, and its limits, or the fact that political forces 
were guiding this process, were never discussed; it has been defined as modernisation from 
above without popular participation.109
The Left, without questioning the positive character of development, nevertheless 
criticised the social impact of the government policies on the growing income 
differentiation, tax inequalities, unemployment, etc. Even so, it saw development as the 
solution to the country’s problems such as emigration, economic dependency, foreign 
intervention, deficiency of social and political institutions, etc.110 The Left projected 
unrestricted development of the productive forces as the goal to be desired, and only 
questioned the composition of the political forces leading this process. Focusing their 
criticism on the capitalist mode of development, they ignored the consequences of 
economic expansion. Also, while the Left campaigned against the role of multi-nationals 
and the danger of monopolies, nothing was said about the increasing consumerism of the 
Greek people.111 Quite the contrary: the Left supported many popular demands,
167 Louloudes, Leonidas, ‘Social Demands: From Environmental Protection to Political 
Ecology’, in Orfanides, op. cit., ref. 57.
108 Louloudes; ibid
109 Louloudes, ibid.
110 Louloudes, ibid
111 Louloudes, ibid
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predominantly consumerist, as socially or economically legitimate.112 In other words, both 
the political Right and the Left supported economic development. The former endorsed 
economic growth by private initiative, while the latter argued for economic growth as part 
of socialising the means of production. The post-war ideological climate was not 
conducive to creating an environmental awareness, given that the discourse of the political 
forces was highly homocentric. If considered at all, the environment was perceived as 
merely useful to human pursuits, and issues of resource conservation or environmental 
quality were never given a thought.
5.6.3 Other Factors
One factor inhibiting the rise of environmental consciousness in Greece has been 
the absence of a tradition of environmentalism. Since economic development was never 
seen as a threat to the environment, awareness of such matters prior to the existence of an 
ecological movement was restricted to a few intellectuals, nature lovers, and cultural 
societies.113 There was nothing, on which an ecological movement could be built, which 
distinguished the Greek case from most European countries, where naturalist 
environmentalism preceded and has even been much larger than the ecological
114movement.
While environmental consciousness has been generally low in Greece, it has 
fluctuated significantly depending on external influences. For instance, in 1986 the 
accident at Chernobyl increased impressively public awareness of environmental 
problems.115 The 1989 crisis in the Greek party system too led to increased support for 
the environmental movement. Public interest rose rapidly, the mass media published 
articles on environmental issues, and the circulation of environmental magazines rose by 
30- 40%.116 There are no academic studies providing data concerning the general level of
112 Fapadopoulos, op. cit, ref. 57.
113 Louloudes, op. cit., ref. 107.
114 Stevis, op. cit., ref. 44.
115 Editorial, New Ecology, No. 23, 1986.
116 Fapaioannou, D. ‘Let the Amphitheatres Bloom Again’, New Ecology, No. 42,1988.
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environmental consciousness in Greek society; information is available only from 
Eurobarometer and individual research by environmental magazines or organisations.
For Greece, the Eurobarometer (EB) survey series starts in 1980.117 The strongest 
conclusion drawn from the data is the slight score variation for the same problem in 
different countries, Greece included.118 This is confirmed in 1988 in terms of such 
questions as the environment, unemployment, price stability, arms limitation, agricultural 
surplus, the fight against poverty, aid to third-world countries, protecting national 
security, fighting terrorism and crime, etc.119 In other words, the EB sees no large gap 
between environmental consciousness in Greece and in other E.C. states.
Comparing the Eurobarometer of 1981 and 1983 shows strong opposition in 
Greece to the development of nuclear energy.120 In the 1981 survey, 28% of the 
respondents disagreed strongly with developing nuclear energy to meet future energy 
needs; in 1983 the percentage had risen to 37%. The strongest opposition to nuclear 
energy came from Denmark, where 40% of the respondents opposed it in 1983.121 In the 
1987 survey, 65% of respondents in Greece regarded the risks involved in building 
nuclear-power stations unacceptable — more than in Germany (51%), France (41%), or the 
United Kingdom (41%).122
Concerning environmental protection generally, Greek respondents usually regard 
unemployment and rising prices as more serious. In the 1983 E.B. unemployment ranked 
as the problem of highest importance with the environment second.123 The 1986 E.B. 
listed unemployment and inflation as the most urgent problems that should be debated in
117 Scarbrough, E, (1995) ‘Materialist-Fostmaterialist Value Orientations’ in i Van Beth, 
E. Scarbrough (eds) The Impact o f Values (London, Oxford University Press). 
111 Eurobarometer, No. 20, December 1983, p. 41
119 Eurobarometer, No.30, December 1988.
120 Eurobarometer, No. 19, June 1983.
121 Eurobarometer, No. 19, June 1983.
122 Eurobarometer, No.28, December 1987.
123 Eurobarometer, No .20, December 1983.
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the European Parliament; the environment ranked fifth.124 In the 1988 E.B., Greek 
respondents overwhelmingly gave unemployment as the foremost problem (95%), 
followed by price stability (90%), and with the environment third (85%).125 By the time of 
the E.B. survey for 1991, unemployment and environmental protection were considered of 
equal urgency.126 Since the spring of 1988, more and more people interviewed have 
considered environmental protection and the fight against pollution as ‘an immediate and 
urgent problem’. In Greece this shift showed a difference of 15% between 1988 and 1992.
The level of environmental consciousness also changes with the social groups 
under consideration. Some social categories are more open to environmental questions 
than others, as shown by the surveys reported below.
In autumn 1986 the environmental magazine New Ecology circulated a 
questionnaire about its readers’ profile and received 500 answers. They showed that the 
readers of New Ecology were mostly men (male: 79.35%, female: 20.65%) and around 30 
years old.127 The majority (71%) had no professional association with the environment. 
Politically they supported the Communist Party of the Interior (34.3%), or declared 
themselves politically non-affiliated (38.3%). In other words, the main profile of New 
Ecology readers showed younger men with a chosen interest it environmental issues, who 
were either politically unallied or supported the Greek Eurocommunists. In 
November/December 1995 the KAPA RESEARCH Company did some research for the 
Union of Municipalities and Communities in southern Attica. The sample covered 800 
households. The results showed that the least developed areas of Attica also showed the 
least interest in the environment.128 Young people (26-35 years) were more interested than 
older ones (over 56) - 61.8% and 39.5 % respectively. There were also marked differences 
in terms of education and income. The interest of people with little education (41.7 %)
m Eurobarometer, No,25, June 1986
125 Eurobarometer, No.30, December 1988
126 Eurobarometer, No.35, June 1991.
127 Papaioannou, D. ‘How do readers perceive “New Ecology”?’, New Ecology, No. 35, 
September 1987.
128 Recycling, No. 18, April/May/June 1996
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greatly differed from that of individuals with a university or polytechnic degree (71%). 
Likewise, people with a high income showed more interest in environmental issues (49%) 
than low-income categories (41.7%). Hence, the variables of age, income, and education 
are strong indicators of the level of people’s environmental consciousness. Accordingly, 
underdeveloped areas with lower quality of life are less sensitive to environmental 
questions. This was confirmed by the results of the Greek elections for the European 
Parliament in 1989 and the Greek national elections in November 1989 and April 1990.129 
In the 1989 elections, the urban Green vote was double to that of semi-urban areas, and 
more than double compared to the rural vote. In all three elections the Green vote was 
higher in well-to-do, new middle class areas than in lower income and environmentally 
polluted ones. Surprisingly, there seems to be no relation between the constituencies’ 
environmental problems and their vote for the ecological parties: environmental 
degradation does not necessarily mean environmental awareness.
We have seen that a higher level of environmental consciousness is usually 
associated with the well-off, educated, middle class. The younger generation is more 
sensitive than their elders to environmental questions, and not as likely to be drawn into 
the entanglements of the polarised Greek party system. The general level of environmental 
consciousness may be lower in Greece than in other countries, but the Eurobarometer 
surveys show no large gap. Has the restricted environmental consciousness inhibited the 
development of a strong Green party in Greece? Richardson and Rootes claim that
‘...the principal factor in the rise and development of Green parties, and their 
electoral successes, has been the varying impact of political competition upon 
them, within the overall context of heightened environmental consciousness’.130 
In the Greek case, neither factor (level of environmental consciousness or political 
competition) has helped the growth of an autonomous ecological movement within civil 
society. It is not surprising, therefore, that the formation of an ecological party was
129 Demertzis, op. cit., ref. 2
130 Richardson, Dick, Rootes, Chris (1995) ‘Introduction’ in Richardson, Rootes, op. cit., 
Ref. 2, pp. 1-2.
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regarded as the only possible way for enhancing the political success of the ecological 
project.
5.7 A Concise History of the Greek Ecological Movement
Before describing the way the Greek ecological movement has developed, let us 
look at the environmental attitudes that preceded it and affected the ascendancy of 
ecological politics in the early 1980s. By that time the initial scattered activities had been 
succeeded by the formation of a social movement. This was not only a quantitative but 
also a qualitative change.
As already mentioned, nature conservation has never had many followers in 
Greece. When the first interest in environmentalism declared itself in the 1920s, it was 
restricted to a very small circle of naturalist, conservationist or scientific associations. It 
was at this time, between 1922 and ‘32 that the first naturalist, mountaineering, and 
excursion societies were founded. Associations like Pan, the Athens Mountaineering 
Society, and the Patras Mountaineering Society called the city dwellers to come closer to 
nature. Protection of the natural environment became part of their activities, for instance 
in the form of protests concerning forest fires set by stock-farmers wishing to extend their 
grazing land.131 In the next decade, 1930-40, the first two national parks, on Mounts 
Olympus and Parnassus, were founded on the initiative of the Central Council of the 
Greek Mountaineering Society.132 In 1951 members of this society established the Hellenic 
Society for Nature Protection. This and the Athens Society of Friends of the Forests are 
the oldest and most enduring organisations with explicit environmentalist priorities.133 
During this first period there was a conspicuous absence of any political framework or 
aspiration to broaden the social base of the environmental groups. Although the decades 
after the 1920s were one of the politically most turbulent periods in Modem Greek 
history, the environmental organisations restricted their activities exclusively to
131 Sfikas, G. (1987) ‘To march forwards, while also looking backwards* in Orfanides, op. 
cit., ref. 57.
132 Adamakopoulos, T. (1987) ‘In the beginning were the mountains’, in Orfanides, ibid.
133 Kousis, op. cit., ref. 9.
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environmental issues and so avoided all and any conflict with the state or other established 
institutions.
The 1950s witnessed the pioneering role of archaeologists and architects in 
preserving the quality of the surrounding environment.134 The lack of infrastructural 
planning coupled with rapid population increase led to state agencies sponsoring proposals 
for public health and spatial planning. The problems of Greater Athens were studied, and 
the Athens Centre of Urban Planning was set up in 1955/133 Architects and archaeologists 
opposed the unrestricted development by pointing out the importance of a better quality of 
life as exemplified in urban planning.
The colonels’ coup d ’etat in 1967 brought canvassing for broader support for 
environmental issues to an abrupt halt. On the one hand political repression forbade 
collective mobilisations and on the other, the first priority o f collective struggles was the 
restoration of democracy. Environmental questions were not entirely in abeyance during 
the seven years o f the dictatorship, however. For instance, peasants of Eastern Macedonia 
demonstrated in 1972 against the use of the local turf as fuel for a thermoelectric plant. 
Although they were promised generous land compensations, the peasants preferred to 
continue with the cultivations of com and grapes.136 And in 1973 the residents of Megara 
demonstrated against plans to extend the local oil refinery at the expense of their 
agricultural land.137 Government policy in this period was contradictory. It both wished to 
acknowledge environmental matters as belonging to the competencies of public 
administration, and at the same time it sought to legitimise extensive environmental 
damage. An example of the latter was a large area in northern Attica, covered by olive 
trees and forests; this was designated by the dictatorship an industrial zone, and ruthlessly 
exploited by private capital.138 Moreover, on a more unobtrusive level the junta tolerated
134 Schizas, G. 'A contribution to the history of the Greek ecological movement’, 
Ekotopia, No. 23, July-August, 1993.
135 Stevis, op. cit., ref 44.
136 Schizas, op. cit., ref. 134.
137 Kousis, op. cit.,ml 9. 
131 Sfikas, op. cit., ref. 131.
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people favourable to the regime, to violate or circumvent laws on environmental 
protection (e.g. by illegal building on tourist sites). Officially, however, the environment 
was a government responsibility. So in 1970 the Ministry of Agriculture organised a 
National Conference for the Protection of the Environment, 1971-‘72 the government set 
up a Committee for the Environment, and in 1972 the environment became part of the 
government’s fifteen-year plan (1970-‘85).139 Official references to the environment reveal 
the junta seeking political legitimation as well as linkages with the international 
community.
The fall of the dictatorship revived the social struggle over the environment, and 
between 1973 and 1981 there was a surge of environmental interest and activities. This 
was the result not only of the return to democracy, but also of the emergence of the 
environmental problems created by earlier intensive industrial development. There were 
many mobilisations: in 1973 in Megara and Methana; in 1975 in Volos, Pylos, and Itea; in 
1975/76 in Salonica; in 1977 in Eleona of Aighaleia; in 1977-79 in Karystos; in 1978 
against a petrochemical plant being established in Misolonghi; in 1980/81 in Neohori of 
Aitoloakamania.140 All of them purposed either to halt industrial development likely to 
cause environmental damages, or to relocate existing environmentally hazardous plants 
elsewhere. In other words, the chief aim of these protests was environmental conservation. 
Other common elements were as set out below:
1. Most of the demonstrations were held in rural districts, and Athens was rarely the 
target of environmental protest.
2. Environmental protests had a trans-class social support. Only in Salonica did skilled 
and semi-skilled and workers constitute the majority of the participants.
m  Spanou, op. cit., ref. 42.
140 In the beginning of the 1970s the Public Power Corporation of Greece began 
negotiations for the construction of a nuclear power plant at Kaiystos on Euboea. On 4 
May 1979 there was a mass demonstration in Halkida o f4,000 people protesting against 
nuclear energy. An outcome of this was the short-lived organisation ‘Anti-Nuclear 
Initiative’ (Antipiriniki Protovoulia). Schizas, op. cit., ref. 134.
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3. The protests were organised by initiative groups (in the form of coordinating 
committees) or local communities.
4. Non-local groups, such as organisations for the protection of the environment, 
scientific associations, Chambers of Commerce, as well as European organisations 
provided additional support.
5. All these protests opposed large-scale plans of state-owned, national, or multi-national 
enterprises that already had the support of the government.
6. The protesters suggested as an alternative to the offensive, the option of developing 
the primary sector, processing agricultural products and alternative forms of mild 
tourism.
7. All mobilisations developed similar repertoires of action: strikes, marches, rallies, 
publications, media announcements, scientific studies, meetings with experts or 
officials in Athens, and transferring the struggle to the capital.
8. The response from the state and the political parties was usually equivocal. To begin 
with they were usually hostile or mistrustful, but if the mobilisation became successful 
they showed tolerance or even approval. The press, student unions, intellectuals, 
academics, and sometimes the Ministry of Culture were very receptive to the demands 
advanced by the participants in mobilisation.
9. In the end, environmental protests contributed to increased social awareness of 
environmental issues and state initiatives concerning long stated environmental 
demands. The state either accepted the primary demands of the participants or new 
Bills for ratification were drawn up and proposals put forward for special 
environmental studies. Moreover, the political inpact on social attitudes was 
considerable. Incidents of violence by state authorities (Megara, Salonica, Neohori) 
and contradictory responses of the government and political parties led to a series of 
local and national debates.141
141 Vested interests also played a role and mobilisations were frequently supported by
private economic interests, not mediated by the existing political networks. Additionally,
the excessively concentrated administrative structure of the state forced those
mobilisations to extend their appeal to the central decision-making headquarters of
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Protest mobilisation in the capital and the broader region of Attica were limited to 
three incidents. The first was in 1976, when the government decision to create a new 
airport at Spata led to mass demonstrations against the planned expropriation of 
agricultural land.142 Then, in 1979-80, environmentalists opposed the installation of 
sewage disposal tanks in the area of Maroussi.143 Finally, in the late 1970s, the Athens 
smog became a major issue. An ephemeral organisation Citizens Against the Smog 
(Polites kata tou Nefous) was formed but dissolved again shortly after organising a big 
publicity concert in Athens.144 In 1981, there were two anti-smog demonstrations in 
Athens. It is a paradox of the Greek ecological movement that the Athens smog, despite 
its serious health repercussions and its wide scope (it affects one-third of the Greek 
population) has never become an issue that rallies mass support.
It is important to note that the ideological framework for all these mass-protests 
was environmentalism rather than political ecology. The ideological discourse during this 
period was human-centred, utilitarian, and emphasised resource conservation and human 
welfare. However, this was a crucial period for the post-1981 Greek ecological 
movement. It was the first time that a tradition of environmentalism was established. Many 
new and enduring environmental organisations were formed, and tentative, coordinated 
organisational schemes were devised. Industrialisation as such, as well as along the Greek 
pattern, was openly criticized. Finally, left-wing organisations also became involved in the 
protection of the environment.
Another important development during the 1970s was that environmental and 
ecological literature expanded greatly, either via the translation and introduction of foreign 
texts or by the introduction of environmental issues in Greek journals. The many foreign 
books on ecology that were published in Greek translation (by R. Dumont, B. Commoner,
Athens. Transferring their appeal to the national level was a precondition for its success. 
Hatzimichalis, K (1992) Regional Development and Policy, (Athens, Exantas - in Greek); 
Demertzis, op. cit., ref. 2.
142 Kousis, op. cit, ref. 9.
143 Karabelias, op. cit., ref. 95.
144 Schizas, op. cit, ref. 134.
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M. Bookchin, R. Carson, P. Samuel, A. Gorz, etc.) helped towards moulding an 
ecological consciousness.145 In addition, articles on sea pollution, the consequences of 
high-speed motorways, the effects of poisonous substances used in agriculture, the nuclear 
threat, and so on, now appeared in newspapers and periodicals. Places like Lavrion, 
Kozani, Ptolemaida, Megalopolis and especially Elefsis (oil refineries) were frequently 
referred to because of the serious environmental problems connected with them. A 
recurring theme in the ecological and environmental writings in 1974-78 was criticism of 
the junta and conservative governments as the main actors responsible for environmental 
degradation. In other words, pollution and environmental destruction were not considered 
the inevitable result of industrialisation, but as proof of the government’s dependency on 
private and foreign capital. So, environmental and ecological issues became linked in these 
articles with the nature of the political regime. For example, the Athens smog was 
declared to be the result of the unregulated and uncontrolled industrial activities in Attica. 
The degradation of the Greek forests was seen as the result of colonialist contracts signed 
by right-wing governments. Accordingly, the anti-Right forces of that period incorporated 
the environment into their project of democratic consolidation and political self- 
determination. They portrayed the solution of environmental and ecological problems as 
feasible only within the context of a left-wing political regime.
An important place for environmental and ecological struggles after the 1974 fall 
of the junta was the universities. Many students who had originally been drawn to the 
political Left began to criticise the centralisation in the student unions, the inflexible party 
discourse, the creation of hierarchies, and the repression of intra-party opposition. A 
number of members of party-affiliated student unions left and began to involve themselves 
with local, social problems.146 One outcome of this was the formation of the organisation 
New Left (Nea Aristera), and the magazine New Left Review (Epitheorisi Neas 
Aristeras) that focused on issues of associationalism, a better quality of life, and the 
protection of citizens. In 1976, the New Left was renamed Association for the Quality of
143 Louloudes, op. cit., ref. 107; Voiklis, op. cit.f ref 94.
146 Poulos, G. ‘1976-86: Experiences and Crises of the Ecological Movement’ in 
Orfanides, op. cit.,te£. 57.
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Life (Enosi gia tin Piotita Zois - EPOIZO) and became Greece’s first enduring 
organisation in the field of political ecology. It instigated the creation of the first small co­
operative companies, the founding of consumer protection associations, and the 
promotion of organically grown foodstuffs.147 EPOIZO also became one of the most 
active organisations in the anti-nuclear campaign during the 1970s. The academic year 
1979-80 saw a new wave of student mobilisations. They were directed against the 
educational reforms proposed by the government, and the students remained to a certain 
extent independent from political control by the established parties. This means that the 
political student movement articulated demands that went beyond the parties’ agenda and 
extended to the whole of social reproduction. The Chemistry Department students were 
the first to include ecological matters in their demands. Students that had taken an active 
part in these mobilisations then formed the ecological organisation Ecological Initiative 
{Ikologiki Protovoulia), and some of them eventually became co-founders of the 
Federation of Ecological and Alternative Organisations.148
Towards the end of the period 1974-81 there was a significant regrouping in the 
ecological spectrum. Many new organisations endorsing the ideological principles of 
political ecology emerged in the big cities as well as in the countryside, but the older 
environmental groups also continued to maintain an active presence. It was they who 
made the first attempt to create a unified umbrella organisation the Coordinating 
Committee of Organisations for Environmental Protection (,Syntonistiki Epitropi 
Organoseon Prostasias Perivallontos - SEOPP). Among the members were the Athens 
Mountaineering Society (Oreivatikos Syndesmos Athinon), the Society of Friends of the 
Forests (Filodasiki), the Greek Movement of Foresters (Panellinia Kinisi Dasologon), the 
Piraeus Club of Nature Lovers (Fysiolatrikos Omilos Piraeus), Country Life (Ypethrios 
Zoi), etc. One of the disadvantages of SEOPP was that many of its constituent members
U1 Interview with Polydevkis Papadopoulos, co-publisher of the Ecological Newspaper 
(1982-‘85), member of Ecological Initiative {Ikologiki Protovoulia), Initiative for a Green 
Alternative {Protovoulia gia mia Prasini Enalaktiki) and Alternative Movement of 
Ecologists {Enalaktiki Kinisi Ikologon), Athens, 13 Dec. 1996.
148 Schizas, op. cit, ref. 134.
243
were not primarily environmentalists. Environmental-protection groups co-existed with 
others for whom the environment as such was secondary. SEOPP’s action was further 
impeded by the fact that the member-organisations were predominantly conservative and 
not really willing to clash with the right-wing government.149 The new ecological 
organisations that joined the green spectrum in the 1980s signified a transition from 
environmentalism (as publicly established by groups in the 1970s) to political ecology.
This process was somewhat halted when the socialist party (PASOK) came to 
power in 1981 and some of the anti-right forces among the ecologists gave it their political 
support. The perception of the Right as a main source of environmental problems, and the 
adoption of environmental topics by the socialist party, led to passing political support for 
the socialist government. In 1981 PASOK announced its hundred-day program to fight 
the smog. It then drew up a Bill for the protection of the environment (1650/1986), and 
set up an organ of its own for environmental policy (Comprehensive Body of 
Environmental Policy - EFOP).150 However, the socialist government was increasingly 
criticised by the majority of the ecologists for not fulfilling its pre-election promises. It was 
also criticised for using environmental demands as a means of forcing opposition against 
the conservatives.151 Moreover, the socialist party after its first four years in government 
giving greater priority to higher rates of economic production than to Green matters 
created new friction with environmental and ecological forces.
149 Sfikas, op. c it, ref 131.
150 Spanou, op. cit., ref.42.
151 An example of the inconsistent environmental policy of PASOK was the case of the 
Aluminium factory at Delphi. The first two attempts to build an aluminium factory in that 
area were made by the conservative governments in the 1970s. The second (1978-79) was 
severely criticised by the then oppositional PASOK, which submitted a question in 
Parliament. However, when PASOK came to power itself, it began a new round of 
discussions with potential investors for building an aluminium plant in the same area 
(1984). See C. Orfanides, ‘1975-87: Mobilisations for the rescue of Delphi: From 
Environmentalism to Political Ecology*, in Orfanides, op. cit., ref 57.
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In the early 1980s the appearance of new ecological publications illustrated a shift 
in the Green spectrum. The Ecological Newspaper {Ikologiki Ejimerida) came out in 
1981, and from the very beginning concerned itself with the dynamics of social 
movements.152 In 1982 the magazine Ecology and the Environment {Ikologia kai 
Perivallon) appeared, and attempted a more scientific discussion of environmental 
problems. It contributed to the dissemination and acceptance of viable scientific solutions 
by the general public. At first the magazine endorsed a technocratic version of ecology, 
but after changing its name in 1984 to New Ecology {Nea Ikologia), it also explored the 
political facets of ecology.153 Alongside the new ecological publications were many new 
organisations, some of them taking over from the older environmental ones -  for instance 
the Green Alternative {Prasini Enallaktiki Kinisi), the Alternative Movement of 
Ecologists {Enallaktiki Kinisi Ikologon), the Ecological Movement of Salonica {Ikologiki 
Kinisi Thessalonikis).154 These new groups no longer restricted themselves to matters of 
environmental protection, because they believed that environmental problems could be 
solved only after fundamental changes in dominant values and/or methods of production. 
They saw ecology as a viable political proposal that could reshape both inter-human 
relations as well as relations between the human and the non-human, natural world. 
During the 1980s, therefore, a significant quantitative and qualitative change took place in 
the Green consciousness. As Demertzis notes, ‘...since 1981 there has been a sort of 
transition from environmentalism to political ecology’.155
Other new organisations at this time centred on the creation of alternative 
lifestyles, a subject that was still virtually unknown in Greece. So it was not only 
environmentalists, but also the growers of organic foodstuffs, opponents of hunting, 
cyclists, anti-smokers, etc. who became organised. They were supported by scientific
132 Louloudes, op. c it, ref. 107.
153 A less-known editorial effort was the short-lived attempt by publisher Timos 
Stavropoulos that led to 12 issues of ‘Environment and Pollution SOS’. See in Schizas, 
op. cit., ref. 134.
134 Louloudes, op. cit., ref. 107.
135 Demertzis, op. cit., ref 2, p. 196
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bodies like the Society for the Protection of Nature (Etaireia Prostasia tis Fysis), the 
Greek Ornithological Society (EUiniki Omithologiki Etaireia), and the Ecological, 
Environmental and Alternative Information Centre (Kentro Ikologikis, Perivallontikis kai 
Enallaktikis Pliroforisis).156 In 1981 the first squatters appeared in Athens.157 This was 
also the time when ecologists illegally set up private radio stations in protest against state 
control of the mass media. The years 1982 to 1987 were highly productive in expanding 
the ecological discourse and witnessed some original repertoires of action (theatrical 
events, happenings, ‘marches’ on bicycles, etc.).158
All these changes and innovations had two main consequences:
(1) The multiplication of ecological and environmental organisations raised the 
issue of coordination and the creation of a pan-Hellenic network that could coordinate 
action and serve as an information exchange. The majority of the organisations agreed on 
the need to unify the Greens, since lack of communication and of technical as well as 
moral support amongst the dispersed groups had long been recognised as a vital 
problem.159 However, there was no general agreement concerning the organisational form 
and the future role of this unifying network. One section of the Greens argued that 
unification should take the form of a national network in civil society, because this would 
shape the necessary conditions for developing a Green mass movement. They insisted that 
the unified network should be independent of the state and the political parties. Other 
organisations saw the Greek unification as the first step in the establishment of a political 
party. Participation in electoral politics, they argued, would stimulate much-needed
‘^Louloudes, op. c it, ref. 107.
157 S. Papapolimerou, ‘Citizens’ Initiatives, City Movements’ in Ecology-City-Self- 
Administration, (Athens: Centre of Ecological Information, 1990 - in Greek).
158 Ecological Calendar (1996), published by Ecological Movement of Salonica.
159 Some ecological organisations (e.g. the Ecological Movement of Volos) disagreed with 
the formation of the Federation, because of their anti-institutional stand. Interview with 
journalist N. Chrysogelos of the Ecological Newspaper, co-publisher of the magazine 
Recycling, member of Ecological Initiative and Initiative for a Green Alternative 
Movement, Athens, 10 Dec. 1996; New Ecology, No 29, March 1987.
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support for the infant ecological movement. The debate between the two camps over 
which strategic option to adopt remained lively all during the 1980s.
(2) The transition from environmentalism to political ecology led to the 
convergence of the ecologists and the extra-parliamentary Left. By going beyond 
environmental protection after 1981, the ecological movement addressed itself to issues 
that were already part of the political project of left-wing politics. The anti-capitalist 
critique, mistrust of the state apparatus, confidence in civil society and self-management, 
and critical reassessment of power became the common ground for co-operation between 
ecologists, the extra-parliamentary Left, and proponents of alternative beliefs. In addition, 
in the 1980s older organisations with Left origins began to interest themselves exclusively 
in ecology (e.g. EPOIZO), while other sections of the extra parliamentary left (e.g. RIXI), 
changed their earlier belief in the primacy of class conflict and acknowledged ecology as 
an independent conflict. These new viewpoints facilitated the political unification of the 
various areas of social conflict in the prevailing socio-political order. While 
acknowledgement of the political value of ecology was a precondition for achieving any 
convergence, some unresolved tension between the ecologists and the alternative side 
remained over whether or not ecology should be in first place. This tension was to become 
more overt later in the organisational scheme of the FEAO and would lead to 
disagreements and ideological inpasses.
The successful expansion of the ecological movement in the 1980s gave rise to 
several attempts at creating a new, unified organisation for its growing dynamic. In 1982 
the first pan-Hellenic meeting of ecological and environmental organisations took place on 
the island of Aegina. About 100 organisations attended and expressed their wish for a 
nation-wide network. An ecological centre was set up in Exarhia (Athens).160 The meeting 
was called again the following year (1983), but the project of unification failed because of 
strong ideological disagreements amongst the participating groups.161
In 1984 a new pan-Hellenic meeting was held in Pendeli outside Athens. 
Participation was broad and high publicity was given to the event. The Minister of Urban
160 Interview with Papadopoulos, op. cit, ref 147.
161 Schizas, op. cit., ref 134.
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Planning and Environment gave the welcoming address, thereby indicating the good 
relations between the socialist government and the Greens. Again, however, no 
organisational links were set up among the groups, although this failure was compensated 
for by the creation of a nation-wide information network, the Ecological Information 
Centre (Kentro Ikologikis Pliroforisis). Its purpose was to transmit information and 
disseminate knowledge among the ecological groups. In 1985 it began to publish its 
Bulletin of Ecological Information (.Deltio Ikologikis Pliroforisis).
In 1984 an external factor, namely the prospect of the 1985 elections for the 
national as well as the European parliament, acted as a strong incentive for the Greens to 
step up their contacts and organisational endeavours.162 The ecologist N. Prasinos gave a 
resume of the main arguments in favour of the Greens participating in these elections:
—  Participation at the elections would initiate and empower the contact with and 
mobilisation of voters interested in ecology and the environment.
— The election campaign would include activities (happenings, occupation of streets, 
exhibitions, etc.) that are difficult to realise in ordinary times.
—  Election participation would advance Green debates and urge the organisations to 
come up with concrete and viable policy proposals.
— It would also increase communication and collaboration with the Green movement in 
Europe
—  An election campaign would widely publicise the Green discourse and ideology.
— The financial subsidy from the European Community and the Greek state would be 
very welcome, and printing and distribution of relevant material would become 
possible.
—  The election of a deputy would provide access to sources of information.
162 According to Maria Kousis: ‘...the number of grass-roots environmental mobilisations 
increases - sharply in the case of Greece -  immediately before election years’. Kousis, M. 
‘Sustaining Local Environmental Mobilisations: Groups, Actions and Claims in Southern 
Europe’, Environmental Politics, vol. 8, no. 1, Spring 1999.
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— Participation at the electoral processes would enhance the comprehension of the 
political system163
These arguments in favour of sending Green candidates to stand for election were 
rebutted by the anti-institutional stand of many of the organisations as an act of co­
optation. They insisted, instead, on developing a mass movement in civil society by 
engaging as much as possible in extra-parliamentary activities. This conflict remained 
unresolved until it was eventually decided to participate in the national elections of 1989.
The forthcoming elections in 1985 initiated a new round of contacts among 
environmentalists and ecologists. There was in 1985 a meeting at the offices of EPOIZO 
to explore the feasibility of a pan-Hellenic ecological formation, but the project failed, and 
so cancelled any possibility of participation in the elections.164
In October 1985 the alternative groups also attempted to unify organisationally 
their political forces. A meeting in Athens invited all groups and individuals interested in 
issues concerning the ecology, women, youth, workers, the unemployed, urban problems, 
the alternative ethos, the people in the Third World and the national struggles for self- 
determination.165 The broad range of issues covered by the meeting indicated the 
alternative groups’ attempt to attract potential supporters and showed their increased 
overlapping with the ideological tenets of the ecological groups. All the groups did not 
welcome the growing proximity between the two. An editorial in New Ecology was very 
critical of the alternative meeting and applauded all ecological organisations that had 
stayed away. The editorial closed with a clear condemnation of the anarchists for their 
anti-institutional stand.166
163 Frasinos, N. ‘European Elections: Is there any prospect for an active involvement of the 
ecologists? % Ecological Newspaper, No. 11, Feb.-March 1984; Papaioannou, Dimitris 
‘Let the amphitheatres bloom again’, New Ecology, No. 61, Nov. 1989, and Ritzoulis, G. 
‘To participate or not in the political game?’, New Ecology, No. 52, Feb. 1989.
164 Schizas, op. cit., ref. 134.
16i New Ecology, No. 12, October 1985.
166 Editorial, New Ecology, No. 13, Nov. 1985.
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In May 1986 the Ecological Information Centre organised an all-Greek meeting of 
ecologists in Athens, and the prospect of municipal elections in October stimulated new 
efforts for organisational unity.167 Once more the attempt was unsuccessful, and in the end 
only two Green groups participated in the municipal elections: the Municipal Ecological 
Movement of Elefsis (Dimotiki Ikologiki Kinisi Elefsinas) and Independent Self­
administration Larisa (Larisa-Anexartiti Autodioikisi).168 The former received 2% of the 
local vote, the latter 5%. The election results confirmed that the public trusted ecological 
formations for the solution of local issues, but withheld its support from them in major 
issues (the economy, national defence, etc.).
In November 1986 the Green Alternative European Link (GRAEL) held its 
monthly meeting in Athens. Its representatives contacted political parties, peace 
organisations, and ecological groups to discuss the possibility of founding a Green party in 
Greece.169 However, the chief Greek ecological organisation (the Alternative Movement 
of Ecologists) declared itself opposed to creating a new party at this stage, and insisted on 
the need to first build an extensive network of autonomous ecological groups.
In 1987 the ecological groups associated with the periodical New Ecology took the 
lead in setting up a pan-Hellenic ecological formation. The umbrella organisation 
Ecological Collaboration (Ikologiki Synergasia) was the product of two pan-Hellenic 
general assemblies that took place first in Athens (January 1987) and then in Tsepelovo 
Zagoriou (August 1987).170 The chief objectives of the new organisation were specified by 
one of its co-founders, I. Efthimiopoulos:
167 New Ecology, No. 19, May 1986.
168 Independent Self-Administration’ was founded by the citizens of Larissa and was a 
purely municipal group. Its program focused on the ecological reconstruction of the city, 
and its practices were guided by the principles of self-management and direct democracy. 
It succeeded in electing one representative to the municipal council. Tsantilis, C ‘Larissa: 
Independent Self-Administration’ in Orfanides, op. tit., ref. 57.
169 New Ecology, No. 26, Dec. 1986
170 New Ecology, No. 38, Dec. 1987
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‘... to fight for strictly defined ecological issues (environmental protection, 
sustainable development, etc) as well as to contribute to the restoration of 
politics’.171
However, Ecological Collaboration never grew to represent the whole of the ecological 
movement, because it never acquired wide enough support. It remained an organisational 
effort limited to a specific segment of the ecological groups.
In September 1987, the Ecological Movement of Salonica proposed to start 
proceedings to form a federation of ecological and alternative organisations.172 On 13 and 
14 February 1988, fifteen Green and alternative groups from eleven cities of Northern and 
Central Greece (Kavala, Xanthi, Serres, Salonica, Giannitsa, Ptolemaida, Kilkis, Volos, 
Lamia, Athens, Rhodes) met and defined the ideological guidelines of the future 
federation.173 They approved a statement specifying the proposed federation’s positions on 
ecological policy, social policy, self-management, direct democracy and anti-violent 
culture. The problems of the existing ecological groups were outlined as follows: 
insufficient exchange of information amongst the organisations, lack of co-operation and 
common campaigns, inadequate theoretical debate, and incomplete coverage of ecological 
activities by the press of the ecological press. In consequence, the meeting resolved to
171 Efthimiopoulos, I , Stamatopoulos G., ‘In Tsepelovo, this Summer?’, New Ecology, 
No. 36, Oct. 1987, p.22
172 Ecological Movement of Salonica, ‘The Federation has disproved our hopes’, New 
Ecology, No. 95, Sept. 1992.
173 The participating organisations were: ‘Ecological Movement of Salonica’ (the 
organiser), ‘Alternative Ecological Movement of Kilkis’ (Enallaktiki Ikologiki Kinisi 
Kilkis), ‘Ecological Movement of Volos’ (Ikologiki Kinisi Volou), ‘Ecological Movement 
of Lamia’ {Ikologiki Kinisi Lamias), the magazine Kontra from Kavala, ‘Ecological 
Movement of Serres’ {Ikologiki Kinisi Serron), representatives from EPOIZO, friends 
from Giannitsa, Rhodes, Ptolemaida and the groups around the magazines Praxis, Katina, 
Skylakia tou Pavlov, Amoumai. See in Psomas, Stelios ‘Salonica: In support of the 
Collaboration and the Federation’, New Ecology, No. 42, April 1988
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publish a Bulletin that would provide all the necessary information about Green 
developments.
On 11-12 June 1988, the collaborating Green and alternative organisations came 
together again, in Volos this time. They agreed to have four two-day meetings, on the 
following subjects: (i) the ecological crisis of nature and society; (ii) political and social 
institutions, iii) social movements and minorities; (iv) peace, anti-militarism, anti-violence 
and social defence; (v) forms of organisation and collective action.
Between 40 and 50 ecological/alternative organisations took part in these two-day 
conferences.174 The reports of the proceedings were published in the Bulletin of 
Collaborating Ecological and Alternative Movements and Groups (Deltio ton 
Synergazomenon Ikologikon Enallaktikon Kiniseon & Omadori). The process for the 
establishment of a federation that had begun in 1987 finally led after two years to the 
formation of the Federation of Ecological and Alternative Organisation (FEAO) in 
September 1989. The success of this effort to unite all of the ecological groups was not 
due to any specific host or single trend, and its ideological pluralism allowed the co­
existence of different, even conflictual, views. For example, the new FEAO incorporated 
in its political profile both a pro-institutional and an anti-institutional stand. Bringing 
together such different trends increased the Federation’s credibility as a representative 
institution, but it undermined its policy formulation when it entered the political arena. The 
ideology, organisation, social base and activities of the FEAO will be discussed in the 
chapter 6.
The matter of election participation remained an open question for the new 
Federation too. It became even more pressing, when the political organisation Ecological 
Alternative Union of Citizens (Ikologiki Enallaktitd Enosis Politon - OEEP) took part in 
the European elections of 1989 with the support of GRAEL.175 Furthermore, the OEPP
m  ‘The founding of the Federation’, Ecological Newspaper, No. 36, Oct. 1989. 
m  The OEEP network was founded in 1988 in order to provide the ecological groups in 
Greece with a pluralistic federational body. However, its close collaboration with and 
support by GRAEL, made other ecologists denounce the network as a foreign intervention 
imposing on ecological developments in Greece. The friction was further intensified by
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and certain ecological groups began a dialogue with some left-wing political parties (e.g. 
Coalition, Communist Party of the Interior -  Renovative Left) and extra-parliamentary 
formations, concerning the prospect of an alliance for the national elections.
Two international events in the 1980s clearly influenced Greek society and made it 
possible to set up a united, representative ecological body. Those two events were the 
1983 entrance of the German Greens into the federal parliament, and the April 1986 
disaster at Chernobyl. The first proved that ecology can constitute a realistic political 
proposal for the present crisis, and the second attested to the legitimacy of fears expressed 
by the environmentalists.176 In Greece, the Chernobyl disaster brought public support for 
the ecological movement to its zenith. The majority of the existing political forces had 
devalued environmental issues to a secondary, minor subject. On the contrary, the Greek 
Greens had underlined the urgency of environmental demands and therefore became the 
sole focus of the new public awareness on environmental hazards. Moreover, a common 
argument among the Greens in Greece had been that environmental problems were not 
intensive enough to support a viable movement.177 Chernobyl, however, proved that 
pollution knows no borders, and an ecological movement has no need to be stimulated by 
local problems.
From 1985 onwards, another factor favourable to promoting the process of 
unification was the spread of the ecological discourse in Greek society. In the mid-1980s 
there were a number of ecological groups competing in the student elections. Ecological 
publications continued, the new magazine Ecotopia (Ekotopia) appeared in Salonica in 
1987; and Nature and Society (Physi kai Koinonia), the first magazine on ecological 
theory, began to circulate in 1992. Meanwhile the daily Greek newspapers or weekly
OEPP’s decision to participate in the elections. Tremopoulos, M. ‘The native political 
ecology’, Ekotopia, No. 1, April-May 1989 and Town, S. and P. Kollias, ‘The Ecologists 
and Europe’, New Ecology, No. 59, Sept. 1989. 
m  Louloudei, op. dt., ref. 107.
177 Chrysogelos, N. ‘Fear of the open sea even though all sails are set’ in Orfanides, op. 
cit., ref. 57.
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magazines (like Eleftherotypia, Kathemerini, Ta Nea, Avgi, To Vima, Mesemvrini, 
Oikonomikos Tachydromos, Epochi) now regularly featured environmental issues.178
Once properly set up, the Federation had a strongly negative impact on ecological 
activism, however. Much energy was consumed by the FEAO’s internal affairs, and many 
rural ecological groups faded out or withdrew their support. Disagreement among the 
groups postponed decisions and undermined the Federation’s active presence. Only a 
vibrant ecological movement continuing its activities in everyday life could have 
counterbalanced the increasing complexities of the FEAO’s functioning. The feet that the 
Federation has been set up as a political body without mass support from civil society 
meant that the Green groups were exclusively dependent on developments within the 
Federation itself. The Greens became identified with the Federation and therefore had to 
radically restructure themselves when the Federation failed.
This outline of the history of the Greek ecological movement has shown the 
environmental activities that preceded and co-existed with ecological mobilisations. Not 
all forms of social mobilisation qualify as a social movement, however. As Foweraker 
argues, an increase in associationalism does not necessarily signify the formation of a 
social movement. Rather this associationalism
‘... may be considered as a pre-movement, or as providing the essential social 
networks and political learning, which underpin social mobilisation’.179 
In Greece, the 1974 fell of the dictatorship was followed by an intensification of 
social struggles over the environment. These environmental protests remained, however, 
on the level of a pre-movement, as described by Foweraker. The novelty and 
intensification of environmental struggles during that period did not signify the existence 
of an ecological movement. It was only during the 1980s that increased associationalism 
resulted in the moulding of a social movement. Earlier environmental mobilisations (1974- 
81) were the work of small environmental groups and local organisations. The post-1981 
ecological activities, on the other hand, aimed at creating a unified national network. The 
quantitative expansion of the early 1980s was accompanied by a notable qualitative
178 Fapaspiliopoulos, op. cit., ref 4.
179 Foweraker, op. cit., ref. 77., p. 4.
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change.180 When the Greek environmental organisations began to think about an 
alternative political project, the original scattered environmental activities made way for 
larger ecological mobilisations that targeted society as a whole. These post-1981 
ecological activities did manifest the properties of social movements. According to 
Melucci,
‘The notion of a social movement is an analytical category. It designates that form 
of collective action which (i) invokes solidarity, (ii) makes manifest a conflict, and 
(iii) entails a breach of the limits of compatibility of the system within which the 
action takes place’.181
All the elements mentioned above were present in the ecological activities of the 
1980s. The Greek ecological organisations (i) built social networks that increased the 
bonds of solidarity, (ii) rejected the post-war ideology of development and proceeded to 
the articulation of an alternative political project, and (iii) called into question the 
regulatory ability of the political parties. Thus, the post-1981 ecological mobilisations have 
constituted the very heart of the Greek ecological movement.
li0Louloudes, op. cit., ref. 107. 
181A  Melucci, Challenging Codes: Collective Action in the Information Age (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 29-30.
CHAPTER 6 
THE FEDERATION OF ECOLOGICAL
AND ALTERNATIVE ORGANISATIONS
6.1 Introduction
The association of green and alternative groups into a federation was the most 
far-reaching and longest-lasting organisational scheme of the Greek ecological 
movement. However, it did not function as a uniform whole, but rather as an 
umbrella-organisation for bringing together heterogeneous ecological, environmental, 
leftist, anti-war, feminist and other alternative groups. Its failure to merge 
organisationally and harmonise ideologically was due to both its own distinctive 
features and the changes in the political system that were taking place during its 
lifetime.
The history of the Federation of Ecological and Alternative Organisations 
(FEAO) is rather unusual, since its establishment was almost immediately followed 
by its hasty transformation into a political party, and without any prior elucidation of 
its specific political identity or organisational principles. The Federation then 
proceeded to participate in two national elections (November 1989 and April 1990), 
still without ever having drawn up its Constitution. The precipitate change into a 
political party prevented the construction of a broad and viable social network. The 
founding of the Federation, therefore, signified on the one hand the demise of 
movement politics, and on the other the Federation’s institutional dominance in the 
Green spectrum. The absence of a real green movement (which might have 
counterbalanced the social effects of the FEAO’s troubles) magnified the Federation’s 
internal ideological clashes and organisational impasses. In the end, the FEAO’s 
internal stalemates became the only measure for judging the state of the green 
movement in Greece.
Section 6.2 below outlines the Federation’s course, as an introduction to the 
application of the five central variables - ideology, organisational structure, social 
base, strategy, and new scenarios of conflicts - to the case study.
6.2 Seeking Public Support for Green Politics.
The various attempts to set up a unified network for the green spectrum have 
already been discussed in the previous chapter. The process of forming a federation, 
begun in 1987, led finally to a preparatory Panhellenic Conference in Athens (1 July 
1989). Aside from the environmental and ecological groups, it was attended by 25 
alternative groups, which indicates the enduring collaboration of Alternatives and 
Greens. The dominant subject at the conference was the organisational form of the
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envisaged ecological/alternative political body. The majority of the participants 
favoured federation, but there was sufficient disagreement on this point for the matter 
to be postponed.1 The meeting then evaluated the results of the European elections, 
given that the participating organisation, the Ecological/Alternative Union of Citizens 
(OEEP), had received a relatively high number of votes.2 This was considered a sign 
of Greek society becoming more aware of the green discourse.
The first official Panhellenic Meeting, in Athens (30 Sept.-10 Oct. 1989) 
formally established the Federation of Ecological and Alternative Organisations 
(FEAO). In addition to 47 environmental, ecological, leftists, feminist and alternative 
groups, 25 other organisations, participated as observers.3 The FEAO’s elementary 
organisational and constitutional principles were voted in, specifying only groups or 
organisations of at least five members each, as eligible to join. The meeting elected 
also a General Secretariat of 27 members and ruled by the principles of direct 
revocability and alteration.
The Federation sought to avoid the western as well as eastern European 
models of industrial societies.4 Both western liberal democracy and eastern 
bureaucratic centralisation were criticised for respectively leading to the 
extermination of life on the planet and totalitarian dominance. The FEAO declared 
that its own organisation intended a complete reconstitution of social relations.
1 Protopsaltis, Michalis ‘The organisational issue is a political one’, Ecological 
Newspaper, No. 36, Oct. 1989.
2 In the European elections of June 1989 the Union of Citizens received 72.826 votes, 
or 1.11%. The party came very close to elect a representative, the required minimum 
percentage being 1.36%. Demertzis, N. ‘The Green Movement and the Green Party in 
Greece’, Diavazo, No. 318, Sept. 1993.
3 The observers represented were environmental, ecological and alternative 
organisations, one homosexual group, and also two minor radical leftist political 
parties. See ‘Ecological and Alternative Organisations participating in the Federation’ 
in Bulletin by the Federation o f Ecological and Alternative Organisations, special 
issue, Oct. 1989.
4 ‘Declaration of the Constitutional Principles of the Federation of Ecological and 
Alternative Organisations’, Bulletin, ibid.
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‘Our federal organisation aims at a radical reconstitution of the entirety of 
social relations via interventions in the political, economic, cultural and 
ecological sphere’, 5
and clarified that this was not a one-dimensional project but founded on the principle 
of pluralism. Although it affirmed the priority of the universal ecological crisis, the 
declaration also underlined the significance of other social conflicts (such as between 
the individual and the collective, gender-based, ethnic, etc.). The major aim of the 
Federation was to end the exploitation of nature by mankind, as well as the 
exploitation of man by man.6 It stated very clearly that this aim could be 
accomplished only via the establishment of a non-violent culture and adherence to the 
principles of direct democracy and self-management.
Another important question at the meeting was the prospect of the November 
national elections and whether or not the Federation should participate. There were 
two schools of thought. The bloc of the groups Rupture (Rixi), Action (Praxi) and 
other Alternatives was in favour.7 Its proponents argued that electoral participation
5 Bulletin, ibid
6 ‘Declaration of the Constitutional Principles of the Federation of Ecological and 
Alternative organisations’, op. cit., ref. 4, p.3.
7 The group around Rupture became politically active in the post-junta period. Its first 
organisational manifestation was the magazine Political Information Bulletin (Politiko 
Deltio Pliroforisis), published in 1978, and in 1979 appeared the new magazine 
Rupture (in Greek: Rixi), the ideology of which underwent certain changes. Initially 
(1979) the group around Rupture identified itself as a section of the broader 
movement of the proletarian Left. It acknowledged the centrality of the proletariat, but 
thoroughly criticised other groups of the extra-parliamentary Left for their Marxist 
economic determinism, which negated the possibility of a worker’s revolution. The 
group initially focused on factory workers, as the new revolutionary subject. In 1978- 
79, the massive student mobilisations in Greek society, made students the potential 
new carrier of the revolution for them. While acknowledging school and university 
students as well as workers and the unemployed young as the new revolutionary 
elements of Greek society, Rupture also participated in ecological mobilisations, 
feminist activities and neighbourhood initiatives. At first it strongly based both 
feminism and ecology on class and underlined their anti-capitalist orientation, but
259
would (i) enhance the FEAO’s efficiency in projecting its political platform, (ii) 
provide a continuation of the OEEC’s successful presence in the 1989 European 
elections, and (iii) prevent the political parties from unduly profiting from the 
increased public interest in green politics. The opposite view was put forward mainly 
by the Alternative Movement of Ecologists (EKO), the Ecological Movement of 
Salonica, and Ecological Co-operation (Ikologiki Sinergasia). These groups stated that 
strengthening the Federation through building up a broad social network and shaping 
its political profile were far more important and should come before taking part in 
elections.8 The majority vote was in favour of election participation, with 40%
later it acknowledged the autonomous existence of many social conflicts. At this 
point, the group redirected its efforts towards unifying the diverse alternative 
organisations under a common banner. Although many ideological differences existed 
between the group around Rupture and the ecologists, there were also some common 
ideological elements: the centrality of the human subject, the belief in direct 
democracy and self-management, the critical stance towards the old dogmas of the 
Left and the so-called socialist republics, anti-statism, and the desire to politically 
mobilise civil society. The Rupture group constituted the main force of the alternative 
spectrum within the Federation. The group Action (in Greek: Praxis) was the 
organisational manifestation of Rupture in Salonica. Rupture, No 1-39, June 1979- 
Jan. 1991.
8 Alternative Movement of Ecologists, ‘The five months that shook the Federation’, 
Ecological Newspaper, No. 36, October 1989; and Blionis, G. ‘Some remarks 
concerning the ecological configuration and the elections’, Ecotopia, No. 5, Nov. 
1989.
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against. This result brought to the fore existing discrepancies among the Federation’s 
members concerning the organisation’s future role with regard to the established 
political system. The Alternatives saw the FEAO as a political means for intervening 
dynamically in the political arena, while the Greens opposed the politicisation of the 
FEAO. The decision to enter candidates for election also raised the issue of whether to 
collaborate with established political schemes. The groups Rupture and Action argued 
in favour of alliances with radical political parties like the Alternative Anti-Capitalist 
Union (Enallaktiki Antikapitalistiki Syspirosi- EAS) and Communist Party of the 
Interior - Renovative Left, but most of the representatives voted for the Federation’s 
autonomy.9
The November 1989 national elections were of major importance for the 
Federation; it received 39,158 votes (0.58%) and one seat in the Greek Parliament.10
9 Ritzoulis, G. ‘Ecology in muddy waters?’, Ecotopia, No. 6, Jan. 1990.
10 The elections of November 1989 and April 1990 were conducted under a new 
electoral law, which introduced elements of proportional representation. The socialist 
government had passed this new law in April 1989 in order to safeguard its future 
electoral victory. The electoral system included many favourable regulations for the 
minor political parties and facilitated the electoral representation of the FEAO (twice). 
When the conservatives returned to power in April 1990, they changed the electoral 
system again (in November 1990). Mendrinou, M. (2000) Electoral Policy in the 
Greek Political System: Domestic and European Factors, 1974-2000 (Athens, 
Papazisis - in Greek).
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Only 35 days after its founding as the socio-political carrier of the green movement in 
Greece, the FEAO was already represented in parliament.
The next two Panhellenic Conferences (November 1989 and March 1990) 
manifested considerable friction between different sections of the Federation. The 
Conferences concerned themselves mainly with organisational problems, such as what 
procedures were to be followed in decision-making, what body would be responsible 
for these procedures or what rules were to be applied concerning the parliamentary 
representation of the Greens. All these issues became foci of much disagreement, 
revealing a very deep discord in the matter of participatory and representative 
democracy. At one end were the pure environmentalists, who wanted a scheme of 
direct democracy that would equalise all the FEAO’s fractions. At the other end were 
the alternative groups, who wanted a mixture of representative and direct democracy. 
The environmentalists accused the Alternatives, of promoting rules of representative 
democracy in order to manipulate political procedures and impose their own will on 
the majority. The Alternatives accused the environmentalists of a naive perception of 
participatory democracy that spelled organisational inefficiency and political 
stalemate.11 The conflict came to a head when Rupture, Action and the Union of 
Citizens put forward a proposal to set up a small presidential council to take over 
some of the political responsibilities of the existing 55-member Secretariat, which was 
criticised as both unwieldy and too rigid. The proposal was fiercely opposed not only 
by the pure environmentalists but also by the provincial groups. The issue served to 
highlight another significant conflict within the Federation: that between the Athens 
organisations and the groups in the countryside.
When the Federation was founded in September 1989, it consisted of 47 
groups; by January 1990, the number of members had risen to 81.12 This rapid 
enlargement was coupled with an overrepresentation of Athens organisations, with 
50% of the participating groups and 60% of their members located in the Athens area 
in 1990.13 Moreover, the FEAO increasingly oriented its policy from local green
11 Marakis, N. ‘Red against Greens’, To Vima, 28 January 1990.
12 Hatzigogas, G. ‘Politics as art and Basket-ball’, Ecotopia, No. 6, Jan 19r00
13 EPOIZO, ‘Declaration of withdrawal from the Federation’, Bulletin, June 1990.
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activism to political intervention in the parliament. This meant a gradual estrangement 
of the non-Athenian groups in terms of both of the Federation’s organs and its policy. 
They charged the Federation with distancing itself from the movement and from its 
social base in the countryside. Even as early as 1990, one year after the FEAO was set 
up, a number of provincial groups began to withdraw from it after publicly protesting 
their organisational exclusion from the Federation’s organs and their degradation to 
local discussion groups.14
The FEAO’s increased focus on formal politics was partially due to the 
unusual conjuncture of that period. The national elections of November 1989 had 
returned one representative from the Federation to Parliament. Overall, however, the 
election had not resulted in a clear majority government, and many informal 
discussions commenced to try to break the stalemate. At this political conjuncture the 
one seat held by the FEAO was unexpectedly crucial for the formation of a viable 
coalition government between the socialist party (PASOK) and the euro-communist 
Coalition (SYN). In these circumstances certain members of the FEAO Secretariat 
entered into secret negotiations with the two parties, pledging Federation support on 
ten non-negotiable conditions. The subjects*were: 1. Disbandment of the special 
police force MAT-MEA; 2. Abolition of the new computerised identities (EKAM); 3. 
Reduction of working hours; 4. Legal distinction among drug-substances; 5. 
Amendment of the Reformatory Code, 6. Cancellation of plans for the Akheloos 
River diversion; 7. Abandonment of the previous government’s plan to host the 1996 
Olympic Games, 8. Setting up a car-free zone in Athens; 9. Economic regulations for 
the automatic adjustment of the cost of living (ATA); 10. Aligning Greek legislation 
with that of Europe concerning conscientious objectors and; also introducing a new
14 See declarations of withdrawal by the Alternative Movement of Christian 
Socialists, the Ecological Movement of Kalamata, EPOIZO, Anti-Hunting Initiative, 
and the Group for Alternative Technology, Bulletin, ibid; Athens interview on 15 Jan. 
1997 with Stelios Psomas, member of the Ecological Movement of Salonica, FEAO 
member, Director of Greenpeace in Athens; Athens interviews on 11 Dec. 1986 with 
Katerina Iatropoulou, FEAO parliamentary deputy 1991-93, and Christos Korkovelos, 
member of the editorial board of the Ecological Newspaper, ex-member of the FEAO 
Secretariat.
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electoral law of direct proportional representation.15 When these negotiations, as well 
as talks conducted by the conservative party reached deadlock, new elections were 
announced for April 1990. Meanwhile the independent initiatives by individuals in 
the FEAO Secretariat brought strong reactions from the Federation’s social base. 
When the issue of supporting a governmental coalition was finally put to the vote, the 
proposal was soundly defeated, and members asked that in future a referendum be 
held in the case of major political issues (such as electoral participation, support of 
coalition governments, or political collaboration with other political formations).16
At the beginning of March 1990 the Federation held an international 
conference in Athens of green groups, parties, or movements from the Balkans. The 
discussions focused on inter-state environmental problems that had caused friction 
between the participants in the past. They included also the significant and delicate 
issue of ethnic minorities. All representatives were agreed on the need for closer 
collaboration and declared their opposition to the existing models of ‘modernised
17social democracy’ and ‘neo-liberalism’.
With new national elections coming up in April 1990, the FEAO candidature 
was again an issue. Apart from an articulate -minority opposed to any institution of 
representative democracy, the majority of Federation’s members believed that green 
activism should develop both inside and outside Parliament. It was therefore decided 
to put forward candidates for election, again, but the high hopes of the FEAO were 
dashed by the vote count. The Federation had received 50,868 votes and was still only 
entitled to its one representative, though it had increased its percentage from 0.58 to
0.77%.18 Since all the opinion polls had predicted between 2 and 3%, there was 
general disappointment and talk about a lost historical opportunity.19 The poor 
election results revitalised discussions about turning from political institutions back to
15 Tsavides, K. ‘Federation of Ecological and Alternative Organisations and the Social 
Movement spectrum’, Flowers o f Evil (Anthi tou Kakou), No. 5, Spring 1990.
16 Schizas, G. ‘Let’s Start from the Beginning’, New Ecology, No. 62, Dec. 1989.
17 ‘Eastern Europe and the Balkans: A Preliminary Co-operation’, New Ecology, No. 
66, April 1990.
18 Demertzis, op. cit., ref. 2.
19 Ritzoulis, G. ‘The shop-window is in a thousand pieces, but what matters is the 
display’, New Ecology, No. 68, June 1990.
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civil society and encourage green activism at the local level.20 Many FEAO members 
complained that for some time most of the internal discussions had concerned 
organisational issues or political topics, and that there was no comprehensive political 
agenda with concrete policy proposals.
Since there was a host of unresolved problems within the Federation, it was 
decided not to participate officially in the municipal elections of October 1990, 
although many ecological or alternative municipal groups, which participated, had 
FEAO support. Some of these groups stood independently, some allied themselves 
with political formations (all of them from the Left). These political collaborations at 
the municipal elections caused new friction within the Federation, because the 
environmentalists accused the alternative groups of trying to unite extra-parliamentary 
left-wing groups at the expense of ecology.21
However, if ecological and alternative groups had not scored highly in the 
national elections, it was otherwise in the municipal ballot. The participating green 
organisations much increased their percentages, and became represented on many 
municipal councils. Provincial environmental and ecological groups (e.g. in Larissa, 
Kozani, Zakinthos, Rhodes, Nafplio) that had a long history of local green activism 
received the highest number of votes.22 The results of the municipal elections showed 
that the people have confidence in green political formations where local problems are 
concerned, but less so concerning general issues like the economy, foreign policy, etc.
Between 1989 and 1991 the FEAO parliamentary group concerned itself with 
many matters closely related to the Federation’s agenda. It submitted a draft-law, 
introduced amendments to existing draft-laws, raised questions in Parliament, and 
responded to issues raised by the media and social foundations. The issues to which it
20 Modinos, M. ‘The period of Adulthood’, New Ecology, No. 67, May 1990.
21 Paraskevopoulos, G. ‘The Municipal Elections and the Ecological Spectrum’, 
Ecological Newspaper, No. 39, Nov. 1990; and Tremopoulos, M. ‘Was Sisyphus an 
Ecologist?’ Ecotopia, No. 11, Jan. 1991.
22 At the municipal elections in Kozani in northern Greece, the independent green 
Ecological Movement of Kozani took 8% of the vote. Ritzoulis, G. ‘The Centre is 
Grey, Yet the Periphery has Become Green’, Ecological Newspaper, No. 39, Nov. 
1990; and Tremopoulos, M. (1992) The Ecological Movement in Greece and the 
Balkans: History and Perspectives, M.A. Thesis, Goddard College, U.S.A.
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addressed itself, and which transcended the boundaries of mere environmentalism, 
were:
1. environmental protection and the quality of life (e.g. sweet-water shortages, 
disposal and recycling of sewage, industrial pollution, the protection of archaeological 
sites);
2. the government’s social and economic policy (e.g. the rise in the price of tickets 
on public transport, social insurance for people with special needs, indirect taxes);
3. violation of labour legislation and the right to unionisation (e.g. cases of dismissal 
of public sector employees, the right of policemen to unionisation),
4. the rights of social minorities and human rights generally (e.g. E.C. funding for 
improving conditions at the psychiatric hospital on Leros island, students’ right to 
housing);
5. peace and anti-military movement ( e.g. the American military bases on Crete, 
harmonising Greek legislation with that of Europe with regard to conscientious 
objectors);
6. certain matters concerning local self-administration (e.g. adjusting the boundaries
'J'Xof prefectures and municipalities).
The Federation’s Constitutional Conference was initially planned for May- 
June 1990, but was repeatedly postponed due to growing internal troubles. A firm date 
was finally set for 23-26 January 1992, and between January and June 1991 three 
preparatory meetings of working groups were held to elaborate the agenda.24 The 
range of topics discussed manifested the groups’ hope to put forward a comprehensive 
political program including certain specific positions on major issues. Inevitably, the 
sensitive issues of nationalism and ethnic minorities also came up for discussion, and 
the working groups were unable to reach agreement; they therefore provided a simple 
statement of the incompatible positions. The existing rupture between the ecological 
and the alternative groups on some of these issues became very evident indeed.
The 1992 Constitutional Conference itself was, for the first time, attended not 
only by groups and organisations, but also by single individuals. By inviting groups
23 ‘Parliamentary Questions by the FEAO’, Eco-Information, No. 6, Jan. 1991.
24 ‘Federation of Ecological and Alternative Organisations’ in First Constitutional 
Conference o f the Federation o f Ecological and Alternative Organisations, Bulletin 
published by the Federation, Jan. 1992.
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and individuals, who may previously have been excluded, it was hoped to broaden the 
Federation’s social reach.25 That this was fast shrinking soon became apparent. Many 
organisations (above all from the provinces) had already withdrawn, and the 
remainders were faced with strong ideological disagreements over the rise of 
nationalism in Greek society.
The two topics that dominated the proceedings were the situation in the ex- 
Yugoslav democracy of Macedonia, and ethnic minorities.26 There was a profound 
disparity of opinions concerning the Macedonian issue. They ranged from recognising 
the right of the people of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) to 
call themselves Macedonians, to insisting on official participation at the Salonica pan- 
Hellenic rally on the lasting importance of the Greek-Macedonian civilisation, and the 
objection to any renaming of FYROM that would include the word Macedonia or 
Macedonian.27 The Macedonian question was of course closely intertwined with that 
of ethnic minorities, since denying the FYROM people the right to self-determine 
their national identity automatically affected the right of all ethnic minorities to adopt 
an identity at variance with that of their host-state.
25 ‘ “Ecologists/Alternatives”: The Two-Year Course’, First Constitutional 
Conference, ibid.
26 The Macedonian issue was one of the main mobilising forces of nationalism in the 
early 1990s. The dissolution of Yugoslavia had led to the independent status of the 
former republic of Yugoslavia, Macedonia. The formation of an independent nation­
state under that name resulted in passionate objections from a large part of the Greek 
people, who feared that recognition of an independent Macedonian state would 
complicate the question of ethic minorities in Greece and lead to active involvement 
by Turkey on behalf of the Muslim minority in Western Thrace.
27 Athens interview on 10 Dec. 1996 with N. Chrysogelos, member of the Alternative 
Movement of Ecologists, member of the FEAO, journalist on Ecological Newspaper, 
on the editorial board of Recycling. Interview with Caterina Iatropoulou, op. cit., ref. 
14; Korakianitis, M. ‘Hollow Nationalistic Infatuations and Mummified Peoples’, 
Flowers o f Evil, No. 7, Winter 1991; Ifantis, S. ‘Dry Soil’, Ecotopia, No. 17, March 
1992; Blionis, G. ‘The Fragmentation of the Ecological Movement’, Ecotopia, No. 
26, Oct.-Nov. 1994.
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The Constitutional Conference split into two camps. The first, consisting 
mainly of the extra-parliamentary left-wing groups Rupture and Action, wanted to 
create a Balkan bloc against European Community and United States expansionism in 
the region. Moreover, they argued that recognition of an independent nation-state 
named Macedonia would increase tension in the Balkans and undermine the strong 
Balkan union that was the only viable strategy against Turkish expansionism. 
Concerning the issue of ethnic minorities, they asserted that in Greece and Cyprus the 
Muslim minorities are being manipulated by the Turkish state, undermining thereby 
Greek national interests. The anti-European and anti-American position of the 
alternative camp, and their approval of nationalism as a political strategy for realising 
the presence of a strong Greek nation-state in the Balkans, brought strong opposition 
from the ecologists, environmentalists, anti-militarists, conscientious objectors, and
Oftinternationalists. This ecological/environmental camp denounced any rise in
nationalism as entailing the increased polarisation and militarisation of Greek 
00society. On the Macedonian issue and the rights of ethnic minorities, it 
unequivocally came out in favour of the right to self-determination as a principle 
taking precedence over any strategic interest of some national majority or oppositional 
state. In any case, the ecologists and environmentalists questioned the premise of an 
expansionist Turkish state and of any cultural and/or religious unity in the Balkans.30
28 The positions of the Rupture and Action groups are presented more fully in a book 
by G. Karabelias, the leader of the alternative camp. The following two extracts are 
typical: ‘Until 1974 the dominant conflict, in regard to foreign policy, was the one 
between the Greek social formation and American imperialism. After 1974, the 
dominant conflict has been between Greece and Turkish expansionism’. And: ‘The re­
acquisition of our national identity constitutes our strategic policy for the ‘90s’. 
Karabelias, G. (1993) Greece: A Country in Between Boundaries, (Athens, 
Alternative Publishing and Egeon Publishing House), p. 83 and p. 105.
29 Tremopoulos, M. ‘Greek-Turkish Relations: “National Policy” or Development of 
an Anti-War Consciousness’, I  Refuse, No. 3, July 1987.
30 Kakouriotis, S. ‘Draft Resolution in Regard to the Balkan Issue’, First 
Constitutional Conference, op. cit., ref. 24.
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The FEAO, therefore, incorporated a broad range of attitudes from extreme 
nationalism to international pacifism.31 Its internal proceedings were further 
complicated by the decision of the Greens in the European Parliament to support the 
immediate recognition of the old FYROM under the name of Macedonia.32 The 1992 
Panhellenic Constitutional Conference finally witnessed the dissolution of the 
Federation. However, the withdrawal of the environmental and ecological 
organisations did not stop the Alternatives from opening the third phase of the 
Conference.33 The ecological/environmental organisations declared the groups 
Rupture and Action as responsible for the breakdown of the Conference, and 
denounced the continuation of proceedings under the general auspices of the 
Federation as illegitimate.
Following the FEAO’s dissolution, the environmental and ecological groups 
went their different ways. In general, the period succeeding the Federation was 
marked by an increased professionalisation of the Greens.34 Many groups became 
involved in international non-governmental organisations (the World Wildlife Fund, 
Greenpeace, etc.) and established local branches in Greece.35 Others built up their
31 Indicative of some extreme nationalistic positions in the Federation was the 
proposal to close down the Turkish consulate in Komotini, in northern Greece, on the 
grounds that it constituted one of the Turkish state’s political means to influence and 
impose policies on the Muslim minorities. ‘Muslim Minorities in Thrace’, First 
Constitutional Conference, ibid.
32 P.N., ‘Why do the Greens in Europe support the immediate recognition of the 
democracy of Skopia under the name Macedonia?’, Ecotopia, No. 21, Jan.-Feb. 1993.
33 Ecological Movement of Salonica, ‘The Ecologists-Altematives have Belied our 
Hopes’, New Ecology, No. 95, Sept. 1992.
34 Athens interview with Leonidas Louloudes, ex-member of the ecological 
department of SYN, journalist at New Ecology, Anti, Dawn, ex-member of the 
Coordinative Committee of The Citizen, professor at the Geoponic School, and FEAO 
member, 17 Dec. 1996.
35 Non-governmental organisations (NGOs) differ significantly from new social 
movements in regard to their ideological agenda, social base, and strategy.
(i) Ideology: New social movements have formulated a holistic critique of modernity. 
Even where new social movements have focused on specific topics (gender the
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own non-governmental networks (for example SOS Mediterranean, or the Recycling 
Group). Most of these NGO’s have co-operated extensively with international 
networks like MEDNET (Mediterranean Network), EARTHACTION, etc., as well as 
with ministerial agencies. Since 1992 the number of non-governmental ecological or 
environmental organisations has risen rapidly.36
environment, etc.), they have associated these specific demands with an alternative 
vision of politics. NGO’s on the other hand have concrete objectives, which they try 
to meet via management of material and political resources,
ii) Social base: New social movements have a broad base of supporters and 
sympathisers, who also legitimate these movements. NGOs consist of a circle of 
professionals and sympathisers. Their legitimation stems from the effective delivery 
of policies. Accordingly, the leadership of NGOs is composed of professionals, who 
can either offer unique expertise in specific areas, or a knowledge base useful for the 
evaluation and implementation of social programs. The professional character of 
NGO’s excludes by definition individuals and social groups that cannot meet these 
criteria.
iii) Strategy: New social movements also include anti-institutional elements. The 
desired position vis-a-vis political institutions has always been a significant issue of 
ideological dispute in new social movements. NGOs, on the other hand, are inevitably 
bound up with existing political or economic institutions (e.g. the European 
Community) since they have to deliver policy successes. For instance, government 
agencies or international institutions often collaborate with NGOs to develop, 
evaluate, and implement social programs. Many activists of new social movements 
have participated in the formation of NGOs. However, new social movements and 
NGOs are different phenomena associated with different historical periods (the 1960s 
to 1980s for the former, the 1990s for the latter).
36 In 1995 there were 145 non-governmental environmental or ecological 
organisations in Greece. In 1997, the number had risen to 196. Research conducted by 
the ‘Environmental Group’ of the National Centre of Social Sciences (Jan. 1996- 
March 1997) and Katsakiori, M. (1995) Non-Governmental Nature-Oriented 
Organisations in Greece, Europe and the Mediterranean Basin, (Salonica, The 
Goulandris Natural History Museum, Greek Habitat-Wetland Centre).
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There have also been several attempts to construct broader collaborative green 
projects, which have taken the form of either green activism on purely environmental 
issues, or trying to build up a new political formation, or to coordinate the green 
groups in Greek society.37 However, none of the new collaborative projects succeeded 
in bringing together as broad a range of environmental and ecological organisations as 
did the FEAO. After 1992, therefore, the Greens broke up into a large number of 
environmental/ecological NGOs and uncoordinated efforts to revitalise political 
ecology. The FEAO’s failure has left a strong mark on the Greens, exemplified by the 
subsequent ascendancy of environmentalism and the demise of political ecology. The 
Federation constituted the last broad effort by the Greens to transcend mere 
environmentalism and formulate a political vision of a novel society based on the 
principles of political ecology.
In brief the history of the green movement in Greece can be divided into four 
phases: 1973-81: primacy of environmentalism and green activism, 1981-1989: rise of 
political ecology and movement politics, 1989-1992: fragile supremacy of political 
ecology, ascendancy of party politics (Federation), demise of movement politics.
37 For instance, the Network of Environmental Organisations was founded in October 
1995. The 65 participating organisations proclaimed as their main target co-operation 
and coordination concerning environmental degradation (for instance, the 
management and pollution of water resources, environmental impact of large public 
works, the new draft-law concerning forest regions). Another important endeavour, 
initiated by the magazine New Ecology in collaboration with individuals ideologically 
linked to SYN, led to a Panhellenic political formation called New Ecological 
Initiative (Nea Ikologiki Protovoulia). However, its bearing on the green spectrum 
was limited. In December 1993 various ecological groups, interested in unification of 
the existing environmental and ecological groups and in safeguarding green 
autonomy, set up the organisation Political Ecology. This organisation became a 
member of the European Greens and participated in the 1994 European elections. In 
1996 the Initiative of Green Politics (Protovoulia Prasinis Politikis) was set up to 
intensify the debate in politics with regard to the ecological transformation of society. 
‘Network of Environmental Organisations: One more Step’, New Ecology, No. 146 
Dec. 1996; Ifantis, S. ‘The Ecological Spectrum at the European Elections’, Ecotopia, 
No. 25, June 1994; Initiative o f Green Politics, leaflet; Blionis, op. cit., ref. 27.
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Since 1992: rise of environmentalism and ascendancy of non-governmental
•  * 38organisations.
In section 6.3 the ideological discourse of the Federation of Ecological and 
Alternative Organisations will be discussed with reference to that of the feminist 
movement put forward one decade earlier.
6.3 Ideology
The FEAO’s ideological framework is representative of the shift in the 
dominant political discourse from dualistic to multi-factor analysis during the late 
1980s/early 1990s. The Federation’s position of ideology goes beyond the essential 
dualist position of the Greek feminist movement (capitalism and patriarchy) and 
introduces a post-modernist reading of society that is based on a decentralised 
perception of power. Concerned with a multiplicity of social conflicts, the 
Federation’s very declaration of principles admits fragmentation and indeterminacy. 
Aside from obvious differences between the feminist and ecological movement, both 
share certain ideological elements. These are representative of the new social 
movements’ common ideological core, the clear influence of the political Left and the 
enduring impact of geopolitics.
6.3.1 Ecocentrism and Humanism, Environmentalism, Social/Political Ecology
The various manifestations of green politics can be grouped in two broad 
categories in terms of the importance they attach to mankind’s place in the natural 
world:
‘.. .the most fundamental division from an ecophilosophical point of view is 
between those who adopt an anthropocentric ecological perspective and those 
who adopt a non-anthropocentric ecological (or ecocentric) perspective. The 
first approach is characterised by its concern to articulate an ecopolitical 
theory that offers new opportunities for human emancipation and fulfilment in 
an ecologically sustainable society. The second approach...regards the 
question of our proper place in the rest of nature as logically prior to the 
question of what are the most appropriate social and political arrangements for
38 The term ‘movement politics’ denotes the transition from green activism to 
organisationally more coherent and ideologically more articulated forms of action.
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human communities.. .The magnitude of the environmental crisis is seen by 
ecocentric theorists as evidence of, among other things, an inflated sense of 
human self-importance and a misconceived belief in our capacity to fully 
understand biospherical processes’.39 
The divide runs between environmentalism and political or social ecology on the one 
hand, and ecocentrism on the other. In the case of the Federation ecocentrism was 
absent, since the organisation’s ideology was clearly founded on an anthropocentric 
green ethos encompassing strong humanistic ideological elements.40 Representative of 
the strong and enduring roots of humanism in the Greek green agenda are the 
ecological manifesto distributed by the ecological group Red Balloon in October 
1978, and the ideological position of the ecologist Georges Voiklis (FEAO candidate 
in the national elections of November 1989) fifteen years later on. The Red Balloon 
group clearly states: ‘The ecological movement constitutes the humanism of modem 
times’.41 Voiklis declares similarly: ‘Ecology is not simply a new political vision, but 
also a social ideology that connects us directly with the tradition of humanism’.42 The 
humanistic elements in the FEAO’s ideological declaration echo the humanistic 
discourse of the Greek feminists. Both movements formulated a political vision 
centred on the notions of collectivity, liberation, and the fulfilment of ‘the essence of 
humanity’. Although the feminist movement projected the opposition of the sexes, it 
also firmly acknowledged mankind’s common humanity. Likewise the ecological 
movement remained faithful to humanism, ideologically marginalizing any ecocentric 
discourse that would have questioned its ideological premises 43 This is evidence of
39 Eckersley, R. (1992) Environmentalism and Political Theory: Towards an 
Ecocentric Approach (London and New York, University College London), pp. 26- 
28.
40 A strong exception has been the organisation and member of the Federation of 
Physiolatric Anti-Hunting Initiative. The organisation published the magazine Nature 
and Ecology, which put forward an experiential and biocentric approach to nature. 
Nature and Ecology, special issue 17 (‘Against Humanism’), Spring 1992
41 Tremopoulos, op. cit., ref. 22, pp. 22-23.
42 Voiklis, G. (1992) Ecologism (Athens, Alternative Publications-in Greek), p. 99.
43 A common critique by the proponents of ecocentrism of an anthropocentric political 
ecology is that humanism is inherently ‘speciesist’. The word ‘speciesism’, like
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the two movements’ common origin in the broader spectrum of the Left, as well as of 
their enduring interaction with the Left in the course of their existence.44
In the absence of an ecocentric discourse, the ideological variants in the 
Federation were confined to three major themes: environmentalism, social and 
political ecology, and the alternative discourse.
The environmentalist platform argued mainly for nature-protection, and was 
found in organisations dedicated to improving the quality of life, to scientific 
associations, health or alternative life-style clubs, and certain single-issue 
associations. Environmentalism was not homogeneous, since some groups were 
interested in it exclusively in terms of degradation due to the waste and depletion of 
natural resources, while others extended their interest also to the urban environment 
and quality of life. Some single-issue organisations were concerned with one specific 
demand and did not engage in broader ecological schemes. What all these 
ideologically diverse groups within the environmentalist persuasion had as a common 
denominator and unifying element was their deep mistrust of the political system and 
the established political institutions. Within the Federation the environmentalists 
formed as a united bloc that persistently opposed any politicisation of green issues by 
the Federation.
The second ideological current in the Federation consisted of supporters of 
political or social ecology. Political and social ecology differ in their evaluation of 
modem political thought and the degree of importance they attach to the human 
subject. Political ecology is based on modem political theory, and underlines aspects 
related to the social construction of our human or non-human environment, as well as 
to the political significance of human agency. Accordingly, political ecology
sexism or racism, indicates discrimination. In the case of speciesism it is 
discrimination on the grounds of species. Accordingly, political ecologists are accused 
of attaching superior value to the human world compared to the animal world. 
Dobson, A (1995) Green Political Thought, (London and New York, Routledge). 
^According to Nicos Chrysogelos, the Greek ecological movement has been more 
homocentric than its European counterparts, due to the participants’ organisational 
origins from the political Left, and also because these has been no large 
environmental movement that could have fostered a more ecocentric green ethos. 
Interview with N. Chrysogelos, op. cit., ref. 27.
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4.. .refers to the attempt to see nature primarily as a political question. The 
political ecology package gives social actors a constructive role in the 
relationship between man and nature... Its basic assumption is that the 
environment is a field of political struggles and as such is open to human 
(political) intervention. The conservationist idea of a nature that has to be 
maintained .. .is replaced by an idea of the political making of a “better” 
nature... Its moral framing devices are characterised by an agency symbolism 
that is closely connected to ideas of an ethics of responsibility’.45 
Social ecology on the other hand is based on an organismic philosophy of 
nature. The concept of social ecology is associated with the work of Murray 
Bookchin, who states that social ecology promises to put an end to the existing 
hierarchical and domineering attitudes as well as the social relations that connect 
man’s domination of nature with mans domination of man.46 Bookchin has elaborated 
a comprehensive philosophy of nature based on the ecological principles of 
differentiation, inner development and unity in diversity. He applies these principles 
to all realms, including the nature of the self. He underlines that no kind of 
organisation can guarantee non-domination, not even self-management, 
communalism, or direct democracy. Only those liberating structures, that allow the 
free development of an authentic selfhood and consequently change the nature of the 
self, can be successful47
Although, therefore, political and social ecology are in some respect 
ideologically incompatible, they do agree in their definition of ecology as a political 
project reconstituting society in its totality. Both emphasise the social and political 
origins of environmental degradation, both are vehemently critical of mere 
environmentalism and ecocentrism. Although the declarations and documents of the 
Federation represent an ideological framework that is closer to political ecology, they
45 Eder, K (1996) The Social Construction o f Nature (London, Thousand Oaks, and 
New Delhi, Sage Publications), pp. 178-79.
46 Bookchin, M. (1986) Post-Scarcity Anarchism (Montreal, Black Rose Books).
47 Clark, J. (1984) The Anarchist Moment: Reflections on Culture, Nature and Power 
(Montreal, Black Rose Books).
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also include elements of social ecology.48 In any case, the FEAO’s political ecology 
tenet has always been rather fragile, since both the environmentalist and the 
alternative groups have consistently questioned it.
The alternative groups perceived ecology as a universal and trans-class 
discourse, a view that has made possible the unification of the various alternative 
movements under a single banner. However, ecology itself was seen as an incomplete 
political project.
‘An ecologically viable society does not specify necessarily the form of the 
social regime, economic distribution, gender relations or even the one of 
technology.. .the ecological perspective cannot turn out to be adequate’.49 
It was claimed that since ecology does not constitute a holistic political project in 
itself, only an alternative perspective originating from the unification of alternative 
movements can encompass the notion of totality. This is an interpretation of ecology 
in narrower terms than given by the proponents of political or social ecology, and 
thereby also denies the primacy of the ecological discourse. This is quite clear in the 
documents of the Federation, where any reference to the primacy of the ecological 
crisis is always followed by a list of social conflicts that constituted the main locus of 
the political activism of the alternative groups.
In brief, the co-existence of environmental, ecological, and alternative groups 
under the common banner of the Federation became possible by the adoption of an 
ideological platform, which, while approximating to political ecology, avoided a clear 
definition of ecology. The Federation’s agenda presents a pluralistic reading of 
society that unites humanism with a vague definition of ecology, thereby providing 
the vital common ground for safeguarding the organisational alliance.
48 The FEAO documents often stress the need to intervene politically on the personal 
level too, in order to change the nature of the self that has been deprived of all 
freedom and creativity by the present industrial civilisation. A very active group in the 
Federation and a proponent of social ecology has been the Alternative Movement of 
Ecologists (EKO). Declaration of Constitutional principles, op. cit., ref. 4, and 
Ecological Calendar, 1988
49 Karabelias, G. ‘Green-Alternative Politics in a Changing World’, Rupture, No. 39, 
January 1991, p. 8.
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6.3.2 Holism, Pluralism, Difference
The Federation’s all-embracing discourse put in question the legitimacy of the 
modem political and social order and its relation to nature. For the environmentalist/ 
ecological groups this holism was ideologically founded on the green principles of 
interdependency and mutuality. As Michalis Modinos argues:
‘the infinitely small becomes infinitely large, because everything has an end 
result and everything influences something else...The small and the large must 
come together in order to lead to a new awareness of things, a new political 
perspective’.50
In an applied sense, the Green emphasis on interrelationship has provided the 
ideological background for a critique of industrial civilisation as such (both western 
and eastem-European manifestations of industrialism, as well as the relations of the 
capitalist centre with developing countries). The holistic discourse of the alternative 
groups, on the other hand, rests on an anti-systemic ideological stand:
‘Society cannot be cleansed of pollution, it must be overturned’.51 
The Federation has taken interdependency, mutuality, and the anti-systemic 
standpoint and merged them all into one ecopolitical program.
By its holistic criticism of industrial civilisation, coupled with its efforts 
towards a new eco-political utopia through creating a new and liberated society, the 
FEAO’s ideology corresponds more to the radical political culture of the 1970s and 
early 1980s than to the dominant political culture of the subsequent decade (1990s). In 
that regard it is in agreement with the holistic and utopian nature of the Greek feminist 
movement’s political project. There is an important difference between them, 
however, concerning their perception of power. The feminists expanded the dominant 
political discourse by introducing the dimension of gender, but remained faithful to a 
reading of society centred on capitalism and patriarchy. The Federation, on the other 
hand, provided a holistic reading of social reality without acknowledging a central 
organisational principle or dominant social conflict. If, therefore, the Greek feminist 
movement questioned the modernist claim to universality by asserting women’s right
50 Modinos, M (1990) ‘The Time of Ruptures and the Claim to Universality’ in 
George Karabelias (ed.), The Greening o f Theory (Athens, Alternative Publications 
‘Commune’- in Greek), pp. 61-62.
51 Rupture, No. 7, Nov. 1981, p. 30.
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to speak for themselves in their own voice, the green protagonists questioned 
modernity further by adopting a reading of society closer to post-modernism. Thus it 
was pluralism, fragmentation and difference that constituted the ideological marks of 
the Federation’s discourse.
The first declaration of the constitutional principles of the Federation states 
very clearly that
‘...the proposed “ecological/alternative” perspective of politics and the social
conflicts of this world is not one-dimensional; on the contrary this perspective
is pluralistic and multi-dimensional’.
The pluralistic aspect of the FEAO’s ideology is illustrated by the detailed references 
in its documents to a series of fundamental social conflicts, namely between society 
and nature, individuality and collectivity, intellectual versus manual labour, 
administrators and administrated, labour and capital, the battle of the sexes, racial 
conflicts, social minorities and the state, ethnic conflicts, centre and periphery, First 
World and Third World, national liberation movements versus imperialism, etc.
The juxtaposition of social conflicts as equivalent was in accord with the green 
principles of multiplicity, heterogeneity, and interdependency, but it also exemplified 
the Federation’s actual ideological and organisational impasses. As already 
mentioned, the co-existence of green and alternative would not have been possible 
under a purely ecological agenda, and absolutely necessitated associating the 
ecological with other social predicaments. Not surprisingly, merging the two 
perspectives created problems of its own. Simply enumerating social conflicts without 
shaping them into an ideological whole with a clear political theme led to confusion 
with respect to the Federation’s political identity. The FEAO’s subsequent endeavours 
to create a political image of itself beyond that of a catch-all organisation of numerous 
social minorities led to further ideological dilemmas.53 The greens argued for a
52 ‘Declaration of the Constitutional Principles of the Federation of Ecological and 
Alternative Organisations’, op. cit., ref. 4, p. 3.
53 Both the FEAO’s ideological components, Greens and Alternatives, severely 
criticised the lack of a clear political identity and underlined the dangers of this 
deficiency for the organisation’s future. Nerantzis, P. ‘The Moment of Truth has 
Come also for the Ecologists’, Ecotopia, No. 11, Jan. 1991; Athanasopoulos- 
Kalomalos, T. ‘Identity and Principles of the Green Movement in the World and in
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broader definition of ecology, while the alternative groups dismissed ecology as an 
incomplete political project and insisted that only the alternative perspective can be 
politically comprehensive. The inability of the two sides to agree on the definition of 
ecology and its political priority does not, however, negate the Federation’s clear 
commitment to the principles of multiplicity, heterogeneity and interdependency. 
Because of it ideological commitment as well as from organisational necessity, 
pluralism was never questioned.54
6.3.3 Development, Industrialism, Capitalism
The Federation of Ecological and Alternative Organisations was 
uncompromisingly anti-developmental. It made it quite clear that
‘By the concept “development” we understand the distortion of the creative 
evolution of humankind. This process commenced with the appearance of 
industrial society in the middle of the eighteenth century and has led to the 
dominance of economic growth as the necessary and sufficient precondition of 
progress. Contrary to former societies, western societies have a linear
Greece: Critical Review and Proposal’, Ecotopia, No. 13, May-June 1991; 
‘Ecologists/Alternatives: An All-Encompassing Account’, Eco-lnformation, No. 6, 
Jan. 1991.
54 The Greek experience has been similar to the case of the Groen Links (Green Left) 
in the Netherlands. The Groen Links consisted of a progressive Christian party (the 
Evangelical People’s Party), the Political Radical Party, the Pacifist-Socialist Party 
and the Communist Party of the Netherlands. Due to its composite origins, the Groen 
Links, like the FEAO, acknowledged several social conflicts: man-nature, gender, 
north-south, hetero- and homosexuality, labour-capital, etc. Its first manifesto ‘...was 
a cocktail of pacifist, Marxist, progressive Christian, libertarian socialist, ecologist 
and feminist ideas’. Like the FEAO, the Groen Links struggled with its ideology from 
the beginning and ‘had real difficulties in framing a coherent ideology’. Voeerman, G
(1995) ‘The Netherlands: Loosing Colours, Turning Green’ in Dick Richardson, C 
Rootes (eds) The Green Challenge: The Development o f Green Parties in Europe 
(London and New York, Routledge), p. 118 and p. 110.
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perception of progress and perceive as a stage of maturity the capability to 
endless growth, instead of the realisation of a condition of balance’.55 
The rationale of economic expansion, the Federation declared, now dominates the 
whole world, penetrating all economic and political systems in the East, West, and 
Third World.56 On the international level, consequences of this global rule of 
industrialism have been the unequal exchange between North and South and the 
consequent impoverishment of the Third World. Moreover, industrialism has 
destroyed the Third World social networks and devalued and marginalized its 
culture.57 On the national economic level, industrialism has led to the establishment of 
dependent wage labour, the increasing exploitation of man by man, and the 
eradication of social solidarity through increasing commercialisation and individual 
competition.58 Furthermore, on the political level industrialism has set in motion the 
centralisation and bureaucratisation of political power, the increasing intrusiveness of 
the state in the private life of its citizens, and the dominance of a political culture 
favouring political inertia and indifference.59
In the Federation’s all-encompassing criticism of industrialism two aspects of 
the industrial model are especially underlined: the ecological crisis and industrial 
civilisation. According to the Federation’s Bulletin
‘the crisis of nature is the most important outcome of the ideology of 
development and the decisive boundary mark of the actual end of the society 
of affluence’.60
This clearly states the physical limits of the rationale of development and the 
shrinking of the material preconditions for the perpetuation of the human species. 
Ecological degradation is not, however, put forward as an independent, phenomenon:
55 ‘Is there any Counter-Solution to the Rationale of Development?’, FEAO Bulletin- 
Jan .1992, p. 21.
56 ‘Is there any Counter-Solution to the Rationale of Development?’, ibid.
57 ‘Is there any Counter-Solution to the Rationale of Development?’, ibid.
58 ‘Common Agreement of the Cooperating Ecological Groups’, Bulletin, No. 6, Nov. 
1988
59 Fundamental Principles o f Green-Alternative Politics, FEAO bulletin.
60 ‘Is there any Counter-Solution to the Rationale of Development?’, op. cit., ref. 55,
p. 21
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‘Any discourse concerning the “crisis of nature” is also a discourse concerning 
the “crisis of society”. The destruction of the former (nature) is posing the 
question of the restructuring of the latter (society)’.61
Thus, the depletion of natural resources is presented as an outcome of 
industrial civilisation, which provided the foundation for the consolidation of many 
different forms of domination. The critique of ecological degradation is coupled with 
that of the destructive logic of capitalist accumulation, of the acquisitive values of the 
consumer society and, more generally, of the authoritarian and hierarchical relations 
underlying the various systems of domination (class exploitation, patriarchy, 
imperialism, racism, domination of nature, etc.). The Federation has accordingly 
projected the ecological emergency primarily as a ‘crisis of culture’, meaning a crisis 
of the inherited knowledge, values, and ideas permeating social relations and
•  XT')practices. The creation of new values, and restructuring of shared human needs are 
underlined as most fundamental for the realisation of any ecopolitical project.63 The 
declaration of the Federation’s constitutional principles specifies that the green 
principles of balance, diversity, pluralism, and interconnectedness delineate the
61 ‘Ecological Crisis in Nature and Society’, Ecological Calendar, publ. Ecological
Movement of Salonica, 1989.
62 Robyn Eckersley argues that the ecological problematic of political and social 
ecology can be identified as a ‘crisis of culture’: ‘In short, this new breed of 
ecopolitical theorists began to draw out what they saw as the emancipatory potential 
that they believed was latent within the ecological critique of industrialism. Moreover, 
this new project entailed much more than a simple reassertion of the modem 
emancipatory ideal of human autonomy or self-determination. It also called for a 
revaluation of the foundations of, and the conditions for, human autonomy or self- 
determination in Western political thought’. Eckersley, op. cit., ref. 38, p. 18.
63 ‘The question of human needs constitutes one of the most fundamental issues of the 
ecological movement...The human needs of everyday life must...be evaluated in 
regard to the social system’s production of “artificial” needs and the endless effort to 
satisfy them. The ecological movement believes that the rationale underlying the 
evaluation and satisfaction of human needs must change, in accordance with the 
ecological, social and cultural consequences of any realisation of those needs...’, 
Common Agreement of the Co-operating Ecological Groups, op. cit., ref. 58, pp. 5-6.
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ideological framework of any endeavour to restructure social values and practices.64
The FEAO’s anti-developmental stand is paralleled by its anti-capitalist 
position, with capitalism denounced as a result of the worldwide supremacy of 
industrialism. The profitability motive inherent in capitalist production is presented 
as one of the chief causes of the present ecological dilemma. This means that
‘... overcoming the ecological crisis is a precondition of overcoming the 
capitalist mode of production and the creation of a new liberated, self-defined 
society’.65
For all that, for the FEAO industrialism was not synonymous with the capitalist mode 
of production, and references to the former outnumber references to the latter. This is 
due mainly to the Federation’s global perspective, which includes countries with a 
certain degree of industrialisation but not capitalist. Furthermore, the strong emphasis 
on industrialism illustrates the organisation’s opposition to not only the capitalist 
production but to all manifestations of industrialism.
The Federation’s documents include a historical account of Greece’s specific 
route to modernisation, as well as its impact on the growth of the country’s green 
movement. The FEAO texts note that in Greece capitalism has been characterised by 
a fragmentation of capital and property, with post-war development based 
predominantly on small manufacturing, middle-range industry, tourism, and massive 
remittances from emigrants. This process of modernisation has resulted in a large 
middle class with a highly self-interested and state-oriented mentality. Moreover, the 
prevalence of small or medium-sized industrial enterprises and the lack of economic 
surplus that would allow a serious anti-pollution policy or restoration, has forced the 
state to assume the bulk of environmental investment costs.66 In this context, the
64 ‘Declaration of the Constitutional Principles of the Federation of Ecological and 
Alternative Organisations’, Bulletin, special issue, op. cit., ref. 4.
65 EKO, ‘In Regard to the Ecological Crisis in Nature and Society’, Bulletin, No. 6, 
Nov. 1988.
66 Louloudes, L. (1987)‘Social Demands: From Environmental Protection to Political 
Ecology’ in C. Orfanides, The Ecological Movement in Greece (Athens, Meta te 
Vrochi -  in Greek); Papadopoulos, P. ‘For a Greek Political Ecology’ in Orfanides, 
ibid; ‘Ecology and Sewage tanks’, Rupture, No. 5, Nov. 1980; Schizas, G.
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Federation pointed out, the Greek ecological movement had to deal with two major 
problems: the middle strata’s consumerist ideology, and the magnified role of the 
state. In other words, Greece’s route to modernisation frequently brought the 
ecological movement in conflict not only with private capital, but also with the social 
middle layers and the state.
The above analysis by the FEAO of Greece’s post-war development is in 
accord with the ideological premise of the Left that the country has experienced a 
distorted process of capital accumulation, which made private capital dependent on 
foreign actors and the state. While the FEAO adopted the argument of a false 
modernisation, it at the same time rejected outright the Left’s belief in economic 
progress in the sense of unending further development of the productive forces.67 In 
that respect the Federation’s discourse constitutes a radical break with the political 
tradition of the Left, which has regularly projected development as the solution to 
many of the structural problems of Greek society (e.g. emigration, economic poverty, 
foreign dependency, deficiency in social and political institutions). Its denial of the 
Left belief in economic growth has constituted the only anti-developmental political 
discourse in Greece’s post-war political culture*
6.3.4 The State and Civil Society
The ideological stance of the FEAO was generally anti-state and in favour of 
direct democracy. The declaration of its constitutional principles clearly professes 
adherence to the principles of autonomy and self-management. Achievement of these 
two aims presupposes the transfer of powers and authorities from the state to civil 
society, meaning the citizens themselves.
‘The state-Leviathan has been suppressive and oppressive. Moreover, it has 
confined the autonomy of its citizens, by acting on their behalf. Therefore, the 
realisation of autonomy presupposes the transfer of powers from the state to 
the citizens’.68
‘Contribution to the History of the Greek Ecological Movement’, Ecotopia, No. 23, 
July-Aug. 1993.
67 Modinos, M. ‘The Developmental Myth of the Left’, New Ecology, No. 7, May 
1985.
68 ‘Non-Violent Culture’, in FEAO bulletin Oct. 1989, p. 5.
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The above statement shows the organisation’s political stand vis-a-vis both the 
state and civil society. In the Federation’s early publications the state is associated 
with domination, violence, and falsification of the people’s political choices. It is also 
linked to oppression of and violence against social and political minorities. 
Furthermore, its authoritarianism has been supported and legitimated by scientific and 
technocratic knowledge.
‘Politicians and technocrats define and impose policies, leading to a state of 
things where “freedom”, “democracy”, “equality”, and “justice” have become 
merely formalistic terms losing their real meaning’.69
It was the FEAO’s view, therefore, that the authoritarian function of the state, 
in association with the consolidation of a hegemonic political culture, has diminished 
the role of citizens and made a mockery of political representation. The only solution 
to this escalating democratic deficit is, according to the Federation, the mobilisation 
of civil society for the purpose of deepening democracy.
‘As a consequence we radically question, in action and theory, whatever is 
nowadays called “politics”, and any organisational scheme and procedure, 
which aims at organising better the society of exploitation’.70 
The FEAO’s broad definition, of the ‘institutionalised political system’ (e.g. the 
parties, labour unions, the army, psychiatric institutions) means a narrow definition of 
civil society as the sphere of the active enactment of collective citizenship. Since 
associations in the political and economic domain function according to a bureaucratic 
and capitalist logic of their own, civil society can only be located within the life- 
world, which remains a world of meaning and freedom. Civil society, therefore,
69 Indicative of the anti-scientific position of many green organisations was also a 
slogan in the April 1981 Athens demonstration against the smog: ‘The solution will 
not come from the experts, it will come from the people’. Some green groups, 
however, did believe in ‘ecological science’ as a means for overcoming 
environmental degradation (e.g. the group around New Ecology, Ecological Challenge 
(Ikologikos Antilogos), the Union of Greek Ecologists, the Greek Association for the 
Protection of Nature, the Panhellenic Movement o f Foresters, the Greek 
Ornithological Association). Ecological Calendar, 1988, p. 43; ‘Non-Violent 
Culture’, ibid, p. 5
70 ‘Non-Violent Culture’, ibid.
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located outside the borders of the dominative politico-economic system, is perceived 
as the only sphere with an emancipatory potential. It is civil society that, in the 
Federation’s creed, is capable of realising:
‘the fundamental needs of human beings for solidarity, personal fulfilment and
creativity’.71
And:
‘There exists only one option for Greek society nowadays, that is the 
autonomous reconstitution of civil society, involving every single social 
movement’.72
Within the Federation, however, ideological variations existed, especially 
between the green and alternative protagonists, with regard to political strategy vis-a- 
vis civil society and the state.73 The Greens focused on the emancipatory potential of 
civil society, while the alternative groups underlined the political danger of ‘self­
limited radicalism’, giving no consideration to the interaction between civil society 
and the state. So, while the ideological principles of anti-statism and anti-capitalism 
served to unify the two sides, the question of civil society’s political potential 
generated dissent. The ideology of the Federation is significantly different from that 
of the feminist movement in this respect. While the latter aimed at the autonomous 
mobilisation of citizens, it never mentioned civil society in so many words. The 
discourse of the Federation illustrates the ideological shift in the political culture of 
the 1980s/1990s away from the terminology associated with the political Left and 
towards the new social movements’ emancipatory potential in civil society. While 
both, the feminists and the FEAO, are phenomena of new social movements, the 
ideology of the ecological movement also presents a kind of self-reflection and self-
71 Fundamental Principles of Green Alternative Politics, FEAO bulletin, p. 5.
72 ‘Social and Political Institutions’, Bulletin, No. 9, Feb.-March, 1989, p. 17.
73 Among the Greens, the pure environmentalists articulated the most rigid anti-state 
and anti-institutional discourse. They declined all participation in the established 
institutions of the political system, on the grounds that it would lead to co-optation 
and abolition of Green autonomy. Nikolopoulos, F. ‘Social Dynamic and Electoral 
Processes’, New Ecology, No. 53, March 1989; Xiros, G. ‘The Course of Autonomy is 
Consistent with Us’, New Ecology, ibid.
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identification that is grounded in the new body of academic literature about new social 
movements.
6.3.5 Participatory and Representative Democracy
A fundamental premise of the Federation’s ideology was the principle of direct 
participatory democracy. While the superiority of direct as opposed to representative 
democracy was never questioned by the FEAO in the course of its existence, how 
these two forms of political participation should be balanced remained an open 
dispute that was never resolved. In the FEAO’s declaration of its constitutional 
principles the support for direct democracy is clearly stated. So is its opposition to any 
ruling out of the institutions of representative democracy.
‘The Green movement is a democratic movement. It does not counterpoise 
representative with direct democracy. However, it regards direct democracy as 
the centre of the new political perspective, and that representative democracy 
devoid of direct democracy becomes merely a form without a content’.74 
The Federation’s proposals for a future novel societal organisation expressed a 
firm belief in direct democracy. In terms of the economy, they underlined the need for 
decentralisation and empowering the periphery.
‘The ecological alternative movement proposes an agricultural economy that is 
not going to be founded on monocultivations and fertilisers; an industry 
developed on a peripheral basis, which will not pollute, and finally a tourist 
sector converse to the unilateral tourist development of specific regions and 
the development of “mass tourism’” .75 
In the Federation’s terminology, economic decentralisation is perceived as a 
presupposition for successful decentralisation on the political level
The Federation did not consider the political institutions of liberal democracy 
as expendable. On the contrary, it declared the aim of ecological/alternative politics to 
be the restoration of their democratic character through the citizens’ active political 
participation. It would be the people themselves, who, once mobilised, will either 
restore their democratic meaning and purpose or expose them as obsolete and create
74 ‘Self-Management, Autonomy’, in FEAO bulletin Oct. 1989, p. 4.
75 ‘The Ecological and Economic Crisis in Greece’, in Fundamental Principles of 
Green-Alternative Politics, FEAO bulletin, p. 9.
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new political institutions that truly meet social needs.76 A presupposition for the 
citizen’s active participation is the eradication of ‘any form of centralisation and 
gigantic size either of the state or the private sector’.77
The policy proposals by the Federation for encouraging direct democracy in 
Greece were the following: (i) direct control of the government at all times by way of 
referendums; (ii) restructuring the judicature by means of new laws concerning the 
promotion and appointment of judges; (iii) empowering the institutions of local self­
management. Certain competencies, concerning not only local problems but also 
general social needs, must be transferred to local self-management. Moreover, 
decision-making must not be restricted to organs on the top of the hierarchical ladder 
or to individuals. The FEAO proposed indirect election of the mayor, and the transfer 
of competencies from the mayor to municipal and neighbourhood councils and any 
other form of local organisation, (iv) application to all political institutions of the 
principles of rotational alternation and direct reversibility of representatives, and 
prohibiting of any single person from occupying more than one public office.78
In terms of direct democracy and self-management, the green/alternative 
perspective went beyond the political and economic to the sphere of culture and 
prospects for attaining personal fulfilment. Direct democracy
‘is going to advance a new cultural perspective, where human beings are not 
subjects of central governing bodies, but in control of this process themselves. 
This will advance the specification of the actual true needs, contrary to the 
artificial needs produced by the existing culture’.79 
In the Federation’s ideology, belonging to the community is a fundamental human 
need. Since the community plays such an important role in building a personal 
identity
76 First Constitutional Conference of the Federation of Ecological and Alternative 
Organisations, FEAO bulletin, Jan. 1992.
77 FEAO bulletin, Oct. 1989, p. 5.
78 FEAO bulletin, Jan. 1992.
79 Ibid, p. 27.
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‘the right to be oneself presupposes the continuous participation in social
developments. Direct democracy is the only procedure safeguarding this
A A
every-day participation of citizens’.
In brief direct democracy, by providing human autonomy and self-determination, 
while integrating human beings in their social environment, reconciliates community 
and subjectivity and so conduces to personal development.81 In the Federation’s creed 
direct democracy was a fundamental precondition for any broader political project for 
human emancipation.
The Federation’s ideological adherence to the institutions of participatory 
democracy was challenged by its rapid transformation into a political party and its 
subsequent election candidacy. The principles of direct democracy were also put to 
the test within the organisation itself by the persistence of administrative problems 
and ideological clashes. It was for this reason that, at the first Constitutional 
Conference three years after the FEAO’s founding, its earlier unconditional support 
for the principles of direct democracy became a cautious reference to the necessary 
preconditions for the application of these principles. There were many reservations at 
the Conference concerning the feasibility of direct democracy. It was noted that, to 
function effectively, participatory democracy required communities of only a limited 
size, and that it was necessary to remain flexible concerning the merger between 
direct and representative democracy.82
80 FEAO bulletin, Oct. 1989, p. 4.
81 The ideological framework of the Federation is representative of ‘ecological 
communitarianism’. This stream of thought reproduces ‘the idea of a community 
embodying a single shared subjectivity’. Like communitarianism, it is inspired by 
‘the romantic project of recreating the “whole” individual, presently tom apart by the 
conditions of modem life’. However, ecological communitarianism deepens the 
traditional communitarian discourse by stressing not only the human constitutive 
communities in which one is embedded, but also the natural biotic ones. Kenny M.
(1996) ‘Paradoxes of Community’, in B. Doherty and M. de Geus, (eds), Democracy 
and Green Political Thought: Sustainability, Rights and Citizenship (London and 
New York, Routledge), pp. 25-26.
82 ‘Principles of Ecological Alternative Politics: Third Meeting’, in FEAO bulletin, 
Jan. 1992.
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6.3.6 Non -Violence, Pacifism, Civil Disobedience
The ethic of non-violence was central to the ideology of the Federation. The 
concept was perceived as a core value of the broader subject of ecology. Since 
ecology advocates respect for nature and human beings, its tenets can be realised only 
in the context of a non-violent culture. This is why it was constantly pointed that the 
attitudes towards human communities and nature are mutually interdependent. 
Violence identifies with both military aggression and ecological destruction. To 
implement the principle of non-violence requires, in the Federation’s argument, the 
creation (via education) of a culture based on co-operation and solidarity, and the 
advancement of non-violent social practices:
‘The absence of domination over humans and nature presupposes the 
development of a non-violent culture, meaning non-violent repertoires of 
action, methods and institutions’.83 
As the proponents of non-violence have argued:
‘If you want peace, you have to prepare for peace’.84 
The Federation investigated the cultural roots of militarism, but also put 
forward specific claims and policy proposals, which can be summed up as follows: 
demilitarisation, disarmament (nuclear and conventional), abolition of the military 
blocs of NATO and the Warsaw Pact, the revocation of military intervention in local 
or international conflicts, the abolition of military expenditures and allocation of these 
sums to relieve true social needs and protect the environment, the establishment of 
nuclear-free zones, empowering the international peace and anti-militaristic 
movement, empowering the role of international institutions and NGOs (the United 
Nations, International Amnesty, human-rights organisations etc), the development of 
new forms of social defence and civil disobedience (e.g. the refusal to pay taxes for 
military expenditure), and active solidarity with all oppressed communities across the 
world.85
‘Declaration of the Constitutional Principles of the Federation of Ecological and 
Alternative Organisations’, op. cit., ref. 3, p. 4.
84 ‘Alternative Movement of Ecologists’, Bulletin, No. 2, July 1988, p. 39.
85 A strong rallying point for activists belonging to various social movements has 
been the subject of nuclear power. It has also played a role in the creation of Green
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Concerning specifically Greece, the claims centred on withdrawal from 
NATO, the ouster of all foreign military bases, the immediate reduction of military 
service, recognition of the rights of conscientious objectors, the army’s right to 
unionise, reduction of the military expenditure, improvement in Greek-Turkish 
relations and rapprochement of the two peoples.86 The major demands (Greece’s 
withdrawal from NATO, abolition of the two military blocs) were put forward by 
individual organisations or blocs of groups, whereas the official documents of the 
Federation focused more on more long-term processes like the development of 
international institutions, co-operation with NGOs and the peace movement, and the 
encouragement of civil disobedience.87
The issue of ‘non-violence’ acquired additional weight due to the outbreak of 
two wars during the FEAO’s existence: the Gulf-war and the civil war in the former 
Yugoslavia. The Federation vividly denounced both the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait
protoparties, as in Great Britain. In Greece it was of much less importance, due to the 
absence in the country of nuclear plants or weapons.
The Federation reproduced the firm belief of one section of the global green 
movement that ‘A people united in their desire for freedom and well prepared in the 
methods of non-violent resistance should ... be able to mount a non-military social 
defence against any potential invader’.
See Rootes, Chris (1995) ‘Britain: Greens in a Cold Climate’, in D. Richardson and 
C., Rootes, op. cit., ref. 54; Tokar, B. (1991) ‘Green Defence’, in A. Dobson, (ed.) 
The Green Reader, (London, Andre Deutsch, 1991), p. 92.
Ecological/Alternative Union of Citizens, ‘For a “Green” Federal Europe of 
Peripheries’, Bulletin, No. 8, Jan. 1989; ‘Alternative Movement of Ecologists’, op. 
cit., ref. 84; I  Refuse, No. 4, Spring 1991.
The Federation’s most active group in regard to ‘non-violence’ was the 
conscientious objectors around the magazine I  Refuse. The magazine took a strongly 
anti-militaristic and pacifistic stand within the anarchist tradition of social ecology. 
Accordingly it stressed the significance of the nature of the self for establishing a non­
violent culture.
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and all and any practice of war (including embargo). In the Balkan case the 
principle of non-violence revealed itself as more sensitive and caused ideological 
dissension within the Federation. The camp of the ecologists and environmentalists 
argued that peace is inseparable from the right to self-determination and that the 
principle of non-violence is undisputable. They accordingly were against Serbia’s 
military reaction to the declaration of independence by Croatia and Slovenia. The 
alternative groups, on the other hand, considered the principles of both self- 
determination and non-violence as relative in the context of imperialistic expansion, 
and declared that violence in self-defence against an imperialistic attack can be 
legitimate, and that the right to self-determination can be misused in the interests of 
imperialistic expansion.89 They argued that Slovenian and Croatian independence did 
ultimately serve the imperialistic interests of Europe and the United States, and that 
the Serbian reaction was therefore legitimate.
In order words, during the civil war in the former Yugoslavia, the non­
violence triad of peace, disarmament, and non-violent social defence lost its 
unambiguity and moral certainty and was subsumed into the Federation’s broader 
ideological dispute on the rights of ethnic minorities and nationalism. The above 
ideological differences and conflicts illustrate the dissimilar interpretation of the 
connection between the local/national and international level by the environmental 
and ecological groups on the one hand, and the alternative organisations on the other.
6.3.7 The Local, National, and International Level
A slogan of the green movement, present in all green manifestos all over the 
world, has been: ‘Think globally, act locally’. It expresses the wish of the green 
movement to transcend the traditional constraints of the nation-state and to link up the 
local and the international level directly. In this respect, the green movement is clearly 
anti-state:
88 Ecologists/Alternatives, ‘No to the Gulf War, No to the New International Order’, 
Eco-Information, No. 6, Jan. 1991; Skordoulis, K. ‘Gulf-Crisis: The Unfolding of the 
Anti-War Movement’, Ecological Newspaper, No. 39, Nov. 1990.
89 ‘Principles of Ecological/Alternative Politics: Third Meeting’ in FEAO Bulletin 
Jan. 1992.
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‘Green anti-statism characteristically emanates in proposals not for strong 
suprastate political institutions but rather in proposals for breaking states up 
and developing their powers to smaller units organised around bioregions or 
some such.. .But of course what gives impetus to the contemporary green 
movement in its present form is the supposition that we can no longer afford 
purely local remedies’.90 
On the one hand the Greens have focused on the ‘specificity of local action’, and on 
the other on a ‘universal network of solidarity based on social citizenship’.91 This 
anti-state characteristic is clearly present also in the Greek green movement, which 
has always been mindful of the dialectical interaction between local and global. Its 
agenda has ranged from the idea of establishing a universal citizenry to setting up 
smaller units of self-management on the local level. References to a national plane of 
analysis have been very limited in the Greek Green publications.92
Concerning the international community, any references to foreign-policy 
matters, or the geopolitical role of Greece in the world context, have been entirely 
absent. Instead, the movement’s writers have focused on the international ecological 
dilemma, the dominance of industrial civilisation, demilitarisation, active solidarity 
with oppressed communities, and co-operation with the peace movement. The 
absence of any reference to the nation-state as a geopolitical unit reflects the green 
movement’s ideological stand in favour of an international community founded on
90 Goodin, R. (1992) Green Political Theory (Cambridge, Polity Press), p. 157.
91 Benton, T. (ed.) (1996) The Greening o f Marxism (New York and London, The 
Guilford Press), pp. 152-53.
The West German Greens and German unification illustrate the Green anti-state 
attitude and the difficulty this causes for integrating the national level into a green 
theory. The federal program of the West German Greens in the 1980s contained only 
one reference to unification on the premise of dissolving the two military blocs. So, 
when national unification became the dominant political theme, the West German 
Greens were left ‘...confused, ambivalent and discordant’, while ‘... on the 
unification issue, one national survey indicated that the West Greens were out of 
touch with 66 per cent of their supporters’. Frankland, G (1995)‘Germany: The Rise, 
Fall and Recovery of Die Grunen’ in Richardson and Rootes, op. cit., ref. 54, pp. 34- 
35.
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solidarity and co-operation. In addition, the Greens in Greece have been critical of 
the presence of nation-states in the international community, since they associate this 
with phenomena like nationalism and geopolitical competition and with prolonged 
vicious circle of militarisation, violence, and oppression. This green anti-state 
perspective was clearly illustrated when the Federation clarified that it did not oppose 
European unification, but that this process should lead to the consolidation of a 
federal scheme based on different local centres and founded on the principles of 
autonomy and self-management. Accordingly, the FEAO actively supported opening 
up the EC to countries in Eastern and Southern Europe so as to achieve a more 
balanced development among the Community members.93
In respect of internal state organisation, existing analyses concern themselves 
with either Greece’s main ecological problems, or with the societal transformations 
necessary for empowering civil society and restraining state power (e.g. by changes in 
the existing social and political institutions as well as in cultural values).94 The 
ultimate aim of these policy proposals is to free civil society from both state 
intervention and the market economy. If on the international level the state is 
identified with militarisation and aggression, on the national level it is identified with 
hierarchy, domination and authoritarian structures. The green movement wants to see 
small communities founded on self-management and participatory democracy, and the 
Greek organisations, in accord with the principle ‘Think globally, act locally’, have 
advocated international peace and a universal citizenry, as well as local self­
management and decentralisation.
The political target of the green movement in Greece has been declared to be 
the formation of
The Union of Citizens has argued in favour of the demise of nation-states and their 
integration into broader peripheries: ‘Our ultimate vision, on a European level, is a 
United Federal Europe, above and beyond the extant political and militaristic defence 
blocs. A Europe, which is going to transcend the concept of the nation-state and will 
be composed instead by equal in force and authority peripheries, according to each 
peripheiy’s geographical, historical, cultural and social distinctiveness, which is of 
course going to be equally valued and respected’. Ecological/Alternative Union of 
Citizens, op. cit., ref. 86.
94 ‘Common Agreement of the Co-operating Ecological Groups’, op. cit., ref. 58.
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6... an ecological movement, which articulates a criticism of the institutions of 
industrial society and struggles for the dismantling of those institutions on a 
local and global level’.95
By this direct linkage of local and international level, the concepts of nation­
state and national interests become obsolete, contrary to the ideological framework of 
the alternative organisations.
The alternative literature has no lack of geopolitical analyses of the 
international community with respect to matters of national dependency or foreign 
intervention. The alternative group Rupture has even accused the green movement of 
having imported foreign models of ecological thought and of being unaware of the 
particular conditions of the Greek nation-state. It charges that
‘A section of the Greek ecologists, like in the past the Marxists, devaluates the 
significance of the “national issues”. [Thus, for the green movement] to 
become a political formation with a broader magnitude, it must first of all 
become “grounded”, meaning to connect itself with ... older Greek historical 
movements and the Greek national reality. Today, a primary issue, in regard to 
the green alternative movement’s “Greekness”, is its political position vis-a- 
vis the national issues’.96
For Rupture, ‘national grounding’ means to see the Greek people as a national 
unit in the context of a competitive global order. Previously, Rupture had focused on 
national issues relating to the European Community, NATO and Cyprus. However, 
during the late 1980s it changed direction and stated that the United States and the 
European Community had ceased to be the main imperialistic threat for Greece. Now 
it was Turkey, which in the new international conditions, had emerged as an 
increasingly autonomous peripheral power and was threatening Greek sovereignty. 
Rupture considered that Greece was in an increasingly vulnerable position vis-a-vis 
Turkish expansionism. In addition to that, the growing interference of the European 
Community and the United States in the Balkans, necessitated according to Rupture, 
the formation of a strong unified Balkan presence. In brief, while in the earlier post­
junta period the alternative discourse identified imperialism with the European
95 Ecological movement of Volos, ‘Ecology and Ecological Movement’, Bulletin, No. 
1, June 1988.
96 Karabelias, op. cit., ref. 28, pp. 70-72.
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Community and NATO, from the 1980s onwards it became identified with Turkish 
expansionism.
It was, therefore, national issues bringing out the very the different political 
and ideological attitudes of Greens and Alternatives that became the Achilles heel of 
the Federation and led to its dissolution. The Greens, in defiance of the political 
tradition of the Left, asserted their anti-state stance as non-negotiable.97 The 
alternative groups, on the other hand, reproduced the Left’s older arguments of 
national empowerment and international solidarity. In the eyes of the Greens the 
national level is irreversibly associated with relations of hierarchy and domination. 
The alternative groups, on the other hand, have adhered to the position of the political 
Left that, in the case of imperialism, the national level is the sole effective vehicle for 
attaining self-determination.
We have seen that the ideological agenda of the Federation, like that of the 
feminist movement, reproduced certain fundamental premises of the Left, namely 
humanism, the belief in collectivity, anti-capitalism, and a holistic political project of 
human emancipation. However, in terms of the ascendancy of new values, associated 
with the new social movements, it broke away from the political tradition of the Left. 
The Federation’s political discourse rested on anti-statism, the emancipatory potential 
of civil society, the principles of autonomy and participatory democracy, the 
multiplicity of social subjects and identities, criticism of industrialism and the 
significance of symbolic goods and individual needs, and the politicisation of the 
personal sphere. The ideologies of the FEAO and the autonomous feminist groups are 
in agreement with the ideological framework of new social movements, as set out in 
the relevant literature. However, in the case of the Federation this feet has often been 
blurred by the presence and views of the alternative protagonists.
97 For the Greens the nation-state concept embodies also the consolidation of a quite 
artificial homogeneity. By contrast, the green principles of differentiation, pluralism 
and unity in diversity allow a perception of minorities as contributing to the 
heterogeneity of society and enriching existing social formations. Tremopoulos, M. 
‘Solidarity to the Minority’, Ecotopia, No. 7, March 1990.
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6.4 Organisational Structure
The Federation’s belief in grassroots democracy influenced its endeavour to 
establish an organisational scheme and procedures that would allow everyone’s active 
participation in decision-making. Although it was not always clear what form this 
should take, there was no doubt about what it should avoid. The organisational 
proposals by the FEAO members against the practices and values of the established 
political parties, denounced hierarchism domination, centralisation, and reliance on 
the edicts of experts as manifestations of the undemocratic nature of the existing 
political system. Proposals for the Federation’ Constitution underwent a series of 
discussions before a first draft could be formulated.98 This was finally approved by 
the 47 participating groups at the First Panhellenic Meeting (in 1989), and contained 
the following provisions concerning the organisational set up.
1. The Federation would consist of organisations. In order to become a full 
member, a candidate-organisation must be composed of five or more members, 
and be proposed by another organisation already belonging to the Federation. 
The prospect of organisations acting as mere observers, but with full access to 
the Federation’s information and participating in its activities was not 
excluded.
2. Every member-organisation was entitled to take part in local (neighbourhood or 
city) or peripheral assemblies. Every local or peripheral assembly elected a 
local or peripheral secretariat.
3. The member-organisations elected representatives to the Federal Assembly, the 
highest decision-making body, and these representatives elected the Federal 
Secretariat.
4. Committees would be set up to elaborate on ideological issues, campaign 
topics, etc., and to research or generally support the Federation’s activities.99
98 The first organisational draft was intended as only temporary until its ratification by 
the first Founding Conference. However, it became the only existing organisational 
regulation of the Federation, since the Conference was repeatedly postponed, and 
when it finally took place the Federation was dissolved.
99 In 1989 the Secretariat had 27 members, later it was enlarged to 45 and finally 55 
members, a size that caused problems of political efficacy. FEAO Bulletin, Oct. 1989; 
Demertzis, op. cit., ref. 2.
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Relations between the local or peripheral secretariats and the Federal Secretariat 
remained unspecified, chiefly because the first organisational draft did not specify the 
function of local or peripheral secretariats.100 However, the lack of any obligatory 
institutionalisation of these representative bodies, in the long run undermined the 
provincial organisations, which had access to the Federal Secretariat only via the 
organisation’s Assembly.
The draft, therefore, outlined an organisational structure where the 
composition of the Federation’s Assembly and Secretariat constituted the crucial 
factor for the members’ proportional representation. It also contained more detailed 
regulations on a number of other points concerning the participatory character of the 
organisation. With respect to bring the representative bodies under direct control and 
to prevent any political elite of becoming established, no representative from the 
member-organisations had the right to participate more than twice in succession at the 
Federal Assembly, and the principles of rotation and revocability applied to all 
representatives at all organisational levels of the FEAO. Several regulations were to 
protect usually underrepresented social minorities and safe-guard their participation 
and expression. So, (i) it was obligatory for all representative bodies to consist 35% of 
women. If this requirement could not be met, the positions were to be left vacant; (ii) 
the composition of the Federation’s Secretariat should favour the privileged 
representation of students, provincial organisations, and the publications of the 
ecological/alternative spectrum; (iii) three members of the Federation’s Secretariat 
should be appointed by lot from groups not represented at all at the level of the 
Secretariat. Moreover, the principle of appointment by lot was to be applied 
increasingly to all the FEAO’s representative bodies; (iv) a logarithmic proportional 
representation was decided on in order to increase the participation of smaller groups. 
So, if a group consisted of 10-19 members, it had two representatives at the 
Assembly; between 20 and 39 members, three; between 40 and 79 members, four; 
between 80 and 159 members, five and so on.101
100 The majority of the participants voted in favour of the obligatory function of those 
institutions. However, since the proposal did not gather two-thirds of the vote, a final 
decision was postponed until the first Constitutional Conference. FEAO Bulletin, ibid.
101 This regulation indirectly acknowledged the more influential presence of a small 
organisation in a local environment than the presence of a same-size organisation in
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To summarise: the organisational scheme of the Federation set out a number 
of organisational principles and practices (rotation, revocability, appointment by lot, 
proportional representation, quotas, etc.), which illustrated the FEAO’s belief in 
participatory practices and its opposition to the consolidation of any political or 
technocratic elite. It also included a series of provisions, manifesting the Federation’s 
ideological stand in favour of protecting and enhancing the political participation of 
social minorities (women, students, provincial groups):
‘Our federal organisation has a horizontal structure that safeguards the 
maximum feasible organisational decentralisation and the actual dispersion of 
power to the autonomous organisations-members. The provided organisational 
structure makes ineffective any concentration of power in the hands of an all- 
powerful and essentially uncontrolled central guiding body; an organisational 
practice that is common in the traditional political formations, which 
implement the vertical pyramid-like organisational structure’.102 
The very establishment of the Federation and the proposed organisational 
scheme were major loci of serious dispute. The green groups in the mid-1980s all felt 
that there was significant lack of informational exchange, theoretical debates, and co­
operation among them on practical projects. A series of meetings was begun to try and 
create a nationwide coordinating network. The first disagreement centred on whether 
to adopt a federated scheme, of member-organisations, or to set up a party consisting 
of individuals.103 The reasoning underlying federalization was to create a central body 
while respecting the members’ independence and the first Panhellenic Assembly 
(September-October 1989) duly voted in the federated scheme.104 The main difficulty 
this caused was the exclusion of active individual ecologists who shared the 
Federation’s principles but belonged to no specific group. In the end a compromise
Athens. Tremopoulos, M. ‘For A Green Federal Political Body’, Ecotopia, No. 3-4, 
Sep. 1989.
i  rv> ‘Declaration of the Constitutional principles of the Federation of Ecological and 
Alternative Organisations’, op. cit., ref. 4.
103 Protopsaltis, op. cit., ref. 1.
104 ‘We support... the prospect of a Federation, because we believe in the autonomy 
of the participating groups and denounce any centralised, bureaucratic formation’. 
Ecological Calendar, op. cit., ref. 61.
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was arrived at, whereby single individuals could participate at the organisations’ local 
meetings, but were only represented if they participated in city-assemblies, composed 
by non-affiliated individuals.105 The Constitutional Conference three years later had to 
acknowledge the impracticability of this scheme.106
Another point of dispute, related to the previous one, was what political role 
the Federation should adopt vis-^-vis the political system. The proponents of changing 
the Federation into a political party were political ecologists mainly from 
organisations in the Greater Athens area, as well as alternative groups.107 In their view 
the lack of a strong and broad ecological movement in Greece could only be corrected 
by some electoral shock tactic that would bring the ecological issues to the forefront 
and create a positive dynamic for the further development of the ecological 
movement.
Opposition to the formation of a political party stemmed from anti­
institutionalists, provincial organisations, and advocates of movement politics and 
civil society. They objected that the creation of a political party would estrange 
individuals who were active in green formations, but were also politically affiliated to 
other parties.108 The organisations in the countryside also disagreed, because they 
expected the FEAO’s political institutionalisation to enhance the role of well-known 
organisations or personalities in the broader Athens region, and therefore devalue the 
equally important, but less publicised green activism in the provinces. This reflected 
also the opinion of many other members who believed that changing the Federation 
into a political party would inevitably lead to a split between the party of professional 
politicians, and the green movement, confined to practical green activities.109
As we have seen in section 6.2, the Federation did finally become a political 
party, but it always maintained its federal organisation and was the only political party 
in Greece without a normal party structure. As the FEAO’s history has shown, its 
existence as a political party eventually eroded its social base and multiplied its
105 Protopsaltis, op. cit., ref. 1.
106 ‘The procedures for participating at the Conference’, in FEAO Bulletin, Jan. 1992.
107 Tremopoulos, op. cit., ref. 101.
108 Glametatzds, G. ‘Ecological Movement of Drama’, Ecotopia, No. 3-4, Sept. 1989, 
and Tremopoulos, ibid.
109 Tremopoulos, op. cit., ref. 22.
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internal difficulties. When the Federation was functioning chiefly as a political party, 
this led to the marginalization of its provincial groups, which gradually withdrew their 
membership. This shrinking of the organisation’s social base had marked 
repercussions. In traditional political parties the lack of an active and expanded social 
base is usually compensated for by the existence of a strong party machinery. In the 
case of the FEAO, however, they were both absent. The loose federal scheme could 
not act as a strongly unifying apparatus supporting the Federation politically, and the 
feeble political presence of the organisation was not counterbalanced by a strong 
green movement.
Another organisational difficulty was the implementation of regulations 
concerning direct democracy. For instance, the Federation’s resolution on rotating the 
members of the Secretariat every three months was never put into practice due to 
major organisational problems and the reluctance of many of its members to take on 
official posts.110 Likewise the Federation’s initial decision that all representative 
bodies must consist 50% of women showed itselfj to be impracticable, and even when 
the quota was reduced to 35% this did not solve the practical complications.111 Yet, 
another example was the incompatibility between the ideological principle of 
safeguarding the right to expression of minorities, and the endeavour to arrive at 
binding political decisions. Whenever important issues were at issue (e.g. 
participation in the elections), the reinforced majority of the participants were entitled 
to overrule the right of the one-third of the representatives to veto the decision 
taken.112 The relation between the Federation’s principles and its actual organisational 
practices corresponded to a large extent to the degree of political efficacy.
The Federation’s organisational endeavour to find a third way, between that of 
democratic centralism and total decentralisation, shows the practical obstacles 
between the principles of direct democracy and the required minimum political 
efficacy. At the end of the first year of the Federation’s existence, most of its
110 Demertzis, op. cit., ref. 2.
111 ‘Concerning the Quota’, New Ecology, No. 65, March 1990.
112 So, in the 1989 Panhellenic Conference, 85% of the participants overruled the right 
of one-third of the representatives to veto the majority decision to participate in the 
forthcoming elections. Papaioannou, D. ‘Let the Auditoriums Flourish Again’, New 
Ecology, No. 61, Nov. 1989.
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members had come to believe that putting into practice the principles of direct 
democracy (e.g. rotation, revocability, autonomy of the member-organisations) 
together with the acute power struggles between individual groups, had resulted in 
individual irresponsibility and political inefficacy.113 The organisational impasses 
generated a new debate: should the participatory structures and procedures be adhered 
to in their pure form, or should they be accompanied by some degree of representative 
democracy? Two camps developed. The environmentalists were wholly for the 
principles of direct democracy, irrespective of any political inefficacy. The alternative 
groups argued in favour of a combination of representative and participatory 
democracy, and underlined the necessity of political efficacy.
The discrepancy between direct democracy and political efficacy made itself 
felt also in the relations of the FEAO as a unifying and central organisational body 
with its autonomous member-organisations. Given the Federation’s belief in 
participatory democracy and its opposition to centralisation, it was hardly possible to 
restrict the members’ autonomy. There were many complaints, however, that the 
Federation’s inability to construct a comprehensive political platform was due to the 
growing sense of independence of certain groups that objected to a comprehensive 
political agenda as an ideological imposition by the central body.114
The emergence of non-institutionalised power structures constituted another 
significant organisational problem. The absence of a rigid, well-defined organisational 
structure often led to ad hoc hierarchical relations and the domination of single 
personalities.115 In other words, the endeavour to keep the organisation flexible and to 
promote participatory democracy often brought about the opposite effect. Non- 
institutionalised hegemonic relations were an especially awkward problem. Their 
development took two forms: either as the result of organisational and ideological 
dominance of single personalities or blocs of groups, or through the increasingly
113 Nerantzis, op. cit., ref. 53.
114 In contrast to the situation of the political Left, there was no binding commitment 
of the members to the Federation. Interview with Louloudes, op. cit., ref. 34; 
Athanasopoulos-Kalomalos, op. cit., ref. 53.
115 Diakos, K ‘Let’s talk seriously about the Federation’, Ecotopia, No. 10, Sept.-Oct. 
1990; Kalesakis, K ‘The Federation Presumes Work and Sincerity*, New Ecology, No. 
84, Oct. 1991.
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unilateral and arbitrary actions of individuals in their official capacity. In the first 
case, the individuals aspiring to monopolise procedures were persons with scientific 
qualifications or with a long history in the green movement; well-known political 
personalities with access to the mass-media; and persons skilled in organisational 
manipulation.116 However, there was one person particularly, who was the main cause 
for hierarchical relations within the Federation, and this was the leader of the 
alternative protagonists, Georges Karabelias. The strong influence of the alternative 
persuasion and their leader was founded on Karabelias well-known political history, 
on the ideological homogeneity of the Rupture-Action combination, and their long 
experience in political mass-procedures. The Rupture-Action bloc had an ideological 
and organisational rigidity that endowed it with a disproportionately strong presence 
in the Federation’ s flexible proceedings.
In this general context, questions were also raised about the increasingly 
unilateral policies put forward by certain individuals in the Secretariat.117 A very 
obvious case in point was the occasion when members of the Secretariat on their own 
initiative began secret talks concerning the FEAO’s position in efforts of forming a 
coalition government.118 To prevent similar such occurrences in the future, internal 
referenda were proposed, and at the Panhellenic Meeting in November 1989 it was 
agreed that decisions on important issues (e.g. whether or not to participate in 
elections, changes in the FEAO program or additions to it), should be taken by 
referendum.119 This demand from the Federation’s social base proved the existence of 
non-institutionalised hegemonic, and therefore non-representative, relations between 
two organisational layers (Assembly and Secretariat).
The likelihood of the emergence of power structures other than those defined 
by the Constitution had been discussed during the process of the Federation’s
116 Diakos, ibid.
117 Dikaioakos, M. ‘Concerning the State of the Federation’, Ecological Newspaper, 
No. 38, Sept. 1990; and ‘Declaration of Withdrawal’ by EPOIZO and the Physiolatric 
Anti-Hunting Initiative, op. cit., Ref. 13 and 14.
118 In the elections of November 1989 no political party gained an absolute majority 
of parliamentary seats, and the FEAO’s single seat assumed major importance for 
forming a governmental coalition (see section 6.1).
119 Schizas, op. cit., ref. 16.
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founding. The Federation-to-be took into account the organisational problems 
experienced by the autonomous feminist groups. While the experiment of the 
autonomous feminist groups to create small units without structure was agreed as 
necessary for establishing contact and raising personal consciousness, it was also 
acknowledged that any form of collectivity will inevitably set up unofficial 
hierarchical structures. A clearly defined organisational scheme would, therefore, 
constitute a minimum guarantee for a certain degree of representation and 
responsibility.120 The Federation’s outline of organisational principles on the one hand 
specified the function of the organisation as such, and on the other assured the 
presence of elements of participatory democracy. The failure to control the emergence 
of non-official power structures in practice, together with the difficulties of 
implementing the participatory regulations and achieving political efficacy, gradually 
led to a more cautious stand vis-a-vis direct democracy. If  in 1989 direct democracy 
was perceived as the only possible organisational form guaranteeing the revitalisation 
of the true content of representative democracy, in 1992 it was admitted that 
representative democracy too was necessary for a viable implementation of direct 
democracy. In consequence, the two forms of representation were no longer 
considered incompatible and became increasingly supplementary.
6.4 Social Base
As we have seen, the FEAO consisted of an association of many groups with 
very different social attributes. Besides the pure environmentalists, the ecological and 
alternative groups, there were for instance the antivivisectionists, the Society of 
Bicycle Lovers, the homosexual group (Kraximo), the feminist group (Katina), the 
students’ group (Pavlov’s Dogs), the alternative Christian-Socialist group around the 
magazine Exodus, the group for an alternative intervention in the sphere of knowledge 
(Erotic Mushrooms) - which illustrates the wide range of participating 
organisations.121
The Federation’s organisational base accordingly showed a high degree of 
political pluralism and social heterogeneity. It was strongly present right across the
120 ‘Groups without Structure and their Limits’, Bulletin, No. 10, April-May 1989.
121 ‘Ninety-One Organisations’, New Ecology, No. 65, March 1990.
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country, including the islands.122 The extensive geographical penetration by the 
Federation was coupled with its penetration of diverse social strata. So, in the Greater 
Athens area the groups in the Federation came from both privileged and 
underprivileged neighbourhoods.123 The Federation’s trans-class identity endured 
longer than the participation of provincial groups, which, as mentioned earlier, 
withdrew when the Federation was functioning chiefly as a political party and they 
felt themselves excluded. By the time of the First Constitutional Conference in 1992 
the FEAO’s social base was already restricted to a few groups that were active 
predominantly in the two major cities of Greece: Athens and Salonica. Still, its initial 
capability to penetrate both different social strata and geographical areas was 
remarkable, given that it never had a party-like organisational apparatus like the 
Union of Greek Women. The heterogeneity of the Federation’s social base was, of 
course, in part attributable to the pre-existing nuclei of local green groups.124
An interesting characteristic of the FEAO’s social base was the very limited 
presence of scientific and academic organisations.125 This eventually proved to be a 
serious disadvantage in terms of proposing scientifically viable solutions to problems 
of environmental degradation. Besides, this under-representation of scientists and 
academics contradicts new social movement literature, which notes the high presence 
of better-educated strata in new social movements. However, some of the Federation
122 For instance some of the towns and geographical areas represented in the 
Federation were: Patras, Chalkida, Lamia, Pilion, Karpenisi, Amfissa, Ptolemaida, 
Yiannina, Giannitsa, Drama, Trikala, Kozani, Kilkis, Xanthi, Karditsa, Messini, 
Lakonia, Imathia, Ermionida, Kalamata, Zakynthos, Kefalonia, Corfu, Lefkada, 
Carystos, Paxchsi, Syros, Rhodes, Milos, Mitilini, Crete (Iraklio-Sitia). ‘Ninety-One 
Organisations’, ibid.
For instance: Neo Psychico, Maroussi, Glyfada, Drapetsona, Hhaidari, Egaleo and 
the western districts of Athens. ‘Ninety-One Organisations’, ibid.
124 In 1987 there were roughly 150 environmental organisations, spread all over the 
country. Papadopoulos, op. cit., ref. 66.
125 Interview with Stelios Psomas, op. cit, ref. 14; with Leonidas Louloudes, op. cit., 
ref. 34; with Caterina Iatropoulou and Christos Corcovelos, op. cit., ref. 14.
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members included former activists of the students’ mass-mobilisation in the late 
1970s.126
Another noteworthy element of the organisation’s social base was the high 
percentage of members who had formerly been active on the political Left. They had 
either belonged to the established political parties (mainly the Communist-Party of the 
Interior), or to the extra-parliamentary Left. In the former case, disagreement with 
repression of intra-party differences, as well as the instrumental rationality that 
dominated the parties, led to their departure and their active involvement in new 
social movements or the institutions of local self-management (e.g. municipal 
councils).127 In the second case, the gradual withering away of the extra-parliamentary 
groups that had prevailed during the post-junta period meant a restructuring of the 
alternative protagonists, who now denounced the strategy of a revolutionary 
overthrow of the capitalist system and focused instead on the mobilisation and radical 
reconstitution of civil society.
The unifying element in the Federation’s social base, which was made up of 
people of diverse social origins, from different geographical areas and all ages, was 
their prior active involvement in green groups, in political organisations of the Left, or 
institutions of self-management. While this multiplicity of social and political 
attributes, enhanced the FEAO's pluralistic distinctiveness, it also slowed down the 
process of shaping a concrete political identity that would be unambiguous and 
comprehensible to the wider public.
The social base of the Federation did not always correspond to the social 
profile of the voters supporting its political project. As discussed earlier (chapter 5), 
the Green vote in urban areas differed markedly from that in semi-urban ones and 
even more so in the countryside. The wealthier, well-preserved, new middle-class 
areas were much more likely to cast a green vote than low-income and
1 A by-product of these student mobilisations was the founding of the organisation 
Ecological Initiative. Athens Interview (13 Dec. 1996) with Polydevkis 
Papadopoulos, first publisher of Ecological Newspaper (1982-‘85), member of 
Ecological Initiative, and of the Alternative Movement of Ecologists.
127 Poulos, G. ‘1976-1986: Crises and Experiences in the Ecological Movement’ in 
Orfanides, op. cit., ref. 66.
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environmentally damaged areas.128 This dissociation between the social attributes of 
the Federation’s members and its electoral supporters was coupled with a further 
factor: In many areas, with a pre-history of green activism, the green vote was 
surprisingly limited. It was only in municipal elections that this discrepancy between 
local green activism and the green vote disappeared.
According to the theorists of new social movements, it is the younger, better 
educated, and more articulated strata of society who make up the social base of new 
social movements.129 In the case of the Federation, this premise was reflected by the 
FEAO’s electoral base, but not by its actual social base. This of course created 
organisational problems of its own concerning the formulation of an effective political 
strategy.
6.5 Strategy
In its declaration of constitutional principles the political role of the Federation 
is envisaged as a political intervention in the whole spectrum of society and politics. 
This means that even in the case of the FEAO participating in representative politics, 
it would always be actively involved in social struggles rather than convert them into 
votes or act as mediator with the political system.130 Accordingly, the Federation did 
not initially exclude political action in any form, whether on behalf of civil society or 
involving participation in the conventional channels of the political system. It tried to 
reconcile two strategic choices: Whether to give priority to movement politics over 
traditional politics, and how to maximise FEAO influence within traditional politics. 
The first focused on mobilising civil society via participatory practices, the second 
centred on delivering policy outcomes. Every social movement is constantly faced 
with these two strategic choices. In the case of the Federation, the gradual dominance 
of the second strategy was due to: (i) the organisation’s positive evaluation of the
128 In the elections of April 1990, the all-Greek record of the FEAO was in one of the 
wealthiest areas of Athens (Palaio Psychiko: 2.11%). ‘Comments on other 
Comments’, New Ecology, No. 67, May 1990, Demertzis, op. cit., ref. 2.
129 O’ Neill, M. (1997) Green Parties and Political Change in Contemporary Europe: 
New Politics, Old Predicaments, (Aldershot and Brookfield, Ashgate), p. 5.
130 ‘Declaration of the Constitutional Principles of the Federation of Ecological and 
Alternative Organisations’, op. cit., ref. 4.
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political opportunity structure, (ii) in belief that society was ready and able to respond 
to ecological demands and iii) the feeble state of the ecological spectrum. When the 
Federation was set up, the first two factors were very positive, which gave support to 
those members who argued in favour of its election candidature.
In 1989, when the Federation was founded, an intense political crisis erupted, 
which was expected to lead to a great volatility of votes. With the political scene tom 
by scandals of corruption in 1988 and ’89, a decisive break in party loyalties was 
predicted. It was precisely this assumption that persuaded the Greens to enter into 
politics. The hasty transformation of the Federation into a political party was not, 
however, due only to the exceptionally favourable political conjuncture, but also to 
the increasing social awareness of environmental issues. In the European elections of 
June 1989, the Union of Citizens had received an unexpectedly high vote (1.11%). 
Also, in 1989 the circulation of ecological magazines rose by 30% to 40%, and the 
mass media included more and more environmental material in their disseminations. 
On the other hand, the state of the Greek ecological movement remained fragile. 
Although there had been several meetings to organise some form of cooperation, the 
FEAO was not set up until 1989. Political ecology had begun to dominate green 
thinking from 1981 onwards, but there was not yet a robust, broad, and co-ordinated 
ecological movement.
The positive political conjuncture, the rise in environmental consciousness, 
and the feebleness of the ecological movement made the majority of the FEAO 
members argue in favour of a strategy, which would first tackle the party system and 
hope to carry civil society along with it. So, instead of starting by strengthening the 
ecological movement and then proceeding to the formation of a party, it was decided 
to create a political party, as an electoral shock tactic, which would then accelerate the 
movement’s progress. Therefore, traditional politics became the Federation’s priority, 
which hoped to activate then civil society.
It was the strategic decision by the Federation to join the party-political game 
that in the long run led to its demise and indeed to that of the whole movement. 
Changes in the political conjuncture, the rise of nationalism, the enduring polarisation 
of the ‘frozen’ Greek party system, and the lack of social interest in environmental 
issues were some of the factors that invalidated the Federation’s earlier reading of the 
political opportunity structure and society’s ecological readiness. The desired 
electoral breakthrough, which was supposed to act as a political accelerator, never
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happened. In addition, a number of internal factors - including the ambiguity of its 
own political identity, organisational problems and personal clashes, the almost 
exclusive focus on central politics and the consequent neglect of the ecological 
movement in the provinces - inhibited the Federation from projecting a strong 
political presence.
The shrinking of the FEAO’s social base and its political marginalization were 
openly acknowledged in the organisation’s Constitutional Conference (1992):
‘In the last two years, since autumn of 1989, many things have changed. The 
situation at the present time shares few common elements with the period of 
our starting point, when we were at the centre of publicity and full with 
optimism and expectations. The continual internal clashes have tired most of 
us; an extended ecological movement has not yet been generated and our 
alternative activities have been feeble’.131
In these circumstances the Conference organisers had hoped to change the 
direction of the Federation’s strategy and strengthen its presence in civil society. 
Green groups and single individuals were invited to this new beginning, and the 
willingness to turn towards movement politics shows that new social movements are 
not constrained to keep to one strategy only, nor do they tend irreversibly towards 
increased institutionalisation. It is the wider societal context, the institutional setting, 
and the actors’ own understanding of these factors that are the crucial variables for the 
strategic choices by social movement organisations.132 The Federation’s reading of the 
institutional and societal context had certainly changed between 1989 and 1992, but 
its dissolution at the 1992 Conference ruled out all possibility of testing some 
diferrent strategy.
The failure of the Federation’s political project left a strong mark on all of the 
green protagonists. Most of the green groups withdrew from all political involvements 
and concentrated instead on green activism on the local level or on professional 
activities in the broader environmental context.
131 ‘The Situation at the Present Time’, in FEAO Bulletin, Jan. 1992, p. 4.
132 Hjelmar, U. (1996) The Political Practice o f Environmental Organisations 
(Aldershot, Brookfield, Ashgate).
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6.7 New Scenarios of Conflict
The green and alternative endeavour to collaborate in a federated organisation 
became really in the late 1980s/early ‘90s. This means that, in relation to the 
autonomous feminist groups and the Union of Greek Women (EGE), the Federation 
of Ecological and Alternative Organisations was a new scenario of conflict. The 
autonomous feminist groups and the EGE, all of which became active after 1974, 
represented the evolution of two earlier phases of conflict. In the first period, 
following the fall of the dictatorship, all these feminist groups incorporated into their 
program demands concerning the consolidation of democracy, the formation and 
defence of liberal political institutions and the termination of the political and social 
exclusion of the political forces of the Left. Then, after the socialist party came to 
power in 1981, the conflict concerned the introduction of fundamental social- 
democratic reforms and the modernisation of obsolete institutions, regulations and 
practices (such as the reform of Family Law). As we have seen in chapter 4, the 
question of modernising the political system and social practices created a great deal 
of disagreement in the autonomous feminist groups between pro- and anti­
institutionalists. When the green and alternative groups initiated their collaborative 
efforts later in the 1980s, the issue of modernisation was in the forefront again, but in 
a rather differed context. Social-democratic reforms had been implemented for almost 
a decade, but the crisis of political scandals in 1989, as well as the changing 
international environment, put in question the efficacy of liberal political institutions 
and the viability of social-democratic reforms within a context of globalisation. So, in 
the late 1980s the political crisis in Greece and the country’s increasing international 
exposure gave rise to a new debate, this time concerning the premise of representative 
democracy as well as a national strategy for the global context.
The answer of both the ecological and the alternative schools of thought to the 
growing dilemma was twofold: (i) representative democracy must be merged with 
participatory democracy in order for the first to regain its true character and meaning; 
and (ii) the neo-liberal as well as the new social-democratic model of management, 
imposed by the process of globalisation, must be rejected. The only permissible policy 
was decentralised and anti-developmentaL Meanwhile, in the late 1980s/early ‘90s 
Greece’s interdependence with other countries (in terms of economic crisis and its 
impact on the prospect of European monetary unification, international intervention in 
the Balkan war, and the rise of the discourse of globalisation) was for the first time
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experienced as an immediate and unavoidable reality. In consequence, a broad section 
of the Greek people began to reassert the concept o f ‘Greek identity’ and to support a 
nationalism that cut across party lines. In the 1990s Greek politics was polarised 
between nationalists/anti-Europeans and anti-nationalists/pro-Europeans. In this new 
conflict, permeating the whole of society, the ecological/alternative protagonists split 
up and followed diverse routes. The alternatives embraced nationalism as a form of 
anti-imperialism, while the ecologists and environmentalists adhered to their anti-state 
platform and concentrated on green issues locally and globally.
The alternative and environmentalist/ecologist groups may have formed 
opposing sides with regard to nationalism, but they were still united in their rejection 
of the political and economic model linked to the process of globalisation. Yet, while 
both held anti-capitalist and anti-developmental views, the alternatives saw the 
process of globalisation as inseparably linked with capitalist modernisation, while for 
the Greens globalisation carried the potential of strengthening local and global civil 
society. The question of modernisation, therefore, re-emerged in a new form. The 
post-junta call for the activation of liberal institutions, and the post-1981 social claims 
for deepening political and economic democracy, now became demands for 
formulating a new strategy to defend the rights recently acquired, but also to respond 
to the increasing international pressures. In such a historical conjuncture, the anti-state 
stance of new social movements accords better with the process of globalisation than 
do the national policies of traditional parties. The difficulty for new social movements 
lies in how to become political bearers of a national claim for self-determination 
without embracing the institutions representative of the nation-state as such.
6.8 Summary
The case of the Federation of Ecological and Alternatives Organisations is 
representative of the ideological framework and organisational structure of new social 
movements as depicted in the relevant literature. This cannot, however, be said of its 
actual political strategy. The organisation’s decision to proceed quickly to the creation 
of a political party so as to make use of the political system for influencing civil 
society differs from that of the previous case studies. The autonomous feminists 
focused exclusively on civil society, and the EGE was looking to the political parties 
and the state apparatus for support. The FEAO tried to formulate a third strategy, 
which, however, could not be put into practice because of the too great diversity of its
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member organisations. The Federation’s most serious shortcoming was its 
organisational structure. Resource-mobilisation theorists have always argued that 
organisation is one of the most important elements for the success of a social 
movement. Exactly what organisational scheme a social movement adopts is closely 
connected to its overall goals, so that for instance decentralised organisation is more 
likely to be successful for dispossessed groups or mobilisations of civil society. In the 
case of the Federation, however, the decentralised, participatory form of organisation 
that was adopted was not congruent with simultaneous active involvement in 
traditional politics. While, the FEAO had chosen a decentralised, fluid organisational 
form in accord with its belief in participatory practices, it nevertheless participated in 
a political system that demanded efficiency rather than communication. In the end the 
participatory form of organisation proved to be incompatible with the requirements of 
representative democracy. Its ineffectiveness in policy-formation gradually led the 
Federation to drop its former principles of participatory politics, and this undermined 
the belief of many of its members that direct democracy can intervene on a general 
political level. Therefore, after the Federation’s dissolution many of them restricted 
their activities to specific domains and single-issue agendas.
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Conclusions
We have seen that of the three case studies examined in chapters 2-6 above 
that the autonomous feminist groups came closest to the ideal type of new social 
movements. The Federation of Ecological and Alternative Organisations (FEAO) was 
an amalgam of groups some of which adhered to the principles of new social 
movement politics and others were more interested in the question of political 
efficacy. The Union of Greek Women (EGE), finally, manifested a number of 
attributes that contradicted the ideal type (its centralisation, state engineering, 
nationalism, etc.). However, all three groupings expanded the boundaries of the 
political by questioning the representative quality of formal politics and introducing 
new subjects into the political agenda. The different forms this new politics took in 
the post-1974 Greek society was related to the prevailing structures and cultural 
attributes of that society, as well as to the ideological and strategic choices of the three 
collective social actors presented.
New social movement theory provided the archetype that constituted the main 
point of reference throughout the thesis, while resource mobilisation highlighted the 
strategic dilemmas faced by the organisations in their endeavour to introduce 
movement politics in a civil society non-receptive to autonomous grass-roots projects. 
New social movement theory on its own is inadequate to explain the different forms 
new politics has taken in Greece (EGE, FEAO), given that the ideal type is based on 
the specific structures of advanced capitalist societies. On the other hand, neither can 
resource mobilisation theory on its own account for the manifestation of new social 
movement politics (autonomous feminist groups) in Greek society, despite the limited 
resources and the rational calculation of political efficacy. The Greek case studies also 
show that the macro-question of movement emergence or development is linked to the 
micro-questions of individual participation. For instance, the Federation’s decision to 
join the central political scene discouraged members from the provinces to remain 
active in the organisation, and led to a major change in its social base and subsequent 
course of action. Thus, the micro-question of individual participation, emphasised by 
collective theory, highlights the shifting identity of a movement. As already noted in 
chapter 1, new social movement theory focuses on broad structural changes; resource 
mobilisation analyses the preconditions for mobilising participants; and the classical 
model illustrates the participants’ cognitive orientations. By presenting three different
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answers to the question of the viability of movement politics, the Greek case studies 
exemplify the complementary character of those three levels of analysis.
The individual case studies were built around a common nucleus of strategic 
dilemmas, due to (i) statocracy and patrocracy, (ii) the political tradition of the Left, 
(iii) the open question of modernisation.
(i) Statocracy and patrocracy: The political tradition of a strong state 
dominating over civil society, the limited but polarised pluralism of the party system 
and its respective personalistic-particularistic features, as well as the lack of a political 
culture supportive of autonomous citizens’ associations, seriously limited the strategic 
options available to social movements in Greece. Collectivities deprived of resources, 
while competing with others in the political arena, have either had to address 
themselves to influential allies to obtain access to the state apparatus and extract 
resources from factions of the elite, or to apply innovative practices and take
advantage of unconventional resources in the framework of a weak and
underdeveloped civil society. The solution of this strategic problem proposed by each 
of the three protagonists has been different. The EGE chose the socialist party as its 
alliance system, and after the party’s election victory made extensive use of the state
apparatus. The autonomous feminist groups applied innovative practices and used
unconventional resources, in their efforts to actuate a feeble civil society. The 
Federation, while supporting ecological networks and initiatives, also associated itself 
with the party system and the state when divisions within the political elite and the 
prospect of electoral realignments revealed an increasingly positive political 
opportunity structure (1989-92). In terms of policy outcomes the most successful 
organisation was the EGE; in terms of movement politics, the autonomous feminist 
groups were the only ones actuating civil society and positing the issue of autonomy. 
If the two feminist case studies illustrate a zero-sum game with regard to autonomy 
and policy outcomes, the Federation opted for the political project of reconciliating 
those two objectives. Its adoption of elements from each of the other two groupings 
did not, however, bring the desired outcome, since its organisational structure was not 
concordant with its political objectives.
Resource mobilisation theorists have asked which organisational forms are the 
most effective for mobilising and applying resources. In a society with strong 
patrocratic and statocratic elements they are those that are centralised and 
bureaucratised, since it is they that are best able to enter into negotiations with the
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various institutions of formal politics (state, political parties). So it was the rigid 
organisational form of the EGE that enabled it to utilise the resources made accessible 
by its alliance with the governing Socialist Party. The autonomous feminist groups, on 
the other hand, adopted an organisational form befitting movement politics in civil 
society. As a result, they were the only network that succeeded in building an 
alternative feminist culture. The Federation adopted a decentralised organisational 
structure, while simultaneously participating in formal politics. This resulted in a 
political and organisational impasse in terms of its political efficacy vis-a-vis both the 
party system and civil society.
Patrocracy and statocracy in Greek society, as well as the weakness of civil 
society, have posed a clear dilemma to social movement strategies: should they give 
up their anti-statist and anti-institutional ideology in favour of goal achievement, or 
should they adhere to the principles of new social movements at the cost of limiting 
their political appeal? This predicament -  of whether to enter mainstream politics or 
safeguard movement politics - has been felt by all new social movements everywhere, 
but in Greece the influence of the state and the party system over civil society has 
been particularly acute and made the phenomena of social movements’ party- 
dependency and semi-autonomy more common. This is very obvious in the case of 
the Greek second-wave feminist movement. A decisive factor reinforcing this 
tendency has been the political tradition of the Left.
(ii) The political tradition of the Left: New social movement theory 
emphasises that a radical rupture with the Left usually precedes the formation of new 
social movements, but in Greece, there have never been mass-departures from left- 
wing political parties or organisations. As a result, the political forces of the Left 
exerted a marked effect on developments in the social movement sector. Within the 
period 1975-1992 under consideration in this work, a historical cycle of the Left came 
to an end (during the 1990s), concurrently with the reorganisation of social 
movements in non-governmental organisations (NGOs) as the new form of interest 
articulation. The bulk of this thesis concerns a time in the history of the Left when 
polarities like reform and revolution, parliamentary and extra-parliamentary action, 
individual versus collective, market versus state were still politically valid. The 
political tradition of the Left marked the identity of the country’s new social 
movements in terms of the articulation of grand narratives, the duality of particular 
versus general struggles and, a belief in humanism.
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• Grand narratives: The Greek Left has traditionally favoured the articulation 
of modernist political projects, meaning larger emancipatory projects that have aimed at 
transforming or dismantling large centres of power (e.g. the state, the party, 
international institutions).1 Thus, the dominant political discourse of the Greek Left has 
undermined the articulation of fragmentary political projects. Accordingly, new social 
movements in Greece have articulated alternative totalising projects. This means that in 
Greece the discourse of new social movements has been founded on ‘narrative’, 
‘synthesis’, and on ‘transcendence’ in sharp contrast to the focus of NSM literature on 
fragmentation and ‘self-limited radicalism’. In brief, Greek new social movements have 
manifested the strong entrenchment of a political culture, where questions of a broader 
societal transformation remain still open.
A correlative dimension of the Left’s totalising projects has been its strong anti­
capitalist identity. After following the fall of the junta in 1974, all three major political 
parties of the Left (the socialist PASOK, the Communist Party of the Interior, and the 
Greek Communist Party) outlined an alternative vision of societal organisation. In 
parallel there was a proliferation of political groups of the extra-parliamentary Left, also 
professing a strongly anti-capitalist stand and- being committed to revolutionise the 
existing social order.
The Greek feminist and ecological movements took up this anti-capitalist 
ideology alongside their own feminist and ecological vision.
• ‘General' versus \'particular ’ struggles: In delineating an alternative societal 
organisation they had, however, to face a political culture that acknowledged only the 
left-wing political forces as the legitimate bearers of ‘general’ political projects. This 
political culture had its roots in a series of national historical events (e.g. resistance 
against the Germans, the civil war, the junta) that had temporarily incorporated social 
movements with the broader political struggles for the national cause. But aside from 
that, the political Left was also open to feminist and ecological demands, taking them
1 According to Hart, Modernism’s ‘fundamental project cannot really be considered 
“fragmentary” in the post-modem sense, because modernism was so clearly tied to 
underlying myths and hopeful truths about social processes. At its core modernism 
was a “larger emancipatory project’” . Hart, J. (1996) New Voices in the Nation:
Women and the Greek Resistance, 1941-64 (Ithaca and London, Cornell University 
Press), p. 36.
315
up as more ‘particular’ issues into its ‘general’ agenda. In doing so, the Greek 
political culture opposed ‘general’ and ‘particular’ struggles with the latter secondary 
and less important than the former. Moreover, the political dimension of any 
‘particular’ struggle was questioned as long as it remained autonomous from the 
‘general’ project of the Left. This duality of the ‘general’ versus the ‘particular’ put 
the emerging new social movements on the defensive, and forced them to prove the 
political dimension of their endeavour and to interact with the left-wing political 
forces.
This is clearly illustrated by the EGE, which articulated its feminist vision in 
conjunction with the already ‘legitimate’ socialist vision of PASOK. In the case of the 
autonomous feminist groups the general-particular duality was exemplified by the 
high percentage of double militancy amongst their members. The Federation’s 
cooperation with the extra-parliamentary Left also manifested it, and it later became 
conspicuous in the FEAO’s internal ideological clashes over the ‘political’ or 
‘apolitical’ nature of the ecological project. It was only some of the autonomous 
feminists who unambiguously disconnected from this political tradition by 
denouncing formal politics (including that of-the Left) and focusing exclusively on 
civil society and feminist consciousness-raising. However, their ideology remained 
confined to a very small section of Greek society
The antithesis between ‘general’and ‘particular’ issues is not a specifically 
Greek phenomenon. New social movements everywhere have had to confront it and 
redefine the meaning of the political. Nevertheless, in Greek society the relationship 
of new social movements and this political tradition has been more complex, since the 
category ‘general’ historically includes not only struggles targeting the political 
system, but also such matters as relocating the nation-state in the international world 
order. In this sense, ‘general’ political projects have always incorporated the question 
of modernisation.
• Humanism: The Greek new social movements reproduced one of the major 
contradictions of the political Left. Their social constructionist view that the 
individual is moulded by his/her social and cultural environment went hand in hand 
with an essentialist perception, seeing all human beings as sharing a common identity. 
While the belief in social constructionism demands political emancipation, the 
humanistic viewpoint reinforces the belief that such , a project will liberate society in
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its totality. In other words, the humanistic identity of Greek new social movements 
accords with their grand political projects to revolutionalise society and to liberate 
human beings from exploitation and domination. In the ideology of all three 
groupings studied, capitalism was rejected not only on the basis of economic 
exploitation, but also on the grounds of distorting the true ‘essence’ of human beings. 
This strongly entrenched humanism also clearly manifested in the total absence or 
very limited presence of gynocentrism in the feminist movement, and eco-feminism 
or ecocentrism in the ecological movement.
(iii) The question of modernisation: As already mentioned, new social 
movement literature focuses on the national context in isolation from its global 
environment. New social movement theory is built on the assumption that nation-states 
are able to define and materialise policy issues autonomously. The theoretical absence 
of the international context endows the nation-state, the main unit of analysis, with 
uncontested power to formulate its own internal policy. In Greece, however, the 
feminist and ecological movements unfolded in a political culture, which embodied 
international dependency rather than autonomy. Accordingly, the identities of the Greek 
new social movements include attributes not mentioned in new social movement 
literature and, which refer to the open question of modernisation in the context of the 
global community.
Modernisation or development has been a major subject in Greece ever since 
the modem nation state was founded. Greece has been a late-developing society and, 
as Mouzelis has noted,
‘ ...most late-developing societies suffer from a marked split between two 
mutually antagonistic political cultures, which results in two different 
conceptions of what is or should be, the core national identity. The one points 
to a more traditionally oriented, indigenously based, inward-looking political 
orientation hostile to Western values and the institutional arrangements of 
modernity (seen as Westernisation). The other is a modernising, outward- 
looking orientation that tries to catch up with the West by adopting Western 
institutions and values as rapidly as possible. Although different groups or 
parties tend to opt for one or the other of these two orientations, in actuality,
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there are different mixtures of the traditionalist and modem discourses,
rearranged in a variety of combinations’.2
Greece’s two antagonistic political cultures are founded on two different 
geopolitical visions, which have projected either a zero-sum view of international 
relations by stressing issues of dependency and lack of national self-determination, or 
an international context of mutuality by underlining the need to modernise and 
become integrated in the international community.3 Moreover, peak experiences in the 
history of the Greek nation-state have strengthened either one or other of these 
perspectives and so led to a political geographical socialisation with long-term 
political effects.4 For instance, events after World War II - the civil war, the junta, and 
the Turkish occupation of part of Cyprus - have accentuated the geopolitical view of 
national dependency, since all of these conflicts were decisively affected by foreign 
intervention.
During the 1970s the left-wing political forces allocated Greece’s problem of 
dependent development to world capitalism. The Communist Party stressed the need 
to overturn the capitalist relations of production via an alliance with the countries of 
‘actually existing socialism’. The Socialist -Party developed an anti-imperialistic 
political agenda founded on dependency theory and the Communist Party of the 
Interior argued for the joint transformation of Greek society and the European 
Community according to the political guidelines of Euro-communism. All three 
explicitly denounced the conservative government, then in power, for acting on behalf 
of foreign interests and undermining national self-determination. In other words, in
2 Mouzelis, N. (1995) ‘Modernity, Late Development and Civil Society’ in John Hall 
(ed.) Civil Society: Theory, History, Comparisons (Cambridge, Polity Press), p. 239 
According to Dijking’s definition, a ‘geopolitical vision’ refers to ‘any idea 
concerning the relation between one’s own and other places, involving feelings of
(insecurity or (dis)advantage (and/or) invoking ideas about a collective mission of 
foreign policy strategy.. .One might include in the category of geopolitical visions 
assumptions about impersonal... forces. This may include laws of change and forces 
organising the world that can be taken advantage of or that require containment, such 
as modernisation.’ Dijkink, Gertjan (1996) National Identity and Geopolitical 
Visions: Maps o f Pride and Pain (London, New York, Routledge), p. 11 and 14.
4 Dijkink, ibid.
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the 1970s the political agenda of the Left was built around the dualities of: right-left, 
centre-periphery, and imperialism-national self-determination, which meant that it 
blended national political projects with the country’s position in the international 
community. The transformation of Greek society was seen to go hand in hand with the 
relocation of the Greek nation-state in world politics. During this period, anti­
imperialism was one facet of the multi-dimensional political project of any social 
movement or political party for achieving collective emancipation and self- 
determination.
This being so, the Greek feminist movement, which emerged in that decade, 
incorporated a strong anti-imperialistic stand into its political agenda. Both the EGE 
and the autonomous feminist groups stated their opposition to foreign domination and 
penetration, and declared their support for national-liberation movements around the 
world. In the case of the EGE this anti-imperialistic identity was strongly nationalistic 
and state-centred, while the autonomous feminist groups were opposed to imperialism 
as one form of domination among others (including the institutional power of the 
state).
During the late 1980s/early 1990s the inward-looking, anti-Western aspects of 
Greek political culture came to the fore once more, although in rather a different 
guise: this time they manifested as a rise of nationalism over the question of national 
identity.
The nationalism of this period was not an opposition to specific forms of 
economic and political dependency, but rather opposition tout court to any 
modernisation that was also westernisation. There were two camps: for one, 
modernisation and integration in the global community meant expansion of choices, 
for the other modernisation was a foreign imposed process that eradicated accepted 
traditions and so eliminated choices. The latter questioned the superiority of Western 
values and institutions, and strove to redefine the Greek national identity. While, the 
nationalism of this period challenged processes and institutions like globalisation and 
the European Community; however, its main feature was the redefinition of the Greek 
identity outside and beyond the west-European context implicit in the process of 
modernisation. Furthermore, this type of nationalism cut right across the political 
spectrum, including right and left-wing political forces.
The ecological movement witnessed the rise of this nationalism and, as 
mentioned in chapter 6, the ecological groups of the Federation vividly denounced it
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and formulated a political program presenting a significant rupture with the country’s 
entrenched geopolitical elements. The ecological groups in the Federation focused 
predominantly on the local and international level, thereby diminishing the nation-* 
state as an essential unit of political life. In opposition to this, the groups of the extra- 
parliamentary Left in the FEAO took a clear stand in favour of the nationalistic 
movement, and in favour of Greek expansion in the Balkans. Their traditional 
interpretation of geopolitics strongly criticised the ecological forces as being 
‘apolitical’.
The Greek nationalism of the 1980s could not have been so effective and 
widespread without the latent nationalism in the anti-imperialistic culture of the 
1970s. Both periods believed that national self-determination was incompatible with 
global integration. The nation-state was the only political unit still promising a viable 
alternative modernisation. Thus, both these cases illustrate the predominance of a 
political culture that constantly reflected on the political opportunity structure of the 
global context, even if this was often translated defensively-negatively.
The characteristics of new social movements in Greece that were specific to 
the political environment, can be classified under two main headings: (i) the borders 
of collectivity, and (ii) autonomy, self-determination
(i)The borders o f collectivity: The advent of new social movements has been 
associated in the literature with the increased fragmentation of post-modern or post­
industrial societies and a radical reformulation of the previous notion of collectivity as 
the heterogeneity of previous unified political subjects became apparent (e.g. black 
feminism against white domineered feminism). In the Greek feminist and ecological 
movements, however, collectivity persisted firmly as an essential principle of their 
ideological identity. It was not only fundamental for the attainment of any political 
goal, but also an authoritative principle in its own right.
In the case of the feminist movement, collectivity meant above all the firm self­
definition by the EGE as well as the autonomous feminist groups as trans-class in 
character. Although both organisations introduced a class analysis and an anti-capitalist 
stand in their discourse, they never divided the subject ‘woman’ into classes or different 
subgroups on the basis of women’s different identities and experiences.
In the Federation too collectivity persisted as an authoritative principle. 
Although the organisation acknowledged the existence of many different social
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conflicts and consequently the fragmentation of the political subject into as many sub­
groups (pacifists, ecologists, leftists, feminists, anti-militarists, anti-racists, etc.), they 
still affirmed collectivity as an indispensable component of any substantial political 
change.
The two movements’ ideological adherence to the concept of collectivity is also 
shown by their endorsement of a social conception of citizenship.5 They both 
underlined the positive freedom of the community, disputing thereby the interpretation 
of citizenship as the individual exercise of civil, political, social or cultural rights. They 
both acknowledged the significance of the community, while they took a critical stand 
towards concepts (such as personal development) that underlined the empowerment of 
the individual.
(ii) Autonomy and self-determination: One of the main ideological features of new 
social movements is the quest for an autonomy that will allow the unobstructed 
development of their identity. Without autonomy there can be no new social identities 
to critically question the norms of social reproduction and legitimation. In the 
literature this demand for autonomy is identified with the creation of political spaces 
not subject to the state, the political parties or* the economy. Accordingly, new social 
movements are located within civil society in juxtaposition to the state and the 
established institutions of the political system. While this is the theoretical pattern in 
the relevant literature, in practice new social movements in Greece formulated a 
discourse that signifies a complex relation with the established institutions of the 
political system. In the Greek context, new social movements tried not only to create 
political spaces for themselves within the nation-state, but also for the nation-state 
within the global community. Consequently, their struggle for self-determination took 
two forms: a) to defend their space vis-a-vis the State, and b) to create a political 
space on behalf of the state in the international community. As autonomy and self- 
determination became polysemic subjects, this led to a variety of political strategies.
51 refer here to the perception of civil society as ‘a society of citizens understood in 
the more republican, participatory sense of the positive freedom of the community, 
rather than the negative (liberal) freedom of the individual”. See Gideon B., ‘From 
Structuralism to Voluntarism: The Latin American Left and the Discourse on Civil 
Society and Democracy’, Contemporary Politics, vol. 4, no. 4, 1998, p. 403.
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When the EGE chose to link its statist political project of social change with 
its national project to establish an autonomous course of development, the state 
became the vehicle for achieving both social transformation and national self- 
determination. Anti-imperialism was followed by statism. The focal point of the 
autonomous feminist groups remained movement politics, within the national context 
as well as the international community. It was civil society, national or global, that 
became the main vehicle of social change. Their political identity was founded on 
anti-imperialism and movement politics. The Federation’s ecological groups adopted 
a political stance similar to that of the autonomous feminists. They focused on civil 
society, national or international, and they were anti-imperialistic, but not outright 
anti-state. For them, the state and the political parties were simply some of the many 
actors in the political arena. The groups of the extra-parliamentary Left, on the other 
hand, developed an anti-imperialistic stance, founded on nationalism and including an 
opportunistic attitude vis-a-vis the state.
Overall, the case study with findings closest to the properties of new social 
movements as presented in the literature is that of the autonomous feminist groups. 
However, in order to fully account for the politics of social protest in the Greek 
context one must also take into consideration the EGE and the Federation. Only a 
complete reading of these oppositional forces can provide an understanding of the 
various forms of movement politics during the period 1975-1992. Even where the 
case studies show some divergence from the ideal type of new social movement, these 
groups did introduce novel elements into Greek politics and became the main bearers 
of the second-wave feminist and ecological movements respectively. Their specific 
attributes remind us that social movements always interact with their political 
environment, and therefore manifest a heterogeneity that suggests that the last word 
on new social movements has not yet been writtea
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RIXI Rupture
SEGES Coordinating Committee of Representatives of Women’s 
Organisations
SEOPP Coordinating Committee of Organisations for the Protectio 
of the Environment
SMO Social Movement Organisation
SYN Coalition of the Left and Progress
UN United Nations
Bibliography
‘A Feminist Claim or a Process of Assimilation?’ Adesmevti Kinisi Ginaikon, April 
1989, (in Greek).
‘A Week of Alternative/Liberation Movements’, Ecological Newspaper, issue 11, 
February-March 1984, (in Greek).
Adamakopoulos, T. (1987) ‘In the beginning were the mountains’ in: Christoforos 
Orfanides, (ed.) The Ecological Movement in Greece, (Athens, Meta te Vroche - in 
Greek).
Agenda, published by the Union of Greek Women, Athens 1995, (in Greek).
Alevizou, F., Korassidou, M. and Samiou, D. ‘Feature: Violence and Rape’, Dini, No.
2, October 1987, (in Greek).
Alternative Movement of Ecologists, ‘The five months that shook the Federation’, 
Ecological Newspaper, No. 36, October 1989, (in Greek).
‘Alternative Movement of Ecologists’, Deltio, No 2, July 1988, (in Greek).
Alvarez, S, Dagnino, E. and Escobar, A. (eds) (1998) Culture o f Politics/Politics o f  
Culture: Re-Visioning Latin American Social Movements (Colorado, Westview 
Press)
Alvarez, S., Dagnino, E., Escobar, A. (1998) ‘Introduction: The Cultural and the 
Political in Latin American Social Movements’, in: Sonia E. Alvarez, Evelina 
Dagnino, Arturo Escobar (eds.), Culture o f Politics/Politics o f Culture: Re- 
Visioning Latin American Social Movements (Colorado, Westview Press)
Amin, S. (1990)‘The Growing Sophistication of Northern Control’, Socialist Review,
3.
Aminzande, R. (1995) ‘Between Movement and Party: The Transformation of Mid- 
Nineteenth Century French Republicanism’, in C. Jenkins and B. Klandermans 
(eds) The Politics o f Social Protest, (London, UCL Press).
‘An Alternative Week’, Rupture, issue 14, February 1984, (in Greek). 
Athanasopoulos-Kalomalos, T. ‘Identity and Principles of the Green Movement in the 
World and in Greece: Critical Review and Proposal’, Ecotopia, No 13, May-June 
1991, (in Greek).
324
Athens Interview on 13 Dec. 1996 with Polydevkis Papadopoulos, first publisher of 
Ecological Newspaper (1982-‘85), member of Ecological Initiative, and of the 
Alternative Movement of Ecologists, Athens, 13/12/1996.
Athens Interview on 10 Dec. 1996 with N. Chrysogelos, member of the Alternative 
Movement of Ecologists, member of the FEAO, journalist on Ecological 
Newspaper, on the editorial board of Recycling.
Athens Interview on 11 Dec. 1986 with Christos Korkovelos, member of the editorial 
board of the Ecological Newspaper, ex-member of the FEAO Secretariat.
Athens Interview on 11 Nov. 1998 with Anni Pitsiori-Kavadia, ex-member of the 
EGE Executive Board and councilor at the General Secretariat of Equality.
Athens Interview on 14 Oct. 1998 with Soula Merentiti, ex-president of EGE’s branch 
in Trikala, ex-councilor of the municipality of Trikala.
Athens Interview on 15 Jan. 1997 with Stelios Psomas, member of the Ecological 
Movement of Salonica, FEAO member, Director of Greenpeace’s in Athens.
Athens Interview on 11 Dec. 1986 with Katerina Iatropoulou, FEAO parliamentary 
deputy 1991-93.
Athens Interview on 30 Oct. 1998 with Constantina Giannopoulou, EGE co-founder, 
president 1989-‘94, honorary president 1994-.
Athens Interviews on 15 Feb. 1998 and 24 March 1998 with Gianna Athanassatou, ex­
member of the editorial board of Dini and member of the Athens Women’s House,
Athens Interview on 17 Dec. 1996 with Leonidas Louloudes, ex-member of the 
ecological department of SYN, journalist on New Ecology, Anti, Dawn, ex-member 
of the Co-coordinative Committee of The Citizen, professor at the Geoponic School 
and FEAO member.
Athens Interview on 7 Nov. 1998 with Margaret Papandreou, EGE co-founder, vice- 
president 1975-1989, president 1989-92.
Athens Interview on 26 Feb. 1998 with Martha Kaloudaki, former member of the 
Administrative Council of the EGE, co-founder of Unaligned Movement of 
Women, co-founder of the feminist network Telesilla.
Athens Interview on 10 Dec. 1996 with Nikos Chrysogelos, journalist on Ecological 
Newspaper, co-publisher of the magazine Recycling, member of Ecological 
Initiative and Initiative for a Green Alternative Movement.
Athens Interview on 9 Nov. 1998 with Chrysanthi Laiou-Antoniou, EGE co-founder, 
Head of the Council of Equality (1983-‘85), Secretary of the General Secretariat of
325
Equality (1985-‘89), member of the legal committee for the reform of Family Law 
(1985), ex-member of the United Nations Committee for the Elimination of all 
Forms of Discrimination against Women.
Athens Interviews on 3 March 1998 and 15 March 1998 with Vicky Kotsovelou, 
former member of the feminist group of the Communist Party of the Interior and 
co-founder of Diotima (Centre of Women’s Studies and Research).
‘Autonomous Women’s Groups’, Sfigga, No. 1, July 1980, (in Greek).
Avdela, E. ‘About the Crisis’, Dini, No. 4, June 1989, (in Greek).
Avdela, E., Papayannaki, M. and Sklavenitis, C. ‘Abortion 1976-86: A Retrospective 
Account of a Feminist Issue (the Greek Experience)’, Dini, No. 1, December 1986, 
(in Greek).
Baker, G. (1998) ‘From Structuralism to Voluntarism: the Latin American Left and 
the Discourse on Civil Society and Democracy’, Contemporary Politics, 4 (4).
Baker, S., Milton, K. and Yearly, S. (eds) (1994) Protecting the Periphery: 
Environmental Policy in Peripheral Regions o f the European Union, (London, 
Frank Cass).
Banks, J. A. (1972) The Sociology o f Social Movements (London, Macmillan).
Barry, John (1994) ‘The Limits of the Shallow and the Deep: Green Politics, 
Philosophy, and Praxis’, Environmental Politics, 3(3).
Benton, T. (1996) (ed.), The Greening o f Marxism (New York and London, The 
Guilford Press).
Beopoulos, N. (1996) ‘The Impact of Agricultural Activities’ in: Spilios,
Papaspiliopoulos, Thymios, Papagiannis, Spiros, Kouvelis (eds) The Environment 
in Greece, 1991-1996, (Athens, Bodosaki Foundation) (in Greek).
Berger, S. (ed.) (1981) Organising Interests in Western Europe (Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press).
Bhaskar, V. and Glyn, A. (eds) (1995) The North, the South and the Environment 
(London and Japan, United Nations University Press).
‘Bimonthly Chronicle of EGE Activities’, Open Window, issues 1-43, (in Greek).
Blakeley, G. (1998) ‘Democratisation and Civil society in Chile: A Blind Alley for 
Feminists?’ Contemporary Politics, 4 (2).
Blionis, G ‘The Fragmentation of the Ecological Movement’, Ecotopia, No 26, Oct- 
Nov. 1994, (in Greek).
326
Blionis, G. ‘Some Remarks Concerning the Ecological Configuration and the 
Elections’, Ecotopia, No 5, Nov. 1989, (in Greek).
Boggs, C. (1995) ‘Rethinking the Sixties Legacy: From New Left to New Social 
Movements’, in: S., Lyman, (ed.) (1995) Social Movements: Critiques, Concepts, 
Case Studies (London, Macmillan)
Bookchin, M. (1986) Post-Scarcity Anarchism (Montreal, Black Rose Books).
Bookchin, M. (1991) ‘Social Ecology’ in: A. Dobson (ed.) The Green Reader 
(London, Andre Deutsch).
Bottomley, G. (1986), ‘A Word Divided? Studies of Gender Relations in Modem 
Greece’, Mankind, 16, (3)
Brand, K. (1990) ‘Cyclical Aspects of New Social Movements: Waves of Cultural 
Criticism and Mobilisation Cycles of New Middle-class Radicalism’, in: R. Dalton 
and M. Kuechler (eds.), Challenging the Political Order: New Social and Political 
Movements in Western Democracies (New York and Oxford, Oxford University 
Press).
Brown, C. ‘Mothers, Fathers and Children: From Private to Public Patriarchy’, in: 
Lydia Sargent (ed.) (1981) Women and Revolution: A Discussion o f the Unhappy 
Marriage o f  Marxism and Feminism (Boston, South End Press).
Bryant, C. (1995) ‘Civic Nation, Civil Society, Civil Religion’ in: John A. Hall (ed.), 
Civil Society: Theory, History, Comparison, (Cambridge, Polity Press).
Buechler, S. (2000) Social Movements in Advanced Capitalism: The Political 
Economy and Cultural Construction o f Social Activism (Oxford and New York, 
Oxford University Press).
Bulletin o f the Federation o f Ecological and Alternative Organisations, special issue, 
Oct 1989, (in Greek).
Burstain, P., Einwohner, R. and Hollander, J. (1995) ‘The Success of Political 
Movements: A Bargaining Perspective’, in: Craig Jenkins and Bert Klandermans 
(eds.) The Politics o f Social Protest: Comparative Perspectives on States and 
Social Movements, (London, University College of London).
Bystydzienski, J. (ed.) (1992) Women Transforming Politics: Worldwide Strategies 
for Empowerment (Bloomington and Indianapolis, Indiana University Press).
Cacoullos, A. (1994) ‘Women Confronting Party Politics in Greece’, in: B. Nelson 
and N. Chowdhury (eds.), Women and Politics Worldwide (New Haven and 
London, Yale University Press).
327
Calderon, F. and Piscitelli, A. (1990) ‘Paradigm Crisis and Social Movements: A 
Latin American Perspective’, in: Else Oyen (ed.) (1990) Comparative 
Methodology: Theory and Practice in International Social Research (London, 
Sage)
Carter, A. (1999) A Radical Green Political Theory (London and New York, 
Routledge).
Cavounidis, J. (1983) ‘Capitalist Development and Women’s Work in Greece’, 
Journal o f  Modern Greek Studies, 1(2).
Charles, N. and Hughes-Freeland, F. (eds) (1996) Practicing Feminism: Identity, 
Difference, Power (London and New York, Routledge).
Chatzigogas, G. ‘Politics as Art and Basket-ball’, Ecotopia, No 6, Jan 1900, (in 
Greek).
Chatzimichalis, K. (1992) Regional Development and Policy, (Athens, Exantas - in 
Greek).
Christaki, P. ‘The Role of Greek Woman in the National-Liberation Struggles’, Open 
Window, issue 31, (in Greek).
Chronaki, Z, ‘The Need for a New Feminist Movement: Thoughts and Agonies of a 
Feminist’, Alpha, No. 1, February 1995, (in Greek).
Chronaki, Z. (1996) ‘Greek Women in the Nineteenth Century: First Attempts at 
Equality and Emancipation’, Kathemerini, 6 Oct. 1996 (in Greek).
‘Chronicle of the First Panhellenic Meeting’, Open Window, issue 20, Jan.-April 
1983, (in Greek).
‘Chronicle’, Skoupa, No. 5, July 1981, (in Greek).
Chrysogelos, N. ‘Fear of the open sea even though all sails are set’ in: Christoforos 
Orfanides, (ed.) The Ecological Movement in Greece, (Athens, Meta te Vroche - in 
Greek).
Clark, J. (1984) The Anarchist Moment: Reflections on Culture, Nature and Power 
(Montreal, Black Rose Books).
‘Classness’, Gaia, No. 2, 1984, (in Greek).
Clogg, R. (1979) A Short History o f Modern Greece (Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press).
Close, D. (1998) ‘Environmental NGOs in Greece: The Acheloos Campaign as a Case 
Study of their Influence’, Environmental Politics, 7 (2).
328
Cohen, G.A. (1997) ‘Back to Socialist Basics’, in: Jane Franklin (ed.) Equality 
(London, Institute for Public Policy Research).
Cohen, J. (1985) ‘Strategy or Identity?’, Social Research, 52 (4).
Cohen, J. and Arato, A. (1995) C/v/7 Society and Political Theory (Cambridge, 
London, Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press).
‘Comments on other Comments’, New Ecology, No 67, May 1990, (in Greek).
Committee of Young Women, ‘Thoughts and Concerns in regard to Sexual Liberation 
of Women’, Open Window, issue 13, Apr.-June 1981, (in Greek).
‘Common Agreement of the Cooperating Ecological Groups’, Deltio, No 6, Nov. 
1988, (in Greek).
‘Concerning the Quota’, New Ecology, No 65, March 1990, (in Greek).
Connell, R. (1990) ‘The State, Gender, and Sexual Politics: Theory and Appraisal’, 
Theory and Society, 19 (5).
Constas, D. and Stavrou, T. (eds) (1995) Greece Prepares for the Twenty-First 
Century, (Washington D.C. and Baltimore, The Woodrow Wilson Centre Press and 
The John Hopkins University Press).
‘Continuation of a Presaged Death’, Gaia, No. 2, 1984, (in Greek).
Cott, N. (1986) ‘Feminist Theory and Feminist Movements: The Past Before Us’, in 
Juliet Mitchell, Ann Oakley (eds.) What is Feminism? (Oxford, Blackwell)
Cowan, J. (1996) ‘Being A Feminist in Contemporary Greece: Similarity and 
Difference Reconsidered’ in Nickie Charles and Felicia Hughes-Freeland (eds) 
Practicing Feminism: Identity, Difference, Power (London and New York, 
Routledge).
D’Anieri, P., Ernst, C. and Kier, E. (1990) ‘New Social Movements in Historical 
Perspective’, Comparative Politics, 22 (4).
Dalton, R. and Kuechler, M. (1990) (eds) Challenging the Political Order, (Oxford, 
New York, Oxford University Press).
Dalton, Russel, Kuechler, Manfred and Burklin, Wilhelm (1990) ‘The Challenge of 
New Movements’, in: R. Dalton and M. Kuechler (eds.), Challenging the Political 
Order: New Social and Political Movements in Western Democracies (New York 
and Oxford, Oxford University Press).
Daraki, P. (1995) The Vision o f Equivalence o f the Two Sexes (Athens, Kastaniotis-in 
Greek).
329
Davies, J. (1979) ‘The J-Curve of Rising and Declining Satisfactions as a Cause of 
Revolution and Rebellion’, in: Hugh Davies Graham and Ted Robert Gurr (eds.), 
Violence in America: Historical and Comparative Perspectives (London, Beverly 
Hills, Sage Publications)
Davies, T., (1997) Humanism (London, New York, Routledge).
Davion, Victoria (1994) ‘Is Ecofeminism Feminist?” in: Karren Warren (ed.) 
Ecological Feminism, (London, New York, 1994).
Della Porta, D. and Diani, M. (1999) Social Movements: An Introduction (Oxford, 
Blackwell)
Demertzis, N. (1995) ‘Greece: Greens at the Periphery’ in Dick, Richardson, Chris 
Rootes (eds) The Green Challenge: The Development o f Green Parties in Europe, 
(London, New York, Routledge).
Demertzis, N. (ed.) (1994) Greek Political Culture in Our Time (Athens, Odysseus -in 
Greek).
Diakos, K. ‘Let’s talk seriously about the Federation’, Ecotopia, No 10, Sept-Oct 
1990, (in Greek).
Diamantouros, N. (1991) ‘PASOK and State - Society Relations in Post- 
Authoritarian Greece (1974-1988)’ in Speros Vryonis (Ed.) Greece on the Road to 
Democracy: From the Junta to PASOK, (New York, Aristide D. Caratzas).
Dijkink, G. (1996) National Identity and Geopolitical visions: Maps o f  Pride and 
Pain, (London, New York, Routledge).
Dikaioakos, M. ‘Concerning the state of the Federation’, Ecological Newspaper, issue 
38, September 1990, (in Greek).
Dobratz, B. (1986) ‘Socio-political Participation of Women in Greece’, Research in 
Politics and Society, no 2.
Dobratz, B. (1992) ‘Differences in Political Participation and Value Orientations 
among Greek Men and Women’, International Journal o f Sociology and Social 
Policy, 12 (8).
Dobson, A. (1990) Green Political Thought, (London, New York, Routledge).
Dobson, A., (1996) ‘Democratising Green Theory: Preconditions and Principles’ in: 
Doherty, B. and Geus, M. (eds) (1996) Democracy and Green Political Thought: 
Sustainability, Rights and Citizenship (London, New York, Routledge).
Docherty, T. (1993) Post-Modernism: A Reader, (New York, London, Harvester 
Wheatsheaf).
330
Doherty, B. and Geus, M. (eds) (1996) Democracy and Green Political Thought: 
Sustainability, Rights and Citizenship (London, New York, Routledge).
Doulia, D. (1994) ‘To Didi Giannopoulou’, Open Window: Feature 1982- ‘94, Athens, 
(in Greek).
Du Boulay, J. (1986) ‘Women - Images of their Nature and Destiny in Rural Greece’, 
in: J. Dubisch (ed.), Gender and Power in Rural Greece (Princeton, N.J, Princeton 
University Press).
Dubisch, J. (ed.) (1986) Gender and Power in Rural Greece (Princeton, N.J,
Princeton University Press).
Dubish, J., (1983) ‘Greek Women: Sacred or Profane’, Journal o f Modern Greek 
Studies, 1(1).
‘Eastern Europe and the Balkans: A Preliminary Co-operation’, New Ecology, No 66, 
April 1990, (in Greek).
Eckersley, R. (1992) Environmentalism and Political Theory: Towards an Ecocentric 
Approach (London, University College London).
Ecological Calendar 1988 and 1996, published by Ecological Movement of Salonica, 
Salonica, (in Greek).
Ecological Movement of Salonica, ‘The Ecologists-Alternatives have belied our 
hopes’, New Ecology, No 95, Sept. 1992, (in Greek).
Ecological movement of Volos, ‘Ecology and Ecological Movement’, Deltio, No. 1, 
June 1988, (in Greek).
Ecological/Alternative Union of Citizens, ‘For a “Green” Federal Europe of 
Peripheries’, Deltio, No 8, Jan. 1989, (in Greek).
Ecologists/Alternatives, ‘No to the Gulf War, No to the New International Order’, 
Eco-Information, No. 6, Jan 1991, (in Greek).
‘Ecologists/Alternatives: An all-encompassing Account’; Eco-Information, No 6, Jan 
1991, (in Greek).
‘Ecology and Sewage tanks’, Rupture, No 5, Nov. 1980, (in Greek).
Eder, K (1996) The Social Construction o f Nature (London, Thousand Oaks and New 
Delhi, Sage Publications).
Eder, K. (1985) ‘The “New Social Movements”: Moral Crusades, Political Pressure 
Groups, or Social Movements ?’ Social Research, 52 (4).
‘Editorial Note’, New Ecology, issue 13, November 1985, (in Greek).
‘Editorial Note’, New Ecology, issue 23, 1986, (in Greek).
331
Efthimiopoulos, II., Stamatopoulos, G., ‘In Tsepelovo, this Summer?’, New Ecology, 
issue 36, October 1987, (in Greek).
EGE Constitution dated Athens, 29 Nov. 1983, (in Greek).
EGE Constitution, dated Athens, 15 Sept. 1976, (in Greek).
‘EGE’s positions on Abortion’, Open Window, issue 5, June-July-Aug. 1979, (in 
Greek).
‘8 March: Day of Struggles for Women’, Open Window, issue 12, Jan.-March 1981, 
(in Greek).
EKD, ‘In Regard to the Ecological Crisis in Nature and Society’, Deltio, No 6, Nov. 
1988, (in Greek).
Elman, A. (1995) ‘The State’s Equality for Women: Sweden’s Equality Ombudsman’, 
in Dorothy McBride Stetson, Amy G. Mazur (eds.) Comparative State Feminism, 
(London, Sage).
EOG (1979) ‘Introduction’ in Alice Schwartzer, The Small Difference and its Great 
Consequences (EOG publication, Athens), (in Greek).
Epanastatiki Pali Ginaikon, bulletin published by the Revolutionary Struggle of 
Women, 1978, (in Greek).
EPOIZO, ‘Declaration of Withdrawal from the Federation’, Bulletin, June 1990, (in 
Greek).
Epstein, B, (1990)‘Rethinking Social Movement Theory’, Socialist Revierw, 20 (1).
Escobar, A. (1992) ‘Culture, Practice and Politics: Anthropology and the Study of 
Social Movements’, Critique o f Anthropology, 12 (4).
Escobar, A. (1995) Encountering Development: The Making and Unmaking o f the 
Third World (Princeton, New Jersey, Princeton University Press)
Escobar, A., and Alvarez, S. (eds.) (1992) The Making o f  Social Movements in Latin 
America: Identity, Strategy and Democracy (Boulder, San Francisco and Oxford, 
Westview Press)
Esping-Andersen, G. (April 1992) Post-Industrial Class Structures: An Analytical 
Framework, Working Paper 38, Centre for Advanced Study in the Social Sciences, 
Juan March Institute, Madrid
Eurobarometer, No. 19, June (1983), No. 20, December (1983), No.25, June (1986), 
No.28, December (1987), No.30, December (1988), No.35, June (1991), No.37, 
June (1992), No. 42, Spring (1995).
332
Evans, J. (1995) Feminist Theory Today: An Introduction to Second-Wave Feminism, 
(London, Sage).
‘Excerpts from a Statement by Margaret Papandreou’, Atlantis, 12 (2), 1987.
Eyerman, R. and Jamison, A. (1991) Social Movements: A Cognitive Approach 
(Cambridge, Polity Press).
Featherstone, M. (1990) (ed.) Global Culture: Nationalism, Globalisation and 
Modernity (London, California, Sage).
‘Feature: Panhellenic Meeting of Women’, Gaia, No. 2, 1984, (in Greek).
Feminism-Socialism: The Route to Social Liberation, publication by the Union of 
Greek Women, Athens, 1984, (in Greek).
‘Feminist Groups Discuss About Feminist Politics’, Dini, No. 3, July 1988, (in 
Greek).
Feree, M. (1995) ‘Making Equality: The Women’s Affairs Offices in the Federal 
Republic of Germany’ in: D., Stestson and A., Mazur (eds) Comparative State 
Feminism (Thousand Oaks, London and New Dehli, Sage).
Ferree, M., (1992) ‘The Political Context of Rationality: Rational Choice Theory and 
Resource Mobilisation’, in: Aldon Morris and Carol McClurg Mueller (eds.) 
Frontiers in Social Movement Theory (New Haven and London, Yale University 
Press).
Fine, R. and Rai, S. (ed.) (1997) Civil Society: Democratic Perspectives (London and 
Oregon, Frank Cass)
First Constitutional Conference o f the Federation o f Ecological and Alternative 
Organisations, bulletin published by the Federation, Jan. 1992, (in Greek).
Floros, G. ‘From Terrorism and Court Martial to the Rallies for Peace’, Anti, 186,11 
September 1981, (in Greek).
‘For Our Autonomy...’, Sfigga, No. 1, July 1980, (in Greek).
Foweraker, J. (1995) Theorising Social Movements (London and Boulder, Colorado, 
Pluto Press)
Foweraker, J. and Craig, A. (eds.) (1990) Popular Movements and Political Change in 
Mexico (Boulder and London, Lynne Rienner Publishers)
Fox, B. (1988) ‘Conceptualising “Patriarchy” ’, The Canadian Review o f Sociology 
and Anthropology, 25 (2).
333
Frankland, G (1995) ‘Germany: The Rise, Fall and Recovery of Die Griinen’ in: D. 
Richardson, C. Rootes (eds) The Green Challenge: The Development o f Green 
Parties in Europe, (London and New York, Routledge).
Franklin, J. (1997) (ed.) Equality (London, Institute for Public Policy Research).
Fraser, N. (1998) ‘From Redistribution to Recognition? Dilemmas of Justice in a 
“Post-Socialist” Age’ in: Anne Phillips (ed.) Feminism and Politics (Oxford, New 
York, Oxford University Press).
Freeman, J. (1973) ‘The Origins of the Women’s Liberation Movement’, American 
Journal o f  Sociology, 78 (no. 4).
Friedl, E. (1986) ‘The Position of Women: Appearance and Reality’, in: J. Dubisch 
(ed.), Gender and Power in Rural Greece (Princeton, N.J, Princeton University 
Press).
Fromm, E. (ed.) (1966) Socialist Humanism: An International Symposium (New 
York, Anchor).
Fundamental Principles o f Green-Alternative Politics, FEAO bulletin Oct. 1989, (in 
Greek).
G. M., ‘Alternative’, Ecotopia, issue 8, April 1990, (in Greek).
Gamer, R. (1996) Environmental Politics, (London, Harvester Wheatsheaf)
Gatzogiannis, S. (1996), ‘The Country’s Forest Resources’ in: Spilios 
Papaspiliopoulos, Thymios Papagiannis, Spiros Kouvelis (eds.) The Environment in 
Greece, 1991-1996, (Athens, Bodosaki Foundation) (in Greek).
Gelb, J. (1990) ‘Feminism and Political Action’, in: R. Dalton, M. Kuechler (eds.), 
Challenging the Political Order, (Oxford, New York, Oxford University Press).
General Secretariat o f Equality, information pamphlets by the General Secretariat (in 
English).
Gia tin Apeleftherosi ton Ginaikon, No. 1-4, 1978, Athens, (in Greek).
Glametatzis, G. ‘Ecological Movement of Drama’, Ecotopia, No 3-4, Sept. 1989 (in 
Greek).
Goodin, R. (1992) Green Political Theory (Cambridge, Polity Press).
Gouliarou, Th. ‘Some Thoughts about the Past and the Present of the Women’s 
Movement’, Katina, No. 3, June 1988, Salonica, (in Greek).
Gouliarou, Th. and Kavka, M., ‘Women’s Alliance or What Does the Fox Look for in 
the Bazaar?’, Katina, No. 2, December 1987, (in Greek).
Greece through new Eyes, EGE pamphlet (in English).
334
‘Greece: Hellenic Republic’ in: Robin Morgan (ed.) (1984) Sisterhood is Global 
(New York, Anchor Press/ Doubleday).
Greek Council for Equality, information pamphlet by the General Secretariat (in 
English).
Group o f Women in Publishing, EOG pamphlet, 1979, (in Greek).
‘Groups without structure and their limits’, Deltio, No 10, April-May 1989, (in 
Greek).
Guadagnini, M. (1995) ‘The Latecomers: Italy’s Equal Status and Equal Opportunity 
Agencies’ in: D., Stestson and A., Mazur (eds) Comparative State Feminism 
(Thousand Oaks, London and New Dehli, Sage).
Gurney, J. and Tierney, K. (1982) ‘Relative Deprivation and Social Movements: A 
Critical Look at Twenty Years of Theory and Research’, The Sociological 
Quarterly, vol. 23
Gurr, T. (1970) Why Men Rebel, (Princeton, Princeton University Press)
Habermas, J. (1989) The Structural Transformation o f  the Public Sphere (Cambridge, 
Polity Press)
Habermas, J. (1970) Toward a Rational Society: Student Protest, Science, and Politics 
(Boston, Beacon Press).
Habermas, J. (1981) ‘New Social Movements’, Telos, no. 49.
Half o f the Sky and the Earth is Going to Change the World, EGE pamphlet, (in 
Greek).
Hall, J. (ed.) (1995) Civil Society: Theory, History, Comparisons (Cambridge, Polity 
Press)
Hall, S. and Jacques, M. (eds) (1990) New Times: The Changing Face o f Politics in 
the 1990s ((London and New York, Verso).
Hann, C. (1995) ‘Philosophers’ Models on the Carpathian Lowlands’ in: John A. Hall 
(ed.), Civil Society: Theory, History, Comparison, (Cambridge, Polity Press)
Hart, J. (1996) New Voices in the Nation: Women and the Greek Resistance, 1941-64 
(Ithaca and London, Cornell University Press).
Hartmann, H. (1981) ‘The Unhappy Marriage of Marxism and Feminism: Towards a 
More Progressive Union’ in: L., Sargent (ed.) (1981) Women and Revolution: A 
Discussion o f the Unhappy Marriage o f Marxism and Feminism (Boston, South 
End Press).
335
Haynes, J. (1997) Democracy and Civil Society in the Third World: Politics and New 
Political Movements (Cambridge, Oxford, Polity Press).
Held, D. (1987) Models o f Democracy (Stanford, California, Stanford University 
Press)
Held, D. (1990) The Decline of the Nation State’ in: Stuart Hall and Martin Jacques 
(eds) New Times: The Changing Face o f Politics in the 1990s ((London and New 
York, Verso).
Heilman, J. (1990), ‘Latin American Feminism’, Review Article, Socialist Review, 
90/3.
Hicks, Emily (1981) ‘Cultural Marxism: Non-Synchrony and Feminist Practice’ in:
L., Sargent (ed.) (1981) Women and Revolution: A Discussion o f the Unhappy 
Marriage o f Marxism and Feminism (Boston, South End Press).
Hindess, B. (1987) Freedom, Equality, and the Market: Arguments on Social Policy 
(London, New York, Tavistock)
Hirsch, J. (1988) ‘The Crisis of Fordism, Transformation of the “Keynesian Security 
State”, and New Social Movements’, Research in Social Movements, Conflicts and 
Change, vol. 10.
Hjelmar, U. (1996) The Political Practice o f Environmental Organisations, 
(Aldershot, Brookfield, Ashgate).
‘ “House of Women”: A Proposal Open to Discussion’, To Milo kai to Fidi apo ti 
Skopia tis Evas, No. 4, April 1982, (in Greek).
Hugh, D. and Gurr, T. (eds) (1979) Violence in America: Historical and Comparative 
Perspectives (London, Beverly Hills, Sage Publications)
Humm, M., (ed.) (1992) Feminism: A Reader (New York and London, Harvester 
Wheatsheaf).
I. E., ‘Alternative Meeting 1985’, New Ecology, issue 13, November 1985, (in Greek).
Iatrides, J (1992) ‘Papandreou’s Foreign Policy’, in T. Kariotis (ed.), The Greek 
Socialist Experiment: Papandreou’s Greece 1981-1989, (New York, Pella).
Ifantis, S. ‘Dry Soil’, Ecotopia, No 17, March 1992, (in Greek).
Ifantis, S. ‘The Ecological Spectrum at the European Elections’, Ecotopia, No 25, 
June 1994, (in Greek).
Inglehart, R. and Flanagan, S. (1987) ‘Value Change in Industrial Societies’ American 
Political Science Review, 81 (4).
Initiative o f Green Politics, leaflet, (in Greek).
336
‘Invitation to a Meeting of Women in autumn ‘83’, Poli ton Ginaikon, No. 10, Oct 
1983, (in Greek).
Jackson, C. (1994)‘Gender Analysis and Environmentalisms’ in: Michael Redclift and 
Ted Benton (eds) Social Theory and the Global Environment, (London and New 
York, Routledge).
Jenkins, C. (1995) ‘Social Movements, Political Representation and the State: An 
Agenda and Comparative Framework’ in Craig Jenkins and Bert Klandermans,
(Eds.) The Politics o f Social Protest, (London, University College of London).
Jenkins, C. and Klandermans, B. (eds) (1995) The Politics o f Social Protest: 
Comparative Perspectives on States and Social Movements, (London, University 
College of London).
Johnston, H. and Klandermans, B. (eds) (1995) Social Movements and Culture 
(London, UCL Press).
Jordan, T. (1994) Reinventing Revolution: Value and Difference in New Social 
Movements and the Left (Aldershot, Brookfield, Sydney, Ashgate Publishing).
Kafetzis, P. ‘Political Crisis and Political Culture’ in: Nicos Demertzis (ed.) The 
Greek Political Culture Nowadays, (Athens, Odysseus - in Greek).
Kalesakis, K ‘The Federation presumes work and sincerity’, New Ecology, No 84, 
October 1991, (in Greek).
Kaloudiotis, D. (1998) Greece in the post Cold-War Period: An Optimistic Hypothesis 
(Athens, Zacharopoulos -  in Greek)
Kapazoglou, E. ‘The Result of the Transition to Socialism is Eventually Democracy’, 
Open Window, issue 10, July-Aug-Sept. 1980, (in Greek).
Kaplan, G. (1992) Contemporary Western European Feminism (London, Allen & 
Unwin, UCL).
Karabelias, G. (1993) Greece: A Country in between boundaries, (Athens, Alternative 
Publishing and Egeon Publishing house -  in Greek)
Karabelias, G. ‘Beyond Socialism’ in: Michalis Raptis, Giorgos Karabelias, Nicos 
Chrysogelos (eds.) An Alternative-Revolutionary Movement, (Athens, Alternative 
Publications Commune - in Greek).
Karabelias, G. ‘Green-Alternative Politics in an Altering World’, Rupture, 39, January 
1991, (in Greek).
Karabelias, G. ‘The Volcano Cannot Be Tackled with Exorcisms’, Rupture, 39,
January 1991, (in Greek).
337
Karavellas, D. and Pateras, Ch. (1996)‘The Marine Environment’ in: Spilios 
Papaspiliopoulos, Thymios Papagiannis, Spiros Kouvelis (eds.) The Environment in 
Greece, 1991-1996, (Athens, Bodosaki Foundation) (in Greek).
Kariotis, T. (ed.) (1992) The Greek Socialist Experiment (New York, Pella 
Publishing).
Kassimati, K. (1994) ‘Female Education and Employment: Problems of Equal
Opportunities in Greece’, in: A. Yotopoulos-Marangopoulos (ed.), Women's Rights: 
Human Rights, (Athens, Estia).
Kastrinakis, M. ‘Ecology and Authority’, Ecotopia, issue 2, June 1989, (in Greek).
Katsakiori, M. (1995) Non-Governmental Nature- Oriented Organisations in Greece, 
Europe and the Mediterranean Basin, (Salonica, The Goulandris Natural History 
Museum, Greek Biotope-Wetland Centre -  in Greek).
Katsoulis, II. ‘What Hinders the Development of an Ecological Consciousness?’, 
Ecological Newspaper, issue 14, December ’84 - January ’85, (in Greek).
Kellner, D. (1989) Critical Theory, Marxism and Modernity (Baltimore, John 
Hopkins University Press).
Kenny M. (1996) ‘Paradoxes of Community’, in B. Doherty and M. de Geus, (eds.), 
Democracy and Green Political Thought: Sustainability, Rights and Citizenship 
(London and New York, Routledge).
Kinisi Politon, Evaluation o f the Environmental Status o f Greece in 1990, Athens: 
Kinisi Politon, May 1991, (in Greek).
Kinisi Politon, Evaluation o f the Environmental Status o f Greece in 1989, (Athens: 
Kinisi Politon, March 1990), (in Greek).
Kitschelt, H. (1992) ‘Resource Mobilisation Theory: A Critique’, in: Dieter Rucht 
(ed.) Research on Social Movements: The State o f the Art in Western Europe and 
the U.S.A. (Frankfurt, Campus).
Klandermans, B. (1990) ‘Linking the “Old” and the “New”: Movement Networks in 
the Netherlands’, in: R. Dalton and M. Kuechler (eds.), Challenging the Political 
Order: New Social and Political Movements in Western Democracies (New York 
and Oxford, Oxford University Press).
Klandermans, B. (1992) ‘New Social Movements and Resource Mobilisation: The 
European and the American Approach Revisited’, in: Dieter Rucht (ed.) Research 
on Social Movements: The State o f the Art in Western Europe and the U.S.A. 
(Frankfurt, Campus)
338
Kondyli, M., ‘Nostalgic Inertia’, Dini, No. 3, July 1988, (in Greek).
Korakianitis, M. ‘Hollow Nationalistic Infatuations and Mummified Peoples, Flowers 
o f Evil, No 7, Winter 1991, (in Greek).
Komhauser, W. (1960) The Politics o f Mass Society (London, Routledge and Kegan 
Paul)
Kotsovelou, V., Indicative Chronology o f Groups/Publications/Mobilisations o f the 
Greek Feminist Movement during the decade 1975-1985, Diotima, Athens, (in 
Greek).
Kotsovelou, V. and Repousi, M. ‘Some Thoughts about the Political Identity of 
Feminism in Greece’, Dini, No. 4, June 1989, (in Greek).
Kotsovelou, V. and Repousi, M., ‘Feminist Magazines 1978-‘85: A First 
Interpretation’, Diavazo, No. 198, 14 Sept. 1988, (in Greek).
Kousis, M. (1994) ‘Environment and the State in the EU Periphery: The Case of 
Greece’ in Susan Baker, Kay Milton, Steven Yearly (eds.) Protecting the 
Periphery : Environmental Policy in Peripheral Regions o f the European Union, 
(London, Frank Cass).
Kousis, M. (1999) ‘Sustaining Local Environmental Mobilisations: Groups, Actions 
and Claims in Southern Europe’, Environmental Politics, 8 (1).
Kouvelis, S. (1996) ‘Water Supplies’ in: Spilios Papaspiliopoulos, Thymios 
Papagiannis, Spiros Kouvelis (eds.) The Environment in Greece, 1991-1996, 
(Athens, Bodosaki Foundation) (in Greek).
Kriesi, H. (1995) ‘The Political Opportunity Structure of New Social Movements: Its 
Impact on their Mobilisation’, in: Craig Jenkins and Bert Klandermans (eds.) The 
Politics o f Social Protest: Comparative Perspectives on States and Social 
Movements, (London, University College of London)
Kyriazis, N. (1995) ‘Feminism and the Status of Women in Greece’, in: D. Constas 
and T. Stavrou (eds.), Greece Prepares for the Twenty-First Century, (Washington
D.C. and Baltimore, The Woodrow Wilson Centre Press & The John Hopkins 
University Press).
Laclau, E. and Mouffe, Ch. (1985) Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards A 
Radical Democratic Politics (London, Verso).
Lavdas, K. (1997) The Europanisation o f Greece: Interest Politics and the Crises o f 
Integration, (London, Macmillan Press).
339
Lavris, magazine published by the Autonomous Group of Homosexual Women, (in 
Greek).
Lazarides, G. (1994) ‘The Feminist Movement in Greece: An Overview’, Journal o f 
Gender Studies, 3 (2).
Legally Equal’, Open Window, issue 20, Jan.-April 1983, (in Greek).
Leontidou, E. and Ammer, R. (eds) (1992) Women's Greece (Athens, Alternative 
Publications - in Greek).
Leontidou, L. (1992) ‘Women’s Labour in Cities: A Contradictory Acquisition’, in: E. 
Leontidou and S. Ammer (eds.), Women’s Greece, (Athens, Alternative 
Publications - in Greek).
Lindberg, S. and Sverrisson, A. (eds) (1997) Social Movements in Development: The 
Challenge o f Globalisation and Democratisation, (Basingstoke, Macmillan).
Louloudes, L. (1987)‘Social Demands: From Environmental Protection to Political 
Ecology’ in: C. Orfanides, The Ecological Movement in Greece, (Athens, Meta te 
Vrochi — in Greek).
Lyman, S. (ed.) (1995) Social Movements: Critiques, Concepts, Case Studies 
(London, Macmillan)
Lyrintzis, C., Nicolakopoulos, II. and Sotiropoulos, D. (1999) (eds) Society and 
Politics: Facets o f the Third Greek Democracy (1974-1994) (Athens, Themelio-in 
Greek).
Maier, C. (ed) (1987) Changing Boundaries o f the Political (Cambridge and New 
York, Cambridge University Press).
Marakis, N. ‘Red against Greens’, To Vima, 28 January 1990, (in Greek).
Marx, G. and Wood, J. (1975) ‘Strands of Theory and Research on Collective 
Behaviour’, Annual Review o f Sociology, vol. 1.
Mavrogordatos, G. (1984) ‘The Greek Party System: A Case of Limited but Polarised 
Pluralism?’, West European Politics, 7 (4).
Mayer, M. (1995) ‘Social Movement Research in the United States: A European 
Perspective’, in: S., Lyman, (ed.) Social Movements: Critiques, Concepts, Case 
Studies (London, Macmillan)
Mazur, A. (1995) ‘Strong State and Symbolic Reforms: The Ministere des Droits de 
la Femme in France’ in: D., Stestson and A., Mazur (eds) Comparative State 
Feminism (Thousand Oaks, London and New Dehli, Sage).
340
Mazur, A. and Stetson, D. (1995) ‘The Case for State Feminism’ in: D., Stestson and 
A., Mazur (eds) Comparative State Feminism (Thousand Oaks, London and New 
Dehli, Sage).
McAdam, D. (1982) Political Process and the Development o f Black Insurgency, 
1930-1970 (Chicago and London, University of Chicago Press)
McCarthy, J. and Zald, M. (1977) ‘Resource Mobilisation and Social Movements: A 
Partial Theory’, American Journal o f Sociology, 82 (6).
‘Meeting at “Ocean”’, Open Window, issue 42, Feb.-Dee., 1988, (in Greek).
Melucci, A. (1985) ‘The Symbolic Challenge of Contemporary Movements’, Social 
Research, 52 (4).
Melucci, A. (1989) Nomads o f the Present (London, Hutchinson Radius).
Melucci, A. (1996) Challenging Codes: Collective Action in the Information Age, 
(Cambridge and New York, Cambridge University Press)
Melucci, A. and Diani, M. (1992) ‘The Growth of an Autonomous Research Field: 
Social Movement Studies in Italy’, in: Dieter Rucht (ed.) Research on Social 
Movements: The State o f the Art in Western Europe and the U.S.A. (Frankfort, 
Campus).
Men and Women o f Europe in 1987, Supplement No. 26,Commission of the European 
Communities, Brussels.
Mendrinou, M. (2000) Electoral Policy in the Greek Political System: Domestic and 
European Factors, 1974-2000 (Athens, Papazisis - in Greek).
Mihopoulou, A. ‘The First Steps of Feminist Theory in Greece and the Journal 
Skoupa: The Women’s Case (1979-81)’, Dini, No. 8, 1995-96, (in Greek).
Mitchell, J. and Oakley, A. (1986) (eds) What is Feminism? (Oxford, Blackwell)
Modinos, M (1990) ‘The Time of Ruptures and the Claim to Universality’ in George 
Karabelias (ed.), The Greening o f Theory, (Athens, Alternative Publications 
‘Commune’- in Greek)
Modinos, M. (2000), ‘Concerning the Nature of the Ecology’, Politis, No. 7
Modinos, M. ‘The Developmental Myth of the Left’, New Ecology, No 7, May 1985, 
(in Greek)
Modinos, M. ‘The Period of Adulthood’, New Ecology, No 67, May 1990, (in Greek).
Morgan, R. (ed.) (1984) Sisterhood is Global (New York, Anchor Press/ Doubleday).
Morris, A. and Mueller, C. (eds) (1992) Frontiers in Social Movement Theory (New 
Haven and London, Yale University Press).
341
Moschonas, G. (1994) ‘The “Right-Anti-Right” Divisive Split during the Post-Junta 
Period (1974-90)’, in: Nicos Demertzis (ed.) Greek Political Culture in Our Time 
(Athens, Odysseus -  in Greek).
Mouzelis, N. (1995) ‘Greece in the Twenty-first Century: Institutions and Political 
Culture’, in: D. Constas and T. Stavrou (eds.), Greece Prepares for the Twenty- 
First Century, (Washington D.C. and Baltimore, The Woodrow Wilson Centre 
Press and The John Hopkins University Press).
Mouzelis, N. (1995) ‘Modernity, Late Development and Civil Society’ in: John A. 
Hall (ed.), Civil Society: Theory, History, Comparison, (Cambridge, Polity Press)
‘Municipal Elections’, Adesmevti Kinisi Ginaikon, 1986, (in Greek).
Murray, R. (1990) ‘Fordism and Post-Fordism’ in: Stuart Hall and Martin Jacques 
(eds) New Times: The Changing Face o f Politics in the 1990s ((London and New 
York, Verso).
N., P., ‘Panhellenic Meeting of Women in Salonica’, Rupture, No. 16, autumn 1984, 
(in Greek).
National Report o f  Hellas (Ministry to the Presidency, Hellenic Council for Equality, 
1985).
Nature and Ecology, special issue 17 (‘Against Humanism’), Spring 1992, (in Greek).
Neidhardt, F. and Rucht, D. (1992) ‘The Analysis of Social Movements: The State of 
the Art and Some Perspectives for Further Research’, in: Dieter Rucht (ed.) 
Research on Social Movements: The State o f the Art in Western Europe and the 
U.S.A. (Frankfurt, Campus)
Nelson, B. and Chowdhuiy, N. (eds.) (1994) Women and Politics Worldwide (New 
Haven and London, Yale University Press).
Nerantzis, P. ‘The moment of judgment has come also for the ecologists’, Ecotopia, 
issue 11, January 1991, (in Greek).
‘Network of Environmental Organisations: One More Step’, New Ecology, No 146 
Dec 1996, (in Greek).
Nicolacopoulos, I. (1990) ‘The Electoral Influence of Political Forces’, in: C. 
Lirintzis, I. Nicolacopoulos (eds), Elections and Political Parties in the 1980s: 
Developments and Prospects o f the Political System (Athens, Themelio - in Greek)
Nikolaidou, E. ‘Women and the Mediterranean’, Open Window, issue 4, Apr.-March 
1979, (in Greek).
342
Nikolopoulos, F. ‘Social Dynamic and Electoral Processes’, New Ecology, issue 53, 
March 1989, (in Greek).
‘Ninety-One Organisations’, New Ecology, No 65, March 1990, (in Greek).
O’ Neill, M. (1997) Green Parties and Political Change in Contemporary Europe: 
New Politics, Old Predicaments, (Aldershot and Brookfield, Ashgate).
Oberschall, A. (1973) Social Conflicts and Social Movements (Englewood Cliffs, 
N.J., Prentice-Hall)
OECD (1983) Environmental Politics in Greece, (Paris, OECD).
Offe, C. (1985) ‘New Social Movements: Challenging the Boundaries of Institutional 
Politics’, Social Research, 52 (4).
Offen, K. (1992) ‘Defining Feminism: a Comparative Historical Approach’ in Gisela, 
Block and Susan James (eds) Beyond Equality and Difference (London and New 
York, Routledge).
Okin, S. (1998) ‘Gender, the Public, and the Private’ in: Anne Phillips (ed.) Feminism 
and Politics (Oxford, New York, Oxford University Press).
Olofsson, G. (1988) ‘After the Working-Class Movement? An Essay on What’s 
“New” and What’s “Social” in the New Social Movements’, Acta Sociologica, vol. 
31.
Olson, M. (1965) The Logic o f Collective Action (Cambridge, Harvard University 
Press).
Orfanides, C. (ed.) (1987) The Ecological Movement in Greece (Athens, Meta te 
Vroche - in Greek).
Orfanides, C. ‘1975-87: Mobilisations for the Rescue of Delphi: From 
Environmentalism to Political Ecology’, in: Christoforos Orfanides, (Ed.) The 
Ecological Movement in Greece, (Athens, Meta te Vroche - in Greek).
Oyen, E. (ed.) (1990) Comparative Methodology: Theory and Practice in 
International Social Research (London, Sage)
P.N., ‘Why do the Greens in Europe support the immediate recognition of the 
democracy of Skopia under the name Macedonia?’, Ecotopia, No 21, Jan.-Feb. 
1993, (in Greek).
Pakulski, J. (1988) ‘Social Movements in Comparative Perspective’, Research in 
Social Movements, Conflicts and Change, vol. 10.
Pakulski, J. (1991) Social Movements: The Politics o f Moral Protest (Melbourne, 
Longman).
343
Pamphlet by the Committee of the Struggle for the Reform of Family Law, Skoupa, 
No. 4, July 1980, (in Greek).
Pampouki, E. (ed.) (1984) Agenda, Athens (in Greek).
Panagiotopoulou, R. ‘ “Rational” Individualistic Practices in the Context of an 
“Irrational” Political System’, in: C. Lyrintzis, II. Nicolakopoulos, D. Sotiropoulos 
(eds.) Society and Politics: Facets o f the Third Greek Democracy (1974-1994) 
(Athens, Themelio-in Greek).
Panayotopoulou, R. ‘The Lost Honour of Greek Women’s Political Culture: Thoughts 
and Remarks Concerning Women’s Political Culture’, in: N. Demertzis (ed.) (1994) 
Greek Political Culture in Our Time (Athens, Odysseus -in Greek).
Pantelidou-Malouta, M. (1989) ‘Greeks and the Women’s Vote’, Greek Review o f 
Social Research, 73, (in Greek).
Pantelidou-Malouta, M. (1992) Women and Politics: The Political Profile o f Greek 
Women, (Athens, Gutenberg - in Greek).
Papadimitriou, G. (1995) ‘Environmental Constitution’ in: M. Skourtos, K. Sofoulis 
(eds) Environmental Policy in Greece, (Athens, typothito-Giorgos Dardanos -  in 
Greek).
Papadopoulos, P. (1987) ‘For a Greek Political Ecology’ in: Christoforos Orfanides, 
(ed.) The Ecological Movement in Greece, (Athens, Meta te Vroche - in Greek).
Papadopoulos, Y. (1989) ‘Parties, the State and Society in Greece: Continuity within 
Change’, West European Politics, 12 (2).
Papagaroufalis, E. (1990) Greek Women in Politics: Gender Ideology and Practice in 
Neighbourhood Groups and the Family, Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, Columbia 
University.
Papageorge-Limberes, Y. (1992) ‘The Women’s Movement and Greek Politics’, in: J. 
Bystydzienski (ed.), Women Transforming Politics: Worldwide Strategies for 
Empowerment (Bloomington and Indianapolis, Indiana University Press).
Papaioannou, D. ‘How Do Readers Perceive “New Ecology”?’, New Ecology, issue 
35, September 1987, (in Greek).
Papaioannou, D. ‘Let the Amphitheatres Bloom Again’, New Ecology, issue 42, 1988, 
(in Greek).
Papapolimerou, S.,‘Citizens’ Initiatives- City Movements’ in Ecology-City-Self- 
Administration, (Athens: Centre of Ecological Information, 1990 - in Greek).
344
Papaspiliopoulos, S. (1996) ‘New Organisational Formations’ in: Spilios
Papaspiliopoulos, Thymios Papagiannis, Spiros Kouvelis (eds.) The Environment in 
Greece, 1991-1996, (Athens, Bodosaki Foundation - in Greek).
Papaspiliopoulos, S., Papagiannis, Th., Kouvelis, S. (eds.) (1996) The Environment in 
Greece, 1991-1996, (Athens, Bodosaki Foundation - in Greek).
Papayannaki, M. (1981) ‘The Voice of their Master’, Skoupa, issue 5, (in Greek).
Papayannaki, M. and Fragoudaki, A. ‘Does our new room have a balcony with a view 
towards the cliff?’, Dini, No. 4, June 1989, (in Greek).
Papayannaki, M. and Fragoudaki, A. ‘Which Policy for Feminism?’, Dini, No. 3, July 
1988, (in Greek).
Papoutsanis, G. ‘The Peace Movement Nowadays: Splitting or Many-Voiced?’,
Anti, 186, 11 September 1981, (in Greek).
Paraskevopoulos, G. ‘The Municipal Elections and the Ecological Spectrum’, 
Ecological Newspaper, No 39, Nov. 1990, (in Greek).
Parliamentary Questions by the FEAO Ecologists/Alternatives’, Eco-Information, No. 
6, Jan 1991, (in Greek)
Pateman, C. (1970) Participation and Democratic Theory (New York, Melbourne, 
Cambridge University Press).
‘Peace, Disarmament’, Open Window, issue 11, Oct.-Dec. 1980, (in Greek).
Peet, R. (ed.) (1977) Radical Geography: Alternative Viewpoints on Contemporary 
Social Issues (Chicago, Illinois, Maaroufa Press)
Peet, R. and Watts, M. (1998) (eds.) Liberation Ecologies: Environment, 
Development, Social Movements (London and New York, Routledge).
Pelekasi, K. and Skourtos, M., ‘Air Pollution in Greece: An Overview’, Ekistics, 348, 
(1991).
Phillips, A. (1997) ‘What has Socialism to do with Sexual Equality? ’, in: Jane 
Franklin (ed.) Equality (London, Institute for Public Policy Research).
Phillips, A. (1998) ‘Democracy and Representation: Or, Why Should it Matter Who 
our Representatives Are?’ in: Anne Phillips (ed.) Feminism and Politics (Oxford, 
New York, Oxford University Press).
Phillips, A. (ed.) (1998) Feminism and Politics (Oxford, New York, Oxford 
University Press).
Piven, F. and Cloward, R. (1979) Poor People ’s Movements (New York, Vintage 
Books)
345
Piven, F. and Clo ward, R. (1995) ‘Collective Protest: A Critique of Resource
Mobilisation Theory’, in: S., Lyman, (ed.) Social Movements: Critiques, Concepts, 
Case Studies (London, Macmillan).
Plagianakos, P. (1996) ‘Energy’ in: Spilios Papaspiliopoulos, Thymios Papagiannis, 
Spiros Kouvelis (eds.) The Environment in Greece, 1991-1996, (Athens, Bodosaki 
Foundation) (in Greek).
Plotke, D. (1995) ‘What’s so New about New Social Movements?’, in: S., Lyman 
(ed.) (1995) Social Movements: Critiques, Concepts, Case Studies (London, 
Macmillan).
Political Culture in Southern Europe (1985), Research conducted by the National 
Centre for Social Research, Athens (in Greek).
Pollis, A. (1992) ‘Gender and Social Change in Greece: The Role of Women’, in: T. 
Kariotis (ed.), The Greek Socialist Experiment (New York, Pella Publishing).
‘Porno Movies’, Open Window, issue 10, July-Aug.-Sept. 1980, (in Greek).
Poulos, G. ‘1976-1986: Crises and Experiences in the Ecological Movement’ in: 
Christoforos Orfanides, (ed.) The Ecological Movement in Greece, (Athens, Meta 
te Vroche - in Greek).
Prasinos, N. ‘European Elections: Is there any prospect for an active involvement of 
the ecologists? ‘, Ecological Newspaper, issue 11, February-March 1984, (in 
Greek).
Pratt, M. (1998) ‘Where To? What Next?’, in: Sonia E. Alvarez, Evelina Dagnino, 
Arturo Escobar (eds.), Culture o f Politics/Politics o f Culture: Re-Visioning Latin 
American Social Movements (Colorado, Westview Press)
Pridham, G. (1994) ‘National Environmental Policy-Making in the European
Framework: Spain, Greece and Italy in Comparison’, Regional Politics and Policy, 
4(1).
Pridham, G. (1999) ‘Towards Sustainable Tourism in the Mediterranean? Policy and 
Practice in Italy, Spain and Greece’, Environmental Politics, 8 (2).
Pridham, G., Vemey, S. and Konstadakopoulos, D. (1995) ‘Environmental Policy in 
Greece: Evolution, Structures and Process’, Environmental Politics, 4 (2).
Protopsaltis, M. ‘For a Greek Green Organisation... not only for the Elections’, 
Ecological Newspaper, issue 34, February 1989, (in Greek).
Protopsaltis, M. ‘The Organisational Issue is a Political One’, Ecological Newspaper, 
No 36, Oct. 1989, (in Greek).
346
Psacharopoulos, G. (1983) ‘Sex Discrimination in the Greek Labour Market’, Journal 
o f Modern Greek Studies, 1(2).
Psevdonymou, Ch. (1992) ‘Cries and Whispers: On the Lesbian Issue in Greece’, in:
E., Leontidou and R. Ammer (eds) Women’s Greece (Athens, Alternative 
Publications - in Greek).
Psomas, S. ‘Salonica: In support of the Collaboration and the Federation’, New 
Ecology, issue 42, April 1988, (in Greek).
Rape/Press/Rape by the Press, publication by the Mass Media Group of the Women’s 
House of Athens, (in Greek).
Rape: Myth and Content, publication by Women’s House of Athens, 4 December 
1982, (in Greek).
Rapitou, A. ‘Beating has not come from Paradise’, Open Window, issue 7, Dec.-Jan. 
1980, (in Greek).
Raptis, M. (1985) ‘Alternative Movements in Europe’ in: Michalis Raptis, Giorgos 
Karabelias, Nicos Chrysogelos (Eds.) An Alternative-Revolutionary Movement, 
(Athens, Alternative Publications Commune - in Greek).
‘Recent Activities in the Feminist Spectrum’, Skoupa, No. 4, July 1980, (in Greek).
Recycling, issue 18, April/May/June 1996, (in Greek).
Redclift, M. and Benton, T. (eds) (1994) Social Theory and the Global Environment, 
(London and New York, Routledge).
Report on the Conference: ‘Mainstreaming’, European Parliamentary Group of the 
Socialist Party (PASOK), Athens 23 February 1998
Ritzoulis, G. ‘Ecology in Muddy Waters?’, Ecotopia, No 6, Jan. 1990, (in Greek).
Ritzoulis, G. ‘The centre is grey, yet the periphery has become green’, Ecological 
Newspaper, No 39, Nov. 1990, (in Greek).
Ritzoulis, G. ‘The shop-window is in a thousand pieces, but what matter is the 
display’ New Ecology, issue 68, June 1990, (in Greek).
Ritzoulis, G. ‘To participate or not in the political game?’, New Ecology, issue 52, 
February 1989, (in Greek).
Rootes, Chris (1995) ‘Britain: Greens in a Cold Climate’, in: D. Richardson, C.
Rootes (eds) The Green Challenge: The Development o f Green Parties in Europe, 
(London and New York, Routledge).
Rucht, D. (1992) ‘The Study of Social Movements in West Germany: Between 
Activism and Social Science’, in: Dieter Rucht (ed.) Research on Social
347
Movements: The State o f the Art in Western Europe and the U.S.A. (Frankfurt, 
Campus).
Rucht, D. (ed.) (1992) Research on Social Movements: The State o f the Art in Western 
Europe and the U.S.A. (Frankfurt, Campus)
Rupture, No 1-39, June 1979-Jan. 1991, (in Greek)
Samiou, D. (1992) ‘The Feminist Movement in Greece (1860-1960)’, in: E. Leontidou 
and S. Ammer (eds.), Women’s Greece, (Athens, Alternative Publications - in 
Greek).
Sarafis, M. and Eve, M. (1990) Background to Contemporary Greece (London,
Merlin Press).
Sargent, L. (1981) ‘New Left Women and Men: The Honeymoon is Over’ in: L., 
Sargent (ed.) (1981) Women and Revolution: A Discussion o f the Unhappy 
Marriage o f Marxism and Feminism (Boston, South End Press).
Sargent, L. (ed.) (1981) Women and Revolution: A Discussion o f the Unhappy 
Marriage o f  Marxism and Feminism (Boston, South End Press).
Scarbrough, E. (1995) ‘Materialist-Postmaterialist Value Orientations’ in Jan Van 
Deth, Elinor Scarbrough (Ed.) The Impact o f Values, (London, Oxford University 
Press).
Schizas, G. ‘A Contribution to the History of the Greek Ecological Movement’, 
Ekotopia, issue 23, July-August, 1993, (in Greek).
Schizas, G. ‘Let’s start from the beginning’, New Ecology, No 62, Dec. 1989, (in 
Greek).
Schmitter, P. (1981) ‘Interest Intermediation and Regime Govemability in 
Contemporary Western Europe and North America’ in: Suzanne Berger (ed.), 
Organising Interests in Western Europe (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press)
Sfikas, G. (1987) ‘To march forwards, while also looking backwards’ in: Christoforos 
Orfanides, (ed.) The Ecological Movement in Greece, (Athens, Meta te Vroche - in 
Greek).
Simeonidou, C. (1994) ‘The “Incompatibility” of Women’s Family and Professional 
Lives’, Dini, 1 (in Greek).
Simitis, K. (ed.) (1989) The Policy o f Economic Stabilisation (Athens, Gnosi- in 
Greek).
Singh, R. (1998) Gender Autonomy in Western Europe: An Imprecise Revolution, 
(London and New York, MacMillan Press and St. Martin’s Press).
348
‘Single Mothers’, Open Window, issue 32, Jan.-Feb.-March 1986, (in Greek).
Skepers, A. ‘Day of the Mother’, Open Window, issue 4, Apr.-March 1979, (in 
Greek).
Skepers, A. ‘Justice is Male: Interview with Alice Schwartzer’, Open Window, issue 
37, Jan.-Feb. 1987, (in Greek).
Skordoulis, K., ‘Gulf-Crisis: The Unfolding of the Anti-war Movement’ Ecological 
Newspaper, No 39, Nov. 1990, (in Greek).
Skourtos, M., Sofoulis. K. (Eds.) (1995) Environmental Policy in Greece, (Athens, 
typothito-Giorgos Dardanos -  in Greek).
Slater, D. (1994) ‘Power and Social Movements in the other Occident: Latin America 
in an International Context’, Latin American Perspectives, 21 (2).
Slater, D. (1998) ‘Rethinking the Spatialities of Social Movements: Questions of 
(B)orders, Culture and Politics in Global Times’, in: Sonia E. Alvarez, Evelina 
Dagnino, Arturo Escobar (eds.), Culture o f Politics/Politics o f Culture: Re- 
Visioning Latin American Social Movements (Colorado, Westview Press)
Smelser, N. (1962) Theory o f Collective Behaviour, (London, Routledge & Kegan 
Paul)
‘Social and Political Institutions’, Deltio, No 9, Feb-March, 1989, (in Greek).
Sommerville, J. (1997) ‘Social Movement Theory, Women and the Question of 
Interests’, Sociology, 31 (4).
Spanou, C. (1995) ‘Public Administration and Environment: The Greek Case’ in: M. 
Skourtos, K. Sofoulis (Eds.) Environmental Policy in Greece, (Athens, typothito- 
Giorgos Dardanos -  in Greek).
Speech by Margarita Papandreou at the Conference ‘Woman and Local Self- 
Management’, Open Window, issue 35, Sept.-Oct. 1986, (in Greek).
Stamiris, E. (1986) ‘The Women’s Movement in Greece’, New Left Review, no 158.
Stanley, L. and Wise, S. (1983) Breaking Out Again (London and New York, 
Routledge and Kegan Paul pic.)
Stetson, D. and Mazur, A. (1995) (eds) Comparative State Feminism, (London, Sage).
Stevis, D., ‘Political Ecology in the Semi-Periphery: Lessons from Greece’, 
International Journal o f Urban and Regional Research, 17, (1), 1993.
Strathem, M. (1996) ‘Gender: Division or Comparison ?’ inNickie Charles and 
Felicia Hughes-Freeland (eds) Practicing Feminism: Identity, Difference, Power 
(London and New York, Routledge).
349
Tarrow, S. (1988) ‘National Politics and Collective Action: Recent Theory and 
Research in Western Europe and the U.S.’, Annual Review o f Sociology, vol. 1.
Tarrow, S. (1989) Struggle, Politics, and Reform: Collective Action, Social
Movements, and Cycles o f Protest, Western Societies Program? Occasional paper, 
No.21, (Ithaca, N.Y., Cornell University).
Tarrow, S. (1992) ‘Comparing Social Movement Participation in Western Europe and 
the United States: Problems, Uses and a Proposal for Synthesis’, in: Dieter Rucht 
(ed.) Research on Social Movements: The State o f the Art in Western Europe and 
the U.S.A. (Frankfurt, Campus).
Tarrow, S. (1994) Power in Movement: Social Movements, Collective Action and 
Politics (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press)
Taylor, V. and Whittier, N. (1995) ‘Analytical Approaches to Social Movement 
Culture: The Culture of the Women’s Movement’ in H. Johnston, B. Klandermans 
(eds) Social Movements and Culture (London, UCL Press).
‘The 8th of March’, Sfigga, No. 1, July 1980, (in Greek).
‘The Family in Greece’, Open Window, issue 7, Dec-Jan 1980, (in Greek).
‘The Founding of the Federation’, Ecological Newspaper, issue 36, October 1989, (in 
Greek).
‘The Magazine’, Gaia, No. 1, June 1983, (in Greek).
‘The Participation of Women in Politics and Public Life’, Open Window, issue 8, 
Feb.-March 1980, (in Greek).
‘The Relation between the Sexes is “Predefined”’, Open Window, issue 14, July-Sept. 
1981, (in Greek).
‘The Union of Greek Women: A Feminist-Socialist Organisation’, Central Proposal 
distributed at the EGE’s First Panhellenic Conference, 26-28 Nov. 1982 in Athens, 
(in Greek).
‘The Woman’s Question in Greece’, Open Window, issue 7, Dec-Jan 1980, (in 
Greek).
Tilly, Ch. (1978) From Mobilisation to Revolution (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley)
To the Women, pamphlet by the Kifissia-Athens branch of the EGE (in Greek).
Tobias, S. (1997) Faces o f Feminism: An Activist's Reflections on the Women’s 
Movement (Boulder, Colorado, Westview Press).
‘Together for Peace’, Open Window, issue 32, Jan.-Feb.-March 1986, (in Greek).
350
Tokar, B. (1991) ‘Green Defence’, in: A. Dobson, (ed.) The Green Reader, (London, 
Andre Deutsch, 1991).
Touraine, A. (1981) The Voice and the Eye: An Analysis o f Social Movements 
(Cambridge, Cambridge University Press)
Touraine, A. (1985) ‘An Introduction to the Study of Social Movements’, Social 
Research, 52, (4).
Touraine, A. (1988) The Return o f the Actor (Minneapolis, University of Minnesota 
Press)
Touraine, A. (1990) ‘The Idea of Revolution’ in: M. Featherstone (ed.) Global 
Culture: Nationalism, Globalisation and Modernity (London, California, Sage).
Town, S. and Pavlos K., ‘The Ecologists and Europe’, New Ecology, issue 59, 
September 1989, (in Greek).
Tremopoulos, M. (1992) The Ecological Movement in Greece and the Balkans: 
History and Perspectives, M.A. Thesis, Goddard College, U.S.A.
Tremopoulos, M. ‘For A Green Federal Political Body’, Ecotopia, No 3-4, Sep. 1989, 
(in Greek).
Tremopoulos, M. ‘Greek-Turkish Relations: “National Policy” or Development of an 
Anti-war Consciousness’, I  Refuse, No. 3, July 1987, (in Greek).
Tremopoulos, M. ‘Solidarity to the Minority’, Ecotopia, No 7, March 1990, (in 
Greek).
Tremopoulos, M. ‘The Native Political Ecology’, Ekotopia, issue 1, April-May 1989, 
(in Greek).
Tremopoulos, M. ‘Was Sisyphus an Ecologist? ‘ Ecotopia, No 11, Jan. 1991, (in 
Greek).
Tsantilis, C. ‘Larissa: Independent Self-Administration’ in: Christoforos Orfanides, 
(ed.) The Ecological Movement in Greece, (Athens, Meta te Vroche - in Greek).
Tsavides, K. ‘Federation of Ecological and Alternative Organisations and the Social - 
Movement Spectrum’, Flowers o f Evil, No 5, Spring 1990, (in Greek).
Tsoucalas, C. (1983) Social Development and the State: The Formation o f the Public 
Sphere in Greece (Athens, Themelio - in Greek).
Turner, B. (1990) ‘The Two Faces of Sociology: Global or National’ in: M. 
Featherstone (ed.) Global Culture: Nationalism, Globalisation and Modernity 
(London, California, Sage).
351
Valiente, C. (1995) ‘The Power of Persuasion: The Instituto de la Mujer in Spain’ in: 
D., Stestson and A., Mazur (eds) Comparative State Feminism (Thousand Oaks, 
London and New Dehli, Sage).
Varika, E. (1992) ‘Facing Institutional Modernisation: A difficult Feminism’, in: E., 
Leontidou and R. Ammer (eds) Women’s Greece (Athens, Alternative Publications 
- in Greek).
Varikas, E. (1993), ‘Gender and National Identity in fin  de siecle Greece’, Gender and 
History, 5(2).
Vervenioti, T. (1992) ‘Greek Women before the War, During the Occupation, and the 
Civil War’, in: E. Leontidou and S. Ammer (eds.), Women's Greece, (Athens, 
Alternative Publications - in Greek).
Vervenioti, T. (1993) ‘The Institutionalisation by the Resistance Movement of 
Women’s Right to Vote (1941-1944)’, Dini, 6 (in Greek).
Voeerman, G. (1995) ‘The Netherlands: Loosing Colours, Turning Green’ in: D. 
Richardson, C. Rootes (eds) The Green Challenge: The Development o f Green 
Parties in Europe, (London and New York, Routledge).
Voiklis, G. (1992) Ecologism, (Athens, Alternative Publications - in Greek).
Vryonis, S. (ed.) (1991) Greece on the Road to Democracy: From the Junta to 
PASOK, (New York, Aristide D. Caratzas).
Warren, K. (ed.) Ecological Feminism, (London, New York, 1994).
We Say Yes to Legal Abortion, EGE pamphlet (in Greek).
Week o f Peace and Disarmament: 24-30 October 1987, EGE pamphlet, (in Greek).
Wignaraja P. (1993) New Social Movements in the South: Empowering the People 
(London and New Jersey, Zed Books).
‘Woman and Mass Media’, Open Window, issue 31, Oct.-Nov.-Dec. 1985, (in Greek).
‘Woman and the European Community’, Open Window, issue 6, Sept.-Oct.- Nov.
1979, (in Greek).
Women and Men o f Europe in 1983, Supplement No. 16,Commission of the European 
Communities, Brussels.
Women in Statistics (1984), Supplement No. 14 to Women o f Europe, Commission of 
the European Communities, Brussels.
‘Women Present at the Trial of Kolitsopoulou’ by the Women’s House and Women’s 
Bookstore (Athens), Dini, No. 1, December 1986, (in Greek).
‘Women, Reforms and Political Change’, Gaia, No. 1, June 1983, (in Greek).
352
‘Women’s Bookstore in Athens’, Gaia, No. 2, 1984, (in Greek).
‘Women’s Groups’, To Milo kai to Fidi apo ti Skopia tis Evas, No. 1, 1982, (in 
Greek).
‘Women’s Problems and the Struggle for their Solution within the Context of the 
forthcoming National Elections’, Open Window, issue 14, July-Sept. 1981, (in 
Greek).
‘Women’s Rights on Trial in the European Parliament’, Open Window, issue 12, Jan.- 
March 1981, (in Greek).
‘Women’s Studies at the Universities’, Athens daily newspaper Eleftherotypia, 24 
Oct. 1993, (in Greek).
Women’s Union o f Greece, EGE pamphlet (in English).
Women, pamphlet published by the Committee of Struggles for the Reform of Family 
Law. See ‘Appendix’, Skoupa, issue 4, July 1980, (in Greek).
Wright, E. (ed.) (1989) The Debate on Classes (London, Verso Press).
Yotopoulos-Marangopoulos, A. (ed.) (1994) Women's Rights: Human Rights, 
(Athens, Estia).
Young, I. (1981) ‘Beyond the Unhappy Marriage: A Critique of the Dual Systems 
Theory’, in: Lydia Sargent (ed.) (1981) Women and Revolution: A Discussion o f the 
Unhappy Marriage o f Marxism and Feminism (Boston, South End Press).
Young, I. (1998) ‘Polity and Group Difference: A Critique of the Ideal of Universal 
Citizenship’ in: Anne Phillips (ed.) Feminism and Politics (Oxford, New York, 
Oxford University Press).
Zald, M. (1992) ‘Looking Backward to Look Forward: Reflections on the Past and 
Future of the Resource Mobilisation Research Program’ in: Aldon Morris and Carol 
McClurg Mueller (eds.) Frontiers in Social Movement Theory (New Haven and 
London, Yale University Press).
Zald, M. (1992) ‘The Continuing Vitality of Resource Mobilisation Theory: Response 
to Herbert Kitschelt’s Critique’, in: Dieter Rucht (ed.) Research on Social 
Movements: The State o f the Art in Western Europe and the U.S.A. (Frankfurt, 
Campus).
Zald, M. and McCarthy, J. (1987) Social Movements in an Organisational Society, 
(New Brunswick, New Jersey, Transaction Books),
Zirakzadeh, C. (1997) Social Movements in Politics: A Comparative Study (New 
York, Longman)
353
